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I 
 
Abstract 
 
Qabil Ajmeri (an Urdu poet) once wrote:  
 
Translation: Time nurtures for years  
                    Accident is never sudden 
Same is true for disasters; they just don’t happen suddenly. It is our actions (or 
inaction in certain cases) over the years that turn a hazard into a disaster. 
Development policies, governance system, disaster management system, poverty, 
and level of hazard are some of the most important factors that contribute towards 
disaster vulnerability. Most of the developing countries suffer higher disaster losses 
(as compared to the developed countries) due to their inability to properly address 
these factors. Societies need to have better development policies, good 
governance, efficient disaster management system, and improved livelihoods to 
minimise disaster vulnerability.     
Conducted from the positionality (Robinson 2014) of a victim of the earthquake and 
an important functionary of the post-2005 earthquake reconstruction programme in 
AJK, this research is an auto-ethnographic study in order to understand how 
societies become vulnerable to natural disasters and what role post-disaster 
housing reconstruction can play in addressing this vulnerability. By loosely following 
Blaikie et al.’s (1994) ‘Pressure and Release’ (PAR) model and Collins’ (2009) 
“disaster and development approach”, this research attempts to find what factors 
made people vulnerable to seismic hazard in AJK and turned an otherwise not so 
big Mw=7.6 earthquake into one of the deadliest environmental disasters in the 
world. The performance and impact of the post-2005 earthquake housing 
reconstruction program is evaluated in this study by using the mixed-methods 
research approach. The study finds that the sustainability of the seismic resistant 
construction and continuation of the pre-earthquake vulnerability factors are still 
issues. Till the time issues mentioned in this study are not addressed properly, 
communities in general and the study area in particular will remain vulnerable to 
environmental disasters. 
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however, can also relate to hazardous events that do not 
result in the serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or society. (UNISDR) 
Environmental Vulnerability The type of vulnerability which is created 
mainly due to degradation of the natural environment 
e.g. deforestation   
EQAA  Earthquake Affected Area 
ERRA  Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority 
Gazetted Officer An officer of the government in Pakistan or PAK whose 
appointment is notified in the official Gazette  
Geological Vulnerability    The type of vulnerability which prevailed due to 
geological factors, it especially relates to exposure to 
seismic hazard   
GoAJK  Government of Azad Jammu & Kashmir 
GoP  Government of Pakistan 
Hazard A process, phenomenon or human activity that may 
cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property 
damage, social and economic disruption or 
environmental degradation. (UNISDR) 
Environmental hazards  may include chemical, natural and biological 
hazards. They can be created by environmental 
degradation or physical or chemical pollution in the air, 
water and soil. However, many of the processes and 
phenomena that fall into this category may be termed 
drivers of hazard and risk rather than hazards in 
themselves, such as soil degradation, deforestation, loss 
of biodiversity, salinization and sea-level rise. (UNISDR) 
Geological or geophysical hazards  originate from internal earth 
processes. Examples are earthquakes, volcanic activity 
and emissions, and related geophysical processes such 
as mass movements, landslides, rockslides, surface 
collapses and debris or mud flows. Hydrometeorological 
factors are important contributors to some of these 
processes. Tsunamis are difficult to categorize: although 
they are triggered by undersea earthquakes and other 
geological events, they essentially become an oceanic 
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process that is manifested as a coastal water-related 
hazard.  (UNISDR) 
Gohaal A cattle shed along with a house in rural areas of Jammu 
& Kashmir region 
Hazardous event  The manifestation of a hazard in a particular place during 
a particular period of time. (UNISDR) 
HFIR   Housing Foundation of Islamic Revolution 
Iftari   Breaking of the fast by the Muslims in the evening 
Imam A Muslim title for a person who leads prayers, especially 
in a mosque. 
KPK Khyber Pukhtoon Khawa (a province in Pakistan formerly 
known as NWFP) 
Kotha An unreinforced masonry structure comprising of one of 
more rooms used for living purposes mainly in Jammu & 
Kashmir region  
Larri  A multi-storey wooden house traditionally built in Jammu 
& Kashmir region  
LSO Local Support Organization  
LUP Cell Land Use Plan Cell 
LVU  Land Verification Unit 
Marla  An Indian unit of area equal to 272 ft2.   
Mitigation  The lessening or minimizing of the adverse impacts of a 
hazardous event. (UNISDR) 
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding 
MR  Muzaffarabad Rural 
MU  Muzaffarabad Urban 
NADRA  National Database & Registration Authority 
Nala  A watercourse or nullah   
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
Numberdar A hereditary title for a village leader appointed by the 
government in the Indian Subcontinent  
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ODR  Owner Driven Reconstruction 
PAK   Pakistan Administrated Kashmir 
Pakka/Pukka Literally means strong/solid/ripe. Also means a type of 
building usually made with burnt bricks/dressed 
stones/concrete blocks and cement. It may or may not 
be a frame structure 
Patwari An official of the land administration department (called 
Revenue Department) in the Indian Sub-continent who 
has the land record of a particular area and is 
responsible for matters relating to land administration 
and land revenue 
Physical Vulnerability The type of vulnerability which prevailed due to 
physical factors. It is different from environmental 
vulnerability and geological vulnerability in the sense that 
it relates mainly to vulnerability of the housing stock 
caused by poor quality of construction 
PKR   Pakistan Rupee 
P&DD  Planning & Development Department  
PO   Partner Organization 
Preservation Zone Areas in Muzaffarabad and Bagh cities declared 
unsuitable for future urbanization due to potential 
environmental hazards 
Promotion Zone An area safe from natural environmental hazards such 
as landslides and floods in earthquake affected urban 
areas of AJK designated for future urban development  
PSI  Per Square Inch  
Qiyamt  The Day of Judgment in Arabic/Urdu language 
RCC  Reinforced Concrete Cement 
Reconstruction The medium-and long-term rebuilding and sustainable 
restoration of resilient critical infrastructures, services, 
housing, facilities and livelihoods required for the full 
functioning of a community or a society affected by a 
disaster, aligning with the principles of sustainable 
development and “build back better”, to avoid or reduce 
future disaster risk. (UNISDR)   
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Recovery The restoring or improving of livelihoods and health, as 
well as economic, physical, social, cultural and 
environmental assets, systems and activities, of a 
disaster-affected community or society, aligning with the 
principles of sustainable development and “build back 
better”, to avoid or reduce future disaster risk. (UNISDR) 
 
Red Zone  Areas within 500 meters of fault lines, landslide areas, 
and land pulverised due to seismic activity in 2005 
earthquake in Muzaffarabad city   
Rehabilitation The restoration of basic services and facilities for the 
functioning of a community or a society affected by a 
disaster. (UNISDR) 
Resilience  The ability of a system, community or society exposed to 
hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, 
transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a 
timely and efficient manner, including through the 
preservation and restoration of its essential basic 
structures and functions through risk management. 
(UNISDR) 
 
Response Actions taken directly before, during or immediately after 
a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, 
ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence 
needs of the people affected. (UNISDR) 
Retrofitting  Reinforcement or upgrading of existing structures to 
become more resistant and resilient to the damaging 
effects of hazards. (UNISDR) 
SERRA  State Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation 
Agency 
SIDA  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
Socio-economic Vulnerability The type of vulnerability which is created 
mainly by socio-economic factors such as poverty, high 
population density, high population growth rate, poor 
living conditions, lack of voice, lack of stable local 
political structures  
SRTs Seismic Resistant Techniques  
Structural and non-structural measures  Structural measures are any 
physical construction to reduce or avoid possible impacts 
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of hazards, or the application of engineering techniques 
or technology to achieve hazard resistance and 
resilience in structures or systems. Non-structural 
measures are measures not involving physical 
construction which use knowledge, practice or 
agreement to reduce disaster risks and impacts, in 
particular through policies and laws, public awareness 
raising, training and education. (UNISDR) 
Union Council Basic administrative unit of the local government system 
in Pakistan. A Union Council consists of many villages 
VRC  Village Reconstruction Committee 
Vulnerability The conditions determined by physical, social, economic 
and environmental factors or processes which increase 
the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or 
systems to the impacts of hazards. (UNISDR) 
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To those who lost their lives in the 8th October 2005 Kashmir earthquake 
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Prologue 
 
A man's house burns down. The smoking wreckage represents only a ruined 
home that was dear through years of use and pleasant associations. By and 
by, as the days and weeks go on, first he misses this, then that, then the 
other thing. And when he casts about for it he finds that it was in that house. 
Always it is an essential – there was but one of its kind. It cannot be 
replaced. It was in that house. It is irrevocably lost... It will be years before 
the tale of lost essentials is complete, and not till then can he truly know the 
magnitude of his disaster.  
Mark Twain  
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Soliloquy  
I was born and bred in Azad Jammu & Kashmir, a small hilly semi-
autonomous region in the north of Pakistan. After completing my education I 
took on a dream job of millions in the country, within the civil service. I 
started my career as Assistant Commissioner in 1991. Within 10 years I was 
promoted to the rank of Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner is 
a unique entity in the governance system of Pakistan and other Indian 
subcontinent countries. Introduced by the British during the Raj, the office of 
the Deputy Commissioner wielded immense power and authority to control 
and run India (Kalia 2013; Tanwir & Fennell 2013). The Deputy 
Commissioner was considered to be the direct representative of the British 
Raj in the District. Initially, only white British citizens were appointed Deputy 
Commissioners, however later on native educated people could also join the 
highly prestigious Indian Civil Service (ICS) through a highly competitive 
examination. This legacy continued even after the British left the 
subcontinent in 1947 and two independent states of Pakistan and India were 
created. The Indian Civil Service (ICS) was transformed into Civil Service of 
Pakistan (CSP) and later into District Management Group (DMG), but the 
office of the Deputy Commissioner survived in Pakistan. Though the power 
and authority of the Deputy Commissioner has eroded to a great extent after 
independence in 1947, especially in 1970s (Shafqat 1999; Tanwir & Fennell 
2010), it is still considered the representative of the government in the district 
and is the most important and influential office in a District.  
It was in the backdrop of this great legacy that I was working as Deputy 
Commissioner in Muzaffarabad District. On personal level I tried to match my 
lifestyle with the grandeur of the office; wearing crisp suites and ties, 
polished shoes, living in a police guarded huge official house where national 
flag was hoisted every day, and, armed police guard with me in the flag 
hoisting official car.  
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1.2. Fast Forward 
On 8th October 2005 early in the morning everything came down with a bang. 
My grand house came down in seconds; we were very lucky to have crawled 
out of the rubble only slightly injured. There I was standing on the rubble of 
the house, bare footed wearing sleeping clothes with all my expensive suites 
and boots buried under the rubble. My driver retrieved his old sandals from 
the rubble of his room and gave them to me to wear; and I spent next few 
days in these sleeping clothes and my driver’s old sandals doing all my 
official work. My family spent the whole day under the open sky near the 
rubble of the house without anything to eat or drink. Our chef was there, but 
there was nothing to cook. The night followed with heavy rain and extreme 
cold. My family was lucky to find some space in a neighbour’s tent where 
many other families were already crammed. This was a humbling, if not 
humiliating, situation on a personal level.    
Immediately after the earthquake telephones stopped working, the wireless 
system became silent after a few hours due to power outages. There were 
some bulldozers in Muzaffarabad but their operators had run away to see 
their families. There was utter chaos. I immediately started visiting different 
accessible parts of the city. Wherever I went people, including my very close 
friends, expected me to do something to retrieve their loved ones from tons 
of rubble, being the most powerful man in the district. The biggest hospital of 
the city had become a heap of debris along with some staff and patients. 
There were many schools where hundreds of children were buried, their 
parents wailing outside requesting me to do something. It was then that I 
realized how useless my authority and power was; it was a moment of 
epiphany for me (Bowen 1981; McDonald 2008).  
Over the next few days we continued to count the death toll. I had lost many 
dear friends and their families. I still remember that when people saw each 
other they would not talk but gesture with their fingers how many people 
were killed in their family; there were very few lucky, like myself, who hadn’t 
lost any. I saw so much death, destruction and misery in those days that life 
itself lost its meaning at one point. 
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The experience of the earthquake and subsequent events are the main 
motivation behind my research project (see section 4.2).  
1.3. Research Aim 
The aim of the research is to assess Pakistan government’s initiative of 
“Owner-driven” housing reconstruction in Azad Jammu & Kashmir in the 
aftermath of the 8th October 2005 earthquake, to identify lessons learnt and 
to make recommendations for sustainability and transferability of owner 
driven reconstruction (ODR).  The study also aims to contribute towards the 
wider academic and policy-focused body of knowledge on the subject of 
disaster management and post-earthquake private housing reconstruction 
programme in Azad Jammu & Kashmir in particular. 
1.4. Research Questions  
In Robinson’s (2014) words my life story has provided me a research topic 
which is closer to my heart and very clear in my head. My positionality, being 
from the same country and working in the earthquake affected areas for a 
long time before and after the earthquake, has given me the advantage to 
know the subject under research and what questions to frame (Finlay 2002, 
p. 213; Lofland & Lofland 1995, cited in Robinson 2014, p. 34). I have framed 
the following research questions to strive to develop a new way towards 
understanding the phenomenon of housing, in post-disaster situations 
(Heidegger, 1977) especially: 
1. What factors made people vulnerable to seismic hazard in AJK? 
2. How successfully has the Government of Pakistan implemented the 
housing reconstruction policy in the aftermath of 2005 earthquake and 
has this policy been successful in geography, economic, and social 
contexts? 
3. After the completion of the housing reconstruction programme: 
a. To what extent are seismic-resistant construction techniques 
sustainable, especially in rural areas? 
b. How far has ODR been able to reduce/address pre-earthquake 
vulnerability issues in the study area? 
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c. To what extent has the implementation of the ODR re-worked 
family and household structures and patterns of land 
ownership? 
4. What lessons can be learnt from the Pakistan experience and what are 
the recommendations for transferability/replication of this approach to 
future disaster events? 
1.5. Pakistan – A Disaster Prone Country 
Pakistan is highly vulnerable to many environmental and human-induced 
disasters. Earthquakes, floods, landslides, droughts, torrential rains, tropical 
cyclones, extreme temperatures, major traffic accidents, and more recently 
terrorism, are recurrent phenomenon. Poor construction practices, population 
growth, poverty, environmental degradation, poor agricultural practices, weak 
early-warning systems, lack of awareness and education, weak governance 
and absence of comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) policies are 
some of the factors responsible for vulnerability to environmental disasters 
(Arshad & Shafi 2010; NDMA 2011, 2013). Environmental disasters have 
caused exceptionally high losses to the country. Table 1.1 shows that floods 
and earthquakes have caused the most damage in every respect. Though 
earthquakes and floods are the two most devastating disasters, due to 
relevance with my research, I will only discuss the seismic hazard in this 
chapter.  
 
1Table 1.1 Losses due to environmental disasters in Pakistan (1987-2011) 
 
         (Source: NDMA 2011, p. 5) 
5 
 
1.5.1. Seismic Hazard in Pakistan  
Pakistan is located at the collision of the Indian and the Eurasian plates 
(Avouac et al. 2006; ERRA 2006; Kumar et al. 2001; Sato et al. 2007; 
Szeliga et al. 2010; Valdiya 1980). The boundary between these plates forms 
the Himalayan arc that extends approximately 2,500 km across the 
continent. Three major thrust faults strike the length of the Himalayan arc 
(Fig. 1.1).  
 
 
1.Figure 1.1 Tectonic setting of Pakistan                         (Source: Avouac et al. 2006, p. 515) 
 
The Main Central Thrust (MCT) is located along the southern edge of the 
High Himalaya and is generally inactive. The Main Boundary Thrust (MBT) 
marks the southern edge of the Lesser Himalaya. The Himalayan Frontal 
Thrust (HFT) located at the northern limit of the Indian Plate and is the most 
active of the three faults (ibid). This area is one of the most seismically active 
in the world. Countries around Pakistan (e.g. Afghanistan, Iran, China, and 
India) have been subject to frequent major earthquakes. There have been 
some major earthquakes in Pakistan in the past; for example 1935 Quetta 
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earthquake, 1945 Makran coast earthquake, 1974 Pattan earthquake, and, 
2005 Kashmir earthquake (NDMA 2011; NESPAK 2006). The seismic 
hazard is present almost throughout Pakistan (Figure 1.2).  
High seismic hazard coupled with large population, a high rate of 
urbanization, faulty land use planning, poor building control mechanisms, 
inadequate infrastructure, and poverty will continue to pose a major threat in 
future also (Ainuddin et al. 2014; Ambraseys & Bilham 2011; Mona Liza 
2009; Peiris et al. 2008; Szeliga et al. 2010). Aging building stock in cities 
like Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi are a major hazard for 
future. A recent media report aired after the 26th October 2015 Mw=7.5 Hindu 
Kush earthquake revealed that there were at least 10,000 old and dilapidated 
buildings in the walled city of Lahore which were still inhabited by people and 
could collapse in case of an earthquake (Geo News, 27th October 2015). 
 
2 Figure 1.2 Seismic zoning map of Pakistan                              (Source: NDMA 2009, pp. 6) 
1.6. The Study Area 
The 2005 earthquake hit Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Jammu & 
Kashmir (aka AJK/AJ&K) where my research is focused. Many people might 
find the term Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK/AJ&K) and its relationship with 
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Pakistan confusing. So I will briefly explain the geographical, historical, and 
constitutional position of AJK in below sections.   
1.7. Jammu and Kashmir 
Jammu and Kashmir is the name given to the northern most state in the 
Indian Sub-continent stretching from the east of the river Indus to the west of 
the river Ravi (Ray 1969). According to Gilani (2007, p.1) the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir comprises of ‘Gilgit Wazarat, Ladakh Wazarat comprising of 
districts of Ladakh, Kargil, and Baltistan. Kashmir Division comprising of the 
Valley of Kashmir and Muzaffarabad, and Jammu division or province 
consisting of the rest of the territories of the State, including Poonch, which 
of course was a sort of princely state within the State of Jammu and Kashmir’ 
(Figure 1.3). The Jammu & Kashmir state ‘is bounded by China in the north 
and east, Afghanistan in the North West and Pakistan in the west. It is only in 
the south that the state is linked with the rest of India. Here the state 
boundaries of Himachal Pradesh (south) and Panjab (south–west) touch the 
southern boundary of Jammu and Kashmir’ (Chaudhary 2005, no 
pagination). 
The total area of the State is controversial. According to Gilani (2007, p. 3) 
India claims that the area of the State, as bequeathed by the Maharaja in 
1947, was 86,000 sq. miles while Pakistan claims that it was 84,000 sq. 
miles. Saraf (1977) quotes the figure of 82,258 sq. miles.  
Kashmir is an old state having history of conquests, oppressive rules, and 
environmental disasters. In about 5,000 B.C. Sri Ram Chander of Ceylon 
established the early Hindu kingdom in Kashmir. The Buddhists conquered 
Kashmir under Ashoka in about 250 B.C. The Tartar chiefs subjugated 
Kashmir from about 150-100 B.C. The Huns raided it in the first half of the 6th 
Century. Buddhism disappeared in Kashmir by 638 A.D. (Alexander 1995; 
Bhattacharjea 1994; Lal 1995; Parmu 1969; Ray 1996; Schoflied 1996).  
The Muslims under Mahmood Ghaznavi raided Kashmir in 1015. Since then 
the Muslims started to rise to power and established Muslim rule in Kashmir 
for the next 500 years – 1320 to 1819 (Parmu 1969, p.1). This period can be 
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loosely divided into three eras: the Independent Sultans (1320-1586), the 
Mughals (1586-1753), and the Pathans (1753-1819) (ibid). Sultan Zain-ul-
Abidin aka Badshah, the most famous Kashmiri ruler of the first era, came to 
power in 1423 and peacefully ruled for 50 years. The Mughal king Akbar 
conquered Kashmir in 1586 (Gilani 2007; Lal 1995; Kapur 1976; Mahajan 
1982). This was the end of the rule of the local Kashmiris for times to come 
and establishment of tyrannical rules (Parmu 1969). The Afghans conquered 
Kashmir under Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1753 (Lal 1995; Schoflied 1996) and 
continued the tyrannies of the Mughal era.  
The Sikhs under Maharaja Ranjit Singh defeated Afghans in 1819 and 
captured Kashmir and continued the legacy of repressive rule (Gilani 2007; 
Lal 1995; Saraf 1977; Schoflied 1996). 
The British defeated the Sikhs in the Punjab in the battle of Sobroan in 1846 
and received Kashmir as part of war indemnity. The British sold Kashmir and 
its adjoining areas – the whole tract eastward of the Indus River and 
westward of the Ravi River – to Maharaja Gulab Sigh for 7.5 million rupees 
under the infamous Treaty of Amritsar on 16th March 1846 (Bazaz 1976; 
Gilani 2007; Lal 1995; Khan 2007; Panikkar 1995; Saraf 1977; Schoflied 
1996; Singh 1996). This established the Dogra rule in Jammu and Kashmir - 
one of the most tyrannical rules in the history of Jammu and Kashmir - until 
1947 when the British left India and two separate countries – India and 
Pakistan – came into being (Bazaz 1976; Bhattacharjea 1994; Gilani 2007; 
Khan 2007; Schoflied 1996; Suharwardy 1983). 
Jammu, Rajuori, Poonch, and Gilgit-Baltistan provinces became part of the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir in different eras either through conquest or 
treaties (Gilani 2007), hence the name Jammu and Kashmir.    
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Figure 1.3 Map of Jammu and Kashmir.                                               (Source: UN 2015) 
1.7.1. Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK/AJ&K) 
The partition of India was announced by the British on 3rd June 1947 (Gilani 
2007; Saraf 1977; Schoflied 1996; Singh 1996). According to the partition 
plan, the rulers of the princely states of the Indian Dominion were free to join 
India or Pakistan while considering geographical placement, economic 
compulsions and wishes of the majority of the people (ibid). The majority of 
the population of Jammu and Kashmir was Muslim (95% in Kashmir Valley 
and 61% in Jammu were Muslims according to 1941 census (Bhattacharjea 
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1994; Saraf 1977)) and wanted to join Pakistan. But the non-Muslim 
Maharaja was reluctant to decide in favour of either India or Pakistan (which 
effectively meant end to his rule) and was more inclined to remain 
independent and perpetuate his rule over Jammu and Kashmir (Alexander 
1995; Bhattacharjea 1994; Saraf 1977). Being tired of the tyrannical rule and 
encouraged by the wave of independence in the Sub-continent the Kashmiris 
rose against the Maharaja (Singh 1996). Violence broke out in the Poonch 
and Mirpur areas which the Dogra troops tried to quell by force. This led to 
armed struggle by the people of these areas; which was later joined by the 
armed Pathan clansmen from the tribal areas of the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) (Gilani 2007; Khan 2007).  
A substantial portion of Poonch, Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, and Gilgit-Baltistan 
(called Northern Areas) was ‘liberated’ from the Maharaja’s troops (Gilani 
2007; Saraf 1977; Suharwardy 1983). An interim revolutionary government 
was established in these areas called the Azad (independent) Government of 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir (AJK/AJ&K) on 24th October 1947 (Gilani 
2007; Schoflied 1996). Seeing his rule slipping from his hands, the Maharaja 
hastily and secretly signed a shady agreement (facilitated by the British 
Viceroy) called ‘The Instrument of Accession’ with the newly formed Indian 
government on 27th October 1947 (Gilani 2007; Suharwardy 1983) or on 26th 
October 1947 as claimed by Bhattacharjea (1994). The Indian forces landed 
in Kashmir on the same day and a war broke out between India and 
Pakistan. The Pakistani troops along with local Kashmiri fighters and Pathan 
tribesmen continued to advance towards the capital Srinagar seeing which 
India went to the UN Security Council on 1st January 1948 and agreed to 
hold a free plebiscite and let the people of Jammu and Kashmir decide to join 
India or Pakistan (Gilani 2007; Schoflied 1996). A ceasefire was declared 
between the two sides and a ‘standstill’ position still maintains (i.e. the major 
part of the Jammu & Kashmir is controlled by India, Azad Jammu & Kashmir 
has semi-autonomous status in Pakistan and Gilgit & Baltistan have special 
constitutional status within the federation of Pakistan). Despite many UN 
Security Council resolutions and demands by the Kashmiris the issue 
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remains unresolved to this day and has become a bone of contention 
between India and Pakistan resulting in three wars (ibid).         
Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) is situated in the north of Pakistan between 
longitude 73°-75° and latitude 33°-36° (Figure 2.5). The total area of AJK is 
5,136 square miles and the population is approximately 3.9 million (P&DD 
2010). The topography of AJK is mainly hilly having mountain valleys in the 
north and plains in the south. The Jhelum, Neelum and Poonch are the main 
rivers. The climate is sub-tropical highland type with an average yearly 
rainfall of 1300 mm. The elevation from sea level ranges from 360 meters in 
the south to 6325 meters in the north. The snow line is around 1200 meters 
in winter and 3300 meters in summer season (ibid). AJK is mainly a rural 
society having the rural urban population ratio of 88:12. It falls into low 
income countries category having annual average per capita income of 
US$1254 (P&DD 2014, 2015). The economy of AJK is mainly rural with 
average farm size of 1.2 hectares. Maize, wheat, rice and pulses are the 
main crops (ibid). There is very little industry in certain areas. The public 
sector is the other main source of employment. Traditionally, men have been 
migrating to main cities of Pakistan as seasonal workers. A sizeable number 
of people are now working in Europe, the Middle East and the UK. 
AJK has a semi-autonomous constitutional status within the Federation of 
Pakistan with its own directly elected Legislative Assembly, President, Prime 
Minister, Supreme Court and High Court. The Kashmir Council works as the 
Upper House of the Parliament with the Prime Minister of Pakistan as its 
Chairman. The link between the Government of Pakistan and the 
Government of Azad Jammu & Kashmir is established through the 
Government of Pakistan’s Ministry of Kashmir Affairs (P&DD 2010).   
Though AJK is constitutionally a semi-autonomous area, for all practical 
purposes it is a part of Pakistan (Cabinet Division 1971, Schild 2015). So my 
research is in the wider context of Pakistan. For the purpose of my study I 
have chosen District Muzaffarabad and District Bagh, the two most affected 
districts in 2005 earthquake (Please see Section 4.7 for details). 
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1.7.2. Seismic Hazard in the Study Area 
The study area falls in a highly seismic zone called Hazara-Kashmir 
Syntaxis. Muzaffarabad District is especially at risk because some of the 
most critical tectonic features such as Main Mantle Thrust, Mansehra Thrust, 
Oghi Fault, Banna Thrust, Balakot Shear Zone, Main Boundary Thrust, 
Panjal Thrust, Jhelum Fault, Muzaffarabad Fault, Sanghargali, Nathiagali, 
and Thandiani Thrusts are located within 50 km radius of Muzaffarabad city 
(PMD 2007, p. 1). A post-2005 earthquake study has assigned a potential 
earthquake of maximum magnitude of 7.8 at Balakot-Bagh fault (which falls 
in the study area and is very close to Muzaffarabad city) with PGA value of 
0.25g (10% probability of exceedance for 50 years) (ibid). The study area 
has been assigned Zone 4 in Seismic Zoning Map of Pakistan (Mona Liza 
2009) (Figure 1.2).  
Following are some of the important faults associated with the study area 
(Figure 1.4): 
  
i. Himalayan Main Boundary Thrust (MBT): This is one of the three 
faults of the 2,500 km long Himalayan arc. The MBT is seismically one 
of the most active faults in the region (Kumar et al. 2001; Valdiya 1980). 
About 100 km of this fault travels from Bagh District in AJK to nearby 
Batagram District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province passing through 
Muzaffarabad city. The 8th October 2005 earthquake is associated with 
the rupture of this fault (Bilham 2004; Bilham & Ambraseys 2005; 
Jouanne et al. 2011; Mona Liza 2009; Rossetto & Peiris 2008). The 
return period of earthquakes across this range is about 30-40 years at 
the shortening rate of ∼14 mm/yr. Prior to 2005 earthquake, there has 
been no major earthquake on this range since 1555 AD; so stress has 
been building here and a major earthquake was long overdue in this 
region (Avouac et al. 2006; Bilham 2005). 
ii. Himalayan Frontal Thrust (HFT): This is a northwest-southeast 
trending intra-formational thrust fault near Muzaffarabad (NESPAK 
2006). Its southern extension runs from Muzaffarabad towards Chikar 
Kas in the east running almost parallel to the Jhelum River on the right 
bank and then disappears after crossing the river in the south. In the 
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north it travels from Muzaffarabad up to Balakot and further north into 
Allai valley (ibid).  
iii. Main Mantle Thrust (MMT): This fault is a northward dipping regional 
thrust which separates the Indian Plate from the Kohistan Island Arc 
(NESPAK 2006). In the west it extends from Khar (Bajaur Agency) 
Naran (Kaghan Valley) in the north. In the east it takes a northeast-
ward bend towards Bunji and is truncated by the Raikot fault. The 
Mw=6.2 Pattan earthquake of 1974 is associated with it (ibid). 
iv. Panjal Thrust: It runs northwards parallel to the MBT on the eastern 
side of Hazara-Kashmir Syntaxis (NESPAK 2006). Both the Panjal 
Thrust and MBT come closer to each other and join about 5 km north of 
Balakot (ibid). 
v. Jhelum Fault: This fault extends from north of Muzaffarabad along 
Jhelum River into the Potowar region in the south and further 
southward (NESPAK 2006). It is a north-east trending strike-slip fault 
and follows the western margin of Hazara-Kashmir Syntaxis and 
apparently dislocates from the MBT in Muzaffarabad and disappears 
eastwards (ibid).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Tectonic setting of the study area, Muzaffarabad city is bound by the MBT and 
HFT in a ‘hairpin shaped structural feature.                                  (Source: ERRA 2006, p. 21) 
N 
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Though the study area has a long history of major seismic activity, no 
statistical data of these events is available. Szeliga et al. (2010, p. 42) 
observe that the traditional Kashmiri architecture consisting of earthquake 
resistant “Taq” and “Dhajji-dewari” construction techniques might have 
developed due to constant seismic activity in the past. A quote from King 
Akbar’s court historian, Abul Fazl, about construction in Kashmir valley also 
proves this point: “[O]n account of the abundance of wood and the constant 
earthquakes, houses of stone and brick are not built” (ibid). Some historical 
records show major seismic events in 4th Century B.C., 25 A.D., September 
1555, and May 1885 in the study area (Avouac et al. 2006; Ambraseys & 
Bilham 2011; Hough et al. 2009). The 8th October 2005 Kashmir earthquake 
is by far the most lethal (Avouac et al. 2006; Bilham 2005). It has also been 
suggested by some scientists that another major seismic activity, even 
greater than the 2005 earthquake, is also long overdue in Kashmir (Bilham 
2004; Hough et al. 2009). A study (ERRA 2006) has suggested the 
probability of earthquakes of Mw=7.5 to Mw=8.1 in the area in future. Due to 
absence of building control mechanisms, absence of disaster mitigation, 
poverty, lack of service provision, and population intensity (EEFIT 2008) any 
major seismic activity in the area might prove even more devastating than 
the 2005 earthquake (Bilham 2009). Fault ruptures, slope instabilities, 
earthquake related flooding, and soil liquefaction are some hazards 
associated with any future major seismic activity (NESPAK 2006).   
1.8. Thesis Structure  
Like Oven (2009), this study encountered many challenges; writing the thesis 
being one of them. The first challenge was to reconcile with the enormity of 
the subject and complexity of the research methodology. The type of 
research that I wanted to conduct necessitated the use of mixed methods 
approach; however this approach was challenging as to how to integrate the 
quantitative data, the qualitative material, and my own experiences. I draw 
results from the quantitative data and then qualify those results with the 
qualitative data. I have made frequent use of quotes from interviews and 
focus groups to emphasise the point. I mention my experiences and 
observations also, sometimes expressly but most of the time inconspicuously 
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throughout the thesis. In this way one might find my study more of an 
autoethnography. Reed-Danahay (1997, cited in Holt 2003, p. 2) defines 
autoethnography as “writing practice [that] involves highly personalized 
accounts where authors draw on their own experiences to extend 
understanding of a particular discipline or culture”. However, in my thesis I 
have relied more on the quantitative and qualitative data collected from the 
field to avoid the objection of being ‘too self-indulgent and narcissistic’ 
(Coffey 1999, cited in Holt 2003, p. 3). I mostly mention my experiences only 
to qualify the findings of the fieldwork or where no data is available.  
The 2005 earthquake was an event of epic proportions. It impacted peoples’ 
lives in every respect. So it was very difficult for me to bisect those 
interrelated aspects and keep myself confined to the issue of housing only. It 
is due to this reason that at times one might find this study slightly 
transgressing into other issues.  
1.8.1. Sequence of Chapters 
Instead of following the sequence of the research questions, the thesis starts 
with the day of the earthquake, 8th October 2005, and then flashbacks to 
research question 1 in Chapter 5. This might sound confusing to some but 
this fits the final path that my research has taken. Throughout the thesis I 
keep going back and forth in time because whatever happened in the study 
area on the day of the earthquake had roots in the past and will impact the 
future as well.  
Chapter 2 (The Kashmir Earthquake 2005), describes the event of the 
earthquake and ensuing situation. The earthquake damage will be briefly 
described to give an idea of the scale of the destruction and importance of 
the topic being researched. I will discuss in detail the housing reconstruction 
policy which was adopted by the Government of Pakistan for the 
reconstruction of the damaged housing stock in the study area.     
Chapter 3 (Theoretical Framework), discusses the theoretical framework of 
my research. The status of disaster knowledge in AJK, disaster losses and 
their uneven distribution in the developing and the developed world is 
discussed in the outset. It is explained that there is a relationship between 
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disasters and vulnerability; and development has role in determining disaster 
vulnerability. Disasters can provide a window of opportunity to set the past 
mistakes right and address disaster vulnerability. I will explain the theoretical 
approach that I have adopted for my research. At the end I will discuss the 
importance of housing reconstruction in post disaster situations and different 
housing reconstruction approaches being practised in the world. 
Chapter 4 (Research Methodology), puts forth my research methodology. 
It outlines my research design, data collection and analysis methods, 
research timeline, and geographical details of the areas where the fieldwork 
was conducted. I have adopted a mixed methods approach which combines 
the qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection. I will explain how 
this approach will be used for the purposes of triangulation, complementarity, 
initiation, development, and expansion through the use of concurrent nested 
design.  
Chapter 5 (Vulnerability of the Housing Stock in the Study Area), this 
chapter develops the argument outlined in Chapter 3, that disasters are not 
products or outcomes of hazard only, but a combination of hazard and 
vulnerability; it is the vulnerability of the people which determines the level of 
loss and turns a hazard into a disaster. In this chapter I will present my 
findings on the pre-earthquake housing stock in the study area, the prevalent 
construction typologies, the reasons for adopting these typologies, and the 
reasons for wide-spread destruction of the housing stock. I will also explain 
the role of the development policies of successive governments in AJK in 
laying the foundation of disaster vulnerability in the study area. The findings 
presented in this chapter are derived from academic literature, secondary 
data (mainly of the ERRA and the SERRA), primary data (both qualitative 
and quantitative) collected during my two fieldwork episodes, and my 
personal experience of working in these areas for more than a decade.  
Chapter 6 (Post-2005 Earthquake Housing Reconstruction in AJK), this 
chapter deals with the housing reconstruction programme which was started 
by the Government of Pakistan in 2006, in the aftermath of 2005 earthquake. 
I have explored the nature of the vulnerability of the built environment in AJK 
at the time of the earthquake and the level of damage caused by the 
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earthquake; the progress of the housing reconstruction programme in three 
contexts: the geographical context, which looks into the progress in rural and 
urban settings in two Districts; the economic context, in which I will 
investigate the progress across different income groups in the study area; 
and, the social context, which mainly focuses on gender.  
Chapter 7 (Impact of the Housing Reconstruction Programme), 
discusses the impact of the housing reconstruction programme in the study 
area. The first impact that I will evaluate is the sustainability of the seismic 
resistant construction in rural and urban areas post housing reconstruction 
programme. The second is the status of vulnerability of the housing stock in 
the study area after the completion of the housing reconstruction 
programme. The third is the impact of the housing reconstruction programme 
on the family structure and landownership pattern in the study area. Due to 
limited availability of the academic literature, I have relied mainly on grey 
literature, my qualitative data (semi-structured interviews and focus group 
discussions) collected during fieldwork, my personal experience of working in 
the study area after the earthquake, and my observations made during 
fieldwork.   
Chapter 8 (Sharing the Findings with Respondents), is the discussion 
chapter of the thesis. It is based on my feedback to the respondents 
engaged in my research during my first fieldwork. This fieldwork was 
undertaken during my second fieldwork in order to share the findings of the 
first fieldwork. I will explain how people feel about these findings and how 
these findings fit into the literature. I also present the Lessons Learnt and 
Recommendations in this chapter, which were drawn from the qualitative 
data (mainly interviews and focus groups) collected during two fieldworks.  
Chapter 9 (Conclusion), this chapter wraps up the thesis. The physical 
context, theoretical basis and empirical findings of the study will be briefly 
summed up. Limitations of the study and challenges faced during this 
research will be discussed here. I will also elaborate the contribution of the 
present study into the existing body of knowledge and will make suggestions 
for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE KASHMIR EARTHQUAKE 2005 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the 8th October 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, and 
ensuing events. I have described how I experienced the earthquake as a 
citizen and as a government official in the area. Then I have given a detailed 
account of rescue and relief activities. In the later sections I have briefly 
explained how reconstruction and rehabilitation activities were carried out 
once the relief phase was over. I have also given a detailed account of the 
housing reconstruction programme, due to its importance for my study.      
2.2. The Earthquake 
It was a fine autumn morning in Muzaffarabad on 8th October 2005. I was in 
the sitting room of my house along with my eight day old daughter when I 
heard a loud bang, like loud thunder, and saw the roof of the room being 
ripped apart from the walls. Unwittingly I picked my daughter from the sofa, 
hid her under my chest and started running out of the house without thinking 
about anything else. It was like running for ages, crossing three rooms. I 
could see the walls and roof falling on us but I continued running. When I 
reached the kitchen, the outer walls of the kitchen had fallen and the room 
was full of debris. My chef had huddled himself in a corner; frozen like a 
statue. There was no door or window anymore except for a small hole in the 
debris through which I slid out my daughter and then dug rubble with my 
bare hands to make room for myself to crawl out. I asked my chef to follow 
me. Once out of the debris I put my daughter onto the ground and turned 
around to look for my family, there was no house but only a huge heap of 
debris. There was no way that I could enter into that heap; so I ran out of the 
lawn, bare footed, and took a round of the street about 300 meters long and 
reached the backyard of the house. Luckily I found my wife and two kids 
(aged 3 and 5) safely standing in the backyard. They had crept through a 
hole where there used to be an air conditioner, which was now lying a few 
yards away.  
Until that time I had no idea what had happened. I thought something had 
happened to our house only but when I came to my senses I could see dust 
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and heaps of debris everywhere. After gathering my family in a safe corner of 
the lawn, I walked around in the streets and found out that all the houses had 
fallen. Being a government colony, I knew most of the people there. Most of 
the houses had at least one or two people trapped under the debris. It was 
only then that I could realize that something terrible had happened. I took my 
car and drove around in the city. Most of the roads were blocked due to 
fallen buildings. There was destruction everywhere, people were running 
around, parents were wailing and frantically searching for their missing 
children. The wireless in my car was relaying messages of destruction from 
all over the district. Then I realized that an earthquake had hit us.       
It was our first experience of a major earthquake. The magnitude of the 
earthquake was Mw =7.6 and the epicentre was 11 km north of Muzaffarabad 
city (Figure 2.1). This earthquake was associated with the rupture of the 
Main Boundary Thrust (MBT) in the Hazara Kashmir Syntaxis (HKS) (Avouac 
et al. 2006; Mona Lisa et al. 2008). It was thus far the deadliest earthquake 
in the history of Pakistan. Aftershocks continued many weeks after the main 
event and more than 1,000 aftershocks of up to Mw =6 were recorded (ADB 
2011). These aftershocks caused many more buildings to collapse in the 
area. 
2.2.1. Search & Rescue  
We never expected anything like this earthquake; in fact we had no 
knowledge of the seismic hazard in the area, so we were not prepared for it. 
There was no rescue system in the country. Despite facing environmental 
disasters repeatedly, the only disaster management mechanism in the 
country was the West Pakistan National Calamities Act of 1958 (NDMA 
2011). This law provided a legal basis to authorities to maintain and restore 
law and order in areas affected by calamities and provide relief against such 
calamities. An Emergency Relief Cell existed within the Cabinet Division at 
the federal level with similar institutional arrangements at the provincial level 
in the form of Relief Commissioners (ibid). However, this arrangement was 
meant to provide relief goods and some cash in case of a natural calamity; 
there was no concept of disaster mitigation or disaster management, or even 
search and rescue. 
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3 Figure 2.1 2005 earthquake location and intensity maps.                 (Source: SERRA 2015)  
 
So it was with this capacity that we had to deal with the biggest earthquake 
in the history of the country. The main hospital of the city was destroyed and 
the second was partially damaged but inaccessible due to landslides. As 
happens in emergencies in countries like ours, I decided to seek help from 
the Army and went to one of the nearby Brigade Headquarters. The scene 
there was not much different from elsewhere in the city; most of the buildings 
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4 Figure 2.2 Shifting the injured from Muzaffarabad to Islamabad (Source: ERRA 2015) 
were destroyed, some of the staff were buried under the rubble, and there 
was no communication with the rest of the country.  There wasn’t much that 
we could do during rest of the day to save lives. It was in the afternoon that 
the Army restored its communications and some sort of activity started, but 
there was no formally organized response; people mostly tried to manage 
things themselves. 
The official response was limited to very little medical aid, one or two 
bulldozers trying to cope with the frantic demand of digging out the injured 
and the dead, and some police and local administration trying to solace the 
people. Armed forces helicopters started coming the next day with medical 
aid and troops; they took the seriously injured on their way back to 
Islamabad. Rescue teams from Turkey were the first to reach Muzaffarabad 
on the third day of the earthquake. The government of Pakistan started one 
of the biggest rescue and relief operations in history of the country with the 
help of international community.  
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5 Figure 2.3 (Clockwise from top left): an IDP camp, distribution of cooked food, taking relief 
goods to far-off places, ICRC field hospital in Muzaffarabad.               (Source: SERRA 2015) 
  
125 helicopters made more than 5,000 sorties in the earthquake areas over 
the next few weeks carrying all sorts of relief goods and the injured. I used to 
go to the helipad before dawn every day and spend the whole day in 
organizing the relief activities until the evening, attending meetings there until 
very late in the evening and then return to my makeshift office to work till two 
or three in the night.  Within a few days we were able to open main roads 
and restore electricity, water, and telephone in Muzaffarabad city and 
adjoining areas. Dozens of medical camps, tent villages, and relief camps 
were set up all over the affected areas and elsewhere in Pakistan.  
2.2.2. Earthquake Damages 
Within days of the earthquake the authorities started the damage 
assessment exercise to determine the losses and plan for the reconstruction 
and rehabilitation activities. I still remember that the government gave me 
80,000 rupees (US$ 1300 approx.) to conduct the survey. I gave 1,000 
rupees (US$ 16) to each Patwari (there were 80 Patwaris in my district) and 
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sent them for damage assessment. This 1,000 rupees amount was not 
enough for even one time meal at that time. Most of these Patwaris were 
themselves severely affected by the earthquake; almost all had their houses 
damaged and most had family members dead or injured. These people 
worked selflessly in the most miserable conditions for the next ten days 
travelling on foot to far flung hilly areas in bitter cold without any provision of 
food and shelter. We had no computers so all compilation was done 
manually.  
A similar damage assessment was conducted in all earthquake affected 
areas. This data collection exercise was supervised by a committee 
comprising of representatives of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
World Bank, governments of Pakistan, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
and Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K). A Damage and Needs Assessment 
report was prepared by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank in 
consultation with many other national and international organizations (e.g. 
the EU, DFID, GTZ, KfW, JBIC, JICA, USAID, WHO, FAO, UNICEF, UNDP) 
to estimate the damage and reconstruction cost of the earthquake (ADB 
2005).  All planning for the future reconstruction and rehabilitation was to be 
based on this report. 
The damage reports showed that the earthquake had caused widespread 
and massive damage in AJK and adjoining areas of the then North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP). Approximately 30,000 km2 (roughly the size of 
Belgium) was impacted by the earthquake. More than 85,000 people were 
killed and 128,000 were injured (ERRA 2011b). Over 600,000 houses were 
damaged and 2.8 million people were rendered homeless. Thousands of 
public and private buildings were also destroyed (ibid). Livelihoods of the 
people, especially the poor, were also severely impacted as businesses and 
agriculture were destroyed, livestock were killed, and the employment was 
lost. The damage was estimated to be over US$ 5 billion ((ibid)). Private 
housing suffered damage worth approximately PKR 68,438 million (US$ 1.2 
billion) (ADB 2005). It is estimated that majority of deaths occurred due to the 
immediate collapse of poorly constructed buildings (Figure 2.4). Almost 80% 
of all the buildings which collapsed were kacha houses in rural areas. These 
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buildings were constructed without any seismic resistant specifications 
(ERRA 2011b). The earthquake paralysed the whole government machinery 
in the affected areas. Many government employees and their families were 
either killed or injured and their houses were destroyed. Almost all 
government buildings and communication systems were destroyed. It was 
not possible to have any sort of contact with most of the government 
employees for the initial few days after the earthquake which seriously 
affected the search and rescue activities.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6Figure 2.4 Destroyed towns and villages.                                          (Source: SERRA 2015) 
25 
 
2.2.3. Damage in AJK 
The earthquake caused extensive damage and impacted almost half of AJK 
(Figure 2.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of deaths, injured, and other damages in AJK was the highest in 
the country (Table 2.1). Bagh and Muzaffarabad districts were the worst hit 
where maximum causalities occurred and the most buildings collapsed. The 
death toll in District Muzaffarabad was 33,724; more than 20,000 were 
injured and 125,000 houses (98% of the total housing stock in the district) 
were damaged (ERRA 2007a; NDMA 2012). 8,157 people were killed; more 
7Figure 2.5 Map of Azad Jammu & Kashmir; yellow colour shows earthquake affected area.     
                                                                                                             (Source: SERRA 2015) 
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than 6,000 were injured and more than 65,000 (99.7 % of the housing stock) 
houses were damaged in District Bagh (ibid).    
2 Table 2.1 Losses in AJK due to 2005 earthquake.        
Affected area 7000 Sq. Km  
(Total area 13297 Sq. Km)  
Population affected   1.80 million  
(Total population 3.5 
million) 
Villages affected 977  
(Total villages 1646) 
Houses Damaged 314,474  
 
Deaths 46,570 
Injured 33,136 
Estimated Losses in Private Sector: 
 
(Private Housing:    PKR. 50.000 billion 
Economic Assets: PKR.10.875 billion) 
 
 
PKR. 60.875 billion 
Estimated Damages in Public Sector 
(See Annex-2 for detail of damages) 
PKR. 64.328 billion  
 
Total Losses PKR. 125.203 billion 
     
                                                (Source: developed by the author based on the SERRA data) 
2.3. Post-earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation  
The Government of Pakistan quickly realised that the task of reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of the earthquake affected areas was immense and 
beyond the capacity of the disaster impacted provincial governments. The 
Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) was created at 
the federal level on 24th October 2005 (only 16 days after the earthquake) to 
lead the task of post-earthquake reconstruction in the affected areas. The 
purpose was to ‘bring all activities, relevant to post disaster damage 
assessment, reconstruction and rehabilitation in affected areas under one 
umbrella’ (ERRA 2011, p. 8). It was the first organization of its kind in the 
history of Pakistan; no such institutional arrangement was made in case of 
previous disasters in the country. The role of the ERRA was coordination, 
planning, monitoring & evaluation, and financial management of the 
reconstruction work (ERRA 2011, p.8). In order to involve the governments 
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of earthquake affected areas into the reconstruction and rehabilitation work, 
the Government of Pakistan decided to establish institutional arrangements 
in those areas as well. The State Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation 
Agency (SERRA) was established in AJK, the Provincial Reconstruction & 
Rehabilitation Agency (PERRA) was established for the NWFP, and District 
Reconstruction Unit (DRU) were established in 9 earthquake affected 
districts to undertake the task of reconstruction (Figure 2.5). The ERRA very 
quickly started working on the formulation of reconstruction and rehabilitation 
policy. The ERRA divided the whole reconstruction work into twelve sectors, 
namely: (i) Education, (ii) Health, (iii) Livelihood, (iv) Transport & 
Communication, (v) Water Supply and Sanitation, (vi) Power 
Generation/Electricity, (vii) Social Protection/Vulnerable Groups, (viii) 
Industries & Tourism, (ix) Governance, (x) Environment, (xi) 
Telecommunication, and (xii) Housing (ADB 2011, 2012). The reconstruction 
work was started in 2006. I will confine myself to the housing reconstruction 
programme only in this research.  
2.4. Housing Reconstruction Programme 
The housing sector had suffered the biggest damage in the earthquake. 
Almost 80% of the housing stock in the earthquake affected areas was 
damaged leaving almost 3 million people homeless (World Bank 2011). One 
of the biggest challenges after the earthquake was that millions of shelter-
less people were scattered over thousands of square kilometres (Cheema 
2006). In these areas winter sets in early November, especially in high 
mountains, so the situation was getting worse day by day. The government 
and the humanitarian agencies distributed hundreds of thousands of tents 
but later on it became clear that only 20% of tents could provide protection 
against winter and snow (Qazi 2008). Different solutions such as provision of 
heating equipment and insulation material were considered to provide the 
affected people protection from elements but both these options were found 
to be impracticable due to safety issues, using heating equipment in tents 
and unavailability of large quantities of insulation material. Then the 
authorities came up with the solution of ‘transitional’ housing. The affected 
people were asked to salvage material from their damaged houses and 
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construct shelters for themselves. Each house owner was given 25,000 
rupees and CGI sheets to help them in construction. This strategy was 
successfully implemented and the affected people were saved from the 
difficulties of harsh winters (ERRA 2011; Qazi 2008; UN-Habitat 2011). I 
used to fly frequently in the district and noticed the changes myself; soon 
after the earthquake I could see miserable scenes of debris everywhere 
instead of houses, then tents started to pop up from the first week, after two 
months or so we could see people carrying CGI sheets on their backs and 
bright roofs of shelters started to come up on high mountains. It was such a 
relief and joy to see.  
Naturally housing reconstruction became the top most priority of the 
government. Out of the ERRA’s twelve sectors, the housing reconstruction 
was the first sector to start working in 2006. It became the flagship project of 
the post-earthquake reconstruction programme. It was the single largest 
component of the ERRA’s portfolio. Reconstruction of more than 462,000 
destroyed houses and repair of 100,000 damaged houses was an immense 
challenge. According to the ERRA figures, 96% of the destroyed houses had 
been reconstructed by October 2013. The ERRA takes pride in this 
achievement and considers it a success story in Pakistan and beyond. 
Pakistan was awarded the UN Sasakawa Award in 2011 for excellence in 
housing sector (ERRA 2011).  
In this research I will evaluate the housing reconstruction programme. I will 
look into the housing reconstruction in AJK only.  
2.4.1. Housing Reconstruction Policy  
Simultaneously with ‘transitional’ housing, the ERRA had started a 
consultation process to formulate the housing reconstruction policy. The 
consultation process was jointly led by the UN-HABITAT and the ERRA. 
More than 80 national and international organizations and the Government of 
AJK and the Government of NWFP participated in the process (ADB 2011). I 
also participated in a 2-day consultative workshop in Islamabad as Deputy 
Commissioner in February 2006. As a result of this consultative process, the 
Owner-driven housing reconstruction approach was adopted to ‘provide 
29 
 
financial and technical assistance to affected home owners in AJK and 
NWFP, in reconstructing or retrofitting their damaged houses, using a home-
owner driven, but assisted and inspected construction regime’ (ERRA 2006, 
p. 4). 
The guiding principles for housing reconstruction were (ERRA 2006, p. 14):  
• Seismic resistant reconstruction; 
• Rebuild in situ: wherever possible encourage households to rebuild on 
their original plot of land; 
• Owner-driven approach - homeowners to manage the rebuilding of their 
houses by hiring labour and/or use their own labour;  
• Rebuild with familiar methods and easily accessible materials-
earthquake resistant techniques to be introduced in the traditional and 
prevalent construction practices;  
• Relocation of settlements only when necessary to minimize exposure to 
hazards;  
• Strategic and limited urban planning;  
• Uniform financial assistance package;  
• Full spatial coverage of the damaged houses;  
• Complement housing reconstruction with livelihoods and social and 
physical services support.  
These guiding principles were applicable to both rural and urban areas; 
however their interpretation and implementation varied accordingly. 
2.4.1.1. Why Owner Driven Approach? 
The owner-driven housing reconstruction approach was never practiced 
before in Pakistan after a disaster. This approach was not only new to 
Pakistan but also practised more widely for the first time. The Owner-driven 
approach was partially adopted in Gujarat (India) after 2001 earthquake but it 
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was for the first time in Pakistan that this approach was adopted at a 
massive scale. Certain factors helped in taking up this approach.  
According to Qazi (2008) it was due to the success of the transitional 
housing strategy, the overwhelming large number of damaged houses and 
the advocacy of the humanitarian agencies that the Government of Pakistan 
opted for the Owner-driven housing reconstruction approach. The success of 
the transitional housing proved that the affected people were not merely the 
victims of a tragedy but they were capable and resilient enough to become 
principle actors in reconstruction, if technical guidance was provided. In a 
way the successful implementation of transitional housing strategy laid the 
foundation for Owner-driven housing reconstruction. According to Schacher 
(2008: no pagination), the Owner-driven reconstruction approach was 
adopted to ensure quick and cost-effective reconstruction of houses by using 
the inherent potential of the affected people. The concept of ‘Build Back 
Better’ was central in this approach to promote seismic resistant building 
techniques and safer houses for communities (ibid). Hassan (2005, cited in 
Leersum & Arora 2011: p. 255-256) observed that the scale of the disaster 
was too large for any other housing reconstruction approach such as 
contractor-driven approach or to build model villages or to construct 
prefabricated houses. According to Davis (2010a) international organizations 
such as UN-Habitat and the World Bank were the main proponents of the 
owner-driven approach in Pakistan and elsewhere in the world.  
While explaining the reason behind adopting the owner-driven reconstruction 
policy, General Nadeem Ahmad, the founding Deputy Chairman of the 
ERRA, told me that the 2005 earthquake was an eye-opener for all because 
no one had seen such a big disaster in Pakistan (personal communication). 
He suggested that luckily the leadership of that time was very dynamic and 
visionary and accepted the proposal to construct seismically resistant houses 
because the whole area was full of fault lines and if seismically unsafe 
houses were constructed, these houses were bound to collapse again in 
case of next earthquake (ibid).  
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The Asian Development Bank, one of the main financers of this programme, 
was of the opinion that the local conditions dictated the adoption of ODR in 
Pakistan (personal communication). Four factors were basic in deciding in 
favour of ODR. One was the recent international experience of post-disaster 
housing reconstruction; the donor-driven post-2004 tsunami housing 
reconstruction programme was progressing at a very slow pace in Indonesia 
and people were not very happy with the newly constructed houses. The 
second was the quality issue i.e. how to ensure good quality housing if 
housing reconstruction was given to the community or contractors. The third 
was that outsourcing to the contractors was not cost effective due to the 
scattered population. The fourth was the attitude and mind-set of the affected 
people, who wanted to return to ancestral places.  
A former Programme Manager (Housing) at the ERRA was of the opinion 
that though the World Bank was the main ‘advocate’ of this approach apart 
from other donors, the internal capacity of the provincial governments was 
the main reason for adopting the ODR approach because their capacity was 
practically non-existent due to the earthquake (personal communication). 
The provincial governments would have found it extremely difficult to 
implement community-driven or contractor-driven approach. The World Bank 
also verified that they ‘took the lead’ in adopting this approach because they 
had ‘some experience of housing in Gujarat’ (personal communication). 
So it was the recommendation of the donors, the willingness of the 
government, the immense volume of the work, geographical and social 
realities of the affected areas, and the limited capacity of the contractors and 
the provincial governments that the Owner-driven housing reconstruction 
approach was adopted in Pakistan. The post-earthquake housing 
reconstruction policy consisted of two strategies; Rural Housing 
Reconstruction Strategy and Urban Housing Reconstruction Strategy.  
2.5. Rural Housing Reconstruction Strategy 
The ‘Rural Housing Reconstruction Strategy of Earthquake Hit Districts in 
NWFP and AJK’ was announced in March 2006. The objective of this policy 
was to ‘ensure that an estimated 400,000 houses that were either destroyed 
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or damaged, will be rebuilt by using earthquake resistant building techniques, 
through grant assistance from the Government to eligible households’ 
(ERRA 2006, p. 3). 
Rural areas make up 82% of AJK (P&DD 2006) so the rural housing strategy 
affects the biggest part of the population. All areas, regardless of their size, 
were considered rural areas and their rebuilding came under ERRA’s rural 
program except for urban areas of Muzaffarabad, Bagh and Rawalakot in 
AJK (which were included in urban housing strategy). Many towns such as 
Garhi Dopatta, Naseerabad, Hattianbala, and Dhirkot remained part of the 
rural housing programme. 
The rural housing reconstruction strategy had three main components: (a) 
cash grants for reconstruction or retrofitting; (b) technical assistance; and, (c) 
capacity-building of all affected stakeholders (ERRA 2006).  
(a) Cash Grants 
The government announced a uniform financial assistance package 
regardless of the type of construction and size of the building. There used to 
be different financial assistance in case of kacha (non-permanent or mud 
houses) and pukka (permanent) construction in the past (See Annex-1) but 
this distinction was not observed in case of 2005 earthquake and uniform 
financial assistance was given for both kacha (non-permanent) and pukka 
(permanent) houses (Table 2.2). The financial assistance package for 
completely damaged house was calculated on the basis of each homeowner 
being able to build a “core house” of between 250 and 400 sq. ft. depending 
on their choice of structural solution. 
The homeowners were expected to use their own labour and recycle the 
material of the damaged house to minimize the cost of construction. Since 
joint family system was common in these areas, cash grant was initially given 
on the basis of housing units; not households i.e. one house one grant 
(ERRA 2006). However, this policy was changed later and the grant was 
given to all those in a house who could prove themselves to be an 
independent family, though living in the same building. 
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The housing cash grant was proposed to be paid in instalments through bank 
accounts i.e. crediting money into the house owner’s bank account directly. 
This step was taken to eliminate corruption and bribery on the part of 
government officials and save the affected people from wasting their time by 
coming to government offices. However, the problem was that very few 
people had bank accounts in these areas due to poverty and illiteracy, so the 
government’s decision to transfer the housing cash grant into the beneficiary 
bank account created problems. To remove this bottleneck, the government 
instructed the banks to open accounts on priority basis without going into 
much formality. Service charges of the banks were paid by the ERRA. Banks 
were also directed not to insist upon the production of Computerized National 
Identity Cards for the opening of Bank accounts. One window operation was 
also launched at Union Council / Tehsil / District level by the National 
Database & Registration Authority (NADRA) to issue Computerized National 
Identity Card to the applicants on fast-track basis without the house owner 
going from one office to the other. 
 
3 Table 2.2 Housing cash grant package. 
Nature of Damage Amount 
Completely Damaged 
 
PKR 175,000 (US$ 2900 approx.) 
 
Partially Damaged  
 
PKR 75,000 (US$ 1260 approx.) 
Negligibly Damaged  
 
PKR 25,000 (US$ 420 approx.) 
    
                                   (Source: Developed by the author from ERRA Housing Strategy 2006) 
 
(b) Technical Assistance 
Poor quality of construction was one of the major causes of damage to 
housing stock in the earthquake affected areas (Husain 2008; Halvorson & 
Hamilton 2010; Leersum & Arora 2011; Kazmi et al. 2012; Ozerdem 2006). It 
was necessary to build new houses according to seismic resistant standards 
to avoid any similar situation in future. Keeping in mind the poor technical 
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capabilities of the people and the provincial governments, technical 
assistance was proposed in the housing strategy for these stakeholders in 
following areas (ERRA 2006, p. 14-28):  
 Hazard risk mapping: Since there was no hazard mapping in the study 
area before the earthquake, the strategy proposed hazard and risk 
mapping to identify areas susceptible to future environmental 
disasters such as earthquakes, landslides and erosion;  
 Damage and eligibility assessment: A comprehensive exercise was 
proposed to categorize the extent of damage to each house, 
preparation and verification of lists of house owners eligible for 
housing cash grant, and estimate the construction material 
requirements (Annex-5);  
 Seismic-resistant housing solutions: Since there was no previous 
experience of seismic resistant construction in the earthquake 
affected areas, it was proposed that the house owners will be 
provided seismic resistant construction drawings, fabrication 
drawings, illustrated construction manuals and flyers, and onsite 
technical guidance by AITs (Annex-9a, 9b, 9c); 
 Building materials hubs were to be set up in different areas to provide 
good quality construction material at competitive rates;  
 Land issues: It was proposed that the relocation of the affected 
population will be avoided as much as possible, and will only be made 
in unavoidable circumstances; on voluntary basis and in consultation 
with the affected communities only. A policy for land acquisition was 
also developed. Protection of the rights of the vulnerable groups, 
especially women, was given special attention.  
(c) Capacity Building 
The strategy proposed capacity building of the local authorities and Partner 
Organisations in following areas:  
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   ERRA policies and procedures: training was proposed to ensure 
thorough understanding and optimum compliance;  
   Social mobilisation: training in the preparation of village profiles, 
establishment of Community Housing Reconstruction Committees, 
procurement sub-committees, and community monitoring (Annex-11).  
   Environmental degradation: The massive reconstruction activity was 
expected to generate negative environmental impacts. Training in 
these issues was proposed to reduce environmental degradation;  
   Housing reconstruction training: Simple guidance at village level on 
incorporating earthquake resistant reconstruction techniques and 
materials into local housing types and use of seismic resistant housing 
designs;  
   Skills training: Training for masons, carpenters, metal workers, 
plumbers and electricians; 
   Compliance training: to government officials and Partner 
Organisations to enable them to verify compliance status; 
   Conventional designs like Dhajji-dewari and Bahttar were allowed as 
approved designs because these traditional techniques had 
performed relatively better in the earthquake (Mumtaz et al. 2008 and 
Stephenson et al. 2008) (Annex-8a, 8b). 
2.5.1. Institutional Framework  
The strategy proposed that the housing reconstruction would be a 
decentralized activity. The ERRA was responsible for setting standards, 
provision of design options and construction guidelines, development of 
criteria for Partner Organization selection, construction related skills training, 
awareness campaign, and overall coordination and monitoring of the 
reconstruction process. Figure 2.5 shows the institutional framework for rural 
housing reconstruction. The ERRA, SERRA, and DRU are strategy 
formulating and coordinating bodies; Housing Reconstruction Centre (HRC), 
Partner Organization (PO), and Assistance & Inspection Team (AIT) are the 
implementing bodies; and Village Reconstruction Committee (VRC), 
homeowners, and artisans are to actually undertake the reconstruction work.   
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Considering the limited capacity of the government machinery in the 
earthquake areas to cope with the unprecedented scale of reconstruction the 
ERRA decided to engage reputable Partner Organizations (POs)/NGOs to 
support the implementation of the Owner-driven housing reconstruction 
program. Where NGOs were not available, the Pakistan Army’s Corps of 
Engineers was employed as Partner Organization. The task of the POs was 
to provide guidance to the affected communities in implementing the owner-
driven housing reconstruction programme; train engineers and craftsmen; 
oversee reconstruction/restoration activities to assure quality and seismic 
resistant construction; ensure compliance with social and environmental risk 
mitigating measures; and undertake detailed damage and eligibility 
assessment survey in order to: (a) categorize the level of damage to each 
housing unit, and (b) establish lists of eligible beneficiaries. The POs were 
also required to establish field offices for supporting the assistance, 
inspection, and training activities in a minimum of one or more Union 
Councils. The POs reported to the Housing Coordinators (HC) of the District 
Reconstruction Units (ERRA 2006, p. 24-25). 
The POs were required to constitute three-member Assistance and 
Inspection Teams (AITs) comprising of a government officer, a social 
organizer, and an engineer. These teams were trained in assessment 
techniques and criteria in order to ensure uniform compliance of construction 
standards across all affected areas. A final list of beneficiaries was to be 
determined by the AITs through a house to house assessment of damage. 
AITs were required to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with 
each homeowner eligible for the financial assistance package (Annex-12). 
The purpose of the MoU was to ensure agreement on the part of the 
homeowner to rebuild according to earthquake resistant standards. These 
teams were to visit each under-construction house at three different stages 
(i.e. foundation, plinth, and lintel levels) to ensure compliance with 
construction standards and recommend the house for next instalment of the 
housing cash grant. The payment of instalments was made directly into the 
bank account of the house owner.  
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There were many donors who wanted to adopt a whole village for 
reconstruction. In order to maintain the uniformity of construction, donors 
were required to adhere to the ERRA approved specifications in the 
reconstruction of villages of their choice. It was decided that to retain the 
identity of the earthquake affected areas no village will be renamed to 
acknowledge the contribution of the donor.  
2.5.2. Skills and Compliance Training  
The ERRA estimated that the proposed housing reconstruction programme 
will involve an approximate ten-fold increase in pre-earthquake housing 
activity in the affected districts over a 3-year period (ERRA 2006). It was also 
estimated that about 60,000 skilled and 80,000 semiskilled/unskilled 
workforce would be required. About 20% of the workforce requirement was 
estimated to be met by the skilled construction work force that was already 
available in the country and the remaining 80% of the required workforce will 
have to be trained from scratch (ibid). The housing reconstruction strategy 
provides for earthquake resistant construction training to both the already 
trained workforce and the new one as well. 
2.5.3. Inspection and Compliance 
In order to ensure that the homeowners completed the construction of their 
houses soon enough according to government’s seismic resistant 
construction solutions, the POs were required to inform the relevant 
government appointed Compliance Officer upon completion of each building 
stage to verify the building for the timely disbursement of next instalment of 
cash grant. In case of non-compliance the homeowner was suggested 
corrective measures to make the building compliant with ERRA 
specifications.  
2.5.4. Grievance Redressal Mechanism 
The immense volume of work and previously unfamiliar housing 
reconstruction strategy was bound to cause certain implementation issues. A 
grievance redressal mechanism was proposed in the strategy to address 
issues like incorrect eligibility/housing damage assessment, incorrect amount 
of payment, lack of payment despite eligibility, payment delays, and land and 
property related disputes.  
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2.5.5. Monitoring & Evaluation  
A comprehensive multi-layered Monitoring & Evaluation system was 
provided in the strategy to ensure timely completion of housing 
reconstruction. POs were responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of 
progress in their Union Councils. The Housing Reconstruction Centres were 
responsible for monitoring and evaluation of the POs delivery of training. The 
District Reconstruction Units were required to carry out periodic spot checks 
to monitor progress and compliance. The ERRA also had separate staff for 
this purpose. The criteria for Monitoring & Evaluation were: 
• Amount of restoration/reconstruction grants disbursed;  
• Number of houses reconstructed/restored to earthquake resistant                 
standards;  
• Number of craftsmen trained in key trades (masons and carpenters); and 
• Percentage of complaints redressed.  
2.6. Urban Housing Reconstruction Strategy  
Though the guiding principles of the rural housing reconstruction policy were 
applicable to both rural and urban areas, their interpretation and 
implementation could vary according to geographical setting i.e. rural/urban 
(ERRA 2006). The Urban Development Strategy came out in August, 2007. 
Housing reconstruction in urban areas was made part of the Urban 
Development Strategy due to following reasons: 
(a)  Housing reconstruction in urban areas requires phasing with other 
activities of the Master Plan such as widening of roads and streets and 
construction of utility services;  
(b) Housing reconstruction in urban areas requires planning and 
coordination to a much higher degree than in rural areas due to Seismic 
Microzonation to identify the seismic hazard in different parts of urban 
areas, preparation of building codes, public health and safety 
requirements; and  
(c) Longer timeframes for completing tasks, higher costs, and more 
complex activities in urban environments as compared to rural areas. 
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The urban housing reconstruction policy had three objectives: reconstruction 
of 28,000 urban houses according to new disaster resistant building codes 
approved by the respective State/Provincial governments; equitable 
land/monetary compensation in case of relocation; and minimum possible 
relocation of urban areas residents (ERRA 2006, p. 29).  
2.6.1. Principles of the Urban Housing Strategy   
The urban housing reconstruction strategy has following basic principles:  
 Stakeholder consultation during planning, strategy formulation, and 
implementation at all levels; 
 Decentralized decision-making;  
 Transparency and accountability in decision-making, implementation, 
and enforcement; 
 Minimum and rationalized relocation of residential areas;  
 Payment of compensation in case of relocation/possession of private 
property;  
 Increase homeownership opportunities, promote decent affordable 
housing, encourage pro-poor focus by providing house ownership 
opportunities to the poor segments of the society;  
 Urban housing reconstruction to be synchronized with Town Planning 
& Urban Development;  
 Urban residential areas to be fully functional & integrated part of the 
broader town plan;  
 Reconstruction according to new seismic sensitive building codes; 
 Emergency preparedness;  
 Facilitate residents, government machinery, and other organs of the 
community to resume normal activity and participate in the 
reconstruction process;  
 Educate stakeholders about causes of damage to housing stock and 
how to reduce vulnerability through disaster resistant rebuilding;  
 Better coordination to avoid duplication. 
 
These principles were to be achieved through following measures: 
 Owner-driven housing reconstruction;  
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 Approval of construction designs by the municipal authorities to 
ensure compliance with new seismic resistant building codes;  
 In situ rebuilding to minimize population relocation;  
 Construction of Kacha houses not to be allowed in urban areas;  
 Slum areas to be converted into low-income residential areas through 
re-planning and financial incentives; and 
 Uniform housing cash grant.  
The amount of the Housing Cash Grant was similar in both rural and urban 
areas. However, the disbursement method was slightly different in urban 
areas. Unlike rural areas, the 3rd and 4th instalments were paid 
simultaneously in urban areas after obtaining an affidavit from the 
homeowner that the construction drawing will be approved by the relevant 
municipal body in accordance with seismic resistant building codes and the 
Development Authorities will ensure compliance with the approved plans and 
codes whenever the homeowner does the construction in future. Like rural 
areas, the housing cash grant was transferred directly into the bank account 
of the house owner to ensure transparency (ERRA 2006). 
2.6.2. Institutional Framework  
The institutional framework for housing reconstruction was also different in 
urban areas. The top tier of the institutional framework was the same in 
urban and rural areas (Figure 2.5) i.e. the role of the ERRA, SERRA, and 
DRUs. The remaining two tiers were different i.e. there was no role of HRCs 
and POs in the middle tier and there were no VRCs in the bottom tier (Figure 
2.5). The role of the AITs in the middle tier was also different in urban areas 
and limited to:  
 Door-to-door assessment and compilation of lists of damaged 
houses; 
 Door-to-door reassessment of incomplete/inaccurate assessment 
forms; 
 Reassessment of forms that are subject to a formal grievance; and 
 Guidance to house owners to open bank accounts.  
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Unlike rural areas, the AITs in urban areas did not sign MoU with 
homeowners and did not visit each under-construction house at three 
different stages (foundation, plinth, and lintel levels) to ensure compliance 
with construction standards and recommend the house for next instalment of 
housing cash grant. This role was to be performed by the municipal bodies 
and consultants in urban areas i.e. the construction drawings were to be 
prepared by the architect, the municipal body were to issue planning 
permission, and the consultant were to supervise the construction and give 
completion certificate. The ERRA provided financial and technical resources 
to municipal bodies to enhance their capacity to deal with the increased load 
of work quickly and efficiently. Technical assistance was provided for hazard 
risk mapping, damage and eligibility assessment, disaster-resistant building 
codes, facilitating the building materials markets, and land and property-
related issues.  
2.6.3. Medium Term Housing  
Muzaffarabad, Bagh, and Rawalakot towns had developed without any town 
planning. Since these towns were mostly destroyed by the 2005 earthquake, 
it was thought an opportune moment by the authorities to do Master Planning 
of these towns for the purposes of reconstruction and future planning. 
Preparation of Land Use Plans (Annex-6) and Seismic Hazard Microzonation 
Plans were required to be done before the preparation of the Master Plans. 
These activities were expected to take at least 2 to 3 years before housing 
reconstruction activity could start. People needed a medium term housing 
solution during this period. So the urban development policy proposes the 
construction of ‘Medium term urban areas’ to ‘serve as intermediary step 
between livelihoods of evacuation areas and permanent rehabilitated 
residential areas’ (ERRA 2006, p. 44). Provision of pre-fabricated two-room 
houses was one of the components of this initiative. These houses were 
meant for:  
(a)  People affected by the ‘Red zone’ (areas on fault lines or on 
hazardous lands);  
(b) Population affected due to implementation of Master Plan; 
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(c) Landless people; and 
(d) Extremely vulnerable families.  
It was for the first time in the history of Pakistan that post-disaster housing 
reconstruction was done according to a well-planned policy which was 
formulated through the involvement of many international, national, and local 
stakeholders. The implementation of this policy and its impact on the 
earthquake affected areas will be discussed in the later chapters of this 
thesis.   
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss the theoretical framework of my research. Section 
3.2 discusses the status of disaster knowledge in AJK. Section 3.3 is about 
disasters; definitions, disaster losses and their uneven distribution in the 
developing and the developed world, and disaster management approaches. 
Section 3.4 discusses the relationship between disasters and vulnerability. In 
section 3.5, I discuss the relationship between disasters and development 
and how development itself can lead to disaster vulnerability. In section 3.6, I 
describe the theoretical approach that I have adopted for my research. 
Section 3.7 discusses how disasters prove a window of opportunity of 
opportunity to set the past mistakes right and address disaster vulnerability. 
In section 3.8, I have discussed post-disaster housing reconstruction and 
different approaches that are currently in use around the world.  
3.2. Disaster Knowledge in AJK 
Before the 2005 Kashmir earthquake hardly anyone was familiar with the 
term ‘disaster’ in AJK. ‘Hazard’, ‘disaster’, ‘resilience’, ‘reconstruction’, 
‘disaster management’ and other similar words were heard for the first time, 
even by the educated people, when foreigners, especially Westerners from 
developed countries, came to AJK soon after the earthquake. These 
terminologies remained buzz words for some time; without most local people 
knowing their meaning. Even today most of the people, even those working 
in the Disaster Management Agency, interpret ‘risk’, ‘hazard’, and ‘disaster’ 
to mean similar things. ‘Vulnerability’, ‘disaster mitigation’ and ‘sustainable 
development’ are still viewed as vague terms and the relationship between 
development and disaster vulnerability is irrelevant for development planners 
and disaster management professionals. Since there was no knowledge of 
the seismic hazard in the area until the earthquake struck in 2005, there was 
no risk framing at any level. After the earthquake, people took fatalistic 
(Balamir 2001) and divine-retributionist views of the event and attributed it to 
the punishment of their sins. Posters and graffiti appeared in Muzaffarabad 
and elsewhere immediately after the earthquake warning people that the 
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earthquake was a punishment by Allah for their sins and they should repent 
as soon as possible. This view is still held by many people. Bode (1977) has 
also noticed the divine wrath explanation of 1970 earthquake in Peruvian 
Andes. 
In order to understand the 2005 earthquake without society’s fatalist and 
devine-retributionst lenses, it is important to discuss this phenomenon in the 
light of wider academic debates because there is a growing body of research 
addressing different approaches to the issues of disaster management, 
disaster preparedness and post-disaster recovery (see, for example, 
Alexander 2006; Amendola et al. 2008; Bankoff et al. 2004; Bell 1999; Berke 
1995; Bilham 2009, 2013; Blaikie et al. 1994; Bosher et al. 2007; Canon et 
al. 2003; Collins 2009; Comfort et al. 1999; Cutter 1996; Gilbert 1998; 
Henderson 2004; Lewis 1999; Mohapatra et al. 2009; Quarantelli 1977, 
1998; Rosenthal 1998; Stromberg 2007; Wisner et al. 2004). The 
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR, 1990-1999) 
presented a major conceptual shift in the way disaster management has 
been conducted, namely from disaster response to disaster risk reduction 
(UN, 2004). Community participation has become a recognised element of 
successful disaster risk reduction policy and practice (Lyons et al. 2010). As 
a result, disaster response is suggested to need to look at disasters in the 
context of peoples’ vulnerability by recognising their existing capacities, 
addressing the root causes of vulnerability and embracing community 
participation. The concept of vulnerability is very important in disaster 
management (see, for example, Blaikie et al. 1994; Bosher et al. 2007; 
Collins 2009; Cutter 1996; Wisner et al. 2004).  
Following this, the focus of my research is the core theme of vulnerability, 
especially the relationship between development and vulnerability and the 
role of post-disaster reconstruction in addressing vulnerability.  
3.3. Understanding Disasters 
There are many different definitions of disaster; for example according to 
Stromberg (2007, p. 201) ‘[a]n event qualiﬁes as a disaster in the CRED 
database if at least one of the following criteria is fulﬁlled: 10 or more people 
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are reported killed; 100 or more people are reported affected, injured, and/or 
homeless; the government declares a state of emergency; or the government 
requests international assistance’. The United Nations defines disaster as 
“an event or series of events which gives rise to casualties and/or damage or 
loss of property, infrastructure, essential services or means of livelihood on a 
scale which is beyond the normal capacity of the affected community’s ability 
to cope without aid” (Kent 1994, p. 12). 
There is also a lot of debate in disaster literature towards understanding and 
interpretation of disasters. This debate is very important due to the reason 
that it leads to important policy implications regarding disaster management 
because disaster management policies are determined by the type of 
disaster approach adopted by a particular society. For example, if Gilbert’s 
(1998) “Pattern of war approach” is acceptable in a society, it will formulate 
policies which rely on technological fixes; if, on the other hand, Collins’ 
(2009) “disaster and development approach” is acceptable then such policies 
will be formulated which reduce the vulnerability of the population at risk and 
increase their resilience.  
3.3.1. Disaster Losses 
Natural disasters are causing ever increasing economic and human losses 
due to multiple factors such as growing population, economic and 
infrastructure development, and growing vulnerability of the people 
(Alexander 2006; Amaratunga & Haigh 2010; Aysan & Davis 2013; Berke 
1995; Bilham 2009, 2013; Collins 2009; Davis 2014; Ginige & Amaratunga 
2009; O’Keefe et al. 1976; O’Keefe & Westgate 1977; Seneviratne & 
Amaratunga 2009; Stromberg 2007; Thurairajah & Amaratunga 2009). 
Environmental disasters cost on average US$ 50 billion every year to the 
global economy (Amendola et al. 2008; Bell 1999). During 1980–2004 
disasters are estimated to have caused around US $1 trillion of direct 
economic damage at the global level (Stromberg 2007). According to the UN 
(UNISDR 2013) around 1.1 million people were killed, more than 2 billion 
people were affected and damage of more than US$ 1 trillion was caused by 
disasters during 2000-2011 (Figure 3.1).     
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9Figure 3.1 Global disaster losses.                                       (UNISDR 2013: no pagination) 
3.3.2. Uneven Distribution of Disaster Losses  
Though disasters hit nations across the world, the effects of these disasters 
are unevenly distributed among different nations (Ambraseyes & Bilham 
2011; Birkmann 2005; Bosher & Dainty 2011; Cannon 1994; Carter 2008; 
Cavallo & Noy 2010; Clarke & Munasinghe 1994; Dynes 2002; Frierra et al. 
2001; Gilbert 2001; Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2005; Loh 2005; Kellenberg & 
Mobarak (2008); Macabuag 2009: Moe & Pathranarakul 2006; Pandey et al. 
2008; Quarantelli 2003; Spence & So 2009; Toya & Skidmore 2007). In 
developed societies, hazards can cause great damage to property with 
associated high economic costs but commonly accrue a lower loss of life; 
whereas in the less-developed world there is commonly greater loss of life 
relative to economic losses (Aherns & Rudolf 2006; Bell 1999; Bhavani 2006; 
Bilham 2009; Bilham 2012; Birkmann 2006; Buttenheim 2009; Cavallo & Noy 
2010; DMTP 1997; Enarson & Morrow 1998a, 1998b; Ferreira et al. 2011; 
Hussein, cited in O’Keefe & Westgate 1977, p. 25-26; Henderson 2004; 
Kirkby et al. 1997; Mohapatra 2009; O’Keefe et al. 1976; Stroemberg 2007). 
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For example, more than 227,000 people were killed and US$ 10 billion 
economic losses were inflicted by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami caused 
by a Mw=9.1 earthquake; whereas the 2011 Mw=9.0 Tohoku earthquake and 
resulting Tsunami killed 20,000 people and caused US$ 200–300 billion 
economic losses in Japan (ADB 2005a; USGS 2013). Table 3.1 shows the 
distribution of losses between the developed and developing countries. It is 
evident from the table that the number of people killed in disasters is far 
higher in developing countries than the developed countries, despite the fact 
that all other variables are almost the same except for per capita GDP.  
4 Table 3.1 Comparing Disaster Losses in High- and Low-Income Countries.                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                 (Adapted from Stromberg 2007, p. 206) 
Country 
income 
category 
Number of 
disasters 
Population 
(million) 
Exposed 
pop. 
(million) 
Killed in 
disasters 
GDP per 
Capita 
(US$) 
High-
income 
1,476 828 440 75,425 23,021 
Low-
income 
1,533 869 496 907,810 1,345 
 
“Note: The 2nd and the 5th columns contain the numbers of natural disasters and number killed, respectively, over 
the period 1980–2004. The other columns contain characteristics in 1996. “Exposed pop.” is the population share in 
each country that live in areas in the top three deciles of risk exposure to volcanic activity, earthquakes, storms, 
floods, landslides, or droughts—multiplied by the population in the country and summed over the countries in the 
income group. The “Democracy index” is the population-weighted average POLITY IV Democracy index.” 
(Strömberg 2007: p. 206)  
 
This trend of an uneven distribution of losses is expected to continue into the 
future and disaster losses will continue to rise in the developing countries in 
the next century (Bilham 1988, p. 2012). The uneven distribution of disaster 
losses between the developed and the developing countries is nowhere 
more evident than in the case of earthquakes. According to Bilham (2009) 
similar sized earthquakes cause more fatalities in developing countries than 
in the developed nations; for example the 1992 Mw=7.3 Landers earthquake 
in California resulted in 1 death; whereas the 2005 Kashmir Mw=7.6 
earthquake killed more than 83,000 people. Bilham (2009) further observes 
that earthquakes cost more in developed countries in terms of financial 
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losses. For example, the Kashmir 2005 earthquake caused US$ 2 billion in 
losses (Bilham 2009); while the 2011 Tohoku earthquake caused US$ 225 
billion of direct losses (Capdevila et al. 2014). Figure 3.2 highlights this 
uneven distribution of losses for some of the major earthquakes in the world.  
 
10 Figure 3.2 Distribution of earthquake losses from 1906-2006.           (Bilham 2009, p. 882) 
 
However, authors such as Varley (1994) disagree with the simplistic 
interpretation of lesser economic losses in the developing world and suggest 
that this perspective is based on the crude and ill-informed view of the value 
of the property in developing countries because homes, cattle and other 
household belongings when converted into the western equivalent currencies 
may not have that much value in economic terms, but are valued a great 
deal more to those living in the developing countries.  
Even in economic terms, the developing countries suffer more drastic 
economic impacts than developed countries. For example, between 1970-
2001 disasters caused US $955 billion in economic losses worldwide but on 
a per capita basis, the losses were 20 times larger in developing countries 
than in industrialized nations (Bendimerad 2001; Yang 2005, cited in 
Kellenberg & Mobarak 2008, p.778-789). According to Qurentelli (2003) the 
economic costs of disasters often exceed 3%-4% of the GDP in the case of 
poor countries (in some East African countries the cost even exceeds 20%); 
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whereas in the developed countries these losses hardly figure, for example 
the 1992 Hurricane Andrew was the costliest disaster in the US history but 
US$ 24 billion losses were negligible in the country’s US$ 6 trillion economy.   
3.3.3. Disaster Approaches  
The uneven distribution of disaster losses between the developed and the 
developing world leads us to the understanding that the physical magnitude 
of the disaster event is not the only determinant of disaster losses. The 
degree of destruction is as much a function of the physical context in which 
the event happens as the nature of the hazard itself i.e. the vulnerability of 
people also determines the degree of loss apart from the physical magnitude 
of the event (Cuny 1983). The uneven distribution of losses not only poses 
serious challenges for post disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts, but 
also leads to conceptual debates on understanding disasters. Gilbert (1998) 
identifies three approaches/paradigms for understanding disasters. The first 
paradigm is the “Pattern of war approach” which developed as a result of two 
world wars. Here disaster is considered as a duplication of war in which the 
hazard is taken as an external agent affecting the human communities who 
have to defend/react to this aggression. The causes of disaster are sought 
outwardly, in nature, not within society. This approach can be categorized as 
an “agent-specific” approach and resembles the Realist theory of risk which 
treats risk as an objective set of phenomenon in the physical world. Kreps 
(1998), Oliver-Smith (1998), and Stallings (1998) all suggest an agent 
focused approach towards understanding disasters in which the physical 
agency is important in defining a disaster.  
The second paradigm is the “Disaster as social vulnerability” approach in 
which the disaster in not seen as a reaction to an external agent but as a 
social consequence, whereby the vulnerabilities of a society convert a 
hazard into a disaster (Clarke & Munasinghe 1994). This approach can be 
categorized as “social construction of disaster”, the social constructionist 
theory of risk which does not accept a risk simply as a phenomenon that can 
be isolated from its social, cultural and historical contexts (Lupton 1999).  
According to Bosher et al. (2007, p.4) different people and different 
communities have different levels of vulnerability so the ‘outcome of a 
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disaster is shaped both by the physical nature of the hazard and the 
vulnerability of people who are involved’. Since disasters are not simple 
physical occurrences but are entwined within human societies which have 
their own complexities and peculiarities, disaster research should be based 
on the analysis of communities and not on external physical agents alone 
(Aldrich 2010; Alexander 1997, 2012; Attiri et al. [no date]; Bosher et al. 
2007; Canon et al. 2003; Collins 2009; Comfort et al. 1999; Cutter et al. 
2000; Gilbert 1998; Henderson 2004; Hilhorst & Bankoff 2004; Lewis 1999; 
Malalgoda et al. 2014; Mohapatra et al. 2009; Quarantelli 1977, 1998; 
Rosenthal 1998; Stroemberg 2007; Yumarnia et al. 2014). Coburn et al. 
(1994) and Mileti (1999) distinguish three contributing factors to a disaster: 
the triggering hazard event (such as an earthquake or flood); the population 
exposed to the event; and the vulnerability of that population (Stroemberg 
2007). This concept of human contribution to disasters is not entirely new; 
while writing about the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, Stroemberg (2007, p. 199) 
highlights that Rousseau noted that ‘while the earthquake was an act of 
nature, previous acts of men, like housing construction and urban residence 
patterns, set the stage for the high death toll’.  
The third paradigm is the “disaster as uncertainty” approach in which 
disasters are seen as crises that develop within a society and these crises 
are the result of uncertainty. This uncertainty occurs in three ways: firstly, 
when a society is unable to define the causes and effects of a danger. 
Secondly, the uncertainty is the result of growing complexity in modern 
society. Thirdly, a society’s inability to define and understand a crisis 
situation through ordinary mental frameworks.   
An approach developed by Blaikie et al. (1994) attempts to reconcile these 
differences by combining hazard and vulnerability. This approach not only 
looks at the physical aspects of a natural hazard, but also at the vulnerability 
of the people to a hazard and their capacity to mitigate the effects of that 
hazard. Blaikie et al’s. (1994) ‘Pressure and Release’ model of hazards 
proposes that hazards represent one pressure and the characteristic of 
vulnerability (the physical phenomenon) and the other pressure comes from 
local geography and social stratification which cumulate into the progression 
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of vulnerability (the social phenomenon). These two pressures (i.e. the 
physical and the social phenomena) ultimately culminate into disasters. 
Cannon (1994), Collins (2009) and Nigg (1995) have further developed this 
approach by arguing that natural hazards should not be looked at as ‘natural’ 
disasters and that we should differentiate between hazard and disaster 
because hazards are natural, while disasters are not. Besides the magnitude 
of the event, it is the condition of the people (i.e. their vulnerability) which 
turns a hazard into a disaster (Oliver-Smith 1996).  
3.4. Disasters and Vulnerability  
The concept of vulnerability is central in understanding disasters and their 
mitigation (Cutter 1996; Manandhar & McEntire, 2014). According to Adger 
(2006, p. 268) the concept of vulnerability is a powerful analytical tool for 
describing the ‘states of susceptibility to harm, powerlessness, and 
marginality of physical and social systems and for guiding normative analysis 
of actions to enhance well-being through reduction of risk’. Despite being 
such a powerful and important tool, vulnerability is a much contested concept 
within the disaster literature (Cutter 1996; Cutter & Finch 2008; Cutter et al. 
2003, 2008; Kulatunga et al. 2014). There are many, sometimes conflicting, 
definitions of vulnerability. For example, Cutter (1996) has noted down 18 
different definitions of vulnerability in her article. These discrepancies or 
variations are due to epistemological reasons, methodological practices, and 
according to the type of disaster (ibid). UNISDR define vulnerability as ‘[T]he 
conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental 
factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the 
impact of hazards’ (HFA 2007, p.1). According to Blaikie et al. (1994, p. 11) 
vulnerability is ‘the characteristics of a person or group and their situation 
that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, and recover from the 
impact of a natural disaster’. Cutter (1996, p. 532) defines vulnerability as 
“the likelihood that an individual or group will be exposed to and adversely 
affected by a hazard”. Cannon (1994) and Cannon et al. (2003) are of the 
view that vulnerability not only describes the likelihood of being killed or 
injured by a hazard, but also that different people, who are at different levels 
of preparedness, embody different degrees of resilience and have different 
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capacities to cope with or recover from disaster. According to Brown et al. 
(2008) and Buttenheim (2009) disasters are more destructive to vulnerable 
populations particularly. 
The concept of vulnerability has been in use in disaster research as a 
diagnostic tool since the 1970s (Hewitt 1983, cited in Alexander 2012, p. 50) 
and many experts such as Alexander, Blaikie, Collins, Cutter, Kasperson et 
al., McEntire, O’Keefe et al. and Wisner have worked on the concept of 
vulnerability and its relationship with disasters. Neumayer & Plumper (2007) 
and O’Keefe et al. (1976), cited in Bosher & Dainty (2011, p. 3), argued long 
ago that the term ‘natural disaster’ was a ‘misnomer’ and ‘many disasters 
result from the combination of natural hazards and social and human 
vulnerability’. Cutter (2006), cited in Oven (2009, p. 26), has identified three 
themes in vulnerability research: vulnerability as risk/hazard, vulnerability as 
social response, and vulnerability of places. 
• Vulnerability as risk/hazard 
This theme focuses on the spatial distribution of certain hazardous 
conditions, the occupancy of these hazardous places by people, and the 
degree of loss associated with a particular event likely to impact people 
occupying these places (Ambraseys & Bilham 2011; Anderson 2000, cited in 
Oven 2009, p. 26; Burton et al. 1993; Kellenberg & Mobarak 2008; Oliver-
Smith 1998). 
• Vulnerability as Social Response 
Mainly worked upon by researchers such as Hewitt (1995) and Wisner et al. 
(2004), this theme highlights the social construction of vulnerability and its 
root causes; it focuses on those factors which make people vulnerable to 
disasters and the coping capacity and resilience of the exposed population, 
and how people anticipate, resist, and recover from disasters (Attiri et al. [no 
date]; Oliver-Smith 1998; Oven 2009; Shrestha & Dixit 2008; Wisner 1998). 
• Vulnerability of Places 
In this theme, vulnerability is conceived not only as a physical risk from a 
hazard but as a social response within a particular geographic domain 
(Turner et al. 2003; Cutter 1996, cited in Oven 2009, p. 26; Cutter et al. 
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2000; Bosher et al. 2007; Roosli & O'Keefe 2011). The combination and 
interaction of the social vulnerability and biophysical vulnerability creates the 
vulnerability of places (Cutter 1996, Cutter et al. 2000, 2003, 2008; Cutter & 
Finch 2008). Figure 3.3 lays out the vulnerability of places model which 
explains how various elements that constitute vulnerability interact with each 
other to produce the vulnerability of specific places and the people who 
occupy these places.  
 
11 Figure 3.3 The hazards of place model of vulnerability.                      (Cutter 1996, p. 536) 
 
As there is a lot of variation in the definition of vulnerability, there is also 
bifurcation in disaster literature about causes of vulnerability (Cutter 1996). 
However, most of the studies take a ‘political-economic’ perspective which 
looks into the role of political and economic conditions in shaping the social 
capabilities to cope with a disaster (ibid). A number of conceptual models 
were developed in later years to understand vulnerability and its causes 
(Oven 2009). The ‘Pressure and Release’ or PAR model developed by 
Blaikie et al. (1994) and Wisner et al. (2004) is one such model. According to 
the ‘Pressure and Release’ model a disaster is the product of two opposite 
forces i.e. the forces generating vulnerability and the physical exposure to 
hazard (Twigg 2001, cited in Oven 2009, pp. 28). Figure 3.4 explains the 
PAR model in which vulnerability progresses at three main levels: Root 
Causes, Dynamic Pressures, and Unsafe Conditions. The root causes of the 
vulnerability can be traced back to the economic and political systems which 
determine peoples’ level of access to power and resources within a society 
(Oven 2009, pp. 28-29). These root causes lead to dynamic pressures which 
55 
 
include lack of local institutional capacity, demographic and environmental 
pressures and reduced soil productivity (ibid).  
The Pressure and Release (PAR) model is a framework for analysing how 
natural hazards turn into disasters when they affect vulnerable people. 
According to Wisner (2004) vulnerability is rooted in social processes and 
underlying causes which may be quite remote from the disaster event itself. 
Hence the PAR model attempts to assess the progression of vulnerability in 
order to understand the root causes of a disaster. In this model the Pressure 
side focuses on those practices which generate the vulnerability and natural 
hazard event, while the Release side focuses on the reduction of the disaster 
to relieve the pressure and reduce vulnerability.  However, according to 
Wisner (2005) the use of taxonomies of vulnerable groups such as women, 
children, the elderly, and people with disabilities is not without problems. 
Although vulnerable groups may often have special needs, the taxonomic 
approach fails in that it produces too many ‘false positives’ (Fordham 1998; 
Morrow 1999). For example not all women are equally vulnerable. 
Communities (even individuals in a household) will vary in knowledge, skills, 
and rights to resources according to age, gender, social and cultural 
traditions. Levine (2004) proposed that vulnerability should not therefore be 
seen as a ‘group’ characteristic since this deprives individuals of exercising 
their autonomy. This is an important consideration in terms of resource 
allocation (an important factor in disaster vulnerability) because it could 
mean that resources are misdirected towards people who are regarded as 
vulnerable when they are actually not, whilst really vulnerable people are 
ignored. Wisner et al., (2004, p. 15) suggest that there is a movement away 
from the use of simple taxonomies or checklists of ‘vulnerable groups’ to a 
concern with “ vulnerable situations” which people move into and out of over 
time. The PAR model enables us to fully understand these vulnerable 
situations with a more contextual approach for assessing vulnerability; it 
focuses on understanding the processes that contribute to vulnerability 
production and social capacity building.  
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12 Figure 3.4 Pressure and Release (PAR) model: the progression of vulnerability.               
                                                                                                          (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 51) 
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These effects of combinations of particular indicator values compared with 
other combinations tend not be explored. We therefore need to know how 
vulnerabilities are compounded to create the most vulnerable (Wisner, 1993). 
There is a need to look more at the relationships between specific variables 
and social groups. One important question is whether there is truly a 
difference between social and economic vulnerability? Only parts of the PAR 
model will be relevant in each situation. Wisner et al., (2004) review both 
negative and positive examples of efforts to reduce vulnerability in various 
less developed countries in relation to floods and coastal storms, 
earthquakes and volcanos through the application of the PAR model. The 
root causes and dynamic pressures progress into unsafe conditions which 
include precarious physical environment, weak local economy, weak social 
structures, and ineffective public institutions. The level of vulnerability 
determines the level of exposure/disaster to a particular hazard.   
It can, therefore, be argued that a disaster is not a purely geophysical 
phenomenon but a combination of geophysical and social factors and can be 
summarized by the risk equation (Wisner et al. 2003, p. 45):  
Disaster = hazard x vulnerability 
Where hazard is a physical phenomenon and vulnerability is a social 
phenomenon. Vulnerability can be associated with poverty and development 
and ultimately linked with disaster mitigation (Ahrens & Rudolf 2006; Bosher 
& Dainty 2011; Clarke & Munasinghe 1994; Collins 2009). Abidi et al. (2011) 
and Schilderman (2010) find an inverse relationship between vulnerability 
and capacity and suggest that vulnerability may be reduced by increasing 
the capacity of the community. According to Sandoval & Boano (2014), PAR 
model is based on the pseudo-equation ‘DR = H x V’ (Disaster-Risk equals 
Hazards multiplied by Vulnerability) to explain vulnerability and its 
progression as an important factor in causing disasters. The PAR model 
assumes that societies might have little control over natural hazards but 
societies can really fight against disaster impacts and work towards disaster 
risk reduction by addressing vulnerability and its progression. The 
progression of vulnerability is organised from root causes, dynamic 
pressures to unsafe conditions. The root causes of disasters may be 
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understood as “an interrelated set of widespread and general processes 
within a society and the world economy” (Wisner et al., 2004, p.52); 
examples may include political regimes or economic crises, among others. 
On the other hand, root causes may trigger dynamic pressures such as lack 
of prevention and preparedness. Similarly, dynamic pressures may generate 
particular unsafe conditions such as people living in hazardous locations or 
in unsafe and poor quality buildings (Sandoval & Boano, 2014). Wisner et al. 
(2004, p.6) suggest that though hazards are also very important element of 
disasters, these are mere “triggers” of disasters and not their root causes. 
Other crucial circumstances such as where people live, their levels of 
preparedness, hazard protection, hazard information, education, economic 
conditions and health are some of the important determinants of the impacts 
of a hazardous event. However, these circumstances have nothing to do 
with nature as such; they are produced by social, economic and political 
factors (Sandoval & Boano, 2014). Hence, disasters are a socially 
constructed phenomenon; and vulnerability is also a phenomenon governed 
by socio-economic and political processes.  
Basically, vulnerability is a main factor in the causation of disasters due to 
the reason that it will define the level of impact of a hazardous event. On the 
other hand, although unsafe conditions are evident at minor geographical 
scales (Pelling, 2003, cited in Sandoval & Boano, 2014), root causes and 
dynamic pressures are nested at major scales; both spatially and temporally. 
From root causes to unsafe conditions, vulnerability progresses at different 
spatial levels depending on the characteristics and circumstances of 
particular socio-economic and political processes involved in its progression.  
The PAR model presents a logic chain of explanation where the progression 
of the local-evident vulnerability is devised to explain the causation of 
disasters by natural events. However, this logic is embedded to and only 
works under the political economy perspective of national or global systems. 
In other words, the multi-scalar perspective of the PAR model can only be 
supported when a local community participate of and is influenced by a 
larger system –e.g. national State and/or global economy–. In addition, other 
question arise for further analysis: if vulnerability and risk may be understood 
as the result of particular socio-economic and political processes which, in 
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turn, are geographically scaled, do vulnerability and risk play a role in the 
social production of specific geographical scales? In other words, it may be 
possible that vulnerability and risk can be influenced by geographical scales 
configurations and, in turn, vulnerability and risk may influence these scalar 
configurations (Sandoval & Boano, 2014) 
Vulnerability has been argued to be a result of poverty and is closely linked 
with livelihoods, class, gender, and ethnicity (Bhavani 2006; Cannon 1994; 
Clarke & Munasinghe 1994; Cutter et al. 2000, 2003; Cutter & Finch 2008; 
DMTP 1997; Elliott & Pais 2006; Hilhorst & Bankoff 2004; Manyena et al. 
2011). For example poor people are more likely to have substandard 
construction in vulnerable locations which prove fatal in case of seismic 
activity (Bilham & Gaur 2013). According to Bosher et al. (2007) fatalities 
due to seismic activity are widely prevalent in the developing countries due 
to faulty construction, whereas developed countries have greatly minimised 
these fatalities due to standardised construction practices and higher 
construction standards. People are likely to be less vulnerable when their 
livelihoods are adequate and sustainable; thus it is most often the poor or 
most marginalized who are disproportionately affected by a disaster (Ahrens 
& Rudolph 2006; Albala-Bertrand 1999; Ambraseys & Bilham 2011; Attiri et 
al. [no date]; Canon et al. 2003; Chandrasekhar 2010; Clarke & Munasinghe 
1994; Cutter 2006; Cutter & Emrich 2006; Cutter & Finch 2008; Cutter et al. 
2000, 2003; DMTP 1997; Gangapati et al. 2012; Gupta & Sharma 2006; 
Henderson 2004; Mohapatra et al. 2009; Neumayer & Plumper 2007; Nigg 
1995; Schilderman 1993; Shrestha & Dixit 2008; Stroemberg 2007; Toya & 
Skidmore 2007; Wisner 2009; Yohe et al. 2002). Cutter (2006) has 
excellently evaluated the class and race factors in creating flood vulnerability 
in New Orleans which ultimately culminated in the catastrophe of Hurricane 
Katrina. Collins (2009), while explaining the relationship between poverty 
and vulnerability, has considered many factors such as poverty, 
environmental factors, marginalization, and conflict etc. (Figure 3.5). 
According to Collins (2009, p. 74), since poor people frequently live and work 
in environmentally poor locations, they lack income and have little or no 
access to ‘basic technology’ and ‘basic rights’ so they stay poor. 
Consequently, in order to survive they tend to exploit natural resources in 
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unsustainable manner. These poor people are forced into a cycle where they 
‘compromise’ their investments in basic amenities such as health, education 
and general wellbeing to name a few (ibid). As a consequence, this 
‘impoverished environment’ aggravates poverty; however, poverty impacts 
people according to the level of their vulnerability. In this way the cycle not 
only perpetuates itself, but also ‘progressively increases the gap between 
the rich and the poor, or between the poor and poorest of the poor’ (ibid).   
 
 
 
13Figure 3.5 An integrated poverty and environment view of humanitarian disasters. (Collins 
2009, p. 73) 
 
Poverty, at individual and national levels, not only creates disaster 
vulnerability; it affects disasters losses also, especially life losses. Figure 3.6 
shows the distribution of deaths per 100,000 population according to per 
capita GDP. It is evident from the graph that there is a negative relationship 
between GDP and life losses i.e. with increasing GDP the number of deaths 
decreases or vice versa.   
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14 Figure 3.6 Distribution of life losses per 100,000 population according to GDP/Capita.                                                    
                                                                                        (Kellenberg & Mobarak 2008, p. 791) 
3.5. Development and Disasters – a complex relationship   
The concept of relationship between development and disasters is relevantly 
new. Cuny (1983) and Cutter (1996) are the earliest researchers to work on 
this approach. McEntire (2004) observes that the relationship between 
disasters and development is highly complex and divides this relationship 
into two broad categories. One is the radical theory in Marxian tradition 
represented by Kenneth Hewitt (1983). This theory asserts that poverty is the 
major cause of disasters: poor people are more likely to live in hazardous 
areas, less capable of taking disaster mitigation measures such as 
insurance, and generally have lesser access to better health and education 
facilities. This theory suggests restructuring of social, political and economic 
relations to reduce vulnerability (ibid). According to Collins (2009, p. 252) ‘to 
reduce poverty is to reduce disaster’.   
The other theory is the cultural or institutional theory influenced by Weber 
and mainly represented by Dennis Mileti (1999). According to this theory, 
culture is the main determining factor of disasters i.e. people generally show 
apathy to disaster issues; the importance of mitigation measures is ignored 
by individuals, businesses, and governments; risky development options, 
62 
 
insufficient knowledge of hazards and weak government policies and 
institutions make people vulnerable to disasters (ibid). The solution is 
changes in the beliefs and behaviours of the society and increased 
rationalization and bureaucratization as a means to reduce the effects of 
hazards (ibid).  
McEntire (2004) points out shortcomings in both these approaches and 
suggests a third approach which synthesises the strengths of both the 
approaches outlined above. Blaikie et al. (1994), Burton et al. (1993), Geis 
(2000), McEntire (2004), McEntire et al. (2002) and Weichselgartner (2001), 
among many others, have worked on this approach (ibid). The theme that 
emerges from this approach is that if people are to be resilient to disasters, 
their vulnerability must be reduced. Development process can increase or 
decrease disaster vulnerability (Bari 1998; Birkmann 2006; Brooks et al. 
2005; Clarke & Munasinghe 1994; Delaney & Shrader 2000; McEntire 2004; 
O’Keefe et al. 1976; Schilderman 1993; Toya and Skidmore 2007; White et 
al. 2005). Collins (2009, p.14) terms this approach as the “disaster and 
development approach”, which considers a disaster not only as a natural 
phenomenon but also as a function of development. This concept 
emphasizes that a disaster can be seen either as the consequence of there 
being insufficient development to avoid a human crisis or, alternatively, the 
development process can itself enhance human exposure to disasters 
(Ahrens & Rudolph 2006; Amaratunga et al. 2014; Bosher & Dainty 2011; 
Bremer 2003; Clarke & Munasinghe 1994; DMTP 1997; Gilbert 2001; 
Hannan 2002; Hilhorst & Bankoff 2004; Manandhar & McEntire 2014; 
McEntire 2004; Mohapatra et al. 2009; Palliyaguru et al. 2009; Pelling & Dill 
2010; Schilderman 1993; Seneviratne & Amaratunga 2009; UNISDR 2002).  
According to Majova (2010) Collins’ concept of disaster and development is 
taken in the context where development can have either positive or negative 
impact on disasters, or where stage and quality of development determine 
whether or not certain negative events become disaster. Disasters are 
understood from the functional perspective of being a consequence of 
insufficient development of protection against vulnerability and insufficient 
adaptation to new conditions in times of crisis. There is still gap between the 
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goal of reducing vulnerability and its achievement despite growing 
importance of sustainable development. ‘Disaster and development’ 
approach emphasises the importance of risk assessment and its reduction in 
development activities. As explained by Collins (2009, p. 14) ‘disaster occurs 
through exposure to an adverse hazard; in the ‘wrong place’ at the ‘wrong 
time’ with inadequate forms of protection. The rationale hence is that in as 
much as an earthquake, tsunami, hurricane or flood might be part of nature, 
the process of human development has not adapted sufficiently to avoid 
crisis.’ 
According to Ozerdam (2003), cited in Pyles and Cross (2008, p. 387) 
‘complex disasters are often the result of unresolved development 
challenges’. Cannon et al. (2003) suggest that the aim of the development 
work should be to protect and reinforce livelihoods of the people in such a 
way that they are more resilient to hazards and better protected from them. 
While explaining the disproportionate impacts of disasters on developing 
countries, a World Bank study (Gilbert 2001) identifies the lack of 
development to be the main reason for higher disaster losses. This study 
observes that the lack of development not only results in poor quality 
construction due to lack of building control and land registration processes 
but also displaces the governments’ development priorities from disaster 
mitigation to other sectors. Disaster mitigation is linked with sustainable and 
equitable development which ultimately stems from good governance 
(Ahrens & Rudolf 2006; Avellaneda 2009; Gupta et al. 1998; Seneviratne & 
Amaratunga 2009). According to Manandhar & McEntire (2014, p. 22) 
disasters and development have contradictory connotations – death, 
destruction, psychological trauma, disruption of social networks, loss of 
livelihoods, disruption of the development process, and impacts on economy 
are some of the outcomes of disasters; whereas ‘economic prosperity, 
technological advancement, poverty reduction, modern amenities, education, 
freedom, and perhaps even equality’ are equated with development. Abidi et 
al. (2011) and Ahmad et al. (2011) find an inverse relationship between 
vulnerability and capacity i.e. vulnerability may be reduced by increasing the 
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capacity of a community and they argue that this approach should be made 
part of the normal development process of a society.  
The Disaster Management Training Programme (DMTP) (1994, 1997), 
McEntire (2004), and Fordham (2007) cited in Manandhar & McEntire (2014, 
p. 22) identify four ways in which disaster and development support and 
conflict each other: development increases vulnerability to disasters, 
development reduces vulnerability to disasters, disasters set back 
development, and disasters provide development opportunities. Figure 3.6 
shows different orientations with which the relationship between 
development and disaster vulnerability may be explained. The field is divided 
into “positive” and “negative” aspects of development/disaster.  On the right 
side of the diagram is the positive realm and to the left is the negative realm. 
Development can have both positive as well as negative impacts i.e. on the 
positive side the development can reduce vulnerability whereas on the 
negative side it can increase vulnerability. Similarly disaster can also have 
both positive and negative aspects; on the positive side the disaster can 
provide development opportunities whereas on the negative side it can set 
back development. However, Albala-Bertrand does not agree with the notion 
that disasters set back development, and says ‘[D]isasters are primarily a 
problem of development, not essentially a problem for development’ (Dynes 
2002, p. 39).  
According to DMTP (1997) regular development programmes can 
incorporate a wide range of disaster mitigation measures to reduce disaster 
vulnerability. For example strengthening of urban utility systems, transport 
infrastructure, and industrial support; incorporation of hazard resistant 
building techniques and use of building codes in the construction culture of 
the country; investments in improvement of working and resource base of 
public administration institutions; improvement in forestry and agriculture 
practices, and improvement and diversification of livelihoods of the people 
are some of the mitigation measures that can reduce disaster vulnerability to 
great extent (ibid).   
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15 Figure 3.7 Disaster-Development relationship.                                     (DMTP 1997, p. 12) 
However, poorly planned development interventions may offset the benefits 
of development investments and can become a source of risk (DMTP 1997; 
Hannan 2002; McEntire 2004, cited in Manandhar & McEntire 2014, p. 22; 
O’Brien et al. 2006; Palliyaguru et al. 2009). For example, the use of low 
quality construction materials and poor building techniques during 
development may increase vulnerability to disasters. Similarly development 
may induce population growth, rapid and unplanned urbanization, and 
environmental degradation due to infrastructure development and 
industrialization which might create new disaster vulnerabilities (Alexander 
2006; Bouwer et al. 2007; Canon 1994; Clarke & Munasinghe 1994; Collins 
2009, cited in Manandhar & McEntire 2014, p. 22; Kellenberg & Mobarak 
2008; Palliyaguru et al. 2009). Collins (2009) also highlights the inadvertent 
and negative impacts of development ‘such as mass displacement through 
industrialization, the demand for energy, economic boom and bust, erosion 
of livelihoods, development induced conflicts, environmental degradation and 
social economic collapse that causes vulnerability to hazards’ (p. 29). While 
challenging the mainstream view that economic development and disaster 
vulnerability have a positive relationship, Kellenberg & Mobarak (2008) 
propose that although this notion is generally correct for the majority of 
countries, in the case of very low levels of income this relationship may be 
negative i.e. economic development may increase disaster vulnerability by 
66 
 
changing the micro behaviour of the people in such a way that it increases 
the aggregate exposure to disasters. Ahrens & Rudolf 2006 and McEntire et 
al. (2002, p. 271) are also of the view that the relationship between 
sustainable development and sustainable hazards mitigation is not too clear 
and it is not clear whether “sustainable development addresses all of the 
variables related to disaster”.  
Realising this weakness, McEntire et al. (2002, p. 271) have proposed the 
concept of "invulnerable development" by which they mean “development 
pursued in such a manner as to address vulnerabilities” by altering the 
cultural attitudes about disasters; linking development practices to 
vulnerability reduction; and building of emergency management institutions. 
This approach goes beyond the sustainable development approach. Collins 
(2009, p. 8) have suggested that ‘disaster management should be linked with 
sustainable development.’ Overall it suggests that development should not 
be devoid of risk of future disasters and should not result in causing 
vulnerability to disasters. As development is on the main item on the agenda 
of modern day governments, especially in the developing countries which still 
have to go a long way on the road of development, governments need to 
make ‘real development choices’ mainly ‘in terms of disaster protection, 
including the chance to shape human behaviour and the institution that 
govern’ (ibid, p. 15).   
3.6. Disasters as a Window of Opportunity 
Though disasters are devastating events which disrupt life and cause human 
and financial losses, they also provide a "window of opportunity" (Alexander 
& Davis 201; Chang 1984; Enarson 2001, p.1; Manandhar & McEntire 2014; 
Thurairajah & Amaratunga 2009) to learn from past mistakes, and to attempt 
to set things right. According to Birkmann (2006) disasters have a positive 
side by revealing the vulnerabilities of a society they provide the opportunity 
to reduce them. Abidi (2011), Asgray et al. (2006); Broadbent & Broadbent 
(2006); Cavallo & Noy (2009), Cuny (1983), DMTP (1997), Gupta & Sharma 
(2008); Hannan 2002; Mahdi & Mahdi (2013); Manandhar & McEntire (2014), 
Mohapatra et al. (2009), and Nigg & Tierney (1993) observe that post-
disaster development can provide opportunities to learn from mistakes, 
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enhance the internal strengths of the communities, prepare them for future 
disasters, improve their adaptive capacity and even in certain cases 
economic development. Disasters are mostly followed by an influx of foreign 
and domestic resources which might help in tackling the long standing 
weaknesses, such as low-income housing and access to land (Schilderman 
2010).  
Reconstruction after disasters is important for national governments and 
humanitarian organizations alike. It not only has humanitarian ambitions, but 
economic, political and social aspects as well and can provide an opportunity 
to make amends for past mistakes and reduce vulnerability of the population 
at risk (Abidi et al. 2011; Albala-Bertrand 1993; Archer et al. 2011; Bassard 
et al. 2012; Berke et al. 2006; Brassard & Raffin 2012; DMTP 1997; 
Guarnacci 2012; Hallegatte & Duma 2008). Post-disaster reconstruction is 
the most direct and effective medium for reducing vulnerability of the 
population at risk (Abidi et al. 2011; Archer & Boonyabancha 2011; Bassard 
et al. 2015; Berke et al. 1993). The element of mitigation is very important in 
reducing vulnerability. Both structural or technical and non-structural or 
regulatory measures can be taken during the reconstruction phase to 
incorporate the element of mitigation (Bell 1999). By using the concept of 
“Build Back Better”, post-disaster reconstruction can be used to create safer, 
sustainable and resilient communities (Mannakkara 2013, p.315). According 
to Manandhar & McEntire (2014) many communities switch over to better 
construction practices and building techniques after a disaster. A city that 
was completely destroyed by a disaster (for example Muzaffarabad, Bagh, 
and Balakot cities in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake) may find it a golden 
opportunity to adopt better urban planning strategies to reduce future 
disaster vulnerability (ibid). Researchers such as Loh (2005) and Mohapatra 
et al. (2009) see post-disaster reconstruction as a development opportunity 
in lesser developed nations; though a lack of funds might prove a hindrance 
to better development initiatives in poor countries (Cavallo & Noy 2010; 
Manandhar & McEntire, 2014).  
However Berke & Campanella (2006) and Enarson (2001, p. 1) warn that the 
window of opportunity quickly shuts in a rush to return to “normalcy” after a 
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major disaster and suggests that there should be long-term planning to 
address all those socio-economic, political and gender arrangements which 
initially made people vulnerable to disasters (this is exactly what happened in 
case of Pakistan in later disasters after the 2005 earthquake). Nigg & Tierney 
(1993) and Boano & Hunter (2010) warn that in some cases disasters could 
provide an opportunity for dominant groups or classes in a society to retain 
or even expand their control over resources. As a solution Manandhar & 
McEntire (2014) suggest that a new kind of development paradigm is needed 
to address these issues; a development which not only caters for poverty 
reduction, economic development, and sustainability but is also sensitive to 
future disasters and aims to reduce disaster vulnerability of the people. 
3.7. Post-disaster Housing Reconstruction 
Housing is one of the most important issues for millions of people worldwide. 
For most of the people, a house is the most valuable and biggest asset 
(Schilderman 2010); this is especially true in poor developing countries 
where there are no mortgage and other financial support systems in the 
housing sector and most people spend a lifetime’s income on housing. 
Unfortunately this prized possession becomes the usual target of disasters 
such as floods, earthquake, and landslides. Housing damage is the single 
greatest component of all losses (lives, livelihoods, economic and 
infrastructure) in the aftermath of disasters (Cuny 1983; Barenstein & Pittet 
2007; Comerio 1997; Kumar et al. 2014). Globally, approximately 97% of 
those made homeless by disasters are from developing countries (Gilbert 
2001). Figure 3.7 shows losses to the housing sector in Kashmir caused by 
the 8th October 2005 earthquake. Both of these figures show that the 
damage to the housing sector (both in monetary and numerical terms), is 
overwhelming as compared to other sectors. 
It has also been established that building collapse (mostly residential 
buildings) is the biggest cause of casualties (Alexander 2012; Aysan & Davis 
2013; Comerio 1997; Nigg (1995); Pandey et al. 2008; Spence & So 2009).  
According to Bilham (2009) building collapse is responsible for most of the 
fatalities in earthquakes, especially from residential buildings in developing 
countries. 
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16 Figure 3.8 Damage to housing sector due to 2005 earthquake in Azad Jammu & Kashmir.                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                      (Based on the SERRA data)  
 
Housing damage gives rise to many other social and developmental issues 
such as land tenure, ownership, urbanization, inheritance, land-use planning, 
livelihoods, construction technologies, business opportunities and job skills 
(Cuny 1983). Similarly, political issues like securing electoral constituencies, 
gratification of political allies and victimization of political opponents; and, 
cultural issues like disruption and redefinition of traditional social networks 
due to displacement, formation of new social hierarchies and gatekeeping by 
social elite, become all too evident in post-disaster situations (ibid). 
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According to Nigg (1995) housing losses can have devastating effects on 
post disaster recovery.  
Housing is also critical in disaster situations as a matter of human rights. The 
right to housing is interrelated more widely, including protection from forced 
evictions and the right of all persons to be protected against arbitrary 
displacement to locations distant from their homes or habitual places of 
residence (Barber 2008). There is a growing understanding that while 
providing this right (whether via temporary shelters or in permanent housing) 
priority should be given to original sites (The Sphere 2011), as this territorial 
unit is both a physical as well as a symbolic phenomenon (Boano & Hunter 
2010). People have material as well as emotional attachments with their 
places of permanent abode. Thus the right to housing thereby implies the 
right to the place where the family had lived prior to the disaster (Audefroy 
2010). If the disaster affected people are given shelter away from their 
original homesteads (as usually happens in post-disaster situations), the 
individual or the community must change the physical and symbolic points of 
reference, which can result in organizational and social problems (ibid). 
Housing is important with respect to vulnerability point of view as well. Post-
disaster housing reconstruction can address pre-disaster vulnerability by 
introducing safe construction techniques, new and improved building control 
mechanisms, and hazard sensitive land use planning (Schilderman 2010).  
3.7.1. Housing Reconstruction Approaches  
Due to the scale of post-disaster reconstruction and the implicit associated 
importance as discussed above, housing is one of the most important focus 
areas in most post-disaster reconstruction efforts (Davis 1978; Gangapati et 
al. 2012; Roosli & O'Keefe 2011). According to Audefroy (2010) post-
disaster housing is a very peculiar case in the sense that it refers not only to 
those people who have both been through traumatic phases of a disaster, 
but to those also who have lost their most important asset. Moreover, people 
are usually uprooted and displaced by large disasters triggering important 
changes in property rights, social structures and livelihoods (Bhavani 2006; 
Deng 2010). Housing reconstruction plays a very important role in restoring 
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normality to the communities uprooted by disasters. This necessitates that 
housing reconstruction should start as quickly as possible to minimize the 
period of emergency housing.  
The complexity of disaster situations and the different nature of vulnerability 
lead to the need to design housing reconstruction programmes according to 
the specific situation of the affected community (Audefroy 2010; Bhavani 
2006; Gangapati et al. 2012) because one approach does not fit all societies. 
It is for this reason that over a period of time different housing reconstruction 
approaches have been adopted after various disasters. These approaches 
can be broadly divided into four categories (Chang et al. 2010; Jha & Duyne 
2010; Maly & Shiozaki 2012):  
3.7.1.1. Unconditional Cash Approach 
Under this approach the government gives a financial assistance package 
without any technical support or conditionality. Most developed countries, 
especially the USA, adopt this approach. In the USA the government tends to 
take a less active and indirect role in post disaster housing recovery, which is 
mainly limited to supporting the poorest families via grants and low interest 
rate loans through the so-called ‘safety nets’ system of the Federal Disaster 
Management Agency (FEMA). Otherwise households mainly draw on their 
own resources, insurance, and private capital to finance the reconstruction of 
homes (Kondo 2008; Lu et al. 2007; McCarthy 2008). This approach has 
been criticised, by writers including Dunford & Li (2011); James et al. (2006); 
Rodney et al. (2011) pointing to many problems in the ‘post-Katrina 
reconstruction’ programme, including racially discriminatory policies and 
practices that contributed to the disparity in the African Americans’ return to 
New Orleans.  
3.7.1.2. Community/Donor-driven Reconstruction 
In this approach, community organizations are actively involved in decision 
making, design and construction management. Financial and/or material 
assistance is not given to the affected people directly, but is channelled 
through community organizations. Post-2004 tsunami reconstruction in Aceh 
is one such example where humanitarian organisations used a variety of 
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different construction approaches that were broadly divided into two 
categories: ‘community built’ and ‘contractor-built’ (Daly & Brassard 2011). 
This approach faced many problems such as slow pace of construction, poor 
quality construction, and suitability of the reconstructed houses (Rand et al. 
2011).   
3.7.1.3. Agency-driven Reconstruction 
Here contractors are hired for the construction of houses and the construction 
is managed by either governmental or dedicated non-governmental agencies. 
The government driven housing reconstruction in Kobe, Japan after the 1995 
earthquake is one such example of this type of intervention. Due to minimal 
participation of beneficiaries, this top-down approach led to many problems 
for Kobe residents, such as the housing being located far from residents’ 
former neighbourhoods making it difficult for them to recover their daily lives; 
the housing being limited to the elderly and low-income groups; and 
construction taking a long time (Maly et al. 2012).  
3.7.1.4. Owner-driven Reconstruction (ODR) 
This final approach is relatively new and was first practiced in Gujarat, India 
after the earthquake of 2001 (Abidi et al. 2011; Twigg 2006). Under this 
approach the government gives conditional financial assistance (usually at 
different stages of construction) accompanied by regulations and technical 
support to ensure better housing reconstruction. ODR has been practised 
with some variations, in India after the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, in Iran after 
the 2003 Bam earthquake, and in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake (SIDA 
2008). In Gujarat, more than 200,000 houses were rebuilt and about one 
million were repaired (Jha et al. 2010; World Bank 2002), with 80% through 
ODR and the remaining 20% through a Public Private Partnership approach 
(Barenstein & Iyengar 2008; GSDMA 2002; Twigg 2006). In the case of Bam, 
the private housing reconstruction was the responsibility of the Housing 
Foundation of Islamic Revolution (HFIR) which adopted a bottom-up 
community based approach for the purpose of housing reconstruction (Fallahi 
2007; Gharaati 2006; UN 2004). The home owners were provided with 
various construction methods, construction material and technology options. 
As compared to past approaches, people had more input in the decision 
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making process (Ghafory-Ashtiany & Hosseini 2008; Gharaati 2006; 
Omidwar et al. 2011). In China, the government adopted the ODR approach 
after the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008. Owners were given a 16,000-21,000 
RMB (approx. US$ 2300-3000) subsidy and interest free loans (Audefroy 
2011; Ge et al. 2010) to construct their homes.  
In Pakistan, after the earthquake of 2005, the Government of Pakistan 
started the private housing reconstruction programme as part of the overall 
reconstruction and rehabilitation programme by establishing the Earthquake 
Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA). A Housing Reconstruction 
Policy was formulated by the ERRA in consultation with UN-HABITAT and 
more than 80 international and national organizations (ADB 2011). The 
‘Owner Driven’ approach was incorporated in most of the guiding principles 
such as utilizing local knowledge and capacities, restoration of livelihoods of 
the affected people and the use of local construction materials (Qazi 2008).  
Three main components of this policy were: (a) cash grants for reconstruction 
or retrofitting; (b) technical assistance; and, (c) capacity building of all 
affected stakeholders (ERRA 2006). Owners were expected to use their own 
labour and/or hire labour as well as recycle building materials as far as 
possible from the debris of their damaged homes (ERRA 2006; Qasim et al. 
2010; Shah 2012). By September 2012, a total of 419,624 (96.14 % of the 
ERRA’s portfolio) houses had been declared as reconstructed/repaired 
(www.erra.pk/). According to Abidi (2011) this approach has several 
advantages such as lower administrative cost, higher social adaptability and 
acceptability, speedy and good quality reconstruction, and the introduction of 
new and improved construction techniques into the local construction culture. 
However, Schilderman & Lyons (2011) have noticed some weaknesses in the 
owner-driven approach such as being top-down and exclusionary, ignoring 
those people who do not have land titles, and not addressing the 
vulnerabilities of the people. 
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3.8. Summary  
In this chapter I have discussed the theoretical framework of my research. 
Disasters, vulnerability, and development come out as central themes in this 
chapter. I have discussed that disaster losses (both human and economic) 
are increasing with the passage of time due to growing population, 
infrastructure development, and growing vulnerability of the people. 
However, these losses are unevenly distributed between the developed and 
the developing countries. In the developed world there is lesser loss of life 
and more economic losses; whereas in the developing countries the life 
losses are exceptionally high and the economic losses are lower as 
compared to developed countries.  
This uneven distribution of losses between the developed and the developing 
countries leads to the understanding that the physical magnitude of the 
disaster event is not the only determinant of disaster losses; the degree of 
loss is more dependent on the physical context in which the event happens 
(Cuny 1983). I also discussed the conceptual debate that ensues from this 
uneven distribution of disaster losses. Gilbert’s (1998) three paradigms were 
discussed as an example of this debate.  
The concept of vulnerability is central in understanding disasters. Cutter 
(2006) has identified three themes in vulnerability research: vulnerability as 
risk/hazard, vulnerability as social response, and vulnerability of places. The 
“Pressure and Release” model developed by Blaikie et al. (1994) looks at 
hazard as a physical phenomenon and vulnerability as a social phenomenon 
which ultimately culminates into disaster. The relationship between 
development and disaster vulnerability is highly complex. McEntire (2004) 
divides this relationship into two broad categories: the radical theory (Hewitt 
1983) asserts that poverty is the main cause of disasters and restructuring of 
social, political, and economic relations can reduce vulnerability; the cultural 
theory (Mileti 1999) looks at culture as main determining factor of disasters 
and the solution is changes in beliefs and behaviours of the society. McEntire 
(2004) puts forward a third approach which combines the benefits of these 
two approaches. The central theme of this approach is that if people are to 
be made resilient to disasters, their vulnerability must be reduced. 
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Development plays an important role in disaster vulnerability in two ways; 
development can reduce vulnerability and development can increase 
vulnerability (DMTP 1997). Collins (2009, p.14) terms this approach as 
“disaster and development approach”, which considers a disaster not only as 
a natural phenomenon but also as a function of development. This concept 
emphasizes that a natural disaster can be seen either as the consequence of 
there being insufficient development to avoid a human crisis or, alternatively, 
the development process can itself enhance human exposure to disasters.  
For the purpose of my research, I have relied on the ‘Pressure and Release’ 
or PAR model developed by Blaikie et al. (1994), further developed by 
Wisner et al. (2004) and Collins (2009) “disaster and development 
approach”. By using these approaches I will try to find out how the 
development policies of the Government of AJK made its people vulnerable 
to seismic hazard.  
I have also discussed how disasters can work as a window of opportunity to 
reduce past vulnerabilities and what the importance of housing in post-
disaster reconstruction is. Four mainstream housing reconstruction 
approaches (i.e. Unconditional cash grant approach, Community-driven 
reconstruction, Agency-driven reconstruction, and Owner-driven 
reconstruction) were also discussed.   
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents my research methodology. The motivation for 
undertaking this research project is outlined in section 4.2. Methodological 
tools are discussed in section 4.3 and section 4.4 discusses data collection 
methods. In section 4.5, I present different methodological tools employed 
during fieldwork. Section 4.6 outlines the research timeline. In section 4.7, I 
have discussed the methods used for analysis of the data collected during 
fieldwork; section 4.7.1 describes quantitative data analysis and section 4.7.2 
describes qualitative data analysis. Section 4.8 discusses geographical 
context of the research. Section 4.9 discusses my positionality vis-à-vis 
research. Finally, section 4.10 concludes with a brief summary of the 
chapter.        
4.2. Why Undertake a PhD? 
This is the question that I have to frequently face since the day I decided to 
do PhD. The reason for people asking this question is my professional 
background. I am a civil servant by profession. Being a legacy of the British 
Raj in the Subcontinent, the civil service is considered to be the most 
prestigious career and ultimate dream of millions in Pakistan (Sohail 1990, 
2007; Kalia 2013; Shafqat 1999; Tanwir & Fennell 2010). After working in the 
AJK civil service for more than two decades I was at the peak of my career 
when I decided to do this PhD; I was working as Secretary to the 
Government of AJK at that time. This position brings many perks with it; 
good salary, official chauffer driven car/s, official residential accommodation, 
servants, personal staff, immense influence and connections, and a general 
feeling of authority in the society. All these things are necessary tools for 
survival in a socially highly stratified and developing post-colonial society 
(Hafeez 1985; Mohmand & Gazdar 2007; UK Essays 2013). So leaving such 
an ideal career for doing PhD when, in the words of a colleague of mine, I 
still had thirteen years to “enjoy the secretary-ship” was an incomprehensible 
decision for many. Most of them had found my decision of joining the 
reconstruction programme instead of continuing as Deputy Commissioner a 
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crazy decision as well. My colleagues were equally confused and unhappy 
with my decision and tried to convince me not to pursue PhD; one of them 
even asked me if I had calculated the “payback” period in financial terms 
because according to him it was too late for me to do PhD. I was 47 at that 
time and had thirteen years to retire from service. My colleagues continually 
tried to persuade me to leave my PhD project and resume my job and each 
time I had to request them to spare me for a few more months. I am one of 
those lucky people who have a big circle of sincere friends. Only one or two 
understood my decision, the rest are still unhappy and use various tactics 
(including emotional blackmailing) to bring me back to “normal life”. But 
perhaps the most difficult thing was to convince my family and leave them 
behind for a few years; my kids were growing and needed me the most, my 
wife found it extremely difficult to survive on her own due to particular socio-
cultural makeup of the society, and then my in-laws and extended family. I 
must admit that throughout this period, I had been under tremendous 
pressure due to my decision, especially when the PhD degree will have no 
direct bearing on my further promotion in the job or increase in salary, in fact 
it deprived us of many facilities.  
So the question is why do a PhD at all then?   
The answer was simple for me; I did not want to keep my knowledge of the 
post-earthquake recovery programme to myself. I have a very strong 
emotional association with AJK and the 2005 earthquake. I was born and 
bred in AJK and studied there until I graduated from university. After 
completing my postgraduate studies I joined the civil service of AJK in 1991. 
I was working as Deputy Commissioner of Muzaffarabad District at the time 
of the earthquake and saw all the devastation with my own eyes, probably 
more than anybody else. The Deputy Commissioner is the administrative 
head of the District, so I remained actively involved in the search and rescue 
and relief operation until June 2006 and then I joined the reconstruction 
programme as Programme Manager of the District Reconstruction Unit 
Muzaffarabad. After working in the District Reconstruction Unit for two and a 
half years, I joined the Asian Development Bank funded Earthquake 
Emergency Assistance Project (EEAP) as Project Coordinator. After 
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successfully completing this project I was promoted to Director General and 
Secretary of the State Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (SERRA), 
where I worked for more than a year. It is from this position that I started my 
PhD research. During these six years I had been directly and actively 
involved in the post-earthquake recovery and got first-hand knowledge of 
many things. I was also conscious of the fact that once the reconstruction 
programme was over and the reconstruction organization was wound up, the 
immense knowledge and experience will fizzle out quickly enough. I knew 
from my experience of the civil service that government offices were 
excellent graveyards of data and numerous outstanding people.  
Research on the housing reconstruction programme was extremely limited 
and consisted of reports prepared by different organizations involved in the 
reconstruction programme. I, therefore, wanted to document this experience 
for the benefit of others. The level of in-depth study required for the type of 
research work that I wanted to produce was only possible through a PhD 
project. Moreover I not only wanted enough time to conduct such an in-depth 
study, which was not possible to do while continuing with job, I also wanted 
to “step back” and “step away” from the post-earthquake recovery theatre 
and have a critical and objective look at whatever has been done. As one of 
my predecessors in the SERRA and my long-time friend rightly observed; “till 
the time we were inside the earthquake reconstruction programme we 
believed that it was the best we could do. The moment you come out of there 
and take a step or two back or sideways and then look at it [the 
reconstruction] … looking twenty years down the road then you see that 
there were so many things that needed to be done…”. The reason of 
stepping back was that while being in the government service at the higher 
level we generally look at things at the macro level (about policies and their 
implementation), we are more interested in figures. Thus we mostly remain 
oblivious to micro level details. It was during my fieldwork that I fully realised 
this. It was my interaction with individuals as a researcher that I realised that 
things could be seen and understood differently by those who are the 
recipients of policies.           
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The experience of the earthquake changed my thinking and gave me the 
courage and motivation to break from the norm and do something different, 
hopefully beneficial for others (Blaikie 2012). I do not claim that the 
knowledge that I have produced is comprehensive, objective, and complete. 
Being aware of my positionality and ensuing ‘absences and fallibilities’ (Rose 
1997, p. 305) I admit that the knowledge produced as a result of my research 
is ‘only partial and situated, and versions of the overall reality (Robinson 
2014, p. 69). I must also admit that my research has impacted me a lot as 
well, if not as much as the earthquake itself. As highlighted by Whatmore 
(2003), cited in Robinson (2014, p. 69), the process of data collection and 
the data analysis has ‘changed and affected’ me.     
For the purpose of my research, I loosely follow the ‘Pressure and Release’ 
or PAR model developed by Blaikie et al. (1994), and further developed by 
Wisner et al. (2004) and Collins (2009) “disaster and development 
approach”. Following this theoretical approach, I will try to find out how 
different types of vulnerability progressed into a state of disaster vulnerability 
which left the people of AJK exposed to seismic hazard which ultimately 
culminated into the devastating earthquake of the 8th October 2005 and what 
role the development policies of the Government of AJK played in generating 
those conditions which set the process of vulnerability into motion, but also 
perpetuated it.  
Like Robinson (2014, p. 70) I have conducted an ethnographic research as 
an ‘insider’ but I don’t rely ‘substantially or partially’ on “participant 
observation” only (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994, p. 248; Herbert 2000; 
Mullings 1999). I also involve data collection through survey questionnaires, 
interviews, and focus groups. The subject of positionality is widely discussed 
in the literature (see, for example, Barry et al. 1999; Baxter & Eyles 1997; 
Borbasi et al. 2005; England 1994; Ganga & Scott 2006; Finlay 2002; 
Herbert 2000; Huisman 2008; Macbeth 2001; Mauthner & Doucet 2003; 
Mullings 1999;  Nazarea 1999; Reinhart & Reuland 1993; Rose 1997; 
Sidaway 2000; Sultana 2007; Whiting 2008). Reflexivity is defined as ‘self-
critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of 
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the self as researcher’ and is critical in conducting fieldwork (England 1994, 
p. 244).  
Reflexivity, positionality, and power relations in the fieldwork are contested 
concepts in geography, especially amongst feminist geographers (Sultana 
2007). On one side are those who support a positivist, masculinist, and 
objective approach to research (see, for example, Bourdieu & Wacquant 
1988; Delaney 1988; Mascia-Lees et al. 1989; Pratt 1986) and on the other 
are those who have debated the possibility of reflexive research (see, for 
example, Alvesson & Skoldber 2000; England 1994; Hertz 1997; Hughes 
2006, 2012; Katz 1994; Mauthner & Doucet 2003; Mountz 2002; Nagar 2002; 
Radcliffe 1994; Raju et al. 2002; Robinson 2014; Rose 1997; Sidaway 2000; 
Staeheli & Nagar 2002; Sultana 2007; Wolf 1996).  
Instead of taking a ‘masculinist scientific stance which has spuriously 
claimed a cool, calm and collected detachment for the heroic fieldworker’ 
(Crang & Cook 1995, p. 8) and mentioning my relationship with my research 
as a ‘detached researcher… [in] the introductions, footnotes, and 
appendices’ (ibid) in my thesis I rather adopt the approach which supports 
the ‘fact that both researcher and the researched are equally positioned, 
interconnected and involved in the changing social and cultural relationships 
under study (ibid). According to Finlay (2002) and Sultana (2007, p. 376) 
reflexivity ‘involves reflection on self, process, and representation, and 
critically examining power relations and politics in the research process, and 
researcher accountability in data collection and interpretation’.  
Though reflexivity has been blamed of being “mere navel gazing,” and even 
“narcissistic and egoistic”, (Okley 1994, cited in England 1994, p. 244), I take 
Sultana’s (2007, p. 376) view that ‘being reflexive about one’s own 
positionality is not to self-indulge but to reflect on how one is inserted in grids 
of power relations and how that influences methods, interpretations, and 
knowledge production’.  While being conscious of Finlay’s (2002, p. 209) 
warning that the ‘process of engaging in reflexivity is full of muddy ambiguity 
and multiple trails’ and the limitations that it poses (see, for example, 
Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992; Delyser 2001; Finlay 2002; Ganga & Scott 
81 
 
2006; LaBaree 2000; Robison 2014), I take my positionality as my biggest 
strength (Abu-Lughod 1988 and Hill-Collins 1990 cited in, Mullings 1999, p. 
3; Robinson 2014). Being a ‘part of the setting, context, and social 
phenomenon being studied’ (Barry et al. 1999, p. 30), my experience and my 
research complement each other and form two integral parts of my project. I 
will refer back and forth to my positionality in this chapter and elsewhere in 
the thesis to explain how it situates the knowledge that I am trying to produce 
(Gilbert 1994; Hertz 1997; Katz 1994; Kobayashi 1994; McDowell 1992; 
Robinson 2014; Rose 1997; Sultana 2007; Whatmore 2003).    
4.3. Research Methodology 
Research methodology provides us the ‘road maps’ to conduct our research 
(Creswell et al. 2003, p.159). Kothar (2006, p.8) describes research 
methodology as a “way to systematically solve the research problem…it may 
be understood as a science of studying how research is done scientifically”.  
 My research aims to show not only the empirical evidence of the housing 
reconstruction programme – such as how many houses have been built, the 
completion ratio, what are the trends in progress in different areas and in 
different communities – but also to identify and analyse those socio-cultural, 
political, policy, and organizational factors which lead to this performance. All 
this information could not be gathered through a single research method, so 
a mixed methods approach was more appropriate for my research. Creswell 
et al. (2003, p. 163) define the mixed methods as a “procedure for collecting, 
analysing, and reporting research such as that found in the time-honoured 
designs of quantitative experiments and surveys and in the qualitative 
approaches of ethnographies, grounded theory studies, and case studies”. 
Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004, p. 17) define mixed methods research as “a 
class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language 
into a single study”. 
The purpose of using the mixed methods approach is to make maximum use 
of the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative methods and to neutralize 
or minimise the weaknesses of each. The inadequacy of a mono-method 
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(relying on either qualitative or quantitative methods) approach and the need 
for a third approach is well reported in literature. For example, Bazeley 
(2006); Bryman (1984); Creswell (1994); Creswell et al. (2003); Glaser & 
Strauss (2009); Greene et al. (1989); Jick (1979); Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 
(2004); Johnson et al. (2007); Law (2004); Onwuegbuzie (2002); Tashakkori 
& Teddlie (1998); and Tashakkori & Teddlie (2003) emphasise combining the 
advantages of both quantitative and qualitative methods into a third, mixed 
methods approach. These methods can be mixed in many different ways. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the mixed-methods design matrix.         
                                                       
                                              
17 Figure 4.1 Mixed-method design matrix with mixed-method research shown in four cells 
("qual" stands for qualitative, "quan" stands for quantitative, "+" stands for concurrent 
activity, and "→" stands for sequential activity whereas high priority or weight of the research 
method is shown by the capital letters, and lower priority or weight of the research method is 
shown by the lower case letters).                                 (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004, p. 22) 
 
4.4. Methodological Tools 
My research is of ethnographic nature (Section 4.2 & 4.9). Being aware of 
the criticism on ethnographic research (see, for example, Rengert 1997, 
cited in Herbert 2000, p. 558; Thrift 2000, cited in Latham 2003, p. 1993) I 
have designed my research project to address the shortcomings associated 
with this type of research. For example, I don’t rely on participant observation 
only, but have collected both qualitative and quantitative data (Herbert 2000; 
83 
 
Jackson 1983) in the shape of survey questionnaires, semi-structured 
interviews, and focus groups. The sample size is also large: 200 survey 
questionnaires, 36 key informant interviews, 55 house owner interviews, 4 
focus groups, and 2 life stories. Instead of doing data interpretation 
subjectively, I went back to my respondents to share data results with them 
and get their feedback on the results. I have used the mixed methods 
research approach for the purposes of triangulation, complementarity, 
initiation, development, and expansion (Greene et al. 1989).  Figurer 4.2 
(based on Greene et al., 1989; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004; Olsen 2004) 
explains how these purposes fit in my research.  
 
Contribution of 
Mixed Methods 
Explanation Example 
i) Triangulation Mixing or convergence of 
different data types for 
validation of results in the 
same study.  
Convergence of quantitative data 
(progress reports of ERRA and survey 
questionnaires) and qualitative data 
(interviews, focus group discussions 
and life stories) can explain / validate 
the performance of the ODR in the 
study area.    
ii) 
Complementarity 
Seeking clarification or 
illustrating or collaboration 
of results for one method 
by using the results of 
another method.  
Survey questionnaire reveals that rural 
populations faced greater problems 
than urban inhabitants; these problems 
are illuminated through interviews.   
iii) Initiation Seeking contradictions 
and oxymorons through 
research that might lead to 
the reframing of the 
research questions.  
Research might show that better 
housing reconstruction performance in 
a particular community was due to the 
outside support (e.g. material support 
by NGOs) rather than social capital; 
the research questions might by 
reframed then.   
iv) Development Using the results of one 
method to inform the other 
method. 
Quantitative data of the Reconstruction 
Agency shows relatively lower level of 
housing construction in a particular 
locality; reasons are illuminated 
through interviews and focus group 
discussions. 
v) Expansion Expanding the scope of 
research by using different 
methods of enquiry.  
The use of quantitative methods 
(official data, survey questionnaires) 
and qualitative data (interviews, focus 
group discussions, life stories) will 
expand the scope of my research by 
taking it out of the tight categories of 
physical or human geography.  
18 Figure 4.2 Uses of Mixed Methods Approach of Research 
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Concurrent Nested Design might also be used instead of triangulation. 
Creswell et al. (2003) explain Concurrent Nested Design as a data collection 
phase in which both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection 
are used simultaneously. One data collection method (having lesser priority) 
is nested in the other predominant method (Figure 4.3). This method enables 
the researcher to collect both types of data during the data collection phase 
and these can be mixed during the analysis. This not only makes the data 
collection exercise more flexible, but the researcher can have a broader and 
more comprehensive perspective of the project at this stage. My research 
falls into Design 2 category; it is predominantly a qualitative study, having 
quantitative method nested within i.e. one quantitative method (survey 
questionnaire) is nested in four qualitative methods (key informant 
interviews, house owner interviews, focus groups, and life stories).  
 
19 Figure 4.3 Nested Design Model.                              (Source: Creswell et al. 2003, p. 181) 
 
4.5. Data Collection Methods  
Figure 4.4 explains my research methodology. It explains the data required 
and the method employed for each research question. Figure 4.5 explains 
the methodological tools and their sequence during field work within this 
framework.  
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Research Question Data/information needed Method 
RQ1. What is the importance of 
housing reconstruction in post-
disaster recovery, and which 
housing reconstruction 
approaches are being practised 
more widely in the aftermath of 
disasters? 
 Background knowledge of 
wider academic debates 
around issues like: risk, 
hazard, disaster, 
vulnerability, 
reconstruction 
approaches, social 
capital, and 
governmentality. 
 Books, journal articles, 
grey literature. 
RQ2. What led the Government of 
Pakistan to adopt the Owner 
Driven Reconstruction (ODR) 
approach for post-earthquake 
reconstruction after the 2005 
earthquake and has this approach 
been adopted in subsequent 
national disasters? 
 Policy analysis of the 
Government of Pakistan’s 
response to different 
disaster situations and 
post disaster 
reconstruction 
approaches, especially 
after the 2005 earthquake. 
 Grey literature 
 Key informant    
interviews  
RQ3. How successfully has this 
policy been implemented and is 
the characterization of the owner-
driven approach as successful in 
the geography, economics and 
social contexts)? 
 
 Quantitative data on 
progress of housing 
reconstruction 
 Qualitative evaluation of 
the socio-economic 
impacts of the ODR 
programme 
 Analysis of secondary 
data 
 Analysis of primary 
data 
 Surveys 
Questionnaires 
 Key informant 
interviews  
 Semi-structured 
interviews 
 Focus group 
discussions  
 Life stories  
 
RQ4. After the completion of the 
housing reconstruction 
programme: 
4.1 To what extent the seismic-
resistant construction 
techniques are sustainable 
in the study area, especially 
in rural areas? 
4.2 How far the ODR has been 
able to reduce / address the 
vulnerability issues in the 
study area? 
4.3 To what extent has the 
implementation of the ODR 
re-worked family and 
household structures and 
patterns of land ownership? 
 Qualitative evaluation of 
the socio-economic 
impacts of the ODR 
programme 
 Books, journal articles, 
grey literature 
 Analysis of the 
secondary data 
 Key informant 
interviews 
 Focus group 
discussions 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
RQ5. What lessons can be learnt 
from Pakistan experience and 
what are the recommendations    
for transferability / replication of 
this approach in case of future 
disaster events? 
  Books, journal 
articles, grey 
literature 
 Key informant 
interviews 
 Focus group 
discussions   
20 Figure 4.4 Research methodology. 
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4.6. Methodological Tools for Data Collection 
Field data collection was undertaken in six steps which are illustrated in 
Figure 4.5. These steps are discussed in detail in later sections.       
 
21 Figure 4.5 Methodological tools for my fieldwork including sample design and numbers. 
4.6.1. Secondary Data Collection 
The purpose of this activity was to collect the quantitative data from 
reconstruction organizations and other government departments to provide a 
foundation for further data collection. Data from the SERRA were used for 
two reasons. First, I wanted to verify the claim of the government that the 
housing reconstruction programme was a huge success and more than 96% 
houses have been reconstructed by October 2013 (ERRA 2013) and only 
data of the SERRA could provide details of the progress of the housing 
reconstruction in the study area. The second reason was that as an “insider” 
I knew that these data could provide a strong basis for the next steps of my 
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research including quantitative data collection from the field, triangulation, 
and analysis. Analysis of the official data provided trends and anomalies of 
the housing reconstruction and enabled households for further data 
collection to be identified. Some of my research questions also necessitated 
that I analyse the SEERA data first. For example, the female-headed 
households (to address research question 3) could be more easily and 
reliably identified using the data of the SERRA to target field work. The 
SERRA, especially the Housing Section, was extremely cooperative and 
efficient in providing data. The data of more than 257,000 households were 
analysed in the case of rural areas, and 16,471 households in urban areas. 
These data were provided mainly in electronic format and could be analysed 
in different categories. For example rural/urban, female headed households, 
fully and partially damaged houses, disbursement of housing cash grant 
according to instalments etc. However, I had to face difficulty in case of 
village-wise detail because in many cases the same village was entered in 
the data with different spellings at different places. For example “ALI SUJAL 
SHARKEE”, “ALI SOJAL SHARQI”, and “E ALI SOJAL” are different 
spellings of the same village in these data. It was due to my personal 
knowledge of the area and great help of the SERRA staff that we sorted out 
these anomalies.  
Acquiring data from the Revenue Department and the Census Department 
was an arduous exercise. Unlike the SERRA, the data in the Revenue 
Department was not in electronic format but in hard copies in different files in 
different offices. These files were kept in a careless manner and within a few 
years most of these files had become tattered. The Census Department was 
asked for a copy of the census report conducted in 1998 for population and 
houses in the study area but I was told that it was a classified document and 
could not be given to anybody except the relevant government departments. 
I am still unable to understand what was so secret in that document.  
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4.6.2. Key Informant Interviews  
Semi-structured interviews with key informants were the second step of data 
collection. USAID (2013, p. 2) identified four situations where key informant 
interviews can be useful: 
1. When qualitative, descriptive information is sufficient for decision-
making. 
2. When there is a need to understand motivation, behaviour, and   
perspectives of our customers and partners. 
3. When a main purpose is to generate recommendations. 
4. When quantitative data collected through other methods needs to 
be interpreted. 
Key informants for my interviews were those people who had ‘first-hand 
knowledge’ of the subject (USAID 1996, p. 1) and hence fulfilled the above 
conditions. They had remained closely attached with post-2005 earthquake 
housing reconstruction programme at policy making, implementation, 
monitoring or other relevant roles. They belonged to the ERRA, the SERRA, 
the Government of AJK, local government, civil society, international 
organizations, business, and multilaterals (Annex-3). Their knowledge is of 
the utmost importance for my research because only these people know how 
the housing reconstruction policy was framed and implemented, what issues 
came up during implementation and how these issues were addressed, the 
impacts of this programme, and also what were the lessons learnt and 
recommendations for the future.  
The interviews were conducted with key informants of various backgrounds 
during August 2013 and January 2014; however a few interviews were 
conducted during February-May 2014 with those key informants who were 
later added in the list after going through the data collected till that time. The 
interviewees were either given a printed brief of my research project or were 
orally briefed. Their express consent was sought using a consent form before 
the start of the interview and it was also explained that they had the option to 
remain anonymous (Whiting 2008), the information was confidential and they 
had the option to withdraw their consent at any time. However, it was not 
possible to get written consent from everybody so their oral consent was 
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sought expressly. All respondents except one had no objection in revealing 
their identity in the report. The interviews were held either at the place of the 
interviewee (office or home) or at a neutral location. Two interviews were 
held at my home at the wish of the interviewees because they knew me very 
well and there was no chance of them being influenced by this location (Sin 
2003). The interviews were audio recorded and notes were also taken 
(Whiting 2008). One respondent refused audio recording of the interview and 
was very concerned about the use of the interview in my research, so 
assurance was given that their remarks will be shared with them in exact 
words before incorporating into the thesis.  
According to Mullings (1999, p. 339) and Sabot (1999, p. 329) the 
interviewee, especially the local elite, has the power to decide how much 
knowledge to give to the researcher. In my case most of the respondents 
expressed their opinions readily, candidly, and confidently; may be due to my 
being an “insider”. However some respondents requested that some of their 
remarks be treated as “off the record”; these remarks will not become part of 
the thesis.  
4.6.3. Household Survey 
According to Kitchenham & Pfleeger (2002, p.19) appropriate size is a major 
issue of concern when sampling. They brought forward two reasons as to 
why sample size was of importance: ‘[F]irst, an inadequate sample size may 
lead to results that are not significant statistically. In other words, if the 
sample size is not big enough, we cannot come to a reasonable conclusion, 
and we cannot generalize to the target population’ (ibid, p. 19).  
Keeping this in mind, a sample size of 200 households was appropriate for 
my research. This sample size was chosen for two reasons. One, keeping in 
mind the difficult terrain of the study area, this sample size was manageable. 
A bigger sample size would have been difficult for me to manage physically 
and costly in terms of time and financial resources. Two, it is a decent 
sample size and can provide reliable results which could be generalized to 
the target population whilst retaining statistical significance for subgroups of 
the sample (e.g. data split by gender). The later interactions with different 
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respondents during my second fieldwork proved this whereupon almost all 
respondents agreed with the results and findings of the survey and found 
them reliable (please refer to Section 8.2, 8.2.1, 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 for detailed 
discussion).        
These households were identified for collection of quantitative data through 
the SERRA housing reconstruction data. The survey was conducted during 
January-February 2014 in Bagh and Muzaffarabad cities in urban areas and 
in UC Danna and UC Salmia in rural Muzaffarabad and UC Islamnager and 
UC Jaglari in rural Bagh. The survey was conducted through research 
assistants. The survey was conducted for those houses which were 
categorised as reconstructed in the SERRA data. The purpose of the 
research was clearly outlined in the native language of the households, their 
right not to participate in the survey or withdraw from it at any time, 
anonymity and that no one except the researcher will have access to the 
survey data (Annex-4). Mostly these surveys were conducted in the 
presence of other members of the household who were free to seek 
clarification from the research assistant or express their opinion so the 
respondents felt more confident (Figure 4.6).  
 
22 Figure 4.6 My research assistant doing quantitative data collection. 
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The survey questionnaire was in English but the research assistants were 
also given an Urdu translation as well and they asked questions in Urdu or 
the local language but filled the forms in English (Figure 4.7).  
 
23 Figure 4.7 Image of a completed questionnaire. 
I am confident that not much information was lost due to language and 
involvement of the research assistants because I had designed the survey 
questionnaire to be simple and straight forward requiring short answers 
(Annex-13). I had left more detailed questions for semi-structured interviews 
that I conducted myself. My research assistants were educated and had 
experience of undertaking similar activities with other national and 
international organizations. I also conducted a pilot survey before launching 
the actual data collection exercise and I was satisfied with the level of their 
work. The respondents came from almost every age group and financial 
background (Table 4.1, 4.2). The mean age is 47 years and minimum and 
maximum age is 20 years and 80 years respectively. It was also ensured that 
women should have representation in the survey. The SERRA data were 
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used to identify the female-headed households and 21% (N=42) women 
were surveyed.    
                                
5 Table 4.1 Age profile of the respondents. 
 Age 
 Valid 200 
Missing 0 
Mean 47.07 
Minimum 20 
Maximum 80 
  
6 Table 4.2 Financial profile of the respondents. 
 
 
                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
Each survey form was given a code number to ensure anonymity during 
processing and data analysis (Table 4.3). These numbers were allocated 
randomly according to geographical location at the time of survey. GPS 
coordinates of each surveyed house were taken and these coordinates were 
mapped on Google Earth for identification and future reference (Figure 4.8, 
4.9, 4.10, 4.11).  
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Very Poor 35 17.5 
Poor 80 40.0 
Moderate but unstable 53 26.5 
Moderate and stable 29 14.5 
Strong 1 .5 
Well off 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
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7 Table 4.3 Survey questionnaire codes. 
Location Code 
Bagh rural (Figure 4.9) BR-1 to BR-50 
Bagh urban (Figure 4.10) BU-1 to BU-50 
Muzaffarabad rural (Figure 4.11) MR-1 to MR-50 
Muzaffarabad urban (Figure 4.12) MU-1 to MU-50 
            
 
 
 
 
 
24 Figure 4.8 Location of respondents for survey questionnaires in UC Jaglari (above) and 
UC Islamnager (below). 
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25 Figure 4.9 Location of respondents for survey questionnaires in Bagh urban. 
 
 
 
26 Figure 4.10 Location of respondents for survey questionnaires in UC Danna (above) and 
UC Salmia (below). 
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27 Figure 4.11 Location of respondents for survey questionnaires in Muzaffarabad urban. 
4.6.4. House Owner Interviews 
Interviews are one of the most commonly used data collection tools (Whiting 
2008). As observed by DeLyser & Sui (2014, p. 295) interviews are a ‘vital 
and vibrant research method’. Interviews reflect ‘the actors’ understanding of 
their worlds (Robinson 2014, p. 42) and enable ‘networks of relationships 
and ideas to be presented and qualified’ (Hoggart et al. 2002, p. 205 cited in 
Robinson 2014, p. 42). Knowledge is coproduced through interaction 
between the researcher and the interviewee (Herod 1999).  
Interviews are of immense importance in my research and form an integral 
part of my quest for finding answers to my research questions. Once the 
completed survey questionnaire forms were received from research 
assistants, each form was carefully examined and verified with the notes of 
the research assistants. Necessary details from survey questionnaires were 
entered into MS Excel to analyse. Respondents for semi-structured 
interviews were selected from this analysis. The purpose of these interviews 
was to know how the house owners, the most important actors of the 
reconstruction exercise, viewed the experience of housing reconstruction 
and to give voice to their side of the story which might have remained 
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uncovered (Robinson 2014, p. 43). The nature and complexity of my 
research warranted that instead of just relying on ‘numbers and statistics… 
[and] confidence limits and p values’ (Robinson 2014, p. 42) I should interact 
more deeply with house owners so that I could bring out the complexities and 
nuances of their experience of the disaster. The respondents for these 
interviews were selected to represent a wide variety of backgrounds such as 
geographical location (rural/urban and as widely dispersed as possible), 
economics (very poor, poor, moderate but unstable, moderate and stable, 
strong, and well-off), social (gender, disability, ethnicity, class), and type of 
construction (constructed/not constructed/incomplete, Dhajji-dewari type of 
construction) to provide maximum information and ‘increase the 
trustworthiness’ of my findings (Robinson 2014, p. 48). In total 55 interviews 
were conducted between February and May 2014.  
Being aware of the potential risks involved for the respondents (Barnes 1979; 
Lee & Renzetti 1993), all respondents were assigned codes to hide their 
identity (Table 4.4) and this was expressly explained to them.   
8 Table 4.4 List of semi-structured interviews with house owners. 
Location Interviews 
Bagh rural  
(11 interviews) 
BR-1, BR-3, BR-10, BR-13, BR-20, BR-25, BR-32, BR-35, BR-50, R-
1, R-2 (Two random interviews (R-1, R-2) were conducted with those 
house owners who were not part of the survey questionnaires).  
Bagh urban  
(11 interviews) 
BU-1, BU-5, BU-7, BU-14, BU-15, BU-18, BU-19, BU-22, BU-28, BU-
34, BU-46 
Muzaffarabad rural 
(13 interviews) 
MR-3, MR-5, MR-11, MR-17, MR-21, MR-22, MR-32, MR-35, MR-37, 
MR-42, R-1, R-2, R-3 (3 interviews (R-1, R-2, R-3) with affected 
people of Lodhiabad village, they were not part of survey 
questionnaires).  
Muzaffarabad urban 
(12 interviews) 
MU-1, MU-7, MU-13, MU-14, MU-17, MU-19, MU-22, MU-24, MU-32, 
MU-35, MU-36, MU-47. 
Landslides 
(8 interviews) 
MRLS-1, MRLS-2, MRLS-3, MRLS-4, MRLS-5, MRLS-6, MULS-1, 
MULS-2.  
 
97 
 
I was also conscious of the importance of the place in which interviews were 
held (Sin 2003), so interviews were conducted either in the house/place of 
work of the respondent or a neutral location so that the interviewees felt 
confident and empowered (Anderson & Jones 2009; Elwood & Martin 2000; 
Riley 2010; Saunders & Moles 2013). Four interviews were conducted in the 
shops of the respondents (Figure 4.13) and two interviews were conducted in 
my car because the respondents were found on the road. However as 
opposed to Robinson (2014), who conducted most of his interviews with 
farmers in their kitchen, I couldn’t get access to this area of peoples’ homes 
due to cultural reasons. Bennett (2006) and Robinson (2014, p.58) note that 
most visitors to the farm sat at the kitchen table which was the centre of the 
farmhouse where ‘farmers would meet sales representatives, farm 
inspectors, farm advisors and state vets, it is a place to do business and a 
place of power and authority for the farmer’. 
In the case of AJK, although the kitchen is centre of the house in rural areas, 
strangers are not allowed into the kitchen; there is also no kitchen table and 
people sit on ground mats. Strangers or formal guests are received in the 
guest room/drawing room (called baithek in the local language) or any other 
room except the kitchen. Entering into the kitchen is tantamount to informality 
or closeness which is not expected from people other than close relatives. 
Apart from being a stranger, gender was the other reason of my non-access 
to the kitchen because only male members of the household or closer 
relatives have access to the kitchen. 
  
28 Figure 4.12 Interviewing a lady outside her destroyed house (left) and a gentleman 
outside his shop.                                                                         (Source: Author fieldwork) 
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I clearly explained in their own language the purpose of my research and 
their right not to participate in the interview or to withdraw from it at any time 
(during or afterwards). They were also assured of their anonymity. Their 
express consent was sought before the interview. Since generally people 
were wary of signing the consent form, express oral consent was considered 
sufficient. I kept the survey questionnaire forms, filled earlier by my research 
assistants, with me during interviews for reference. All interviews were audio 
recorded and notes were also taken (Whiting 2008). These interviews were 
either in Urdu language or in local dialects. Again my positionality as an 
insider was a great advantage because I could ‘establish rapport and 
communicate’ (Dowling 2010, cited in Robinson 2014, p. 71) with them and 
their expression of feelings was not clouded by an interpreter. Being the 
victim of the earthquake myself I could commiserate with what the 
interviewees wanted to say and what they meant to convey when they did 
not say anything or stopped short of saying something (Woods 2010, cited in 
Robinson 2014, p. 36). It was due to my experience of the earthquake as a 
victim and as a government functionary who worked extensively in the 
earthquake that I was not an interviewer who ‘does not have enough 
background, enough knowledge, and enough sensitized imagination to catch 
the subtleties and complexities of what the interviewee is saying’ (Dexter 
2004, p. 28 cited in Robinson 2014, p. 65). I could relate with their tears, their 
silences, their pauses; and with their rare moments of joy. I cried countless 
times translating these interviews while sitting in my university thousands of 
miles away. It was a soul wrenching and emotionally traumatic experience, 
no less painful than the earthquake itself (Bennett 2004).      
The duration of the interviews varied ranging from 20 minutes to about an 
hour. These interviews were usually an emotive experience for the 
interviewees and for me as well. These interviews were emotionally so 
draining that after one or two interviews I would feel mentally and physically 
exhausted. Two or three interviews were conducted per day. All the 
respondents were very kind and courteous and offered refreshments. I 
arranged tea or food for the interviews held at neutral locations. At least one 
99 
 
member of the family and my research assistant remained present during 
interviews with female respondents. 
4.6.5. Focus Groups  
Focus groups are a technique of qualitative research increasingly used in 
social science, human geography, health, and medicine fields (Burgess et al. 
1988; Cameron 2010; Gibbs 1997; Hopkins 2007; Kamberelis & Dimitriadis 
2013; Kitzinger 1995; Morgan 1996; Morgan & Kruger 1993; Macnaghten & 
Myers 2007; Powell & Single 1996; Sarantakos 2012; Stewart & Shamdasani 
2014). The biggest advantage of this technique is that it does not 
discriminate against those people who are not literate and encourages 
participation of those participants who might otherwise feel reluctant or 
marginalised (Kitzinger 1995; Morgan 1996; Morgan & Kruger 1993). Focus 
groups integrate ‘pluralities of participants in the research endeavour’ 
(Robinson 2014, p. 44) and are usually more interactive than personal 
interviews (Cameron 2010; Crang & Cook 1995). It can also be used in 
‘triangulation in multi-method research strategies’ (Goss 1996, p. 113). 
According to Kitzinger (1994), cited in Robinson (2014, p. 44) and Skop 
(2006) a focus group provides a platform to participants for debate and 
collective voice to them. Therefore there is likelihood that it provides different 
data from the interviews on the same subject.   
Initially I had planned eight focus groups (four urban and four rural) in both 
districts in order to elicit information that illustrates combined local 
perspectives (Krueger & Casey 2009). However later on, when the actual 
fieldwork started, keeping in mind the logistic issues (it was more convenient 
and quicker for the people of UC Jaglari, UC Islamnager, and UC Danna to 
come to the city than to gather somewhere in their own areas), availability of 
the participants and the usefulness of so many sessions it was decided to 
hold four sessions to make these sessions more productive. These sessions 
were conducted during March and April 2014. The participants were selected 
on the basis of key informant interviews and house owner interviews. The 
purpose of these discussions was to provide the participants with a forum 
where they could discuss the issues related to my research questions and 
build arguments especially around vulnerability, progress of the housing 
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reconstruction, lessons learnt, and recommendations for future. Table 4.5 
outlines the topics used to frame discussions. 
The first focus group comprised of participants from rural and urban areas 
and was held in Bagh city in a local hotel (Figure 4.13). Ten participants, 
including two females, attended the event. They came from different 
backgrounds; all were house owners, five of them had either worked for or 
were still working for NGOs, one was a businessman, one was mason, and 
two were teachers; all belonged to different classes of society and from 
different biradris (clans). At the start of the meeting I gave a presentation 
about my research project. Later the participants were divided into three 
groups to do group work. Each group was given a separate topic to work on. 
All the participants participated in the group work enthusiastically and 
prepared good quality charts. Each group presented their work and 
discussion was held after each presentation. I was really impressed by the 
quality of group work.  
9 Table 4.5 Topics for group work in focus group discussion sessions. 
Topic 1 
1. What factors made people vulnerable to cause so much 
damage? What is the state of vulnerability 8 years after the 
earthquake of 2005?  
2. Recommendations to improve resilience and reduce 
vulnerability? 
Topic 2 
1. Evaluation of the 2005 housing reconstruction policy. 
2. Which approach would have worked better and why: 
i. Cash Approach; 
ii. Agency Driven Reconstruction; OR 
iii. Owner Driven Reconstruction. 
3. Sustainability of the earthquake resistant construction in the 
study area. 
Topic 3 
1. Lessons learnt from the post-2005 earthquake housing 
reconstruction? 
2. Recommendations for future disaster situations. 
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The second focus group was held in Muzaffarabad city in a local guest 
house. The participants comprised of key informants and some 
professionals, all belonged to Muzaffarabad city (Figure 4.13). Seven 
participants, including a female PhD researcher, participated. Instead of 
dividing them into groups, the topics were discussed by all and a participant 
transferred the main points on the charts which he later presented to them 
for further discussion. This session was unique in the sense that the 
participants were not only key informants but many of them were house 
owners as well. So the discussion not only covered policy and practice 
issues, as with key informants, but also had the flavour of individual 
experiences as house owners.        
The third focus group was held in a local guest house in Muzaffarabad city 
(Figure 4.13). The participants were house owners of rural UC Danna and 
urban areas. Ten people participated in the event. They belonged to different 
biradris (clans), different social status and economic backgrounds. They 
were divided into three groups for group work. They worked on their topics 
with great interest and produced some good quality charts and presented 
them before others.   
The fourth focus group was held in UC Salmia (rural Muzaffarabad) in a local 
Basic Health Unit during off hours (Figure 4.13). Ten people (all male) 
participated in the event. They were from different biradris (clans) and 
different backgrounds; one was a local construction contractor, one was a 
small local businessman, one was a government official, one was a former 
employee of UN-Habitat, one was the Imam of a local mosque, and the rest 
were small farmers.  
The participants preferred discussion in one group instead of working in 
different groups. The former employee of UN-Habitat took the responsibility 
to steer the discussion and make charts. He made a good presentation 
which was followed by detailed discussion. Though Morgan (1996) is of the 
opinion that a focus group is an excellent technique to encourage the 
marginalised; in socially stratified and developing societies there is a risk of 
elite capture as well (Bardhan & Mookherjee 2005; Crook 2003; Dasgupta & 
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Beard 2007; Hertz & Imber 1995; Iversen et al. 2006). I had to face this 
situation in case of UC Salmia focus group. A very articulate and 
domineering gentleman from a socially dominant clan, who was economically 
well-off and politically well-connected as well, tried to dominate the whole 
proceeding and would hardly let anybody speak. My experience of public 
service and the expertise of the gentleman from UN-Habitat came in handy 
and we very tactfully involved other participants in the discussion, without 
offending him.  
All focus group sessions were audio and video recorded and notes were also 
made. The proceedings were mainly in Urdu and were then translated into 
English for use in data analysis software. 
 
     
29 Figure 4.13 Focus group Bagh (top left), Muzaffarabad (top right), Muzaffarabad (bottom 
left), UC Salmia (bottom right).                                                       (Source: Author fieldwork) 
4.6.6. Life Stories 
Polkinghorne (1995, p. 6-7) observed that ‘work with stories holds significant 
promise for qualitative researchers’ and are suitable as a linguistic form in 
which human experience as lived can be expressed. I knew from my 
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experience of working in the earthquake that there were countless stories 
that could help me in understanding the performance of the ODR policy at an 
individual level because life stories ‘express a kind of knowledge that 
uniquely describes human experience in which actions and happenings 
contribute positively and negatively to attaining goals and fulfilling purposes’ 
(Donald 1995, p. 8). Burner (1985), cited in Carter (1993, p. 6) and Carter 
(1993) observe that narrative or story explains the human intentions in the 
context of action and action is difficult and unpredictable because it is subject 
to multiple influences thus story ‘with its multiplicity of meanings, is a suitable 
form for expressing the knowledge that arises from action’. Through the use 
of life stories in my research I want to capture ‘the richness and the nuances’ 
of people’s experiences of the disaster and highlight the ‘complexity, 
specificity, and interconnectedness’ (Carter 1993, p. 6) of their lives with 
housing reconstruction.  
I had planned to do three to five life stories with people who were able to 
reconstruct their houses very well, or those who could not do so for certain 
reasons. I wanted to see how particular circumstances defined their 
performance and how could these stories help towards lessons learnt and 
recommendations for future. Subsequently, I chose two people from the list 
of house owners surveyed earlier through survey questionnaires. The first 
was a lady from rural Bagh who, despite being a widow, not only 
reconstructed her house very well but also helped many people after the 
earthquake in relief and reconstruction activities. She represents those 
people, especially female-headed households, who are success stories of 
housing reconstruction programme. The second belonged to rural Bagh; he 
was a very poor man who couldn’t reconstruct his destroyed house because 
he did not get government grant. He represents those people who are not 
the success story of the housing reconstruction programme. 
I have kept a separate notebook for my PhD project in which I have been 
noting important points about my project since I started my research 
(Lathman 2003; Oven 2009). I frequently noted my observations and 
important information in that notebook during my fieldwork/s. These notes 
were a great help.      
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4.7. Geographical Setting 
My research is situated in two districts (Muzaffarabad and Bagh) of Azad 
Jammu & Kashmir. These districts were severely affected by the 2005 
earthquake. I conducted my research in urban as well as rural areas of 
Muzaffarabad and Bagh districts. The reason for this is that after the 
earthquake the government formed two separate housing reconstruction 
strategies and implementation mechanisms for rural and urban areas. It was 
thus necessary to conduct this research in both urban as well as rural areas 
in order to comprehensively understand the dynamics of the housing 
reconstruction performance in the study area. Bagh and Muzaffarabad cities 
were selected as case studies for urban areas; in the case of rural areas, I 
had initially planned to conduct fieldwork in one Union Council in each 
district.  
At the start of my fieldwork I had planned to conduct 200 survey 
questionnaires; 50% (N=100) survey questionnaires were to be conducted in 
urban areas (N=50 in Muzaffarabad city and N=50 in Bagh city) and 50% 
(N=100) were planned for rural areas (N=50 in rural Muzaffarabad and N=50 
in rural Bagh) to explore the housing reconstruction progress in these areas. 
However during the analysis of the housing reconstruction data of the 
SERRA I observed that at the time of the disbursement of the first instalment 
of the housing subsidy in 2006 in rural areas there were many Union 
Councils where construction of a lot of houses had already started; whereas 
there were certain Union Councils where construction of very few houses 
had started.  
This alludes to two important things; one is that there were certain areas 
which did not wait for the ERRA’s technical and financial assistance and 
started reconstruction of their houses which could mean that these houses 
might not be built according to seismic standards. The second is that 
different areas have different capacities. I thus thought it proper to collect 
data from both types of Union Councils so that important things are not 
missed. The geographical details of these areas are discussed in below 
sections. So I decided to collect data from two union councils of each district; 
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one which had higher percentage of the reconstructed houses, and the other 
which had lower percentage of the reconstructed houses. 
4.7.1. District Muzaffarabad 
The District of Muzaffarabad is surrounded by Neelum District in the north, 
Bagh and Rawalpindi districts in the south, Indian-administered Jammu and 
Kashmir in the east; and Mansehra and Abbottabad districts in the west. 
Though Muzaffarabad District was divided into two after the earthquake, for 
the purpose of this study I will consider the pre-earthquake status of the 
district (Figure 4.14).  
The total area of Muzaffarabad district was 2,496 km2 and the population 
was 770,000 at the time of 2005 earthquake (P&DD 2014). District 
Muzaffarabad is characterized by steep and rugged topography. Two main 
rivers, River Jhelum and River Neelam, flow through it. The climate of the 
district is sub-tropical highland type with 2.65○ C mean minimum temperature 
for the month of January and 36.75○ C mean maximum temperature for the 
month of June. The area receives maximum rainfall in monsoon season 
(from June to August) (Iqbal & Khan 2014). The demography of the district is 
mixed having Gujjar, Rajput, Awan, Abbasi, and Mughal as major tribes. 
Gojri, Kashmiri, and Pahari are major languages of the district. Like the rest 
of AJ&K the study area has a weak economic base. Most of the population 
(77%) lives in rural areas, where maize and rice are the major crops but due 
to small farm size (2.13 hectare per family) (P&DD 2010) farming does not 
provide a reliable source of income. Hence families augment their income by 
off-farm activities; mainly men working in towns and major cities (P&DD 
2010). For the past few decades people have also started going to Middle 
Eastern countries for employment. Trading and public sector employment 
are the major sources of income in urban areas (ERRA 2007; P&DD 2010). 
Almost all the population is Muslim.  
The epicentre of the 8th October 2005 earthquake was 11 km north of 
Muzaffarabad city. This earthquake is associated with the rupture of the 
Himalayan Frontal Thrust (HFT), which passes right through Muzaffarabad 
city parallel to Main Boundary Thrust (MBT) (Jouanne et al. 2011). More than 
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35,000 people died and more than 140,000 houses were damaged in the 
District due to the earthquake (SERRA 2014). 
 
30 Figure 4.14 Map of Muzaffarabad District; circles show fieldwork areas: red circle 
Muzaffarabad city, black circle UC Danna, blue circle UC Salmia.      (Source: P&DD 2015) 
4.7.1.1. Muzaffarabad City  
Muzaffarabad city is situated at the confluence of river Jhelum and river 
Neelum at (Lat. 34○ 22’ and Long. 73○ 31’ at 2,470 feet elevation) (Bates 
1991). It is the capital of AJ&K. The population of the city is approximately 
150,000. Most of the population is scattered in small pockets on hill slopes in 
an unplanned manner except for two small formally planned localities of 
Upper Chatter Housing Scheme and Lower Chatter Housing Scheme which 
remained largely unaffected by the earthquake of 2005. Muzaffarabad city 
was one of the worst affected areas in 2005 earthquake (Brown et al. 2008). 
More than 14,000 (96%) houses were damaged and more than 5000 people 
died in the earthquake (SERRA 2014). The worst hit areas were the old city, 
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Chehlabandi, Plate area, Tariqabad, Sathera, Jalalabad, Makri, and many 
localities at steep slopes on the left bank of the river Neelum.  
I conducted the quantitative survey in the worst hit areas of the old city, 
Chehla, Tariqabad, Sathera, Makri, and Rashidabad (Figure 4.11). 
Qualitative data was also collected from these areas through house owner 
interviews and focus group discussion.        
4.7.1.2. Rural Muzaffarabad  
Union Council Danna and Union Council Salmia were selected for fieldwork 
in rural Muzaffarabad. Union Council Danna - Lat.34○ 8’ Long.73○ 36’- is 
situated in the southeast of Muzaffarabad city at about 1900 meter elevation 
(Figure 4.14) (Bates 1991). A metalled road connects it with Muzaffarabad-
Islamabad highway. Agar Nala (a big seasonal stream) flows at the bottom of 
it. Maize is the main crop. The area is dependent on rains for irrigation, 
however some patches of spring water irrigated rice fields can also be found. 
Some people work in the Middle East also. Khakha Rajput, Gujjar, Thakyal, 
and Mughal are the main tribes. More than 3,000 (85%) houses were 
damaged in this Union Council in the 2005 earthquake.  
Union Council Salmia (Lat.34○ 6’ Long.73○ 43’; 2,600 m elevation) is located 
about 50 km in the southeast of Muzaffarabad city (Figure 4.14). The area is 
mainly forest having pleasant environment. A metalled road leads to this 
area from the historical Muzaffarabad-Srinagar road in Jhelum Valley. It is 
also connected with Bagh District through a dilapidated metalled road. The 
economic situation of the people is generally not very good. Maize is the 
main crop but due to small landholdings agriculture does not provide enough. 
Apples are also grown but mostly go waste due to poor marketing. Rajput, 
Kashmiri, and Gujjar are the main tribes. More than 4,500 (95%) houses 
were damaged in the 2005 earthquake. The Zilzal Lake (Hattianbala Lake) 
was formed in this area as a result of a massive landslide that occurred 
during the earthquake (Dunning et al. 2007).         
4.7.2. District Bagh 
The District of Bagh is surrounded by Muzaffarabad District in the north, 
Poonch district in the south, Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir in the 
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east; and Rawalpindi in the west. District Bagh is predominantly a 
mountainous area falling in the Lesser Himalaya zone (Pir-Panjal Range) 
having a general elevation of 1,500–2,500 m above sea level. Total area of 
the district is 770 km2 and population is 364,000 (340,000 rural and 24,000 
urban) (ERRA 2007; P&DD 2010). Bagh has a historical significance; it is 
commonly believed that the armed resistance against the Dogra regime of 
Maharaja Hari Singh started from this area in September 1947 which spread 
to other areas of the state quickly and ultimately led to the formation of an 
Azad (independent) government of Jammu and Kashmir on 24th October 
1947, now known as Azad Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir 
(AJ&K) (Ahmad 2003; Gillani 2007; Saraf 1977; Snedden 2013).  
This area has a weak economic base; there is hardly any industry. Most of 
the population lives in rural areas. Like Muzaffarabad District maize and rice 
are the major crops. The relatively small urban population is mostly engaged 
in trading; foreign remittances are also a major source of income. Syed, 
Mughal, Gujjar, Rajput, Sudhan, Kashmiri, and Abbasi are the major tribes of 
this district. The earthquake of the 8th October 2005 killed more than 9,000 
people and more than 90,000 houses were damaged / destroyed in the 
District of Bagh (ERRA 2007). 
 
31 Figure 4.15 Map of Bagh District; circles show fieldwork areas: red circle Bagh city, blue 
circle UC Jaglari, black circle UC Islamnager.                                        (Source: P&DD 2015) 
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4.7.2.1. Bagh city 
Bagh city (Lat. 33○ 58’ and Long. 73○ 46’, at 1,100 m elevation) is the district 
headquarter of the District of Bagh (Figure 4.15). It is about 100 km from 
Muzaffarabad city. It is situated at the confluence of two major seasonal 
streams, Nala Mahl (which flows from east to west) and Nala Malwani  
(which flows from north to south) (Ahmad 2003). These streams become 
flooded during rains and have frequently caused damage to life and property 
in the past. Trading and public sector employment are the main sources of 
income. Bagh city was one of the three cities worst hit by the earthquake of 
2005; Muzaffarabad and Balakot being the other two. More than 3,600 (84%) 
houses were damaged in the earthquake (SERRA 2014).   
4.7.2.2. Rural Bagh 
Two Union Councils were selected for fieldwork in rural Bagh. Union Council 
Jaglari (Lat. 33○ 57’ and Long. 73○ 42’; 1,300 m elevation) is located in the 
southwest of Bagh city at about a 45 minute drive (Figure 4.15). A metalled 
road from the main Bagh-Kohala road leads to this area. This Union Council 
is economically much better than any in the district. Most of the people are 
engaged in business, mostly the bakery business throughout Pakistan and 
AJ&K. Many people work in the Middle East as well. Agriculture is not a big 
activity; however maize is grown by most of the households. Khakha, Narma, 
Maldyal (sub clans of Rajput clan) and Mughal are the major clans of the 
area. More than 3,200 (63%) houses were damaged by the earthquake in 
2005 (SERRA 2014).  
Union Council Islamnager (Lat. 33○ 59’ and Long. 73○ 50’; 1,900 m elevation) 
is situated in the east of Bagh city at about one hour drive (Figure 4.15). A 
dilapidated metalled road connects this area with Bagh-Haveli road. The 
financial condition of the area is generally poor. People are mostly reliant on 
agriculture which does not provide enough due to very small landholdings. 
Abbasi, Maldyal Rajput, and Gujjar are the main clans. More than 2,900 
(98%) houses were damaged in the 2005 earthquake (SERRA official data). 
4.8. Data Analysis      
Due to mixed methods nature of my research, I had collected quantitative as 
well as qualitative data, so I had to use separate data analysis methods for 
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these data.  Mauthner & Doucet (2003, p. 414) have highlighted the 
difficulties and practicalities involved in the data analysis of a reflexive study 
like mine and suggested that ‘interpretation of data is a reflexive exercise 
through which meanings are made rather than found’. While doing data 
analysis, I am aware of these issues and do not take data analysis methods 
as ‘a series of neutral, mechanical and decontextualized procedures that are 
applied to the data and that take place in a social vacuum’ but as an exercise 
‘infused with the, sometimes different, assumptions of the researchers who 
use them, (ibid, p. 214-215).   
4.8.1. Quantitative Data Analysis  
I used SPSS, the most widely used data analysis tool (Miller & Acton 2009), 
for analysing my quantitative data. Relevant data of 200 survey 
questionnaires were entered into 36 different variables (Table 4.6). These 
variables were used for 7 data sets i.e. Aggregate, Rural, Urban, Bagh rural, 
Bagh urban, Muzaffarabad rural, and Muzaffarabad urban for analysis 
purposes.  
As highlighted by McGuirk & O'Neill (2016, no pagination) ‘[T]he content of a 
questionnaire must relate to the broader research question as well as to your 
critical examination and understanding of relevant processes, concepts, and 
relationships.’ As regards my research, the above mentioned variables were 
chosen with an aim to give me a bigger picture and understanding of the 
research topic. A considerable time was spent in designing these variables 
for my survey questionnaire. Results of the variable 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 
16, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35 and 36 were used in the research 
directly. Results of these variables were shared with different respondents 
and their feedback was incorporated in the study. As regards remaining 
variables, though the results of these variables were of great importance in 
understanding the dynamics of the housing reconstruction programme in 
AJK, these results were outside the scope of present study. Though results 
of these variables were not used in the present research directly, these 
variables helped me a lot in shaping my research.  
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10 Table 4.6 Variables selected from survey questionnaires for SPSS analysis 
 Variable  Variable  Variable 
1 Household ID 14 Toilet after EQ 27 No. of persons in the household 
2 
Gender  15 Pre-EQ 
Landownership 
28 No. of persons killed in the 
household 
3 Age 16 
Post-EQ 
Landownership 
29 
No. of persons injured in the 
household 
4 Source of Income 17 
Satisfaction with new 
house 
30 Was HCG enough 
5 
Pre-EQ HH 
Financial Status 
18 
Safety Perception 
with new house 
31 Additional Money Spent 
6 
Post-EQ HH 
Financial Status 
19 Reason of Perception 32 Location 
7 
Pre-EQ Family 
System 
20 
Satisfaction with relief 
work 
33 Distance from Road (minutes) 
8 
Post-EQ Family 
System  
21 
Construction start 
date 
34 Pre-EQ Household Status 
9 
Pre-EQ number of 
rooms  
22 Construction Time 35 Post-EQ Household Status 
10 
Post-EQ number 
of rooms 
23 Construction Status 
36 
Recommendation of ODR 
Approach in case of future disaster 
11 Kitchen before 
EQ 
24 Pre-EQ Construction 
Type 
12 Kitchen after EQ 25 
Post-EQ Construction 
Type 
13 Toilet before EQ 26 Damage Reason 
 
4.8.2. Qualitative Data Analysis 
Analysis of the qualitative data was a lengthy and tricky exercise and took a 
lot of time because almost all focus group discussions and all key informant 
interviews, except one, were in Urdu. On the other hand house owner 
interviews were either in Urdu or in local languages. Translation of these 
data into English was undertaken manually. One key informant interview, 
which was in English, could not be transcribed using some software due to 
accent issues so I had to transcribe it manually.  These translations were 
coded and analysed using NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software. 
Comparison of queries, similar comments, and quotations from interviews 
under similar question were analysed and synthesized through NVivo 10 
coding.  
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The contents of focus groups were also translated into English and major 
themes were identified and coded (Pyles & Cross 2008) in NVivo 10.  
4.9. Returning to the Field 
Once I had analysed the qualitative and quantitative data and generated 
results, my supervisors and I thought it proper that I should go back to the 
study area and share these results with my respondents and get their 
feedback on my findings. Instead of making the data analysis and data 
interpretation a ‘positivist’ and ‘neutral’ exercise ‘to simplify the complex 
processes of representing the ‘voices’ of respondents as though these voices 
speak on their own (Mauthner & Ducet 2003, p. 218) we thought it better to 
go back to my respondents and work with them in the analysis and 
interpretation of the data. A 12 week field trip was planned between February 
and April 2015. I travelled to Pakistan on 2nd February 2015. I had prepared 
a PowerPoint presentation based on the results of fieldwork data to present 
my work during this stint of fieldwork (Table 4.7).    
11 Table 4.7 List of results which were shared with respondents during 2nd fieldwork. 
 
Result 
1. Pre-earthquake construction typology 
2. Union Council-wise housing damage pattern  
3. Reasons of damage to housing stock 
4. Reasons of faulty construction 
5. Progress in geographical context 
6. Progress in economic context 
7. Progress in social context 
8. Additional money spent on housing reconstruction 
9. Impact on Overall vulnerability 
10. Impact on built environment  
11. Safety perception with new house 
12. Satisfaction with new house 
13. Number of rooms in reconstructed houses  
14. Impact on family system and land ownership pattern 
15. Lessons learnt 
16. Recommendations 
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Since this two-phase interaction with respondents has not been planned in 
the start of the research because its need was felt later, at the completion of 
first phase, the question is whether any other interaction manner was 
appropriate other than the one that I adopted? One possibility was Delphi 
technique.  According to McKenna (1994, p. 1221) ‘the Delphi technique may 
be defined as a method used to obtain the most reliable consensus of 
opinion of a group of experts, by a series of intensive questionnaires 
interspersed with controlled feedback’.  
While explaining the Delphi technique, McKenna (ibid) highlight that 
questionnaires are distributed to a panel of ‘informed individuals’ in a specific 
field of application in order to seek their opinion or judgement on a particular 
issue. When the response is received, the data are summarized and a new 
questionnaire is designed based solely on the results obtained from the first 
phase. This second questionnaire is returned to each subject and they are 
asked (in the light of the first rounds results), to reconsider their initial opinion 
and to once again return their responses to the researcher. Repeat rounds of 
this process are carried out until consensus of opinion, or a point of 
diminishing returns, has been reached. 
The application of the Delphi approach was not suitable for my study due to 
following reasons: 
 In the Delphi approach, questionnaires are sent to respondents 
through mail. This was not possible in my case because there are no 
postcodes, street names and house numbers in the study area. It is 
not possible to acquire postal address without actually going to every 
respondent. There is also no guarantee of respondents getting the 
mail. Sending mail from the UK and getting the reply back was not 
possible because Post Offices/Letter Boxes are not frequently 
available in the study area.  
 My survey questionnaire was in English so considering the low literacy 
rate in the study area, it must not have been possible for every 
respondent to read and understand the questionnaire and fill it 
correctly. I was not aware of the literacy level of respondents because 
they were chosen randomly and no data about their literacy standard 
was available in the ERRA record.  
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 As mentioned earlier this research is an auto-ethnographic study in 
which the researcher and the researched shared their experiences 
which was only possible through face to face interaction between 
them in the form of interviews and focus groups. This research has 
been designed as mixed-methods approach in which only one part of 
the data (quantitative data) was to be collected through survey 
questionnaire. The remaining major quantitative data was to be 
collected through interviews, focus groups, and life stories.     
 According to Hasson, Keeney & McKenna 2000, Hsu & Sandford 
(2007), Ludwig (1994), and Powell (2003) survey rounds are 
conducted in Delphi technique till the time consensus is reached. In 
the case of my study, I could afford only one feedback session in 
order to ‘balance time, cost and possible participant fatigue’ (Powell 
2003, p. 378).  
 In the case of Delphi technique, the questionnaire is in-depth ‘usually 
unstructured and seeks an open response’ (Powell 2003, p.378); 
whereas my survey questionnaire was structured and specific, aimed 
at drawing specific information. The type of information that I wanted 
was not possible to collect through the type of questionnaire used in 
the Delphi technique.   
 Delphi technique is mainly used to build consensus (Hasson, Keeney 
& McKenna 2000, Yousuf 2007 and Woudenberg 1991). I did not want 
to build consensus, I just wanted the opinion of my respondents on 
the results of the first fieldwork data. I wanted to listen to their stories 
and their experiences of the earthquake and reconstruction which was 
not possible through Delphi technique.  
 Conducting Delphi can be time consuming (Hsu & Sandford 2007).  
 There is also a ‘potential for low response rate’ (Hsu & Sandford 2007, 
p. 5) in the Delphi technique which I couldn’t afford in my study. As 
discussed in Section 9.5.7, at the very start of my fieldwork I expected 
that finding some respondents (especially Key Informants) would be a 
problem and I did face this problem and I had to physically chase 
them. It would have been very difficult for me to get response from 
such kind of respondents through Delphi technique.     
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 McKenna (1994, p. 1224) express concern regarding the use of 
’experts‘, while emphasizing the possible benefits of ’non-experts’. 
Hsu & Sandford (2007) and McKenna (1994) also point out that 
perhaps a more important limitation was the poor response rate that 
characterizes the final rounds of most Delphi investigations.  
 Sackman (1975) argue that although complete anonymity appears to 
be a generally held principle in most Delphi surveys, this can lead to a 
lack of accountability for the views expressed, while Goodman (1987, 
p. 731-732) maintained that it encourages hasty ill-considered 
judgements.   
Based on the above discussion, the manner in which the two phase 
interaction with respondents was conducted in my research seems to 
be more appropriate than Delphi technique. 
Now coming back to my second stint of fieldwork, three focus group 
discussions were held in Bagh and Muzaffarabad districts. The first focus 
group was held in Bagh in a local hotel which was attended by 10 
participants, seven of them had attended the focus discussion session during 
my previous visit in 2014 as well. The participants belonged to both urban 
and rural areas. The second was held in Muzaffarabad city in a local guest 
house. This session was arranged for key informants. The third focus group 
discussion was also held in the same guest house in Muzaffarabad for house 
owners of Muzaffarabad district. 11 participants from UC Danna, UC Salmia, 
and Muzaffarabad city attended the session. All these sessions proved very 
fruitful in terms of interest of the participants and the level of discussion.  
I also made individual presentations to those important key informants for 
whom it was not possible to attend the focus group discussion sessions. 9 
key informants were given presentation individually (Table 4.8). Three 
presentations were given in Islamabad and the rest in Muzaffarabad. These 
sessions lasted between 1-3 hours and generally high quality discussion and 
input was given by the key informants, sometimes leading to heated debate 
also. All the key informants were fascinated to see the results; finding them 
corroborative of their view point or revealing or sometimes controversial.    
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I gave a presentation to a house-owner in Bagh city also whom I had 
interviewed during my previous fieldwork. He is bed ridden due to paraplegic 
injury which he got in the earthquake. He runs a small NGO for the physically 
impaired people of the district. He was given presentation to know his views 
on the study results with the perspective of the vulnerable people.  
12 Table 4.8 List of key informants given individual presentations on the survey results.   
 
All these later focus group discussion sessions and individual presentations 
were audio and video recorded and notes were also taken. These 
proceedings were conducted in Urdu language so I had to translate them into 
English manually. Nvivo 10 software for qualitative data analysis was used to 
code and analyse these data.    
4.10. Summary  
This chapter has described my research methodology. I explained that this 
research is an ethnographic study as an insider for which I have adopted a 
mixed methods approach. The mixed methods approach combines the 
benefits and strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods and 
minimises their weaknesses. I also explained how this approach will serve 
                                      
Key informant 
1. Ex-Deputy Chairman, ERRA Islamabad 
2. Ex-Director Housing, ERRA Islamabad 
3. Asian Development Bank (Pakistan Country Office, Islamabad Mission) 
4. Ex-Director General, SERRA Muzaffarabad  
5. Director Social Protection/Donors & Sponsors, SERRA 
6. Member of AJK Legislative Assembly, Muzaffarabad 
7. Ex-Employee of UN-Habitat, Muzaffarabad 
8. Ex-Employee UN-Habitat, Muzaffarabad 
9. Architect in Muzaffarabad city 
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the purposes of triangulation, complementarity, initiation, development, and 
expansion through Concurrent Nested Design. Methodological tools for data 
collection consisted of collection of secondary data, key informant interviews, 
survey questionnaires, house owner interviews, focus group discussions, 
and life stories. I also briefly explained how these data were analysed. In the 
geographical settings section of this chapter I set out that my research is 
focused on districts of Muzaffarabad and Bagh in AJK. Both urban and rural 
areas are included in the study to investigate how the housing reconstruction 
programme performed in rural/urban settings. Muzaffarabad and Bagh cities 
in urban setting and UC Danna, UC Salmia, UC Jaglari, and UC Islamnager 
in rural setting were studied. Being an ethnographic study, I discussed the 
issue of positionality and how it impacts my research. Towards the end of the 
chapter concludes with the description of my second stint of fieldwork which 
was undertaken to give feedback to respondents of first fieldwork and get 
their input on it.         
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CHAPTER 5: VULNERABILITY OF THE HOUSING STOCK IN     
THE STUDY AREA 
5.1. Introduction   
This chapter develops the argument outlined in Chapter 2 that disasters are 
not the products or outcome of hazard only, but a combination of hazard and 
vulnerability; it is the vulnerability of the people which determines the level of 
loss and turns a hazard into a disaster. In this chapter I outline the pre-
earthquake housing stock in the study area, the prevalent construction 
typology, the reasons for adopting these typologies, and the reasons for wide 
spread destruction of the housing stock. These characteristics integrate to 
affect the vulnerability, which the Government of AJK have attempted to 
manage through development policies.  The results presented in Chapter 5 
are derived from academic literature, secondary data (mainly of the ERRA 
and the SERRA), primary data (both qualitative and quantitative) collected 
during my two fieldwork episodes, and my personal experience of working in 
these areas for more than a decade.  
5.2. Construction Typology before the Earthquake  
Before the earthquake there was mixed construction typology in the study 
area. The nature of housing construction had been influenced by various 
factors such as climate, economics, availability of materials, and culture. In 
rural areas there were no building regulations or enforcement mechanisms 
operated by the government (Khan et al. 2011). In urban areas building 
codes did exist before the earthquake; however these codes did not consider 
the risk of seismic hazard. Moreover, these codes were rarely enforced for 
houses and private buildings (Halvorson & Hamilton 2010; Husain 2008; 
Naeem & Okazaki 2009; Rossetto & Pieris 2009) due to corruption and 
inefficiency.  
The pre-earthquake housing stock in the affected areas can be broadly 
divided into four categories: kacha (meaning not permanent or not strong), 
pukka (meaning strong and permanent), Dhajji-dewari, and wood. Bloesch et 
al. (2005) and Rossetto & Pieris (2009) identified four types of building 
construction in the earthquake affected areas: unreinforced stone masonry, 
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unreinforced concrete block masonry, unreinforced brick masonry and 
reinforced concrete frames. In my opinion these were actually different types 
of pukka construction which was more prevalent in urban areas. Table 5.1 
shows the type of construction in the study area (Districts of Bagh and 
Muzaffarabad) before the earthquake. Overall the pukka construction was 
not prevalent; on average only 37% of houses were pukka, although this type 
of construction was more prevalent in urban areas (73%) than in rural areas 
(32%). The kacha type of construction was more prevalent in the study area 
(57% of houses were kacha), however the ratio of kacha houses was more in 
rural areas (61%) compared to urban areas (23%). Wood and other types of 
construction were rare.  
  
13 Table 5.1 Pre-earthquake construction typology. 
 Pre-EQ Housing Type 
Location/Type Overall 
(%) 
 
Muzaffarabad 
(%) 
Bagh 
(%) 
Total Rural  Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urba
n 
Pakka 
(Brick/Block/Stone) 
37.11 32.98 73.95 35.98 29.48 78.39 38.25 36.48 68.35 
Kacha 57.25 61.09 23.41 56.87 62.9 17.5 57.62 59.29 29.33 
Wood 3.37 3.44 2.5 4.08 4.16 3.54 2.67 2.73 1.56 
Other 2.26 2.22 0.66 3.07 3.45 0.57 1.45 1.49 0.76 
            
 (Source: developed by the author from ERRA 2007a, 2007b) 
 
Most of the house owners I interviewed were of the opinion that the 
percentage of kacha houses was much higher (70%-80%) in rural areas 
before the earthquake. House owners of Union Council Jaglari (rural Bagh) 
reported that 80% of houses in their area were kacha, whereas house 
owners of Union Council Danna (rural Muzaffarabad) said that about 70% of 
houses were kacha in their area.  Similar figures were reported by 
participants of the focus group discussions held in Union Council Salmia in 
rural Muzaffarabad; the percentage of kacha houses in their Union Council 
was much higher than other areas, about 85-90%.  
In the following sub sections I discuss the construction typology and reasons 
for adopting this categorization.  
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5.2.1. Kacha Houses 
The Kacha type of construction was more prevalent in rural areas as 
compared to pukka or wood construction. The reason is that kacha houses 
are easier to build (requiring no engineering or masonry skills), cheaper in 
cost, and provide better insulation against a harsh climate (Ali 2007). The 
kacha houses (called kotha in local language) were usually made of thick 
stone walls (mostly rounded stones) irregularly laid in mud, or dressed stone 
dry masonry walls with or without internal and external mud plaster. These 
houses usually had a mud roof with thick wood rafters, some of the rafters 
were almost entire trees roughly hewn and squared (Ali 2007; EEFIT 2008; 
Khan 2007). Cross beams were laid on these rafters and split wood was 
spread on the cross beams. This surface was further covered with pine 
needles and shrubs topped by about 30 cm thick earth (Figure 5.1).  
 
32 Figure 5.1 A rural kacha house in Salmia (Muzaffarabad), flat mud roof (saturated with 
water) and steep slope can be noticed (inset: whole tree trunks as roof beams).                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                              (Source: Author fieldwork) 
 
Corrugated Galvanised Iron (CGI) sheet roofs replaced mud roofs in later 
years, but this depended on the financial condition of the household. Figure 
5.2 shows a diagram of a typical house in rural Muzaffarabad drawn by Key 
Informant-21 during interview. The typical house comprised of two rooms (A 
and C) at the front of the house, with a veranda (B) between them. There 
used to be a big wooden column in the middle of the veranda to support the 
roof, but this beam was never fixed into the ground and had no joint with the 
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roof beams either. A bigger room (D) called dalaan was located at the back 
of the house, along with a room (E) for cattle, and some open space (F). The 
front two rooms were used for guests and by members of the household 
during summers. The dalaan was usually used in the winter season. It had 
entry through a door in the veranda (as shown in the drawing). It had a 
hearth for cooking and heating purposes. The whole family also slept in it 
because this room was warm due to the fire. The cattle room (E) was kept 
with the dalaan to provide much needed warmth to the cattle during winters. 
The cattle room could be approached from the dalaan through a door and 
also had a side door (as shown in the drawing) to take the cattle in and out 
and to throw their refuse into the adjacent fields. The veranda had a hearth 
which was used for cooking during summer.    
 
33 Figure 5.2 Drawing of a typical house in rural areas showing the plan of the house: (A) room, 
(B) veranda, (C) room, (D) dalaan, (E) cattle room, and (F) open space.                        
(Source: Key Informant-21, alphabets have been added by myself for explanation reason) 
 
Cost was one of the most important factors in determining the type of 
construction people opted for, hence the kacha houses because they were 
cheaper to build. All the required material such as stones, mud and wood is 
locally available within the immediate vicinity of the house and usually 
community labour is used to save labour cost (Bilham 2009; ERRI 2005; 
Khan 2007). My data of 100 survey questionnaires collected from four rural 
Union Councils shows that 83% (N=5) of ‘Very Poor’ and 67% (N=28) of 
‘Poor’ households had kacha houses before the earthquake. Most of the 
kacha house owners, whom I interviewed, said that they had built the kacha 
A 
E 
D 
C 
B 
F 
122 
 
house because they couldn’t afford the higher cost of a pukka house. 
However, since the 1970s and 1980s, when remittances from Middle Eastern 
countries began and new construction materials and techniques were 
introduced, the kacha construction has been regarded as a sign of poverty 
and people wished and strived to have a pukka house in their life time.    
Climate is the second most important factor that determines the type of 
construction. The study area has a harsh climate with a mean temperature of 
35°C in summer and 3°C in winter (ERRA 2007a; 2007b). Due to its thermal 
effectiveness, the kacha construction provides good protection against this 
harsh climate (Bilham 2009; Khan 2007). Kacha construction thus became 
part of the construction culture of these areas; a large kacha room is 
sometimes added even with pukka houses in rural areas. People use it as a 
kitchen and prefer to spend much of their time in these kitchens in winters; 
they even sleep in them. Cattle sheds are also usually made of kacha 
construction. Since these areas are steep hills, most of the houses are built 
on terraced land, the rooftop of the cattle shed (called gohaal in local 
language) provides the household the much needed extra space in the 
shape of a courtyard (Figure 5.3). 
 
 
34 Figure 5.3 A Pukka house in rural area with a kacha cattle shed or gohaal (yellow arrow) 
added with the house which serves as courtyard as well; notice shear fall in front of the 
cattle shed.                                                                                       (Source: Author fieldwork)   
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5.2.2. Pukka Houses 
Pukka houses are a status symbol due to higher cost compared to kacha or 
dhajji-dewari construction. Different variations can be observed in this type of 
construction such as stone walls with RCC (Reinforced Concrete Cement) 
roof or CGI (Corrugated Galvanised Iron) sheet roof, concrete block walls 
with RCC roof or CGI sheets roof, and baked brick walls with RCC roof or 
CGI sheets roof. RCC roofs were more common in urban areas for three 
reasons: status, convenience, and space utilization. Compared to CGI sheet 
roofs, RCC roofs were considered pukka and thus people considered them a 
status symbol. CGI sheet roofs were not preferred in urban areas due to a 
shortage of cheaper wood for trusses, limited skilled carpenters and because 
such roofs need more maintenance than RCC roofs. Land is limited in urban 
areas; RCC roofs provided solution to this and are ideal for multi-storey 
construction (though these multi-storey buildings caused maximum damage 
in the earthquake because these buildings were of different heights and taller 
buildings fell on the shorter ones thus destroying them). Furthermore people 
used RCC rooftops as open spaces for sitting under the sun in winters, for 
cool air in hot summer evenings, and for putting up washing lines etc. (Figure 
5.4).  
 
35 Figure 5.4 Pukka houses in Muzaffarabad city; different heights are visible.                                           
                                                                                                               (Courtesy: Sheikh Ehsan) 
 
The availability of cheaper local construction materials (stone, aggregate, 
and sand) also played an important role in determining the type of 
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construction. For example, if stone was not locally available, concrete blocks 
were used because they were made with locally available sand and 
aggregate and thus were a cheaper option compared to expensive bricks 
transported from Rawalpindi, which could be as far as 200 km. The concrete 
blocks used to be unreinforced (Peiris et al. 2008). Due to improved road 
networks, low maintenance costs (Ali 2007) and improvement in incomes, 
the pukka type of construction had started to gain popularity both in rural and 
urban areas even before the earthquake. Figure 5.4 shows the typical 
housing typology found in urban areas throughout AJK. These houses are of 
irregular size and unequal height, ranging from single storey up to three 
storeys (Figure 5.4).  In rural areas the pukka houses usually had CGI sheet 
roofs because they were cheaper since wood was locally available and it 
was easier and cheaper to carry CGI sheets from the roadside to the house 
at the top of the hill compared to cement, sand, and steel for a RCC roof. 
Hilly areas receive snowfall and the slanting CGI sheet roofs quickly clear 
away the snow in contrast to flat RCC roofs. In rural areas, these houses 
usually had a kacha kitchen and kacha cattle shed with them. Due to their 
higher cost of construction these houses are regarded as a status symbol. 
Chang et al. (2011, p. 202-203) have also noticed a preference for a 
‘modern’ westernized house in Indonesia because it ‘symbolizes solidity and 
social status’. 
Although these structures were called pukka they failed to perform well 
during the earthquake since these buildings were not usually constructed 
according to engineering specifications (Ali 2007). The structural 
performance of these houses is discussed in detail in section 5.4.2.3. 
5.2.3. Timber Houses 
Timber houses (called larri in local language) were traditionally found in the 
remote valleys of Neelum and Leepa in District Muzaffarabad and certain 
remote areas of District Bagh. Since these areas receive heavy snowfall, 
these houses comprise of multi storeys (Figure 5.5). The ground floor is used 
for keeping cattle and storing firewood and hay. The upper two storeys are 
used for living purposes. Timber is abundantly available in these areas so 
this type of construction is more prevalent compared to other types (Haseeb 
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et al. 2011). “The wood is used in foundations even. The house is laid on a 
raft of wooden planks and has strong joints with each other, so the whole 
house is tightly joined with each other and remains intact during earthquake” 
(Key informant-21).  
 
 
 
36 Figure 5.5 A timber house in Leepa Valley (above), a timber house (larri) in Neelum 
Valley (below).                                                                                                                                       
                                 (Courtesy: above picture Umair Shafiq, below picture Farrukh Qureshi).  
 
Past seismic activity could be another reason for adopting this type of 
construction because these structures have excellent resilience against 
seismic shaking if joints are properly made (Haseeb et al. 2011). A 
participant of the focus group discussion in Salmia in rural Muzaffarabad 
(who has worked in the post-2005 earthquake housing reconstruction 
programme in the Leepa Valley) reported that many old people of the valley 
said that they heard from their great grandfathers that some short foreigners 
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came to the valley after an earthquake and told us how to construct our 
houses. This story was confirmed by Key Informant-21 (who has very 
detailed knowledge of the valley) as well.                
5.2.4. Dhajji-dewari 
Dhajji-dewari is a local construction technique which has developed over the 
centuries in the mountainous areas of Kashmir (Figure 5.6). I have myself 
observed this type of construction in Neelum Valley during my job there in 
1989 and 1995. It is a timber lacing type of masonry which has excellent 
seismic-resistant features (Szeliga et al. 2010). Timber and stone are used in 
this construction technique; the frame of the house is made with thick timber 
planks, timber studs are used to subdivide the infill, mostly of small stone 
pieces. This restricts the loss of masonry panels and resists the progressive 
destruction of the rest of the wall. These timber studs are closely spaced so 
that they provide protection against propagation of diagonal shear cracks 
within any single panel (EERI 2005, p. 7).  
 
37 Figure 5.6 A Dhajji-dewari building in rural Muzaffarabad. (Source: Author fieldwork) 
This type of construction is likely to have developed due to seismic activity in 
the areas in the past (Szeliga et al. 2010). These ‘dhajji’ houses showed 
better seismic resistance during the 2005 earthquake (Craig 2010; Kanji 
2006; Stephenson et al. 2008; UN-Habitat 2009). Dr Shahid Baig, Chairman 
of Geology Department, AJK University Muzaffarabad (Key Informant-22) 
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also reported during his semi-structured interview that he had observed that 
dhajji houses suffered little damage whereas stone, brick, concrete block 
buildings suffered heavy damage due to the earthquake. However, with the 
passage of time this type of construction has given way to other types of 
construction such as pukka construction in urban areas and pukka and 
kacha construction in rural areas. This view was supported by key informants 
in the study area. Key Informant-17, who belongs to Muzaffarabad city and 
has long experience of heading the city’s Development Authority and 
Municipal Corporation, reported  that seismically resistant dhajji houses were 
found in Muzaffarabad city fifty or sixty years ago, but when remittances from 
the Gulf and Middle Eastern countries started in 1970s, people started to 
demolish these old dhajji houses. 
5.3. Damage to Housing Stock in 2005 Earthquake 
More than 318,162 buildings were destroyed by the earthquake. 99% 
(314,474) of these buildings were private houses and only 1% (3,688) were 
public sector buildings (ADB 2005; Khan 2013) (See, for example, Figure 
3.7). Similarly in financial terms the housing sector suffered the biggest loss 
(43.75% of the PKR 114.28 billion total financial losses) followed by the 
Education sector (24.70%) (See, for example, Figure 3.8).  
Figure 3.7 also highlights that the difference in the level of losses between 
the housing sector and other sectors is significant, demonstrating that the 
housing sector suffered the most damage in terms of financial losses. 
According to some estimates three-quarters of deaths in the 2005 
earthquake occurred due to the collapse of houses (Khan 2013). 
It came into my knowledge as Deputy Commissioner of Muzaffarabad District 
at the time of the earthquake that the damage to the building stock was not 
confined particularly to the vicinity of the epicentre, but was spread over a 
large area and majority of the building stock was destroyed even in far-off 
places. I travelled extensively in the area on the ground as well as in 
helicopters for about a year and observed massive destruction everywhere in 
my District. The damage assessment survey also confirmed huge losses in 
neighbouring Districts. In AJK 314,474 houses were damaged in 944 villages 
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spread over an area of 7,000 km2 (SERRA 2014). Most of the building stock 
in the study area (90% of the rural and 70% of the urban) was destroyed by 
the earthquake (ERRA 2007; Haseeb et al. 2011; Khan 2013).  
During my first fieldwork, I thought it proper to have a more detailed insight 
into the trend of the damage in geographical terms i.e. whether some areas 
were more damaged than the others or not, and what were the reasons. I 
looked into the data of the Government of AJK for this purpose. The 
percentage of the destroyed houses in each Union Council was calculated 
because Union Council is the basic administrative unit of the local 
government system. These percentages were put into GIS to generate the 
damage map. The services of the Land Use Plan Unit of the Planning & 
Development Department, Government of AJK were utilized for the 
generation of this map because only they have the Union Council GIS maps 
of AJK. Figure 5.7 shows the level of destruction in all Union Councils of the 
earthquake affected Districts. This map doesn’t present the exact picture of 
the damage though because in some Union Councils the level of damage 
shown is more than 100%. The reason for these unrealistic/inflated figures is 
that the authorities didn’t know the exact number of houses in those areas at 
the time of the survey, so they projected the number of houses in 2005 on 
the basis of the 1998 census. Thus the number of damaged houses (based 
on door to door surveys) at certain places exceeds the total number of 
houses at the time of the earthquake. Nevertheless this map presents a 
reliable overall picture of the damage. A widespread high percentage of 
damage to housing stock can be noticed in this map; even in those union 
councils which were more than 100 km away from the epicentre, for example 
100% damage in Naar Sher Ali Khan.  
One main reason for this wide spread and extraordinarily high level of 
damage could be the vulnerability of the housing stock (Bilham 2005). 
Interestingly some Union Councils experienced very low damage, for 
example 30% in Leepa and 23% in Ashkot.    
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38 Figure 5.7 Spatial distribution of damage to housing stock in AJK. (Source: Author in collaboration with 
LUP Cell) 
 
INDIAN ADMINISTRATED 
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The above map was discussed with the participants of focus groups and key 
informants during second period of fieldwork. All the respondents agreed 
with the level of damage shown in the map and were of the opinion that the 
type and [poor] quality of construction were the main reasons for high and 
widespread damage in AJK. Most of the respondents agreed that the level of 
damage in Leepa Valley was far lower as compared to other areas. They 
thought this was due to the particular type of vernacular earthquake resistant 
construction “the reason of low damage in Leepa is the particular type of 
construction there which is earthquake resistant” (Key informant-21). The 
reasons of damage are discussed in detail in the following sections.  
5.4. Reasons of Damage to Housing Stock  
Many reasons contributed towards the widespread destruction. Halvorson & 
Hamilton (2010); Haseeb et al. (2011); and Husain (2008) suggest that rapid 
population growth, poverty, illiteracy, unplanned urbanization, changing 
building techniques, absence of building regulatory authority, poor physical 
infrastructure, environmental degradation, high population density, socio-
political vulnerabilities and lack of disaster preparedness and mitigation 
contributed towards extraordinary losses. According to Ozerdem (2006) most 
of the vulnerabilities of Alexander’s six-point typology of disaster vulnerability 
i.e. economic vulnerability, technological/technocratic vulnerability, residual 
vulnerability (if pre-earthquake unsafe buildings are not upgraded due lack of 
political will or lack of financial resources), newly generated vulnerabilities 
due to human migration, deliberate neglect of building codes and regulations 
and total vulnerability due to precarious life in general, were all found in the 
case of the Kashmir earthquake. 
 
In my analysis I divide vulnerability into four categories: geological 
vulnerability, physical vulnerability, environmental vulnerability, and socio-
economic vulnerability. My research suggests that the last three 
vulnerabilities i.e. physical vulnerability, environmental vulnerability, and 
socio-economic vulnerability were the direct product of the development 
paradigm/pattern of the country and the first vulnerability i.e. geological 
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vulnerability could have been minimised with the right kind of development 
pattern.     
5.4.1. Geological Vulnerability  
Hazard is one of the two factors of disaster risk; vulnerability being the other 
(Risk = Hazard x vulnerability) (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 45). In my study, by 
geological vulnerability I mean the seismic hazard which was present in the 
study area due to it geology. The epicentre of the October 2005 earthquake 
was in Muzaffarabad District, about 11 km northwest of the Capital city of 
Muzaffarabad. It was the first major instrumentally recorded earthquake in 
this area. The magnitude of the earthquake was high (Mw= 7.6) at a relatively 
shallow depth of 11 Km (Avouac et al. 2006; USGS 2014). Shallow depth 
and close proximity to the epicentre were the main reasons of heavy damage 
to buildings (Pieris et al. 2008). According to Avouac et al. (2006, p. 524) this 
earthquake was a shallow crustal event with an “up dip propagation of the 
rupture together with a steep dip angle and shallow distribution of slip”; the 
rupture velocity was about 2 km/s. These two factors played an important 
role in causing heavy damage in the vicinity of the epicentre. According to 
Haseeb et al. (2011) most of the buildings in mountainous rural areas were 
destroyed along the fault rupture. The earthquake generated many 
landslides damaging those buildings which were situated on the sliding mass 
(ibid). For example a 68 × 106 m3 rock avalanche (Dunning et al. 2007) was 
generated by the earthquake in the Hattian Bala area (in Muzaffarabad 
District) which toppled the whole village of Lodhiabad, killing nearly 247 of 
350 people and destroying all 70 houses (personal interviews with survivors).  
5.4.2. Physical Vulnerability  
While discussing the ‘progression of vulnerability’ in PAR model, Wisner et 
al. (2004, p.4) have explained how ‘unsafe conditions’ comprising of 
‘dangerous locations’ and ‘unprotected buildings’ interact with local hazard 
and cause disaster vulnerability (Figure 3.5). According to Bilham (1988) 
earthquake losses are very high in developing countries due to poor 
construction. In the case of 2005 Kashmir earthquake poor construction 
played an important role. From literature, my personal experience and field 
research I can conclude that the majority of buildings in the study area had 
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not been constructed according to seismic specifications, the general quality 
of construction was very poor, local poor quality construction material was 
used, workmanship was poor, and there were low maintenance standards 
(Ali 2007; ERRA 2006; Khan 2013; Pieris et al. 2008). Most of the buildings 
were built without any proper technical specifications or supervision. 
Engineers had little input into the construction of the houses and private 
buildings. The construction of these buildings was done by masons who 
were usually ignorant about seismic standards or even about concrete 
structures (Halvorson & Hamilton 2010; Kazmi et al. 2012; Naeem & Okazai 
2009; Rossetto & Pieris 2008). I interviewed three masons in three different 
areas (one in urban Muzaffarabad, one in urban Bagh and one in rural Bagh) 
during fieldwork and asked if they knew about seismic resistant construction 
before the earthquake; all said that they did not know anything about it. In 
fact they had no formal training for the job and learnt their skills by working 
with other senior masons, who themselves had no such knowledge.  
 
As a result of my research, I have identified the following construction related 
issues which contributed towards the vulnerability of the building stock. 
5.4.2.1. Lack of Local Knowledge of Seismic Hazard  
“Earthquake kills us when we forget it. The 
earthquake did not kill us; it was our ignorance that 
killed us”. (A house owner in rural Bagh) 
Although AJK, especially the northern part where the earthquake struck in 
2005, is situated in a seismically active zone, but major earthquakes have 
been extremely rare. No instrumental data of past earthquakes was locally 
available, however both geological and historical evidence show that major 
earthquakes have been infrequent. The last major earthquake occurred in in 
this area in 1555 AD, but hardly anyone knew about it before the 2005 
earthquake (Bilham 2004; Iyengar et al. 1996). “A devastating earthquake 
struck in 1827. The aftershocks were felt for three months. Hundreds of 
houses were destroyed and thousands of people were killed. The cholera 
epidemic broke out after the earthquake which lasted for six months” 
(Qureshi 2009, p. 76). In 1878 an Mw=6.7 earthquake occurred in nearby 
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Abbottabad (about 30 km away) and then in 1885 an Mw=6.3 earthquake hit 
Srinagar (about 125 Km away) (Peiris et al. 2008). People in those times 
must have learnt some lessons from these earthquakes because they 
incorporated seismic resistant techniques into their construction (Ali 2007; 
Peiris et al. 2008), for example the seismic resistant properties of the 
traditional Dhajji-dewari and Leepa construction, which remained prevalent in 
many areas until recent past, and proved to be seismically resistant. The 
good performance of these traditional techniques during the October 2005 
earthquake is well documented (Barenstein et al. 2008; Kanji 2006; 
Stephenson et al. 2008; UN-Habitat 2009), however memory of these 
earthquakes faded away with the passage of time and people switched to 
seismically unsafe construction.  
During fieldwork 200 respondents were asked through survey questionnaires 
if they had any prior knowledge of the seismic hazard in the area at the time 
of the 2005 earthquake; all of them said that they had no knowledge of the 
seismic hazard beforehand. Similarly 26 Key Informants were asked the 
same question during semi structured interviews; 21 of them said that they 
had no prior knowledge of the seismic hazard and only five said that they 
had some knowledge but never took it seriously. Following are the thoughts 
of some of the Key Informants who were all well-educated and were working 
at reasonably good positions.    
“Never thought of such a severe earthquake, neither was there any 
warning.” (Key Informant-12; Administrator of a Municipal Corporation) 
“No, I had no knowledge of the seismic hazard nor there was any 
warning of the earthquake. When my house started to collapse, I didn’t 
realize that it was an earthquake. Later on when I realized that the intensity 
was too much then I thought it was Qiyamat because earthquake couldn’t be 
that severe.” (Key Informant-8; Deputy Commissioner of a District)  
“An acquaintance of mine, who was a geologist, used to say before 
the earthquake that you were sitting on fire but we used to take them as fairy 
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tales because we had not gone through it yet.”  (Key Informant-33; Officer in 
Reconstruction Organization) 
 “……we thought that the engineers were just scaring people.” (Key 
Informant-19; Chairman of a Development Authority) 
5.4.2.2. Kacha Construction  
According to Bilham (2009, p. 840) mud is the most favourite building 
material in developing countries because it is cheap, easy to use, and has 
good thermal qualities, but buildings constructed with mud are “killer” 
because they instantly collapse in earthquakes. The same is true in the case 
of AJK where 57% houses in the earthquake affected areas were 
constructed with mud (kacha). Mud and round undressed stones were used 
in these houses employing local semi-skilled masons. There were no 
columns or beams in these structures, the thick wood rafters had no joints 
with roof beams, and the thick layers of mud were heavy. The bigger rooms 
had a thick column (called Thum in local language) in the middle of the 
centre to support roof beam. But this column neither had any strong joint with 
roof beam nor was strongly secured in the ground. That’s why these columns 
readily slipped away due tremors. These structures had little seismic 
resistance (Ali 2007; Haseeb et al. 2011). Almost all kacha houses collapsed 
in the earthquake burying their inhabitants alive. Figure 5.8 shows a typical 
kacha house destroyed by the earthquake. The walls were unable to 
withstand the ground shaking and lateral movements produced by the 
earthquake (Ali 2007; EERI 2006). 
 
As evident from the picture, these houses had heavy mud roofs. Thick 
wooden panels were laid on the walls without any kind of bracing, covered 
with twigs and a thick layer of mud. Though this type of roof did provide 
much needed insulation it was prone to water seepage, so every year, before 
the start of the monsoon season or before winter snow, a new layer of mud 
was added for extra protection thus making the roof enormously heavy. 
These kacha houses were of such poor quality that they even gave in to rain 
or snow. While working in Muzaffarabad District before the 2005 earthquake 
it regularly came into my experience that these kacha houses used to get 
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damaged whenever there were heavy rains or snow. We used to receive 
hundreds of applications for government assistance after every such event. 
So the kacha construction was already a disaster in the making, exacerbated 
by the earthquake.  
 
 
 
39 Figure 5.8 A destroyed Kacha house: note heavy wooden beams, loose joints, undressed 
stones and thick mud roof.                                                                      (Source: ERRA 2015) 
 
5.4.2.3. Poor Quality of Construction 
The general quality of construction in these areas was also too poor and 
unable to resist even moderate tremors (Focus Group Discussions 2014; 
Peiris et al. 2008). Figure 5.9 depicts the cross section of a typical wall. 
Stones of irregular size and shallow foundation using weak materials were 
the contributing factors towards poor quality construction. Most of these 
structures collapsed or were intensely damaged in areas of ground shaking. 
Brick masonry buildings performed better (Haseeb et al. 2011).   
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40 Figure 5.9 Cross section of a typical structure; round stones in walls with mud or weak 
cement mortar, shallow foundation, and weak mortar in foundation were used.                                      
                                                                                                          (Haseeb et al. 2011, p. 172) 
 
Most of the housing stock in these areas had developed as a result of 
incremental housing. People mostly lived in a joint family system; rooms 
were added as sons were married. So the new unit had no structural 
connection or tie with the previous structure. With the passage of time there 
has been a change in the construction typology as well. In rural areas, there 
has been linear addition of mostly pukka structures (consisting of stone and 
in some cases concrete blocks) along with old kacha houses. So there used 
to be separate horizontal structures in rural areas, kacha alongside pakka 
(Figure 5.10). The structure on the right is a pukka structure made with 
concrete blocks and CGI sheet roof, whereas a kacha structure (on the left) 
made with stone, mud and flat roof with heavy wooden rafters of irregular 
size is added. These two structures have no proper joints between them (no 
joint is possible with engineering point of view). No doubt the quality of kacha 
houses was very poor, but the quality of the pukka structures was not much 
better either. Contrary to their name, the so called pukka houses could not 
prove themselves to be pukka (strong) against the earthquake and came 
down as readily as kacha structures. 
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41 Figure 5.10 kacha (left) and pakka (right) structures side by side in rural Bagh.  
                                                                                                              (Source: Author fieldwork) 
In urban areas the situation was different. Due to the scarcity of land the 
development tended to be vertical i.e. addition of storeys on top of the 
existing stone structures. In many cases a cement concrete block storey was 
added on top of the old stone house and then the third cement concrete 
block or brick storey was added on top of the second storey. In some areas 
of the old city, for example the most congested Madina Market, even four 
storey high buildings were constructed in this manner. There was no frame 
structure in these buildings to give strength, so the original single storey 
structure was unable to bear such a load and crumbled under its own weight 
when the earthquake hit. Though considered to be pukka, these buildings 
collapsed as easily as kacha houses because these were loadbearing 
structures which had a variety of construction types and construction 
materials used in them (Figure 5.11).  
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42 Figure 5.11 A pukka building in urban Bagh, mixed construction material (stones and bricks) 
is used in the same wall (picture above); destroyed pukka construction in urban 
Muzaffarabad, mixed construction material such as bricks and concrete blocks can be 
noticed in red circles (picture below).                                                           (Source: SERRA)   
 
Camerio (1997,  p. 167-168) also found that there were concentrated losses 
of multi-family housing in dense urban areas of Mexico City, Loma Prieta, 
and Kobe. 
One of the old residents of Muzaffarabad city observed:  
“Then there was incremental housing e.g. the father had constructed the 
house forty years ago; he constructed another three room storey on the old 
building when his first son married. When the second son married, he added 
the third storey……….Now what happened that the houses got overloaded 
and due to the first jolt the third storey came down on the second storey and 
the second on the first one. There are many buildings in Muzaffarabad city 
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which sank fully into the ground due to the load”. (Key Informant-9; 
Muzaffarabad) 
As was the case in rural areas, the construction typology had undergone a 
lot of change in urban areas since 1970s and there has been a switch to 
more modern construction materials due to improved road infrastructure and 
market access, especially near urban areas. The material used in these 
buildings was usually of poor quality; local low quality sand which had silt 
and clay, low quality aggregate, cheap steel and low quality cement (Ali 
2007). Locally made cement concrete blocks, often of very low quality and of 
small size e.g. 6”x6”x12” were used in walls. These blocks were not 
reinforced and hardly any curing was done so they had very low PSI strength 
so they quickly developed cracks during the earthquake resulting in collapse 
of buildings (Pieris et al. 2008). People made all sorts of compromises on 
quality to reduce cost. There was also a lack of workmanship. Most of the 
engineers had no idea of seismic standards and masons were ignorant about 
the basics of concrete structures (EERI 2006; Halvorson 2010; Kazmi et al. 
2012; Naeem 2008; Naeem et al. 2007; Rossetto et al. 2009). Some houses 
did have RCC frame structures but they had many defects, for example 
fewer steel bars were used than necessary, there were wider spaces 
between steel rings to save cost, and the walls had no joints or connection 
with columns and beams thus providing no “lateral force-resisting system” 
(EERI 2006, p. 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 Figure 5.12 A Destroyed Pakka House                          (Source: SERRA) 
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The widespread damage to building stock indicates structural design 
weaknesses in the construction that could not withstand the seismic shock 
(ERRA 2007). According to Ali (2007, p. 17) a ‘complex dynamism’ existed in 
these areas before the earthquake where 'modernization' and ‘deterioration’ 
occurred simultaneously resulting in extremely poor quality houses which 
were severely damaged by the earthquake. With changing times people 
started to make modern buildings using cement and steel but the required 
engineering standards, materials quality, and workmanship were not used so 
the quality of the these buildings was not up to the standard which ultimately 
deteriorated the quality of the building stock. Figure 5.13 illustrates these 
weaknesses in different parts of these buildings.  
 
44 Figure 5.13 Structural performance of pre-2005 earthquake buildings.          (Ali, 2007, p. 16) 
 
The foundations were constructed as free standing structures (without the 
use of steel bars and rafts) and did not hold the building together as 
monolithic structures which could provide protection against extensive 
rocking or shaking or soil deformation in case of earthquake. The walls had a 
heavy dead load, there was lack of continuous reinforcement of steel 
columns and beams and low width to height ratio (rooms were too big) so 
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wall structures cracked, separated from main structures or overturned as a 
result of ground shaking. The roofs were too heavy (either heavy mud roofs 
or heavy RCC slabs) which had no proper joints with walls and readily 
collapsed due to ground shaking. As compared to traditional houses and 
kacha houses the new buildings had much bigger windows and doors and 
there were no RCC bands at lintel level which made walls weaker. 
 
In order to understand the reasons behind faulty construction, I asked 31 Key 
Informants and house owners to suggest likely causes of poor quality 
construction. They identified “ignorance of the seismic hazard”, “poverty”, 
and “lack of building control” as three most probable reasons of faulty quality. 
They were asked to rank these reasons: 68% ranked “ignorance” as number 
one, 16% identified “lack of control” as number one, and 16% identified 
“poverty” as number one cause of faulty construction (Figure 5.14).  
 
45 Figure 5.14 Reasons reported for faulty construction (based on semi-structured interviews) 
showing ranking of the reasons of faulty construction.                   (Source: Author fieldwork) 
 
This issue was discussed in Focus Group discussions also. The Focus 
Group discussion held in Bagh identified ‘Ignorance of the seismic hazard’ as 
number one reason and ‘Poverty’ as the third. Focus group discussions held 
in Danna and Muzaffarabad identified ‘Ignorance of the seismic hazard’ as 
the second and ‘Lack of building control’ as the third most likely reason.  
Ignorance of seismic hazard
Lack of building control
Poverty
68% 
16% 
16% 
26% 
39% 
26% 
32% 
42% 
1 2 3
Ranking 
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Poor quality construction was not particular to private buildings only; even 
the government buildings were of very poor quality. More than 3,000 
educational buildings (95% of the total schools and colleges) collapsed killing 
around 19,000 students (Bilham 2010; EERI 2006; NDMA 2009). Many 
government officials or members of their family died in government built 
houses and offices. The official accommodation of the Deputy Commissioner 
(the highest ranking government functionary in the District) was no exception 
too. The Deputy Commissioner House of three Districts (Muzaffarabad, Bagh 
and Poonch) collapsed instantly. I was working as Deputy Commissioner 
Muzaffarabad at the time of the earthquake; my official house came down 
within first few seconds of the earthquake. My family and I were inside the 
house as it collapsed and we were lucky to dig ourselves out of the rubble. 
The daughter of the Deputy Commissioner Poonch and two young children 
and a wife of the Commissioner Muzaffarabad were killed in the government 
houses. 
However despite experiencing such a big devastation, most of the people still 
do not consider that faulty construction had much role in this destruction. The 
quantitative data that I collected through survey questionnaires during 
fieldwork substantiate this assertion. The respondents were asked to identify 
reasons of damage (in order of priority) to their property. They could identify 
up to six reasons. The findings of this question are presented in Figure 5.15.  
Overall a majority of respondents (61%) believed that the intensity of the 
earthquake was responsible for the damage. Only 17% identified 
construction related reasons. Another noticeable thing in this graph is the 
difference in perception between urban and rural areas. 74% of the urban 
respondents thought that the earthquake intensity was responsible for the 
damage and 23% pointed out construction related reasons. Whereas 48% of 
the rural respondents identified earthquake intensity and 35% identified the 
construction related reasons. One possible explanation could be the 
construction typology. In urban areas the number of pukka houses was quite 
high (94% in urban Muzaffarabad and 80% in urban Bagh), whereas in rural 
areas the number of pukka houses was relatively lower (rural Muzaffarabad 
52% and rural Bagh 58%). Despite being of poor quality, the pukka houses 
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did give the owners the feeling that their houses were safe and had no 
quality issue and it was not the poor quality of the building but the intensity of 
the earthquake responsible for the damage to the building. Whereas, people 
living in kacha houses in rural areas already knew about the poor quality of 
these houses so this type of construction did give people a perception of 
being strong and reliable. So the rightly pointed out the reason of damage to 
their buildings.  
   
46 Figure 5.15 Reasons of damage to housing stock                     (Source: Author fieldwork) 
 
Another explanation emerged during my second period of fieldwork when I 
discussed these findings with key informants. Some of the key informants 
who had worked in the housing reconstruction programme at very 
responsible positions correlated this difference in perception to the housing 
reconstruction programme. They were of the opinion that in rural areas the 
Assistance and Inspection Teams (AITs), who were responsible for the 
implementation of the housing reconstruction programme, were given the 
task of sensitizing the house owners about the earthquake hazard, faults with 
their damaged buildings, and how to do seismic resistant construction. 
House owners were given training in these things as well. These teams 
inspected the construction progress at three different stages, identified the 
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faults, and suggested remedial measures. The rural areas’ people learnt a lot 
about seismic hazard and construction faults during this exercise so it was 
due to this training that they were able to identify other reasons of damage 
apart from earthquake intensity. Whereas, in urban areas there were no 
Assistance and Inspection Teams so the urban areas’ people have a 
different perception which is heavily focused on earthquake intensity and 
gives less importance to other reasons. These key informants found the 
perception of urban resident particularly worrying because they thought that 
it meant that even nine years after the earthquake and suffering so much 
damage the urban residents had not learnt from the horrific experience and 
were still as vulnerable to seismic hazard as they were before the 
earthquake.              
5.4.2.4. Lack of Building Control Mechanism 
There were no seismic resistant building codes in the study area before the 
earthquake, although some codes for building did exist in urban areas (EERI 
2006; Pieris et al. 2008) and there was no building control mechanism at all 
in rural areas. I know from personal experience (as Administrator District 
Council Poonch in 2001-2002 and Administrator District Council Bhimber in 
2002-2004) that there were no building codes or building control mechanism 
in the rural areas of these districts. On the other hand the rudimentary type of 
building control mechanism was ineffective in urban areas (Halvorson 2010; 
Haseeb et al. 2011; Husain 2008; Naeem 2008; Rossetto et al. 2009), 
especially in the case of residential buildings.  
5.4.3. Environmental Vulnerability 
As enumerated in Wisner et al. s’ (2004) PAR model, deforestation and 
decline in soil productivity contribute towards the ‘progression of vulnerability’ 
as ‘macro forces’ in the ‘dynamic pressures’ part of the model (ibid p. 51). 
Environmental degradation played an important role in making people 
vulnerable in the study area. Deforestation and soil erosion due to the 
construction of roads and buildings on mountains and depletion of vegetative 
cover contributed towards high losses. The consumption of wood is high in 
the study area due to high population density. On average three trees are 
burnt per household every year for fuel purposes and about five trees are 
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required by every household every 8-10 years for construction purposes 
(P&DD 2010). 
Deforestation has made the environment of the study area prone to 
landslides, soil erosion and slope instability even before the earthquake. 
Bloesch et al. (2005) observed that more landslides occurred on slopes in 
the 2005 earthquake where there was less vegetation as compared to those 
slopes that had thick forests. Dunning et al. (2007, p. 130) wrote that 26,500 
people were killed as a “direct result of landslides” in the AJK in the 2005 
earthquake. 88 landslides (out of 183 post-earthquake landslides) in the 
Hattian Bala catchment of District Muzaffarabad area were pre-earthquake 
and 5 km2 area (out of 7.76 km2 landslide affected area) was already 
reactivated by landslides, which alludes to the already degraded formation of 
the area (ibid). Thus the negative impacts of the earthquake were multiplied 
due to the fragile environment (Halvorson & Hamilton 2010; Husain 2008; 
Kazmi 2010).  
According to Owen et al. (2008) road construction is one of the main factors 
triggering landslides in tectonically active areas and 53% of all the sites had 
undergone human activity where landslides were initiated after the 2005 
earthquake. Due to steep hilly terrain, road construction requires extensive 
cut and fill activity in the study area. Earth cutting is the most favourite 
activity of the road contactors in these areas because it is easier and more 
profitable. Usually the contractors do the earth cutting, get the payment, and 
then they go into legal wrangling with the department for years leaving these 
road cuts open to the elements. Landslides were common on roads which 
exceeded 50○ slopes (ibid). It is in my personal knowledge that a vast 
majority of people lived (and continue to live) on slopes exceeding 50○ in the 
study area.  
Apart from above mentioned reasons, poverty is another reason of 
environmental degradation in the study area. People are forced to make 
unsustainable use of their environment. Collins (2009) has highlighted the 
downward spiral relationship between poverty and environmental 
degradation (Figure 5.16). As poverty increases, so does the environmental 
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degradation; on the other hand increasing environmental degradation 
enhances poverty. According to Collins (2009) the term ‘environment’ 
encompasses ‘physical environmental, social and economic components’ (p. 
71) and poverty has three components i.e. ‘income poverty, basic needs 
poverty and capabilities poverty’ (ibid).   
 
47Figure 5.16 Link between poverty and environmental degradation (Collins 2009, p. 71) 
 
5.4.4. Socio-economic Vulnerability 
As explained in Wisner et al. s’ (2004, p. 51) PAR model, limited access to 
resource, lack of local institutions, lack of local investments, livelihoods at 
risk, and low income levels contribute towards the progression of 
vulnerability. According to Ozerdem (2006) a combination of a fragile 
physical environment, poverty and inadequate social and institutional 
structures is most likely to produce a disaster from the occurrence of a 
natural hazard; he declares the 2005 Kashmir earthquake a social disaster. 
Pakistan is amongst the lowest income countries of the world with average 
annual per capita income of US$1194 (World Bank 2012). About 60% of the 
population lives on less than US$ 2 per day (ADB 2012). The economic 
statistics of the study area are not much better than the national average 
because these areas are geographically remote having difficult terrain and 
there is hardly any industry or service sector; apart from employment in the 
public sector. Only 13% (of the total 13,292 km2) area of AJK is under 
cultivation, but in the earthquake affected area this figure is even lower 
because of the scarcity of flat land. The productivity of land is negatively 
147 
 
impacted by the fact that 92% of this area is rain fed. The average cultivated 
area is 1.43 acres per family which makes agriculture a highly uneconomic 
and unreliable livelihood activity, so people have to rely on other sources 
such as foraging in rural areas and informal labour in urban areas (P&DD 
2006). Even before the 2005 earthquake these areas were generally 
considered poorer than the southern Districts of AJK.  
Poverty played an important role in the vulnerability of the people of these 
areas. Unfortunately no official data on exact economic status are available 
in AJK. I have tried to assess the household economic status in study area. 
The results of data of 200 households (Figure 5.17) show that 12% 
households were in “Very poor” category, 40% were in “Poor” category, 36% 
were in “Moderate but unstable” category, 11% were in “Moderate and 
stable” category, 1% were in “Strong” category, and 0% were in “Well-off” 
category. It means that the poverty rate in these areas was 52% which is 
very high. The unemployment ratio in AJK was 6.5% pa in 2006 (P&DD 
2012). There was no social security system for the poor and unemployed.    
 
48 49Figure 5.17 Pre-2005 earthquake household economic status in study area (N=200). 
                                                                                                       (Source: Author fieldwork) 
 
Ambraseys & Bilham (2011) found a direct relationship between poverty and 
death toll from the earthquakes. In the case of my study area, poverty did 
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play its role in poor quality housing (Section 5.2.1). Poor people in rural 
areas abandoned the traditional ‘Dhajji-dewari’ building technique in favour of 
much cheaper ‘Kacha’ houses. According to Ahrens & Rudolph (2006), Nigg 
(1995) and Qurentelli (2003) poor people who already struggle to survive 
have no choice but to live in unsafe structures built on precarious and 
vulnerable locations. In urban areas of AJK the land was very expensive due 
to scarcity so cheaper land on steep and dangerous slopes was utilised for 
construction of their houses. Since landholdings are very small in rural areas, 
people kept plane land for farming and built their houses on uncultivable 
steep and dangerous slopes (Halvorson & Hamilton 2010).  
People used local cheap construction material because good quality material 
was transported from Rawalpindi and was too expensive. RCC structures 
built under the technical supervision of qualified engineers cost more so 
people opted for unsupervised poor quality buildings (Halvorson & Hamilton 
2010; Husain 2008; Kazmi et al. 2012; Ozerdem 2006). Results of my 
quantitative data support this view; “Poverty” was identified by key informants 
as one of the three main reasons of poor quality construction (“Ignorance of 
seismic hazard” and “Lack of building control” being the other two) (Figure 
5.14). Many house owners, whom I interviewed during fieldwork, also 
substantiated this point.      
The area of AJK is relatively small (13,297 km2) but has a large population 
(3.4 million). AJK is a densely populated area (270 persons/km2), whereas 
the population density in the study area in 2005 was 307 (Persons/km2) in 
District Muzaffarabad and 336 (Persons/Km2) in District Bagh (ibid). The high 
population density became especially problematic in the study area because 
these areas have steep hilly topography so a high population density forced 
people to build their houses on steep slopes and susceptible places which 
were vulnerable to seismic activity (Halvorson 2010) (Figure 5.18).  
Rapid population change and rapid urbanisation are some of the ‘Macro-
forces’ which work as ‘dynamic pressures’ towards the ‘progression of 
vulnerability’ (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 51). According to Avouac et al. (2006) 
the extraordinary high death toll in the 2005 earthquake can be attributed to 
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high population growth in the area. Internal population migration also forced 
people to live in vulnerable places. The element of poverty on the one hand 
affected the type and quality of construction and on the other it forced many 
people to migrate to urban areas in search of better livelihoods. These 
people could only afford to live on steep slopes because they were relatively 
cheaper. The geopolitical situation of the area also contributed towards this 
internal migration. For example, hundreds of families migrated from the 
Neelum and Jhelum valleys into Muzaffarabad city in the 1990s due to the 
decade long armed clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces on the Line 
of Control. Since these people were mostly poor and escaped from their 
ancestral homes leaving everything behind, they could only afford to build 
poor quality residential structures on steep slopes and vulnerable locations. 
 
50 Figure 5.18 Massive building and road construction (yellow circles) on steep slopes in 
Muzaffarabad city. All the construction has been done after doing earth cutting.                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                              (Source: Author fieldwork) 
 
According to Collins (2009) risks are greater for those who are less able to 
adapt to urban environment. It was the poor rural migrant population was 
found it difficult to adapt to urban areas and ended up being more vulnerable 
perhaps as compared to their ancestral places. Cutter (2006) described 
almost similar situation in the case of Hurricane Katrina in the USA where 
poor black population occupied vulnerable locations in New Orleans and 
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more affluent white population moved out to safer suburbs thus the hurricane 
damaged the poor black population more than the white population. 
However, in the case of Muzaffarabad city the construction on steep slopes 
was not due to poverty only; many well-off people and social elites preferred 
to construct their houses on slopes to escape congested inner city areas and 
to have better scenic views. This situation sits perfectly well with the view 
expressed by Collins (2009) that though disasters are essentially a result of 
inappropriate development which causes the ‘marginalisation of the sub-
groups as a precursor to disaster, it may be that some urban risks are not as 
much about who you are, but where you live’ (p. 82).  
Provision of civic amenities also played its role in internal migration to urban 
centres. Though the governments in AJK have been trying to provide basic 
civic amenities such as roads, electricity, health, and education to even far 
flung areas, the fact remains that service delivery and the quality of service 
remained a big question mark.  
Though there were school or health buildings in rural areas, there were 
always complaints of absence of teachers and health staff, especially 
doctors, from their duties and the poor quality of service delivery. A lack of 
political institutions at the local level has also contributed towards these 
conditions. Though the political process has continued uninterrupted for the 
AJK Legislative Assembly (which is at the State level) since 1985, there has 
hardly ever been a political process at local government level and there has 
been no local governance system at the rural level either. People had no 
voice at local level for the resolution of their problems so they thought it 
better to move to urban centres in the hope of finding better facilities, 
however they ended up living in even poorer conditions and at more 
vulnerable locations, still without elected representatives. The urban civic 
bodies have almost always been headed by the bureaucrats or politically 
appointed people who did not have much interest in the resolution of 
peoples’ problems. Wisner et al. (2004) have also identified political system 
and lack of local institutions as part of the factors responsible for the 
progression of vulnerability.    
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5.5. Laying the Foundations of Vulnerability 
In the previous section, different types of vulnerability have been identified 
which prevailed in the study area at the time of the 2005 earthquake. As will 
be discussed in this section, this disaster vulnerability progressed over a long 
period of time. I will also try to explain in this section how the two theoretical 
approaches taken in this study i.e. Wisner et al.’s (2004) PAR model and 
Collins’ (2009) ‘disaster and development’ approach perfectly explain the 
progression of this vulnerability. The three factors of the ‘progression of 
vulnerability’ presented in Wisner et al.’s (2004) PAR model i.e. ‘Root 
Causes’, ‘Dynamic Pressures’, and ‘Unsafe Conditions’ (ibid, p. 51) sit 
perfectly well in the case of study area (Figure 3.4). It was these factors 
which formed the vulnerability to seismic hazard and caused the disaster of 
the 2005 earthquake. These factors will be explained greater detail in the 
subsequent paragraphs of this section.  
As highlighted by Collins (2009) disaster vulnerability is basically a 
consequence or by-product of development; either faulty development or 
lack of development (Chapter 2). Development does not mean economic 
development only; it is a holistic concept which encompasses sustainable 
and equitable economic development, sustainable infrastructure 
development, social protection, disaster mitigation and good governance as 
well. A development that focuses on economic progress only and ignores 
other aspects, or concentrates on infrastructure development only but 
remains oblivious to disaster mitigation, lacks good governance and ignores 
social protection and livelihoods is bound to create vulnerabilities. According 
to Collins (2009, p.16) such type of development breeds ‘the risk of disaster 
through environmental degradation, social decay or economic collapse, to 
name a few.’ 
As highlighted by Key Informant-5, a high official of a multilateral 
development bank: 
“If you ask me I would say that you have been asking for it since 
long. This damage was not due to earthquake only; some other 
events might have caused the damage as well because you have 
been doing faulty development. It was just a matter of time”.  
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Unfortunately decades of narrowly focused development practices in AJK 
had created disaster vulnerability which eventually resulted in such a 
tremendous loss of life and property. Such loss could have been avoided to a 
greater extent. Our successive governments have been taking pride (and 
deservedly so to a great extent) in the development that has been made 
since liberation in 1947. All the development indicators in AJK are compared 
with the watermark of 1947, but this development mainly focused on 
infrastructure development (roads, health, and education) neglecting the side 
effects. I interviewed a former Prime Minister of AJK who agreed that the 
focus of the government has been infrastructure development at the expense 
of other sectors, which thus contributed towards creating disaster 
vulnerability and became main reason of wide spread destruction in 2005. 
This focus on development at the cost of neglecting a very potent hazard 
was prevalent at the local level also. A former Chairman of Development 
Authority Muzaffarabad admitted that in 1993 the Geology Department of 
AJK University gave him a report about seismic hazard and faulty 
construction in the area but he did not take this report seriously because “at 
that time my vision was to make parks, playgrounds, remove 
encroachments, improve bus stands and roads and things like that. And I 
used to think that my vision was very big and we were doing something 
grand”.  
Reasons of damage to housing stock discussed in previous sections could 
have been addressed had the governments been conscious enough and 
realised their duties. There were also deficiencies in the knowledge of 
seismic hazard at the scientific level in the country before the 2005 
earthquake. The Pakistan Seismic Code Zoning Map 1986 divided Pakistan 
into four zones, Zones 1 to 4 (Zone 4 being the highest zone). The zonation 
was based on instrumental data collected from the Quetta Geophysical 
Centre (in the southwest of Pakistan) between 1905-1979, which recorded 
felt intensity in each region during past earthquakes. The code was “based 
on a simple premise that the ground motion of a certain intensity experienced 
once in a certain area is likely to be experienced again in that area”, and “the 
map does not take into account recurrence intervals of different magnitude 
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earthquakes” (Rossetto & Peiris 2008, p. 7). This code was advisory in 
nature and was never implemented in AJK (ibid). The uselessness of this 
code became evident after the 8th October 2005 Kashmir earthquake when it 
was realised that the earthquake hit areas had been assigned seismic zone 
2 (corresponding to MMI VII), whereas the observed damage in these areas 
after the earthquake ranged between VIII-IX (Zone 4).  
This deficiency of scientific knowledge resulted in a lack of knowledge of 
seismic hazard at the official level as well. No organization existed in AJK 
until the earthquake of 2005. Despite the presence of two active fault lines in 
Muzaffarabad the government and the city authorities remained unaware of 
the seismic hazard and took no mitigation or even response measures; the 
government and the people were ill prepared for this disaster (Husain 2009). 
This again takes us back to debate on relationship between development 
and disaster vulnerability (please refer to Chapter 2) because development 
‘is also the means to forewarn about disaster through scientifically evaluated 
risk assessment and early warning systems. These are assisted by 
technological developments, such as the use of remote sensing to identify 
vegetation loss, or of seismic modelling to try to predict the likely timing and 
location of earthquakes’ (p. 30). 
Unfortunately even those few who did have some knowledge of the seismic 
hazard did not take it seriously. A key informant, who headed the 
Muzaffarabad Development Authority before the earthquake, told me during 
key informant interview that the Chairman of the Geology Department of AJK 
University informed him in 1993 about the seismic hazard in the area and the 
faults in the construction that was being done in the city. He admitted that he 
did not put up a formal report to the government because he did not take it 
seriously, however he did mention about this hazard in his speeches before 
the then Prime Minister. He also said that six months before the earthquake 
a local of Muzaffarabad, who was a professor of Geology in a US University, 
warned him about the danger of an impending earthquake in Muzaffarabad, 
but again he did not take it seriously and did not inform anyone about it. He 
gave a very emotional account of his meeting with the same professor after 
the earthquake:      
154 
 
“About ten days after the earthquake Professor Mohsin Naqvi called 
me to an Iftar party in which he had invited former ministers and 
other political people. He said that he had gathered us to inform that 
we were the murderers of this city and that we had done nothing to 
save this city from destruction. He also mentioned about our 
meeting some six months ago. We all started crying that we 
couldn’t do anything; we couldn’t even give a statement in the 
newspaper that there was an earthquake hazard and people should 
be ready and shouldn’t take this warning lightly. But none of us 
played their role”.  
 
I interviewed a professor of the Geology Department of AJK University about 
knowledge of seismic hazard in the area. He said that they did know about it 
and coordinated a conference on it in Muzaffarabad in 2004. The conference 
warned about the “chances” of an earthquake in the area; however the exact 
timing was not possible to predict. He said that the papers presented in the 
conference were sent to the government as well, but he was not sure what 
the government did about it. 
Thus it was not only due to a general lack of knowledge of the seismic 
hazard but perhaps, at certain level, carelessness or negligence of those 
people who had the knowledge that nothing was done to mitigate the hazard. 
While discussing ‘the progression of vulnerability’ Wisner et al. (2004, p. 51) 
have explained how ‘lake of preparedness’ at the level of ‘public actions and 
institutions’ breeds ‘unsafe conditions’ which ultimately cause disaster 
vulnerability to a hazard. Cutter & Emrich (2006) have observed similar type 
of inaction on the part of government officials on reports of different 
researchers about impending danger of a hurricane in New Orleans.  
The government agencies in AJK did little to ensure the quality of 
construction of private buildings. Key Informant-21 reported that the whole of 
Muzaffarabad city had been built on loose and weak soil which has a high 
content of dolomite. He said that the relevant government department should 
have done research as to which type of construction was suitable for this 
type of soil, but they did not do any such thing. Though there was no building 
control mechanism in rural areas, the civic bodies in urban areas could not 
implement the existing building codes thus not reducing disaster 
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vulnerability. I headed the Municipal Corporation Mirpur in 2004 and 
Municipal Corporation Muzaffarabad in 2005-2006 and gave final approval of 
planning permission for dozens of residential and commercial buildings 
during this period, but I must admit that these planning permissions were 
hardly ever evaluated in the light of building codes (which were prevalent at 
that time) by the engineering section of these corporations. I also know out of 
my personal experience that construction monitoring and control mechanism 
was ineffective and weak in most of the cases.  
During my fieldwork I interviewed a former Chairman of Muzaffarabad 
Development Authority (who had worked as Administrator of the Municipal 
Corporation Muzaffarabad as well) to know about the status of building 
control in Muzaffarabad. He said that they used to take private housing very 
lightly before the earthquake. There was no permanent civic body in 
Muzaffarabad city until 1988. A small Municipal Committee was responsible 
for building control but it had only one Municipal Engineer and he too was not 
properly qualified. Though the Municipal Committee had building code before 
the earthquake, these codes did not specify which quality of sand, steel, and 
aggregate material should be used in concrete and what type of buildings 
should be built. Construction drawings were passed without consideration of 
landslides and steep slopes. He said that the Muzaffarabad Development 
Authority was created in 1988 for building control, but a tussle started 
between the Development Authority and the Municipal Corporation because 
their jurisdiction and roles were not clearly defined and there was overlap in 
their functions. This tussle proved to be very damaging for the city because 
no institution was clear about its mandate and consequently was ineffective. 
This tussle and overlap came into my observation as well when I worked as 
Administrator of Municipal Corporation Muzaffarabad in 2005-2006. 
The relationship between good governance, development, and vulnerability 
has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2. According to Ahrens & Rudolph 
(2006, p. 209), disaster vulnerability can only be reduced through sustainable 
socio-economic and livelihoods development, which in turn can only be 
achieved if the country’s governance structures are capable of implementing 
and enforcing these public policies and susceptibility to disaster can be 
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interpreted as a consequence of institutional failure. He identifies 
accountability, participation, predictability and transparency as key features 
of a governance structure to foster development and support risk reduction 
(ibid: 207). According to Stroemberg (2007) disaster losses may be lesser in 
those countries where governments are efficient and accountable. Collins 
(2009, p. 2) has also delved on the relationship between disasters and 
governance and has rightly pointed out that ‘[M]uch of disaster resilience is 
related to institutional strengthening. Poor governance predisposes to 
increased impacts of disasters, or can directly cause a disaster, such as 
when building regulations are not in place, investments are not made in 
preparedness for emergencies or where aid and relief are corrupted’.  
Unfortunately, there has also been a gradual and sustained deterioration of 
the government authority in AJK. As Ahrens & Rudolf (2006) said the roots of 
disaster vulnerability and underdevelopment can be traced back to (or 
inferred to) institutional failure on theoretical grounds but it is difficult to prove 
it empirically; similarly although theoretically true in AJK, it is difficult for me 
to prove it empirically, however being a part of the system myself for a long 
period of time I can now infer how sustained deterioration of the governance 
system in AJK has led to disaster vulnerability through development which 
ultimately culminated in massive losses in the 2005 earthquake. Police, 
District Administration, and civic bodies gradually became unable to perform 
basic functions such as controlling encroachments, illegal construction, sale 
of poor quality construction material, and violation of the planning permission 
or even check whether masons, carpenters and steel fixers had any formal 
training and qualification. Corruption, inefficiency, nepotism, and political 
interference in the civic bodies and public administration institutions were the 
main reasons for this. As regards construction on marginal slopes, the 
government or the civic bodies never tried to control it. Informal settlements 
came up in an uncontrolled and unplanned manner with no civic amenities; 
however over a period of time the governments felt obliged to provide road 
infrastructure and other civic amenities thus encouraging more expansion of 
these settlements. A former Prime Minister of AJK agreed with me in his 
interview that the governance had weakened over a period of time and the 
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civic authorities and law enforcement bodies could not perform their duties 
up to satisfactory level to implement even the rudimentary type of building 
codes.  
The environment has rarely been a priority in the infrastructure-development-
centric policies of the government. AJK had high forest cover when it 
became an independent entity in 1947, but with the passage of time the 
forest cover started to decrease due to deforestation. Presently 42.6% area 
of AJK is with the Forest Department but the actual forest cover is only 11% 
(Bloesch et al. 2005; ERRA 2010; P&DD 2012). Commercial logging has 
remained a major source of income for the Government of AJK since 1947. 
The income from forests was estimated to be 225 million rupees in 2005-
2006. Unfortunately governments could not develop other more viable 
sources of income such as industry, hydroelectric generation, minerals, 
sericulture, apiculture, and tourism. Uncontrolled grazing, commercial 
logging by the government, local use of trees for firewood and construction, 
and encroachment on forest land by locals for cultivation and construction of 
houses played havoc with forests (Bloesch et al. 2005).  
The rate of deforestation has been alarmingly high since 1980s. According to 
Iqbal (2010) about 5% forest of AJK has been lost in only two decades 
(1990s-2000s), however an IUCN study (IUCN 2006) reveals a decrease of 
8% in just seven years (between 1997-2003). The main forests of AJK were 
located in the areas affected by the earthquake of October 2005, where 
massive deforestation has been going on for many decades. The control of 
the Forest Department has weakened over time due to corruption, 
inefficiency, political interference, population pressure, and cross border 
firing along the Line of Control (where most of the forests are located). The 
environmental impacts of deforestation were aggravated by the infrastructure 
development policy of the government. Extensive road construction has been 
one of the top priorities of the successive governments in AJK “…..since at 
the time of liberation physical and social infrastructure was almost non-
existent, the efforts over the decades, were focused on building the requisite 
infrastructure and priority was assigned to Transport & Communication and 
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Education sectors and major portions of development funds and revenue 
budget were allocated to these sectors” (P&DD 2015). Table 5.2 shows the 
increase in road infrastructure since 1947.  
14 Table 5.2 Length of roads in AJK between 1947 and 2006. 
Type/year 1947 2006 
Metalled 100 4852 
Fair-weather 165 6116 
Total 265 10968 
Density (KM/KM
2
) 0.008 0.41 
                                                                  (Source: P&DD 2015). 
 
There has been a more than 4,000% increase in road length in less than 50 
years (the real boom in infrastructure development started in 1980s). 55% of 
the total roads in AJK comprise of fair weather or dirt roads (P&DD 2015). 
These dirt roads are severely damaging for mountainous areas and a main 
reason of landslides. Such a huge increase in road infrastructure was bound 
to have adverse impacts on landscape. The roads are constructed at a very 
low cost to save money and even out of that low cost 15-20% money goes to 
corruption (personal communication with a former Chief Engineer). There 
has also been tendency to construct low cost roads for localities at steep 
slopes (Figure 5.18) which make already vulnerable areas even more 
vulnerable to landslides. A former Prime Minister of AJK reported that roads 
were constructed on steep mountain slopes with minimum costs, thus 
compromising the stability of the mountains. He said that roads were 
constructed under “political pressure” without any proper planning. The same 
view was shared by a high ranking official of a multilateral development 
bank, which has been doing huge investments in AJK. He was of the opinion 
that the overall land management and land use planning and control in AJK 
has been faulty: “even in your public sector infrastructure development 
practices you don’t respect your mountains”. Construction of roads is still a 
priority of the government; 45% of the total development budget of AJK for 
the year 2014-15 has been allocated for the Communication & Works 
Department (P&DD 2015). 
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The role of poverty in creating vulnerability in AJK has been discussed in 
Section 5.4.4. The responsibility of the government in the economic uplift of 
the people in under-developed areas like AJK cannot be overemphasised. 
Income generation and diversification of livelihoods should have been 
included in the top priorities of the government because AJK has a weak 
economic base due to limited agricultural potential and absence of industry. 
Unfortunately governments could not do much to improve the economic 
condition of the people. Of late the government admitted this fact; “until 
recently centralized Planning & Development has been the mainstay of 
Public Sector Development Plans but it has been observed that the rate at 
which benefits of development initiatives trickled down to grass root level 
was dismal” (P&DD 2015).  
Sustainable economic development has not been the priority of successive 
governments. Most of the resources were being spent on non-development 
expenditure. In the financial year 2005-2006, a 72% share of the budget was 
allocated for non-development expenditure. The remaining 28% budget 
mainly went on infrastructure development; there was hardly any allocation 
for livelihoods/income generation. Disaster and development approach, one 
of the two main theoretical basis of this study (Pressure and Release Model 
being the other) should have been the mainstay of the development 
paradigm of the Government of AJK. This approach emphasises that 
‘disasters can be significantly reduced through social, economic or 
environmentally governed early warning, conflict resolution and sustainable 
development initiatives’ (Collins 2009, p. 32) in that appropriate development 
‘acts as a counterforce to disaster’ and adverse impacts of development can 
be ‘moderated’ (ibid, p. 60). A former Prime Minister of AJK very candidly 
admitted during an interview that little has been done to improve and 
diversify the livelihoods of the people and creating economic opportunities by 
making policies for the development of agriculture, industries, tourism, and 
services sector. The economic pattern was such that there was a disparity 
between the rich and the poor; the rich were getting richer and the poor 
poorer. I specifically discussed this issue during my second fieldwork period 
with a former Secretary of the Planning and Development Department in 
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Government of AJK. He said “the action and inaction in development work is 
also important to determine the vulnerability of the people; what development 
actions resulted in what results and what actions the government did not take 
which were necessary to reduce vulnerability…………The development in 
AJK has been infrastructure development focused; it did not focus on 
economic and social development. People’s livelihoods have not been the 
priority of the development; one jolt of the earthquake exposed everything”.  
Collins (2009) has put forwarded almost the same premise and says that 
‘disasters can be caused by multiple aspects of development’ and have 
environmental, social and economic origins ‘which may be dependent upon 
actions at institutional, community and individual levels’ (p. 84). 
A lack of voice at local level (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 51) was one of the factors 
that peoples’ problems remained unattended in rural areas and they 
migrated to urban areas in search of better civic amenities (Section 5.4.4). 
There have been hardly any local government elections in AJK since 1947. 
Incidentally the only local bodies’ elections that I remember were held by a 
military dictator in early 1980s, whereas the politically elected governments 
have always tried to avoid elections. In fact the Members of the Legislative 
Assembly (MLAs) take the local government institutions as their rivals 
because all the development work is controlled by these MLAs. Development 
schemes are prepared on the recommendation of the MLAs (sometimes the 
development funds are also spent through them). So in order to keep their 
constituencies secure they do not let the local level institutions grow. For 
these MLAs, even minor development schemes, such as small village level 
water supply schemes, construction of dirt roads, schools, Basic Health 
Units, and provision of electricity are their exclusive domain, of course apart 
from legislation.     
Results and analysis presented demonstrate that the development policies of 
the government created disaster vulnerability in the area and resulted in 
huge losses in 2005 earthquake. The geological vulnerability (which is not a 
direct result of the development policies) could have been addressed had the 
government been responsible enough to know what kind of hazards existed 
in the area and had made disaster mitigation part of the development 
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policies. The physical vulnerability, the environmental vulnerability, and the 
socio-economic vulnerability were the direct outcome of the decades’ of 
infrastructure-development-centric development policies which ignored 
socio-economic and livelihoods development and disaster mitigation. The 
responsibility of the rule of law and good governance, which have cyclical 
relation with development and susceptibility to disaster, again rests with the 
government.   
Bilham (2009, p. 880) has also warned of earthquake related ‘mega-death-
toll’ in developing countries due to human settlements on hazardous 
locations. El Masri & Tipple (2002, p. 164-170) also highlight the risks 
involved in construction on hazardous sites and suggest that encroachment 
onto hazardous sites should be contained by the local authorities. Bilham 
(2012, p.1) identifies poverty, corruption, and ignorance as possible causes 
of non-observance of building codes in developing countries. Ambraseys & 
Bilham (2011) and Bilham & Gaur (2013) find direct relationship between 
corruption of government authorities and earthquake related deaths (Figure 
5.19).  
 
51 Figure 5.19 Cumulative death toll (DRE) caused by earthquakes in the period 1980-2010 as 
a function of corruption Index.                                (Source: Ambraseys & Bilham 2011, p. 8).   
 
Pakistan is one of the countries which have highest CPI (Corruption 
Perceptions Index) and highest earthquake deaths, only after Haiti (ibid). It is 
my personal observation as well that illegal construction on hazardous 
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locations in the study area is facilitated by the corrupt staff of the Municipal 
authorities (who are responsible for building control) and the Revenue 
Department (custodian of the government lands) in return for personal 
gratification. Ferreira et al. (2011) also observe that democratic 
accountability and lower level of corruption reduce the disaster mortality rate. 
5.6. Summary 
In this chapter I have identified how the relationship between disaster, 
vulnerability, and development worked in AJK and how the disaster 
vulnerability has resulted in wide spread damage to housing stock. I have 
tried to explain how the theoretical approach (i.e. Collins (2009) ‘disaster and 
development approach’ and Wisner et al. s’ (2004) PAR model) discussed in 
Chapter 3 fit into the context of AJK. Construction typology prevalent before 
2005 earthquake and the main factors for adopting it, the vulnerability of the 
housing stock in the study area, and how the development policies of the 
Government of AJK passively helped in creating these vulnerabilities have all 
been discussed.  
The construction typology of the study area was a mixture of four different 
types, kacha, pukka, wood houses, and Dhajji-dewari. The majority of the 
houses (57%) in the earthquake affected areas were kacha; however in four 
rural Union Councils, where I conducted my fieldwork, 70%-80% houses 
were kacha. The reasons for adopting this type of construction were low cost 
(because locally available mud, stones, and wood were used with minimal 
engineering input) and climate (because these houses had better thermal 
qualities for harsh climate of these areas. The second major construction 
type was pukka (37%). This type of construction was more prevalent in urban 
areas where 73% houses were pukka. Major reasons of adopting this 
construction typology were improvement in the incomes of the people, 
improvement in road network, easy availability of modern construction 
materials, limited land in urban areas which required multi storey buildings, 
and status attached with this type of construction due to higher cost as 
compared to kacha structures. Wood houses and Dhajji-dewari were the two 
traditional construction types which were more frequently found in Leepa 
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Valley, Neelum Valley and in remote areas of District Bagh. The abundance 
of wood and past seismic activity were the main factors for adopting this type 
of construction because both these construction types have excellent seismic 
resistance and survived the 2005 earthquake.  
Much of the housing stock (87%) in the study area was destroyed in 2005 
earthquake. In some areas the entire housing stock was destroyed. I have 
identified four types of vulnerability which were responsible for this wide 
spread damage; geological vulnerability, physical vulnerability, environmental 
vulnerability, and socio-economic vulnerability. While discussing this section I 
have frequently referred to Collins (2009) and Wisner et al. s’ PAR model 
and have tried to explain how this model fits into the context of the study 
area. The study area is situated in a seismically active zone. Proximity to 
epicentre, shallow depth, and steep hilly geomorphology were the main 
features of the geological vulnerability. Poor quality construction was the 
main feature of physical vulnerability. Based on my research, I have 
identified lack of knowledge of seismic hazard, kacha construction, poor 
quality construction, lack of building control mechanisms, and marginal 
locations as main reasons of the vulnerability of the building stock. In case of 
environmental vulnerability, I have identified deforestation and excessive 
road construction activities as the main reasons of generating landslides 
which contributed towards damage to the housing stock at local level. As 
regards socio-economic vulnerability, poverty was the main reason for poor 
quality construction and construction on steep slopes and marginal lands. 
Internal migration due to poverty, geopolitical situation, and lack of civic 
facilities in rural areas forced people to migrate to urban areas but they 
ended up living at vulnerable locations.  
While discussing the relationship between development and vulnerability I 
have built my argument on Collins (2009) ‘disaster and development 
approach’ in that the development policies of the Government of AJK have 
ultimately contributed towards creating mentioned vulnerabilities. I have 
argued that although the geological vulnerability was not a direct outcome of 
the government’s development policies, this vulnerability could have been 
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reduced to a great extent had the governments invested in disaster 
mitigation. As regards physical vulnerability, the governments have not been 
able to uplift the economic conditions of the people so that the kacha 
construction and poor quality construction could have been avoided. I have 
also argued that development is a holistic term which encompasses 
sustainable and equitable economic development, sustainable infrastructure 
development, social protection, disaster mitigation and good governance as 
well. The governance has been relatively weak in AJK so there was lack of 
building control mechanism which resulted in poor quality construction. The 
over emphasis of the government on road infrastructure development and 
deforestation had contributed towards environmental vulnerability.      
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CHAPTER 6: POST-2005 EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION 
IN AJK 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with the housing reconstruction programme which was 
started by the Government of Pakistan in 2006 in the aftermath of 2005 
earthquake. In previous chapters, I have explored the nature of the 
vulnerability of the built environment in AJK at the time of the earthquake and 
the level of the damage caused by the earthquake; the social element of the 
vulnerability will be discussed in this chapter. Here I focus on the following 
research question: 
“How successfully has the Government of Pakistan implemented 
the housing reconstruction policy in the aftermath of the 2005 
earthquake and is the characterization of this policy successful in 
the geography, economics and social contexts?” 
In this chapter, I have explored the progress of the housing reconstruction 
programme in three contexts (Figure 6.1). The first is the geographical 
context which looks into the progress in rural and urban settings in districts 
Bagh and Muzaffarabad (in four different Union Councils within the rural 
settings and two cities of Bagh and Muzaffarabad). The second is the 
economic context in which I will investigate the progress across different 
income groups in the study area. The third is the social context which mainly 
focuses on gender. Other themes mentioned in the triangle of Figure 6.1 i.e. 
sustainability, vulnerability, and family system and landownership pattern are 
discussed in Chapter 7.    
6.2. Post-earthquake Housing Reconstruction 
 “The overall objective of the rural housing reconstruction policy 
is to ensure that an estimated 400,000 houses that were either 
destroyed or damaged, will be rebuilt by using earthquake 
resistant building techniques, through grant assistance from the 
Government to eligible households”             (ERRA 2006, p. 3)  
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The housing reconstruction programme was started by the Government of 
Pakistan with the above objective in 2006 in the rural areas of the 
earthquake affected districts. Section 6.2.1 of this chapter discusses the 
overall progress of the housing reconstruction programme at the level of AJK 
using secondary data from the State Earthquake Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation Authority (SERRA) and the ERRA, grey literature, and primary 
qualitative data from Key Informant interviews. Sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3., and 
6.2.4 are based on primary data (both quantitative and qualitative).  
 
52 Figure 6.1 Evaluation of the housing reconstruction progress in different contexts. 
 
6.2.1. Progress of the Housing Reconstruction Programme 
According to the ERRA 419,624 damaged houses (96% of the damaged 
houses) had been reconstructed in the earthquake affected areas of AJK and 
KPK by 1st October, 2013 (Table 1). The ERRA has disbursed PKR 71.89 
billion as Housing Cash Grants in the earthquake affected areas (ERRA 
2011a). Over 2.74 million (93%) displaced people had moved into their 
homes as a result of the funding (ERRA 2010; www.erra.gov.pk). The ERRA 
also claims that 96% of the reconstructed houses meet earthquake resistant 
standards (EERA 2011a). The Government of Pakistan’s housing 
reconstruction programme has been widely acclaimed as a successful 
experience (ADB 2011; Davis 2010; ERRA 2011a; Qazi 2008; Stephenson 
2008; UN-Habitat 2009; UN-Habitat 2011; World Bank 2010, 2011) and the 
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UN presented the Sasakawa Award for Disaster Reduction to ERRA in 2011 
(www.erra.gov.pk).  
 
15 Table 6.1 Housing reconstruction progress.                                      
 Status % 
Construction Completed 419,624 96.14 
Under Construction   16,862   3.86 
No work started at all   26,757   5.16 
Total 436,486    
                                                                                                 (Source: ERRA 2014) 
 
Although the figures from the ERRA show that 96% of houses have been 
reconstructed, the way in which houses are deemed to be rebuilt warrants 
more detailed investigation. The ERRA authorities consider a house as 
completed when the fourth (last) instalment of the housing subsidy was paid 
to the household. The fourth instalment was payable to those house owners 
who had constructed their house up to the lintel level and the AI Team had 
declared it compliant with the ERRA specifications. The fourth instalment was 
given to construct the roof and complete the house. Hence it was assumed 
that the house owner must have completed the house after getting the fourth 
and last instalment; however there was no mechanism for verifying this on 
the ground. Key Informant-17 and 21 were of the opinion that the ERRA’s 
claim of progress was contestable for this reason and argued that the 
government’s figure for completed houses was not based on actual ground 
verification but on the basis of the last tranche of the housing subsidy.  
During my fieldwork I interviewed many key informants (those people who 
had been associated with the 2005 earthquake and recovery programme 
afterwards) to assess their understanding of the housing reconstruction 
progress. According to Ex-Deputy Chairman ERRA, Lt. General Nadeem 
Ahmed, 611,000 houses have been reconstructed in three years. A former 
Programme Manager (Housing) ERRA said that his “hunch” was that 90% 
houses have been reconstructed. Two Key Informants, who belonged to  the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (the two major donors of the 
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rural housing reconstruction programme), were satisfied with the progress of 
the housing reconstruction in the earthquake affected areas.   
Though 96% of houses being reconstructed the fact remains that no work 
has started on 26,757 houses and a further 16,862 houses were still under-
construction. In spite of my best efforts I could not get rural Union Council 
and urban areas data of the reconstruction status directly from the ERRA. 
Though I personally knew the Director General (Housing) ERRA and 
contacted him many times, I couldn’t get access to the ERRA Headquarters 
to get these data in spite of his promises. Therefore I am unable to comment 
on how the reconstruction programme has performed in different 
geographical contexts (e.g. in AJK and rural/urban settings) because the 
published reports of the ERRA do not reflect these details.  
However, I can analyse the progress made in AJK with more confidence 
because I did collect the necessary data from the SERRA, which was 
extremely cooperative in providing all the requested data. This cooperation 
was probably due to my positionality and my long association with this 
organization (which also includes heading the SERRA for more than a year).  
The data of 314,474 damaged houses was acquired. Analysis of these data 
shows that 314,474 houses were paid the 1st instalment of PKR 25,000. The 
2nd instalment was paid to 307,494 (100%) houses, which included the 
partially damaged houses as well. 273,151 totally damage houses were 
finalized for the 3rd and 4th instalments. Thus 273,151 totally damaged 
houses were to be reconstructed and 34,343 partially houses were to be 
repaired in AJK. The repair/retrofitting status of 34,343 partially damaged 
houses is not available in the SERRA. As regards the reconstruction status of 
273,151 fully damaged houses, the analysis of the SERRA data shows that 
199,906 (70%) houses have been reconstructed (Figure 6.2). However, the 
SERRA website states (www.serra.gov.pk, 19.07.2013) that 266,325 (86%) 
fully damaged houses have been paid the 4th (final) instalment. The status of 
73,245 houses (273,151 fully damaged houses - 199,906 reconstructed 
houses) is not available with the SERRA.     
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53 Figure 6.2 Housing reconstruction in different areas: Muzaffarabad rural (a), Bagh rural (b), 
Muzaffarabad urban (c), and Bagh urban (d).                                      (Source: Author fieldwork) 
 
Many key informants were interviewed in AJK about the housing 
reconstruction programme. There is a wide gap in the assessment of different 
key informants, for example Key Informant 15 and 16 said that 50% houses 
have been rebuilt, whereas Key Informant 2, 8, 22 and 31 quoted the figure 
of 85%-95%. A former Director General/Secretary of the SERRA was of the 
opinion that progress has been more than 100% in rural areas.  
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“This success is in the rural areas only that the grant money 
was converted into housing. As I mentioned earlier it went 
beyond 100%.” 
 
A former Programme Manager (Housing) of the SERRA put the figure at 
170%.  
“I think as compared to pre-earthquake, 170% houses have 
been reconstructed. 170% because……..…………I will give 
you an example that the Electricity Department has submitted 
a claim with us which shows that only in the earthquake 
affected areas 125,000 new electricity connections have been 
installed”.  
Some house owners were also asked the similar question. 5 house owners 
out of 40 put the figure of housing reconstruction between 70%-90%.  
The above discussion demonstrates that there is a considerable gap 
between the official data and opinions of the Key Informants and house 
owners. My quantitative data of 200 houses collected from six different 
locations (four rural and two urban) also indicates this gap. Survey 
questionnaires were used to collect these data during fieldwork. SPSS was 
used to assess the progress of housing reconstruction. The results 
generated through SPSS show that 78.5% of the 200 visited houses have 
been reconstructed. The overall housing reconstruction progress is lesser 
than the amount of Housing Cash Grant disbursed by the government. 
According to the SERRA, 98% of the affected people (both in rural and urban 
areas) have been given the fourth and last tranche of the cash grant. This 
difference between the percentage of housing cash grants disbursed and the 
percentage of reconstructed houses indicates the gap between disbursement 
of the grant and the actual reconstruction on ground.    
6.2.2. Progress in a Geographical Context 
Urban rural differences in post-disaster recovery, especially housing 
reconstruction, have not been a focus of research (Nigg 1995). The reason 
for the lack of this type of research is the use of single case study method in 
disaster studies (ibid). The post-2005 earthquake housing reconstruction 
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programme was designed to achieve the aim of reconstruction of all houses 
damaged by the earthquake in both urban as well as rural areas with equal 
success. The ERRA reports do not mention anything about difference of 
housing reconstruction progress in rural versus urban settings. However my 
own experience of living in the earthquake affected areas, working in the 
reconstruction programme, and review of some of the literature on post-2005 
earthquake housing reconstruction provides a different view point, that 
reconstruction progressed differently in rural versus urban areas (Davis 
2010b; ICIMOD 2012; Qazi 2008).  
The data of 307,494 houses, acquired from the SERRA, was analysed to 
work out the housing reconstruction progress in a geographical context. The 
analysis of these data shows that 7,919 houses were fully damaged in 
Muzaffarabad and Bagh cities out of which 7,703 (97%) houses have been 
reconstructed. The urban area house owners were paid the whole amount of 
housing subsidy in two instalments without any condition of construction 
(contrary to rural areas where the money was paid in four instalments after 
inspection of construction status). The SERRA is not supposed to have the 
construction status of houses in urban areas, but it does have these data. 
Municipal Corporations of these cities, which give the planning permission in 
urban areas, are the most relevant authorities to give the exact number of 
reconstructed houses. The data of the Municipal Corporation Muzaffarabad, 
acquired during meetings with the staff, demonstrates that 517 residential 
and 13 mixed construction (residential/commercial) planning permissions 
have been issued since 2008. Thus, only 7% of houses have been 
reconstructed in urban Muzaffarabad (as opposed to the SERRA figure of 
97%) or the remaining houses have been reconstructed without any planning 
permission.  
Similarly, in contrast to the above mentioned official figures, my research 
finds a different picture on ground. My Survey Questionnaire data is the 
basis of this finding. SPSS was used to analyse the survey questionnaire 
data and assess the progress of the housing reconstruction programme 
across different geographical settings. This test was conducted on the 
following hypothesis: 
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H0: There is no relationship between geographical setting and progress of 
housing reconstruction 
H1: There is relationship between geographical setting and progress of 
housing reconstruction  
Table 6.2 presents the cross tabulation of the housing reconstruction 
progress. The expected count of constructed housing in rural areas is 78.5% 
but the actual count is 94%, which means more houses have been 
constructed in rural areas than expected. On the other hand, the expected 
count of constructed houses in urban areas is 78.5% but the actual count is 
63%, meaning thereby considerably fewer houses have been constructed in 
urban areas than expected. 
16 Table 6.2 Cross tabulation of reconstruction status. 
 Location Total 
Rural Urban 
C
o
n
s
tru
c
tio
n
 S
ta
tu
s
 
Constructed Count 94 63 157 
Expected Count 78.5 78.5 157.0 
% within Location 94.0% 63.0% 78.5% 
Not 
Constructed 
Count 3 21 24 
Expected Count 12.0 12.0 24.0 
% within Location 3.0% 21.0% 12.0% 
Incomplete Count 3 14 17 
Expected Count 8.5 8.5 17.0 
% within Location 3.0% 14.0% 8.5% 
Repaired Count 0 1 1 
Expected Count .5 .5 1.0 
% within Location 0.0% 1.0% 0.5% 
Under Repair Count 0 1 1 
Expected Count .5 .5 1.0 
% within Location 0.0% 1.0% 0.5% 
         Total Count 100 100 200 
Expected Count 100.0 100.0 200.0 
% within Location 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
A Chi-square test was also conducted to determine the significance of 
association between these two variables (Table 6.3). If the observed counts 
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are different from the expected counts, the Chi-Square Test helps determine 
if the observed counts are different enough for the test to be significant for 
the association to accept or reject the hypothesis.  
 
17 Table 6.3 Chi-Square Tests, 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .50. 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.739
a
 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 31.843 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
22.925 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 200 
  
 
In the above table, Pearson Chi-square value is important. The Pearson Chi-
square tests the hypothesis that the row and column variables in the table are 
independent. The lower the "Asymp. Sig." value, the less likely it is that these 
two variables are independent and would cause the rejection of the Null 
Hypothesis of "no relationship". The output of .000 suggests that geographical 
setting and housing reconstruction rate are related (i.e., they are dependent) 
since the significance of the Pearson Chi-Square test is below usual cut-off point 
of 0.05 (or sometimes 0.10). Thus there is enough evidence to reject the Null 
Hypothesis and therefore, must assume dependence/association. The 
assumption for bigger than 2x2 tables is that the expected count is not less than 
5 or 20% of the cells have expected count of >5. In this particular case the 
expected count is 40% so the assumption has been violated. In case of violation 
of assumption, we need to look at the “Likelihood Ratio”. The Likelihood Ratio 
test rejects the null hypothesis if the value of this statistic is too small. Since the 
value of Likelihood Ratio is .000, we reject the Null Hypothesis.     
 
However, the chi-square does not give us any information how the variables are 
related or how strong the relationship is. Hence Cramer's V test was used 
because it is a post-test to give additional information (Table 6.4). 
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 18 Table 6.4 Results of Cramer’s V test. 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.  
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 
Phi .379 .000 
Cramer's V .379 .000 
N of Valid Cases 200 
 
 
Cramer's V varies between 0 and 1. A value of 0.02 or less would be a weak 
relationship, between 0.2 and 0.3 a moderate relationship and above 0.3 
would be a strong relationship. In other words, the closer the outcome is to 0 
the weaker the association is between variables; and the closer it is to 1, the 
stronger the association is. In this particular case the Approximate 
Significance is closer to zero (0.000) so the significance of association or 
relationship is weak. 
Based on the results of the cross tabulation table above, a bar chart was 
generated (Figure 6.3) which depicts the housing reconstruction progress in 
rural versus urban settings.   
 
54 Figure 6.3 Housing reconstruction progress in geographical settings. 
                                                         (Based on cross tabulation of the survey questionnaire data) 
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Figure 6.3 demonstrates a marked difference of housing reconstruction 
progress between rural and urban settings. In rural areas, 94% houses have 
been constructed; whereas, in urban areas only 63% houses have been 
reconstructed. In rural areas the mean travel time from road to the household 
is 22 minutes and the minimum-maximum travel time is 0-180 minutes. In 
urban areas the mean travel time is 7 minutes and the minimum-maximum 
travel time is 0-16 minutes. The study areas in rural settings are between two 
and five hours away from urban Bagh and Muzaffarabad. The construction 
materials are difficult to transport to the rural areas, sometimes being carried 
on worker’s heads, which increases the cost many fold. Skilled labour is also 
very difficult to come by and expensive in these rural areas but despite all 
these difficulties the rural households showed better reconstruction progress 
(than urban areas).  
Slow housing reconstruction in urban areas is still an important issue. The 
aim of the ERRA’s Urban Development Strategy was “to provide a 
comprehensive and holistic approach for the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
of the urban areas affected by the October 8, 2005 earthquake, to ensure a 
higher level of quality, functionality, and enhanced social services delivery 
that existed before the earthquake” (ERRA 2007, pp. 12). The general 
impression is that this aim has not been achieved significantly in urban areas 
even eight years after the earthquake. According to some studies (See, for 
example, ICIMOD 2012; Qazi 2008) sufficient attention has not been paid by 
the ERRA to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Muzaffarabad. This 
finding is different from the one made by Nigg (1995) who found that after 
2004 Tsunami the reconstruction authorities were more focused on main 
cities such as Banda Aceh, Meulaboh, Calang, and Lokseumaweh ignoring 
rural areas.  
Some Key Informants were interviewed to expound their understanding of 
the situation. Most Key Informants agreed that there was a difference of 
progress between urban and rural areas and that the urban areas lagged 
behind in housing reconstruction. A former Director General of the SERRA 
was very candid about housing reconstruction progress in rural/urban 
settings and gave the following opinion:  
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“I will like to say one thing in clear terms that the impact and the 
meaningfulness of the private housing programme is not in the urban areas 
at all. The total and only impact of the private housing programme in the 
urban areas is that 175,000 rupees were paid to the house owner. Was that 
money converted into housing “No”; and into safe housing “No”; it was not 
even converted into housing.”  
6.2.2.1. Reasons of Slow Housing Reconstruction Progress in Urban 
Areas 
The following reasons were identified as a result of empirical research in the 
field, mainly consisting of discussions with different stakeholders, interviews 
with key informants and house owners, focus group discussions, and 
combined with my own experience of the reconstruction programme.  
a. Reconstruction Started Later in Urban Areas 
The housing reconstruction programme started very late in urban areas due 
to planning issues. Despite the ERRA’s Urban Housing Strategy being 
founded on the basic principles of the Rural Housing Strategy, in urban areas 
the construction of houses was not allowed until the development of urban 
infrastructure under the City Development Project was completed and 
planning permission from the concerned city authorities was acquired (Davis 
2010b; ERRA 2007).  
Table 6.5 shows the number of activities/stages involved before the actual 
housing reconstruction was allowed by the city authorities. These activities 
are not necessarily sequential; some of them could be overlapped with 
others.  
Stage 1 (Rubble removal) was technically not part of reconstruction activity, 
however it was necessary to remove rubble on mass scale before initiating 
reconstruction in cities because the volume of rubble was too much for 
individuals to handle. Contracts were awarded to different firms to remove 
debris; the whole process took many months to complete. Stage 2 (Creation 
of a hazard map) provided technical basis for creating the zoning map and 
zoning code to accurately delineate boundaries and quantify the magnitude 
of hazard which the city is likely to face in future.  
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19 Table 6.5 Activities/stages involved in urban reconstruction.  
  
Stage 
 
Activity 
 
1 Rubble removal 
2 Creation of a hazard map 
3 Conduct a building damage assessment survey 
4 Adoption of a zoning map and zoning code 
5 Adoption of a building code 
6 Determine new land areas needed to contain the city 
7 Develop a final damage definition (damaged areas) and site status (non-
damaged areas) of the city 
8 Determine the shared vision of what the rebuilt city should look like in future. 
9 Create the basic land use plan for the rebuilt city 
10  Create the component attributes (sector definitions) for the rebuilt city 
11 Integrate into the physical redevelopment infrastructure of the town plan the 
social infrastructure attributes. 
12 Create the final town plan 
13 Create the Master Plan implementation strategy 
14 Create the local means to implement the Town Plan 
15 Acquire requisite land interests 
16 Provide Medium Term Housing to affected Population 
17 Implement the town plan 
18 Conduct evaluation, monitoring and readjustment activities to keep the town plan 
on track. 
(Source: developed by the author from the Urban Housing Strategy) 
Stage 3 (Conduct a building damage assessment survey) was meant to 
acquire initial base-line data and provide basis for dealing with transitional 
shelters and other temporary building needs. Stage 4 (Adoption of a zoning 
map and zoning code) is the basic land use document which delineates what 
can be built where and to what standard. Stage 5 (Adoption of a building 
code) this code was adopted at the end of 2006. Stage 6 (Determine new 
land areas needed to contain the city) additional land was needed in some 
cities to accommodate the population needs. The new land needed to be 
identified before the city Master Planning started. Stage 7 (Develop a final 
damage definition (damaged areas) and site status (non-damaged areas) of 
the city) was meant to set the base line and strategically define the starting 
179 
 
point of the reconstruction process. Stage 8 (Determine the shared vision of 
what the rebuilt city should look like in future) this was a consultative process 
which involved many stakeholders. Stage 9 (Create the basic land use plan 
for the rebuilt city) this plan defines the organization and layout of the 
reconstructed city; no construction could be started before the land use plan 
was approved. Stage 10 (Create the component attributes (sector definitions) 
for the rebuilt city) is where sub-plans were fitted into the total Town Plan. 
Stage 11 (Integrate into the physical redevelopment infrastructure of the 
town plan the social infrastructure attributes) this activity was at the ERRA 
level. Stage 12 (Create the final Town Plan) the Town Plan defines the 
structure, design, character and attributes of the city for the next 20-30 years 
and policies and procedures for getting there. The master plans for 
Muzaffarabad and Bagh cities were approved at the end of 2007. Stage 13 
(Create the Master Plan implementation strategy) this is a detailed 
implementation strategy for turning the town plan into reality. Stage 14 
(Create the local means to implement the Town Plan) involved capacity 
building of the Development Authorities to implement the Master Plans. 
Stage 15 (Acquire requisite land interests) this stage involved land 
acquisition for city development projects. Though important for reconstruction 
of the city, this activity didn’t directly impact the housing reconstruction. 
Stage 16 (Provide Medium Term Housing to affected Population) 
prefabricated houses were provided to house owners in Muzaffarabad and 
Bagh city to resolve their difficulties arising due to late start of reconstruction 
work. Stage 17 (Implement the town plan) all stages before this point are 
preparation for the rebuilding encompassed in the implementation. It involved 
construction of the sub projects. Construction of some projects such as 
widening of roads and streets and laying of sewerage and water supply 
network had direct impact on housing reconstruction.  
The authorities did allow reconstruction in certain areas after the completion 
of stage 12 (Implement the town plan) but it took more than two years to 
reach this stage. In case of Muzaffarabad City, there were plans to shift 
certain population of the city to newly planned satellite towns many 
kilometres out of the city, but the construction of these satellite towns was 
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not possible quickly enough; these satellite towns still remain incomplete and 
no one has shifted to these towns so far. The old part of Muzaffarabad City 
had very narrow streets which became the major cause of loss to life and 
property; the authorities decided to plan wider streets for the future (Schild 
2015). People were asked not to start reconstruction of their houses until the 
new Master Plan was finalised. As mentioned above, this stage took a 
couple of years to reach. Such reasoning and planning confused people and 
negatively impacted on the pace of housing reconstruction.  
Different Key Informants and house owners shared their views in following 
words:  
“I think that urban areas had their own chronic issues which 
wasted a lot of our time in issues like Microzonation, seismic fault 
line mapping, land acquisition, master planning etc. So I think we 
got too much involved in technicalities and politics; that’s what I 
think”. (Key Informant-2) 
 “The urban area people remained uncertain for a long time due to 
the unclear policy of the government”. (Key Informant-18) 
 “Construction of houses was also affected due to delay in the 
Master Planning. Then the plan was to shift many people from 
different areas of the city elsewhere so the people were uncertain 
whether to construct the house or not. That’s why the progress 
has been slow in urban areas”. (Key Informant-21) 
 “About 95% people have reconstructed their houses in rural areas 
but due to scarcity of land and change in policies in urban areas 
the progress is not that good. People are forced to live in the same 
damaged houses”. (A house owner in Bagh City) 
b.  Higher Construction Cost in Urban Areas 
As explained in earlier chapters, the Housing Cash Grant was uniform for 
both urban and rural areas and the government had calculated that this 
amount of money was enough for a certain size of house. However, the 
affected people felt that this money was not enough to construct a seismic 
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resistant house according to the ERRA specifications. 200 house owners 
were asked through survey questionnaire whether the government money 
was enough for reconstruction; 91% people said that it was not enough and 
8% did not reply. People claim that they had to top up from their own 
resources with an average of PKR 376,264 spent in addition on each house. 
People of the urban areas claim that keeping in mind the high cost of 
construction in urban areas, the amount of government’s cash grant was not 
enough. Since, contrary to rural areas, there was no assistance and 
inspection regime and the cash grant was paid unconditionally in urban 
areas. This meant that most of the people had spent their funding on day to 
day needs because of the two year delay in starting the reconstruction. 
Some interviewees were quite vocal about this situation and explained their 
feelings in following words:    
 “The biggest injustice the government did was that the urban 
and rural properties were judged on the same scale. Houses in 
villages were mostly single storey mud houses, whereas in 
urban areas a lot of money was spent on the construction of 
houses. I think the primary beneficiaries of this programme 
were the people of the rural areas. A revolution did come there 
in the sense that people got the opportunity that everybody 
made new houses. I think the earthquake was a blessing in 
disguise for them”. (Key Informant-18) 
 “A house might be constructed with this money in rural areas 
but not possible in Muzaffarabad city. This amount is not 
enough to even construct the plinth of a seismic resistant 
house. This policy was very good for the rural areas in the 
sense that people were able to construct their houses quickly”. 
(Key Informant-13) 
 “Those who had no money they could not construct and are still 
living in tents. If you go to rural areas you will not find anybody 
living in tents but you will find many people living in tents in 
urban areas”.  (A house owner in Muzaffarabad city) 
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People found the proposed earthquake resistant construction techniques 
devoid from ground realities and financially difficult to follow. Resultantly 
many people resorted to locally available cheap material and labour and 
even compromised on quality of construction (Kazmi et al. 2010). Although 
the housing reconstruction subsidy of PKR. 175,000 was far more than ever 
paid before in any disaster situation, it was substantially lower than required 
for a 400 Sq. Ft. seismic resistant house as recommended by the ERRA 
(ADB 2011; Kazmi et al. 2012). This posed a big challenge for people to 
follow the ERRA’s specifications. The result was either compromise on 
quality as explained above or reduction in house size. About 60% of the 
reconstructed houses were smaller in size than people had before. This 
shows that people did not have enough financial resources to get the 
required living space for families (ADB 2012). Similarly people found the 
remedial measures suggested by the ERRA to make non-compliant houses 
eligible for the ERRA housing subsidy to be too expensive to follow. For 
example the ERRA had recommended 8 inch concrete blocks but a large 
majority of people used 6 inch concrete blocks due to easy availability and 
low price which were not permissible under the ERRA specification. The 
ERRA suggested measures like wire-mesh on walls, external seismic bands 
and corner stitches for reinforcement but people found these solutions 
prohibitively expensive (Leersum & Arora 2011). 
c. Debris Removal 
Millions of tons of debris were generated by the fallen buildings in the 
earthquake, especially in urban areas (ERRA 2015). The issue of debris was 
not very serious in rural areas because buildings were scattered over a large 
area and the government policy was to encourage people to recycle the 
debris and use it in the reconstruction of their houses. In urban areas the 
debris was an acute problem so the government decided to remove the 
debris itself in an environmentally friendly way (ibid). Millions of rupees were 
given to the Municipal Corporations for this purpose. However this decision 
had two impacts; one was that people had to wait for the authorities to come 
and remove debris which caused delays. The second was that unlike rural 
areas people could not recycle the material which could have reduced the 
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cost of reconstruction (Focus Group Discussion, Muzaffarabad City). As 
explained by a key informant:   
“There were two groups in the society; one that had lots of 
money and had no problem in hiring engineers, the other was 
that which did not have enough money and they could not 
build house with Rs. 150,000 like rural areas…………whereas 
in rural areas people had salvaged stones, wood, CGI sheets, 
doors and windows. The rural areas’ people could construct 
with that money but not the urban area people”. (Key 
Informant-17) 
d. Mechanisms for Implementation 
The implementation mechanism was different in urban areas. Contrary to 
rural areas there was no assistance and inspection process for urban areas. 
House owners in urban areas did not have the facilitation from the ERRA 
which the rural areas house owners had. Urban households had to get a 
range of permissions: for example, the construction drawings of the house 
made by a qualified architect, for which they had to pay a hefty fee; a No 
Objection Certificate (NOC) form the Development Authority, for which they 
had to pay fee; and get planning permission from the Municipal Corporation, 
for which they again had to pay fee. All permissions required working through 
bureaucratic processes. Whereas, people in rural areas did not have to gain 
these permissions so there were neither incentives nor sanctions for the 
urban areas people to spend the government money for the same purpose 
and in the same manner as the government had intended.      
  “You know what I did with my Rs. 100,000 compensation money? I 
went to Islamabad and bought movie camera for Rs. 60,000 and a 
mobile phone for Rs. 40,000 because I knew that Rs. 100,000 was 
not enough for the construction of my house. What I want to say is 
what could have I done with that sum of money? That money was 
simply not enough”. (Key Informant-21) 
An ICIMOD (2012) study observes that not enough attention has been paid 
to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Muzaffarabad city despite the fact 
that world had great sympathy with it. The whole reconstruction programme 
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has been narrowed down to a few public projects and these projects too are 
lingering due to poor decision making and lack of funds. The study fears that 
it might take a decade for 30,000 people living in temporary places to rebuild 
their houses because the money given by the government is not enough to 
build an urban earthquake resistant house and there is lack of technical 
support as well. 
In rural areas, the progress both in performance and in beneficiary 
acceptance has been higher than in urban areas. Since no planning 
permission was required in rural areas and mid-course adjustments were also 
made to allow indigenous construction designs, the performance of ODR was 
better in rural areas as compared to urban areas which lacked this type of 
creativity and flexibility. There has been more focus of both authorities and 
NGOs on rural areas; may be due to enormous size of the damage and the 
population affected. Qazi (2008, p. 132) has noted a ‘rural bias’ amongst the 
humanitarian community and lack of progress in urban areas resulting in 
frustration among the affected people of urban areas. Stephenson (2008) has 
also observed that the urban residents did not have the level of help and 
support which was available to the rural people.  
e. Scarcity of Land 
Scarcity of land in urban areas also played a role in the housing 
reconstruction progress. Availability of land was not a big problem in rural 
areas and people had the space to remove debris and reconstruct the house, 
or even constructed more than one house, where previously more than one 
family shared a house. In contrast, land was too expensive and limited in 
urban areas so it was not possible for many people to move their temporary 
shelter elsewhere and reconstruct the house, or even buy a new piece of 
land for this purpose (Key Informant-9). A Key Informant who, after leaving 
his earthquake damaged house, is still living in a rented house said:  
“The price of land in certain parts of the city has increased more 
than five times since the earthquake so where one would do 
construction? Even if someone thinks that multi-storey building is a 
death trap, they have no choice because the land is too costly”. 
(Key Informant-18) 
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f. Interim Housing Provision  
6,000 prefabricated shelters provided by the ERRA also played their part in 
delaying the housing reconstruction in urban areas. These shelters were 
provided to the affected people in the urban areas of Muzaffarabad and Bagh 
to solve the housing problem until such time as the Master Plan was 
implemented and people were allowed to start reconstruction of their houses. 
SIDA and Saudi Government provided 4200 shelters for Muzaffarabad city 
and 1800 shelters for Bagh city. These shelters comprised of two rooms, a 
kitchen, and a bathroom (ERRA 2011). Moreover, some other organizations 
also provided about 300 shelters in the city. About 8,600 houses were 
destroyed in Muzaffarabad city; the provision of 4,500 shelters solved the 
housing problem for almost half of the city population (Figure 6.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Similarly about 3,000 houses were destroyed in Bagh city and 1800 shelters 
were provided there. During my fieldwork in Bagh city I noticed that these 
shelters were still being erected in some areas, nine years after the 
earthquake. So provision of these pre-fabricated shelters eased the housing 
problem to some extent (Davis 2010b) and may be people didn’t feel as 
much pressure to reconstruct their houses as much the rural people did. 
 
Key Informant-22, whose house was destroyed in the earthquake in urban 
Muzaffarabad and who had worked in post-earthquake housing 
55 Figure 6.4 Transitional housing (blue structures) in Muzaffarabad city.    
(Source: SERRA)                                                     
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reconstruction programme, was of the opinion that the Saudi and SIDA 
shelters contributed towards low progress in urban areas because they not 
only solved the housing problem but also occupied the limited land thus 
leaving no space for the construction of permanent house. He suggested that 
either the shelter price or interest free soft loans should have been provided 
in urban areas. This view is shared by Davis (2006, 2010b) also. 
Survey questionnaire data (N=200) also indicated difference of progress not 
only between rural/urban settings but within rural/urban settings also. For 
example, in rural Bagh 96% houses have been reconstructed; on the other 
hand in rural Muzaffarabad 92% houses have been reconstructed. Though 
the difference in not much in rural areas this difference is more noticeable in 
urban areas. For example, in urban Muzaffarabad 80% houses have been 
reconstructed, whereas in urban Bagh only 46% houses have been 
reconstructed.  
6.2.3. Progress in Economic Context 
One aim of my study was to assess how the housing reconstruction 
programme has performed across different income groups. The SERRA data 
are not disaggregated according to income groups so it was not possible to 
work out the housing reconstruction progress from these data. 
Questionnaires were, therefore, used to gather this information. The data of 
these survey questionnaires reveals the following composition of income 
groups (Table 6.6).  
20 Table 6.6 Household financial status. 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Very Poor 31 15.5 15.5 
Poor 84 42.0 57.5 
Moderate but 
unstable 
63 31.5 89.0 
Moderate and 
stable 
19 9.5 98.5 
Strong 1 .5 99.0 
Well off 2 1.0 100.0 
Total 200 100.0  
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According to the ERRA, one of the hallmarks of the Housing Reconstruction 
Programme was the uniform cash grant package irrespective of the size of 
the house and the type of construction. The aim was to convert the adversity 
of the earthquake into an opportunity and help people construct seismically 
resistant pukka houses (Key Informant-1). According to the former Deputy 
Chairman of ERRA, General Nadeem Ahmed the President of Pakistan, 
General Pervez Musharraf had instructed him to make the housing 
reconstruction programme as “pro-poor” as possible. The uniform subsidy 
package and other assistance measures should have ensured full 
reconstruction across all income groups.  
SPSS was used to analyse the survey questionnaire data and assess the 
progress of the housing reconstruction programme across different income 
groups. This test was conducted on the following hypothesis: 
H0: There is no relationship between economic context and progress of 
housing reconstruction 
H1: There is relationship between economic context and progress of housing 
reconstruction  
Table 6.7 shows the housing reconstruction status across five income 
groups.  
This table presents the cross tabulation of the housing reconstruction 
progress in economic context. The expected count of constructed houses in 
case of “Very Poor” income group is 22 but the actual count is 12, which is 
very low. The expected count of Not Constructed houses is 3.4 in case of 
“Very Poor” income group but the actual count is 10, which is quite high. In 
case of the “Poor” income group, the expected count of reconstructed 
houses is 61.2 but the actual count is 63. Finally, the expected count of Not 
Reconstructed houses is 9.4, but the actual count is 8; there is not much 
difference between the expected and the actual count in this case. Three 
other income groups i.e. “Moderate and stable”, “Strong”, and “Well-off” 
(which make up 11% (N=22) of the total respondents) had reconstructed 
their houses and the difference between the expected count and the actual 
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count is on the positive side i.e. more houses reconstructed than expected 
and less Not Constructed houses than expected.  
21 Table 6.7 Housing reconstruction progress in economic context. 
 Pre-EQ HH Financial Status  
Total Very 
Poor 
Poor Moderate 
but 
unstable 
Moderate 
and 
stable 
Strong 
C
o
n
s
tru
c
tio
n
 S
ta
tu
s
 
Constructed Count 12 63 49 32 1 157 
Expected 
Count 
22.0 61.2 47.1 25.9 .8 157.0 
Not 
Constructed 
Count 10 8 6 0 0 24 
Expected 
Count 
3.4 9.4 7.2 4.0 .1 24.0 
Incomplete Count 6 6 4 1 0 17 
Expected 
Count 
2.4 6.6 5.1 2.8 .1 17.0 
Repaired Count 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Expected 
Count 
.1 .4 .3 .2 .0 1.0 
Under Repair Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Expected 
Count 
.1 .4 .3 .2 .0 1.0 
           Total Count 28 78 60 33 1 200 
Expected 
Count 
28.0 78.0 60.0 33.0 1.0 200.0 
 
A Chi-square test was also conducted to determine the significance of 
association between these two variables (Table 6.8). 
22 Table 6.8 Chi-Square Tests a. 17 cells (68.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is .01. 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 34.699
a
 16 .004 
Likelihood Ratio 34.244 16 .005 
Linear-by-Linear Association 12.565 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 200 
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In the above table, Pearson Chi-square value is important. The Pearson Chi-
square tests the hypothesis that the row and column variables in the table are 
independent. The lower the "Asymp. Sig." value, the less likely it is that these 
two variables are independent and would cause the rejection of the Null 
Hypothesis of "no relationship". The output of .004 suggests that economic 
context and housing reconstruction rate are related (i.e., they are dependent) 
since the significance of the Pearson Chi-Square test is below usual cut-off point 
of 0.05 (or sometimes 0.10). Thus there is enough evidence to reject the Null 
Hypothesis and therefore, must assume dependence/association. The 
assumption for bigger than 2x2 tables is that the expected count is not less than 
5 or 20% of the cells have expected count of >5. In the case, the expected count 
is 68% so the assumption has been violated. In case of violation of assumption, 
we need to look at the “Likelihood Ratio”. The Likelihood Ratio test rejects the 
null hypothesis if the value of this statistic is too small. Since the value of 
Likelihood Ratio is .005, we reject the Null Hypothesis.     
 
However, the chi-square does not give us any information how the variables are 
related or how strong the relationship is. Hence Cramer's V test was used 
because it is a post-test to give additional information (Table 6.9). The nominal 
measures of association take values from 0-1; with 0 being no association and 1 
being perfect association. Since the p=0.0004 is less than the significance level 
(p=0.05), there is significant evidence that there is relationship between 
household financial status and progress of housing reconstruction. These 
differences are significant (𝑥2=34.69, df=16, p=0.004). 
Though the Chi-square explains the significance of relationship between two 
variables, it does not say how much significant and important this relationship is. 
The Cramer's V test was used because it is a post-test to give us this additional 
information (Table 6.9).  
Cramer's V varies between 0 and 1. The closer the outcome is to 0 the weaker 
the association is between variables; and the closer it is to 1 the stronger the 
association is. In this particular case the significance of association or 
relationship is weak. 
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23Table 6.9 Symmetric Measures. 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 
Phi .417 .004 
Cramer's V .208 .004 
N of Valid Cases 200 
 
 
 
Based on the results of the cross tabulation table above, a bar chart was 
generated (Figure 6.5) which depicts housing reconstruction progress 
according to income groups.  
 
56 Figure 6.5 Housing reconstruction progress in economic context. 
 
Figure 6.5 shows that in the “Very Poor” income group only 35% house 
owners could construct their houses, 38% were Not Constructed, and 25% 
were still incomplete. In the case of the “Poor” income group construction 
progress was better (81%) and the percentage of Not Constructed and 
Incomplete houses was lower (11.9% and 4.8% respectively). With a rise in 
the income group category the percentage of Constructed houses also 
increased. So it can be concluded that the household financial status did play 
a role in progress of housing reconstruction despite the fact that a uniform 
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Constructed 35.5% 81.0% 88.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Repaired 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Incomplete 25.8% 4.8% 7.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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housing subsidy package was given to the house owners by the 
Government.  
One reason for this difference of progress between different income groups 
could be that the amount of housing cash grant (PKR 175,000) was not 
enough for the reconstruction of seismically resistant house. 91.5% of the 
respondents said that the amount of grant was not enough (based on the 
Survey Questionnaire data).  
The second reason could be that those house owners who couldn’t 
reconstruct their houses either did not receive full amount of housing subsidy 
or did not receive it at all or spent the housing subsidy on other daily 
necessities. However officials do not agree with the view that the amount of 
Housing Cash Grant was not enough for the construction of a seismic 
resistant house. The former Deputy Chairman of the ERRA said in his key 
informant interview “we calculated the cost of PKR 175,000 after constructing 
model houses”. Mr Tahir Shamshad, Vice President NESPAK, told that when 
they estimated the salvage value of the damaged houses they found that in 
about 80% cases most of the material could be salvaged. And in their 
estimate, the housing cash grant of Rs. 175,000 was enough to construct a 
two room house using this salvaged material. To verify this claim I 
interviewed a mason Syed Qadir Shah, who has constructed more than 100 
houses since the earthquake; he also agreed that the amount of 175,000 
rupees was enough for the construction of a 400 Sq. Ft. house in 2006.     
The house owners were asked through survey questionnaires how much 
extra money did they spend on the reconstruction of their house. Table 6.10 
shows the average amount (in Pakistani rupees) that each income group 
spent on the reconstruction of their house.  
An interesting point which emerged from this table is that in the case of lower 
income groups (Very Poor, Poor, Moderate but unstable, and Moderate and 
stable) the maximum amount of money spent on reconstruction of houses is 
very high as compared to high income groups (Strong and Well-off). I cannot 
explain any reason of these extraordinary figures. I asked the respondents of 
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my second fieldwork if they had any explanation of these outliers. All the 
participants of the three focus group discussion sessions and seven key 
informants were of the opinion that the reason of high amount in case of very 
poor category could be that people tend to exaggerate their expenditure to 
outsiders with the hope that they might get some more money from 
somewhere. One key informant, who was Director M&E in the SERRA, gave 
two reasons of exaggerated figure of extra money: poor people wanted to 
hide their poverty by showing inflated figures; they did not want to show 
themselves as too poor. He said that the other reason could be that they 
actually did spend that much money by borrowing etc. He also said that the 
amount showed by the well-off and strong categories is not realistic either 
because it is too less an amount for constructing a good quality house 
befitting their category. May be they wanted to hide their wealth.  
 24 Table 6.10 Additional money spent on housing reconstruction. 
Income Group N 
Mean 
(PKR) 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum 
(PKR) 
Maximum 
(PKR) 
Very Poor 17 230000 225423 25000 1000000 
Poor 73 286506 209650 20000 1250000 
Moderate but 
unstable 
60 467333 323800 60000 1600000 
Moderate and stable 18 533333 337813 150000 1500000 
Strong 1 800000  800000 800000 
Well off 1 700000  700000 700000 
      
     
6.2.3.1. Life Story of a Very Poor Family in Rural Bagh 
 
“I have three children and we are living in one 
room…………My brother has given me one room in his 
house……he can kick me out of his house any 
time……………I am too much worried. If the government 
could somehow give me compensation, I could make two 
rooms for my children…….my father has given me a small 
piece of land”. 
Mohammad Khan is a poor blacksmith living in a small village in District 
Bagh. He used to live in a joint family house with two other families, of his 
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father and brother, before the earthquake. The 2005 earthquake destroyed 
their house. His father and brother got the housing compensation and 
reconstructed their separate houses, but Mohammad Khan somehow 
couldn’t get the compensation money. He is a very simple soul and has no 
idea why he couldn’t get the compensation. He has put forward many 
applications to the authorities in Bagh for compensation but to no avail. He 
says his neighbours are very nice and have offered him five trees to 
construct his house but he says he is too poor to afford even to feed himself 
and his family, so how could he afford to build a house? His income is very 
low because there is not much business in the village, especially after the 
earthquake. He is living with his wife and three children in his brother’s house 
who has given him a room which is just big enough for two beds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.4.  Progress in Social Context 
In this section I explore housing reconstruction with respect to vulnerable 
groups. It is well established in disaster literature that vulnerable groups such 
as the poor, women, elderly, racial/ethnic minorities, and disabled are hit the 
hardest by disasters and find it extremely difficult to fully recover from the 
impacts of disasters (Alexander 2004; Bhatt 1998; Bolin 1976, 1985; Cuny 
1983; Gangapati et al. 2012; McEntire 2004; Mitchell 1995; Qurentelli 2003; 
Rodney et al. 2011; Thurairajah 2011; Thurairajah et al. 2008). One of the 
57 Figure 6.6 Mohammad Khan outside his brother's house.                                                         
                                                                                   (Source: Author fieldwork) 
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Key Informants, who works in a multilateral organization and has been 
closely involved in post disaster reconstruction programmes in Pakistan for a 
long period, observed that the vulnerable people usually do not have voice in 
the system. He was of the opinion that any post-disaster reconstruction, 
whether housing reconstruction or other, should always have a dedicated 
outreach which should identify the vulnerable and access them. While 
commenting on the post-2005 earthquake housing reconstruction he said 
that they learnt from experience that there was a section of population which 
had not been served in an appropriate fashion. As observed by one of the 
house owners that I interviewed “………..well established and active families, 
which had males, were able to get more benefits as compared to more 
affected and deserving but powerless families.” 
The 2005 Kashmir earthquake severely impacted the already vulnerable 
people. The ERRA conducted a Targeted Vulnerability Survey (TVS) to 
identify vulnerable people. Many vulnerable sections of society such as 
widows, orphans, elderly without care, persons with disability, and the 
landless were  identified who needed special attention from the government 
because of being severely impacted by the earthquake and their limited 
capacity to recover (ERRA 2006c; 2007c). I focused my research on widows 
(more specifically female-headed households). 
6.2.4.1. Female-Headed Households (FHHs) 
Disasters impact women and men differently (ADB 2005b; Bari 1998; Begum 
1993; Cannon 2002; Enarson 1992, 2001; Gangapati et al. 2012: Hannan 
2002; Hines 2007; Khondker 1996; Neumayer & Plümper 2007; Sapir 1992; 
Thurairajah 2011; Thurairajah & Amaratunga 2009; Wiest et al. 1992). 
Women are usually the worst hit because of their vulnerabilities. This 
situation becomes even more damaging during the reconstruction phase due 
to two reasons. First, in patriarchal societies the land and employment 
related activities are mostly handled by men in normal situations but once the 
disaster strikes and women are left without men, it becomes very difficult for 
these women to perform these jobs because the society still works according 
to old ‘gender stereotypes’ (ibid). The second reason is that women do not 
have sufficient representation in normal development activities so they are 
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under-represented in the reconstruction activities as well (ibid). Due to these 
limitations the women, particularly the female-headed households, take 
longer to recover from the negative impacts of the disasters (Bari 1998; 
Gangapati et al. 2012; Thurairajah & Amaratunga 2009).  
The earthquake of 2005 severely impacted all segments of the society. The 
women who make up 49.82% population of AJK (P&DD 2014) were also 
severely impacted. In AJK thousands of households lost their male heads 
(ADB 2005b; ERRA 2009), leaving the responsibility of reconstruction of the 
destroyed houses with women. According to the ERRA 38,100 households 
(20%) are headed by women in AJK (ibid). Key Informant-5 notes that 
enhanced participation of women and improvement of their access to human, 
capital and information resources was proposed in Kashmir in the post-2005 
earthquake reconstruction programme. 
As women are key social actors before, during, after disastrous events, and 
during the reconstruction of homes (Enarson 2001) it is important to know 
how these 38,000 female-headed households fared in the housing 
reconstruction process. 42 FHHs (21% of the sample data) in six 
geographical units (4 rural union councils and 2 cities) were sampled to 
assess the status of housing. The earthquake not only resulted in new 
female-headed households but also affected existing female-headed 
households as well. Women who were already widowed or divorced, or 
unmarried prior to the earthquake would have continued to live in houses 
with some sort of male relations; for example father, son, brother etc. The 
earthquake not only killed many husbands but also took away many male 
heads of these households leaving behind these women with the 
responsibility of reconstructing houses and earning income in a patriarchal 
society (ADB 2005b).  
The ERRA did promote gender equality policy in housing reconstruction and 
30% members of the VRC (Village Reconstruction Committee) were women 
(ERRA 2009), but there were no special arrangements for female-headed 
households in housing reconstruction activity.  
196 
 
SPSS was used to analyse the survey questionnaire data and assess the 
progress of the housing reconstruction programme across two gender 
groups. This test was conducted on the following hypothesis: 
H0: There is a relationship between gender and progress of housing 
reconstruction 
H1: There is no relationship between gender and progress of housing 
reconstruction  
Table 6.11 shows that the expected count of Constructed houses with male-
headed households is 124, but the actual count is 121, whereas in the case 
of female-headed households the expected count is 33, but the actual count 
is 36. The expected count of Not Constructed houses in case of male-
headed households is 19, but the actual count is 22; in case of female 
headed households the expected count is 5 but the actual count is 2. Thus 
the female-headed households showed better housing reconstruction 
progress as compared to male-headed households. 
25 Table 6.11 Housing reconstruction progress according to gender. 
 Gender  
Total 
Male Female 
 
C
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n
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Constructed Count 121 36 157 
Expected Count 124.0 33.0 157.0 
Not Constructed Count 22 2 24 
Expected Count 19.0 5.0 24.0 
Incomplete Count 13 4 17 
Expected Count 13.4 3.6 17.0 
Repaired Count 1 0 1 
Expected Count .8 .2 1.0 
Under Repair Count 1 0 1 
Expected Count .8 .2 1.0 
                      Total Count 158 42 200 
Expected Count 158.0 42.0 200.0 
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A Chi-square test was also conducted to determine the significance of 
association between these two variables (Table 6.12).  
 
26 Table 6.12 Chi-Square Tests a. 5 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5.           
                                The minimum expected count is .21. 
 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.271
a
 4 .514 
Likelihood Ratio 4.198 4 .380 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.833 1 .361 
N of Valid Cases 200 
  
 
In the above table, Pearson Chi-square value is important. The Pearson Chi-
square tests the hypothesis that the row and column variables in the table 
are independent. The lower the "Asymp. Sig." value, the less likely it is that 
these two variables are independent and would cause the rejection of the 
Null Hypothesis of "no relationship". The output of .514 suggests that gender 
and housing reconstruction rate are related (i.e., they are dependent) since 
the significance of the Pearson Chi-Square test is above the usual cut-off 
point of 0.05 (or sometimes 0.10). Thus there is enough evidence to reject 
the Null Hypothesis and therefore, must assume dependence/association. 
The assumption for bigger than 2x2 tables is that the expected count is not 
less than 5 or 20% of the cells have expected count of >5. In the case, the 
expected count is 50% so the assumption has been violated. In case of 
violation of assumption, we need to look at the “Likelihood Ratio”. The 
Likelihood Ratio test rejects the null hypothesis if the value of this statistic is 
too small. Since the value of Likelihood Ratio is .380, we reject the Null 
Hypothesis.     
 
However, the chi-square does not give us any information how the variables 
are related or how strong the relationship is. Hence Cramer's V test was 
used because it is a post-test to give additional information (Table 6.13). 
However, the chi-square does not give us any information how the variables 
are related or how strong the relationship is. Hence Cramer's V test was 
used because it is a post-test to give additional information (Table 6.13). So I 
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used the Cramer's V test because it is a post-test to give us this additional 
information and also because my table is asymmetric i.e. it is not a 2x2 table. 
Cramer's V varies between 0 and 1. The closer the outcome is to 0 the 
weaker the association is between variables; and the closer it is to 1 the 
stronger the association is. In this particular case the Approx. Sig. is closer 
to 1 (.514) so we can say that the significance of association or relationship 
is stronger (Table 6.13). 
 
27 Table 6.13 Symmetric Measures. 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 
Phi .128 .514 
Cramer's V .128 .514 
N of Valid Cases 200 
 
 
Based on the results of the above cross tabulation table, a bar chart was 
generated (Figure 6.7) which depicts housing reconstruction progress 
according to gender.   
 
58 Figure 6.7 Housing reconstruction progress according to gender. 
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Female-headed households not only fared well in the case of “Constructed” 
houses but had lower percentage of “Not Constructed” houses as compared 
to Male-headed households; however the percentage of “Incomplete” houses 
is slightly higher than male-head households.    
 
59 Figure 6.8 A Woman working on her under construction house                      (Source: ERRA) 
{{{{{{  
6.2.4.2. Life Story of a Widow Who Reconstructed Her House 
Iffat Begum lives in a small village of District Bagh. She is a head teacher in 
a government school. Her husband had died before the October 2005 
earthquake. Her pukka house was fully damaged by the 2005 earthquake 
and her two children were injured. She took them to her parents’ home in 
Peshawar on the third day of the earthquake. She went to the television and 
radio stations to launch an appeal for relief goods for the earthquake affected 
people. In just two days she gathered two truckloads of relief goods. She left 
her children with her parents and travelled back to her village; she had to 
spend two nights on the road because the road was closed.  
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She says that she had no idea of the seismic hazard in the AJK and thinks 
that the main reason of widespread devastation was faulty construction. She 
spent one year in a tent and started reconstructing her house in 2006; it took 
her only three months to complete the house. She says that she was given 
175,000 rupees housing cash grant by the government. The AI Team gave 
her the design and inspected the house at three stages. Keeping up her 
tradition of social work she helped the local community in the housing 
reconstruction process. She voluntarily helped the AI Team in their visits to 
other houses and was helpful in motivating people to do construction 
according to guidelines.  
She was happy with her new house and was confident that her house was 
seismically safe because she constructed it according to the ERRA 
guidelines. Though she has reconstructed her house, she says that the 
housing subsidy was not enough and her father and brothers helped her 
greatly in reconstruction. Her estimate is that approximately 70% houses 
have been reconstructed in her village. She was particularly worried about a 
widow, Zeenat Bibi, who was living in a makeshift shelter with her little 
children because she couldn’t get the housing cash grant. Iffat Begum did 
not need to use the grievance redressal system for herself but she did go 
with some other people to get their issues sorted and they were really very 
helpful. She has installed rain water harvesting system on her roof and plans 
to install it in her school and in other houses in the neighbourhood as well.  
She thinks that the amount of housing cash grant should be increased and 
technical support and motivation should be given to the people at village 
level in case of Owner Driven Approach. She supports the Agency Driven 
Approach for housing reconstruction, provided the government works 
honestly.  
6.3. Summary 
In this chapter I have discussed the progress of the post-2005 housing 
reconstruction programme. I have investigated housing reconstruction 
progress in three contexts; geographical (rural and urban), economic (across 
different income groups), and social (female-headed households). I have 
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based my research on literature (both academic and grey literature), 
secondary data of the reconstruction agency of the AJK, and primary data 
(both quantitative and qualitative) which I collected during my fieldwork. I 
observed that in the case of geographical context, the official figures of the 
ERRA show that 96% of houses have been reconstructed. Much of the grey 
literature also agrees with this estimate. Similarly, most of the Key Informants 
whom I interviewed as part of my primary qualitative data also put the figure 
of housing reconstruction at a very high level.    
However, my finding is that the ERRA’s figure is not based on actual 
verification of the reconstructed houses on the ground; rather it is based on 
payment of the fourth tranche of the Housing Cash Grant (which is payable 
after verification of lintel level construction of the house). My primary 
quantitative data (N=200 survey questionnaires) collected from six different 
geographical units (four rural and two urban) show that overall 78.5% houses 
have been reconstructed. I have also explored housing reconstruction 
progress in rural versus urban contexts. The housing reconstruction 
authorities’ data do not give disaggregated data for rural or urban contexts 
separately. My research shows that rural areas have showed better housing 
reconstruction progress than urban areas. My quantitative data (N=200 
survey questionnaires) show that 94% respondents have reconstructed their 
houses in rural areas while 63% respondents in urban areas have been able 
to reconstruct their houses. Most of the Key Informants and house owners 
have agreed that the rural areas have fared better than urban areas. I 
discussed the reasons of this marked difference of progress in rural/urban 
contexts.    
I also investigated the economic context of housing reconstruction. Analysis 
of survey questionnaire data demonstrated a relationship between income 
and housing reconstruction. Only 35% of the Very Poor income group have 
been able to reconstruct their houses. This percentage increases with the 
increase in income level, for example 81% Poor, 88.5% Moderate but 
unstable, 100% Moderate and stable, 100% Strong, and 100% Well-off 
respondents have reconstructed their houses.  
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Finally, I explored housing reconstruction progress in social context with 
regard to vulnerable groups. My quantitative data demonstrated that female-
headed households have fared better compared to male-headed 
households. Despite the patriarchal family system and the particular socio-
cultural makeup of the society that does not encourage women, 85.7% 
female-headed households have reconstructed their houses as compared to 
76.6% of male-head households.  
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CHAPTER 7: IMPACT OF THE HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION 
PROGRAMME 
7.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss the impact of the housing reconstruction 
programme in the study area. The chapter is based on the following research 
question:  
After the completion of the housing reconstruction programme: 
a. To what extent are the seismic-resistant construction 
techniques sustainable in the study area, especially in rural 
areas? 
b.  How far has ODR been able to reduce / address the 
vulnerability of the building stock in the study area? 
c.  To what extent has the implementation of the ODR re-worked 
the family and household structures and patterns of land 
ownership? 
 
The first impact that I have tried to evaluate is to what extent seismic 
resistant construction is being practised by people in rural and urban areas 
while constructing buildings with their own money, especially residential 
buildings. The second is the status of vulnerability of the total housing stock 
in the study area after the completion of the housing reconstruction 
programme. The third is to what extent the housing reconstruction 
programme has impacted the pre-earthquake family structure and land 
ownership pattern in the study area.  
Unfortunately limited academic literature is available on these issues, 
particularly about the study area, so I have relied on whatever literature 
(mainly grey literature) is available, qualitative data (semi-structured 
interviews and focus group discussions) collected during fieldwork, my 
personal experience, and observations made during fieldwork.   
7.2. Defining Impact Evaluation 
Impact evaluation may be defined as “analyses that measure the net change 
in outcomes for particular group of people that can be attributed to a specific 
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program” (Buttenheim 2009, p. 201). Impact assessment, especially Social 
Impact Assessment and Environmental Impact Assessment, is usually done 
before launching a project to assess what impacts the proposed project will 
achieve (Becker 2001; Burdge et al. 1995; Dietz 1987). Social Impact 
Assessment is now common in the case of development projects after 
completion to assess how the lives of the communities have changed. Post 
disaster impact assessment (PDIE) is also gaining currency to assess the 
impact of the humanitarian and development interventions after disasters 
(ibid). Impact evaluation of the post-disaster recovery interventions 
(especially after big disasters) is essential because usually a large section of 
the population is severely impacted for a long time and usually the more 
severely impacted people are already poor, vulnerable, and marginalized 
and do not necessarily have full access to relief and recovery activities. Thus 
it is important to evaluate the impact of the recovery interventions. 
Buttenheim (2010: p. 201, 212-213) has identified some challenges in the 
evaluation of post-disaster recovery interventions, for example programme 
interventions are not randomly assigned, target populations are by definition 
poor and vulnerable, several institutions may be implementing multiple 
interventions simultaneously for the same or neighbouring populations, and 
lack of baseline data; and also identified selection bias, information bias, 
contamination bias as potential sources of bias.   
7.3. Sustainability of the Seismic Resistant Construction 
Sustainability of the seismic resistant construction is of prime importance in 
the study area for two reasons; one is the massive damage to life and 
property as a result of 2005 earthquake and the other is the continued 
presence of seismic hazard. As discussed in previous chapters, more than 
300,000 houses were destroyed in the earthquake in AJK alone and this 
damage could have been minimised by taking timely mitigation measures. 
Since AJK is situated in one of the most seismically active zones of the earth 
it is of the utmost importance to continue seismic resistant construction now 
and in the future to avoid such damages. The success and usefulness of the 
housing reconstruction programme will remain unfulfilled/ incomplete if 
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seismic resistant construction is not sustained in future so that the success 
story is ongoing rather than being a one-off event.  
One of the hallmarks of the post-2005 earthquake housing reconstruction 
was the introduction of seismic resistant construction because the 
government did not want people to reconstruct seismically unsafe houses as 
they used to do in the past (ERRA 2011). After the earthquake, the 
government swiftly took the opportunity to replace all the damaged/destroyed 
building stock with earthquake resistant buildings while keeping in mind other 
local hazards; “build back better” was the slogan of this campaign (ibid). As 
mentioned in previous chapters, several measures were undertaken for this 
purpose; earthquake resistant designs were provided to the house owners, 
training was given to artisans and house owners to implement these designs, 
material hubs were established to provide good quality construction material 
at reasonable prices, Assistance and Inspection Teams were set up to visit 
each under construction house at three key stages of construction, and 
housing cash grant was given in four instalments after these visits to ensure 
compliance with seismic resistant designs.  
The ERRA claims that not only the reconstructed houses are earthquake 
resistant but a culture of seismic resistant construction has been established 
in these areas as a result of owner driven reconstruction (ERRA 2011). 
However the ERRA reports do not present any empirical evidence to support 
this claim. The Asian Development Bank (one of the main financers of the 
post-2005 earthquake housing reconstruction programme) has reported that 
72% of the houses built without ERRA funding in earthquake affected areas 
have used seismic resistant construction techniques (ADB 2011). In the 
absence of any exact and reliable data of the housing stock in the study 
area, it is not possible to say with certainty how many houses were compliant 
with seismic standards and the level of safety of the housing stock of the 
area. Apart from above mentioned reports I couldn’t find any academic 
literature on this issue about the study area.  
I asked key informants during my fieldwork about the level of sustainability of 
seismic resistant construction in the study area. Most of the respondents 
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were of the opinion that sustainability was an issue and seismic resistant 
construction, which was of the utmost importance due to the known high 
seismic hazard, was not being fully practised in the earthquake affected 
areas. Below are the comments by some of the key informants which show 
that seismic resistant construction is being practised to varying degrees 
(between 50%-75%, though one respondent put this figure to only 20%) in 
the study area (Table 7.1). It can be made out from the below table that most 
of the respondents were of the opinion that sustainability of the seismic 
resistant construction was an issue.    
28 Table 7.1 Key Informant response on the sustainability of the seismic resistant construction in 
the study area. 
Respondent Comment 
Key 
Informant-5 
After the earthquake the construction of houses that the people did other 
than the reconstruction programme out of their own pocket, about 70-75% 
were compliant.  
Key 
Informant-6 
Sustainability is certainly an issue in rural as well as urban areas. 
Key 
Informant-15 
People have forgotten safe construction in later construction with their 
own money and have reverted back to old practices………in about 50% 
cases the code is not followed completely.  
Key 
Informant-16 
About 50% are doing better construction. 
Key 
Informant-17 
Seismic resistant construction which was ensured during the housing 
reconstruction programme is not only not sustainable it’s gradually 
collapsing.  
Key 
Informant-18 
Yes sustainability is an issue. People are not doing safe construction and 
are floating the rules.  
Key 
Informant-21 
After the completion of the ERRA’s housing reconstruction programme 
people have gone back to the old ways of construction and they are not 
that careful now. I must say the safety element is getting lesser and lesser 
with the passage of time.  
Key 
Informant-22 
Sustainability (of seismically safe housing) is a big issue. 
Key 
Informant-25 
About 20% people follow the guidelines and 80% have gone back to old 
system.  
Key 
Informant-31 
Even after the reconstruction programme is over, people are doing the 
compliant construction to some extent.  
Key 
Informant-32 
There is no guarantee that houses constructed outside the reconstruction 
programme are seismic resistant.  
Key 
Informant-33 
Not sure how safe new houses are. There might be some improvement 
due to awareness but it cannot be guaranteed. 
Key 
Informant-40 
In rural areas it’s going good because people know that if they don’t have 
pillars and beams in their house, it will fall down. Whereas in urban areas 
the story is bit different, multi-storey plaza are being constructed even on 
slopes and edges. We haven’t learnt anything from the earthquake in the 
city.  
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The issue of sustainability was discussed in focus group discussion sessions 
also. All the four sessions agreed that sustainability of the seismic 
construction was an issue both in rural as well as urban areas. 
Sustainability of the seismic resistant construction has different dimensions 
and issues in urban / rural contexts so I will discuss these separately in the 
following sections. 
7.3.1. Sustainability in the Rural Context 
According to Pandey et al. (2008) past experience shows that people, 
especially in rural areas, tend to forget lessons learnt from earthquakes and 
revert back to pre-earthquake construction practices. 88% of the population 
of the study area lives in rural areas (P&DD 2015), hence most of the 
housing stock is situated in rural areas. The population of the study area is 
growing at the rate of 2.36% pa (P&DD 2015) which means that every year 
thousands of new houses would be required to meet the needs of the 
growing population. Since most of the deaths in earthquakes are linked to 
the collapse of buildings, especially residential buildings (Chapter 5), it is 
important that future houses are not vulnerable to seismic hazard as they 
have been in the past.  
Since there is no institutional mechanism in rural areas which could be 
approached for statistical data on housing, I had to rely on my personal 
observation and qualitative data. The outcome of my research is that the 
sustainability of the seismic resistant construction is a serious issue in the 
study area and nothing can be said with certainty about the seismic safety of 
the buildings constructed outside the reconstruction programme. I asked 
house owners during semi-structure interviews to what extent people still 
observe seismic resistant techniques while constructing their houses. Their 
replies (Table 7.2) suggest that seismic resistant standards were not 
observed in 100% of cases and sustainability was an issue.    
 
 
208 
 
29 Table 7.2 Response of house owners on sustainability of seismic resistant construction in 
rural areas. 
Respondent Comment 
BR-3 I think that now people are constructing better houses than the ERRA 
designs. 
BR-10 People still follow the ERRA guidelines. 
BR-13 Yes people still try to comply with the ERRA guidelines. 
BR-32 I think about 75% people still follow these guidelines.  
BR-35 Yes people do follow the ERRA guidelines due to fear.  
MR-5 I can’t say that 100% houses are now being made according to seismic 
standards but I can say that they are better than before.  
MR-11 About 70% people still follow the guidelines while constructing their 
houses.  
MR-17 About 20% people follow the guidelines and 80% have gone back to old 
system.  
MR-32 Those people who have money they are constructing good houses.  
MR-35 Now people are making very good houses.  
MR-37 Unfortunately people in rural areas are not fully practicing the building 
techniques they learnt during the reconstruction process.  
MR-42      Mostly people ignore the seismic resistant construction techniques.  
 
I have observed during my fieldwork that though most of the newly 
constructed houses were pakka; the full specifications of the pakka type of 
construction, which were strictly enforced by the ERRA during reconstruction 
programme, were not fully followed in later construction. People have 
modified the original EERA designs according to their own liking without any 
input by engineers. Defects such as partial or full absence of a frame 
structure (Figure 7.1), lesser numbers of steel bars or too much distance 
between steel rings in columns and beams to save steel, use of wood or 
small steel columns in walls instead of concrete columns which have no 
bond with walls thus severely compromising the strength of the building, use 
of sub-standard local construction material, unsupervised construction, and 
poor workmanship were frequently noticed during these visits. It was also 
observed during these field visits that in certain cases people did voluntarily 
try to incorporate seismic resistant measures in their construction (Figure 
7.1). I asked a house owner in rural Bagh, who was doing excellent quality 
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construction, why he was doing such good construction despite the fact that 
there was no inspection by any authority? To which he replied that he was 
doing so for the safety of his family no matter somebody checked or not, but 
at the same he said that most of the people were not doing good quality 
construction due mainly to economic reasons. 
  
60 Figure 7.1 (left) An under-construction pukka house in rural Bagh with no plinth and lintel 
level beams in walls (yellow arrows) in contravention to the ERRA specifications; (right) a 
seismically compliant under-construction pukka house in rural Muzaffarabad with proper 
pillars and beams.                                                                           (Source: Author fieldwork) 
7.3.2. Sustainability in the Urban Context 
 
“The more buildings that are damaged the more certain is the 
earthquake to be remembered, and the more likely is the 
reconstruction of that city to incorporate a measure of 
resilience to the next earthquake” (Bilham 2009, p. 840). 
As opposed to rural areas, sustainability in the case of urban areas is linked 
with building control and seismic resistant construction is not a purely 
voluntary act, as in rural areas. According to the AJK Building Regulations 
2006, enforcement of the seismic resistant building codes in urban areas is 
the responsibility of the municipal corporations so sustainability of the 
seismic resistant construction should not be an issue in urban areas. 
However these civic institutions were found to be lacking in effective building 
control. A general impression in the study area, which I gathered through 
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discussions with key informants and house owners, is that the building codes 
are not enforced vigorously. I interviewed bosses and other relevant staff of 
the development authorities and municipal corporations of Muzaffarabad and 
Bagh cities and they admitted that for various reasons they were unable to 
ensure full building control. I visited four under-construction houses in 
Muzaffarabad city during fieldwork and found that these houses were being 
constructed without any planning permission and building codes were not 
enforced by the concerned authorities. Common construction errors in urban 
areas include partial or full absence of a frame structure, lesser number of 
steel bars or too much distance between steel rings in columns and beams 
to save cost of steel, use of sub-standard local construction material, 
unsupervised construction, poor workmanship, and absence of supervision 
by consultant as per AJK Building Regulations 2006. Figure 7.2 is a picture 
of an under construction house in the old part of Muzaffarabad city (one of 
the worst hit areas in 2005 earthquake) where serious violation of even basic 
engineering principles, such as adding a new structure with an old damaged 
structure (which can be seen in the background), construction of brick and 
RCC frame structure, and poor quality of construction material and 
workmanship, are committed in this building.    
 
61 Figure 7.2 An under-construction house in Muzaffarabad city; notice brick columns and 
concrete beam in utter violation of the engineering principles (yellow circles). 
                                                                                                               (Courtesy: Sheikh Ahsan) 
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Despite the lack of enforcement by civic authorities, there were some 
instances of voluntary compliance with seismic resistant construction (Figure 
7.3). I visited an under-construction house in Muzaffarabad city and 
interviewed the owner who, despite being a low paid government employee, 
was very keen to build a seismic resistant house and the whole family was 
fully involved in the construction process. During a semi structured interview 
he said “I am spending my limited money on safer structure….I do not have 
much money so I will not plaster walls and will put very ordinary doors and 
windows but at least this house will be safer for my family”. He said that even 
if there was no restriction of planning permission, no checking by the 
Municipal Corporation staff, and he had limited money he will not forgo 
seismically safe construction because “I have seen the earthquake and that 
fear is still in my mind……..No matter if someone checks it or not, I will make 
it safer and stronger”. 
 
 
62 Figure 7.3 Properly formed steel rings for RCC frame structure, a rarity before the       
earthquake.                                                                  (Source: Author fieldwork) 
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7.3.3. Challenges for Sustainability of Seismic Resistant Construction  
The sustainability of the seismically resistant construction is an issue in the 
study area due to four issues: building control, technical competence, 
economics, and culture of safety/DRR. 
 
7.3.3.1. Building Control 
Building control becomes very important in the presence of seismic hazards. 
Seismic resistant construction cannot be left to the will of the home owners 
and untrained artisans only. There must be a strong, efficient, and effective 
building control mechanism to ensure multi hazard resistant building stock 
(Burby & May 1999; Malalgoda et al. 2014; Roosli & O'Keefe 2011).  
As discussed earlier there was no building control mechanism in rural areas 
of AJK before the 2005 earthquake and this factor contributed towards 
seismically vulnerable housing stock (Chapter 5). Unfortunately this situation 
still continues in rural areas despite suffering such huge losses. The 
government should have learnt lesson from the 2005 earthquake and put in 
place an effective building control mechanism to ensure the continuity of 
seismic resistant construction started by the post-earthquake housing 
reconstruction programme; sadly though nothing was done in this regard.  
Two former employees of the UN-Habitat, who had worked for the housing 
reconstruction programme in the study area, told me that at the end of the 
housing reconstruction programme a series of meetings were held with 
different government officials in order to make seismic resistant construction 
sustainable in rural areas. They said that it was difficult to enforce a techno-
legal regime in rural areas without a proper institutional set up so, as an 
alternate, it was suggested to at least provide technical advice to the rural 
areas people nearest to their places through the existing staff of the Local 
Government Department at the Union Council level. The UN-Habitat offered 
to train these staff and provide printed technical material. They also offered 
to give continuous training to Master Trainers so that they don’t forget these 
things. They thought that perhaps it was not the priority of the government so 
their proposal never materialized (Key Informant interviews). When I asked a 
former secretary to the Government of AJK about this proposal he told me 
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that a proposal for establishing a building control mechanism was put up 
before the government in 2011 but there was no development in this regard 
although many governments had changed since then (personal 
communication). The situation at present is that there is no building control 
mechanism in rural areas and the sustainability of the seismic resistant 
construction is left to the will of the people.  
As regards urban areas, although new seismic resistant building regulations 
were enforced in AJK after the earthquake, lack of enforcement is still an 
issue as in the past. People avoid getting planning permission and the 
concerned authorities cannot stop unauthorised construction (UN 2007a, 
2007b). I interviewed heads and other relevant staff of development 
authorities and municipal corporations of Muzaffarabad and Bagh cities and 
asked them about building control; they agreed that they were unable to 
effectively control the building construction in their areas, “it is only a legal 
formality that we issue construction permission otherwise we cannot check 
the actual construction even in 50% cases” (Key Informant-15 & 16). The 
building control staff of the Municipal Corporation Muzaffarabad told me that 
according to AJK Building Regulations 2006 a consultant was required to 
supervise the construction of the buildings (even houses) and give a 
Completion Certificate to the owner and the Municipal Corporation staff were 
not supposed to check the construction. The owner was required to get 
“Occupancy Certificate” from Municipal Corporation on the basis of 
completion certificate by the consultant. They said that not a single 
occupancy certificate has been issued so far though thousands of new 
houses have been constructed (Key Informant-41, 42, 43).  
I also visited some under-construction houses in Muzaffarabad city during 
my fieldwork and asked the house owners about the level of monitoring by 
the civic authorities; all of them told that no one had ever visited the 
construction site. Some other key informants from these cities also agreed 
that there was lack of enforcement in urban areas, “the civic bodies only 
issue planning permission but don’t check the actual construction. They don’t 
stop people from doing sub-standard construction or construction on 
hazardous land. They sometimes come for checking and take the money and 
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go away. We haven’t learnt anything from the earthquake in the city” (Key 
informant-40). I interviewed a mason in Muzaffarabad city who told me “I 
have constructed more than 100 houses since the earthquake. In almost 
every case the Municipal Corporation Inspectors did come to check the 
quality of the work but they usually get a bribe and then ignore if, for 
example, 5 steel bars are used in a pillar instead of 6.  I mean they do 
question why 5 bars are being used instead of 6 but then they get the money 
and go away”. Thus corruption, inefficiency, lethargy, incompetence, and 
political interference in development authorities and municipal corporations 
are the main reasons of lack of building control.  
7.3.3.2. Technical Competence 
Technical competence of engineers and artisans is important in the 
implementation of construction designs, thus resulting in sustainability of the 
seismic resistant construction. The ERRA was well aware of this importance 
and started a training programme for artisans and house owners in the 
earthquake affected areas during the housing reconstruction programme and 
thousands of people were given training (ERRA 2011). However this was a 
one-off activity and the local governments do not have any system to train 
and certify new entrants into the trade. A former employee of UN-Habitat told 
me that they had suggested that the Government mandate the Technical 
Education & Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) to do the training and 
certification of the masons and other technical people, but the government 
did not take it seriously (Key Informant-36). The result is that untrained / 
unqualified artisans are working in the study area along with trained ones. 
These unqualified artisans are a point of concern in rural areas, especially 
because there are no building codes so seismic construction is purely a 
voluntary activity which is seriously marred in the hands of unqualified and 
untrained artisans. In urban areas this lack of qualification is compounded 
with lack of enforcement by the civic bodies.  
7.3.3.3. Economics 
Economics plays an important role in determining the type and quality of 
construction in those areas where the majority of the population have a low 
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economic base (Bosher et al. 2007; Pandey et al. 2008). Poverty was one of 
three main reasons of faulty construction in the study area (Chapter 5) and it 
has again come up as one of the main reasons for issues around 
sustainability during my research. Many key informants and house owners 
were of the opinion that despite having the knowledge of the seismic hazard 
in the area and knowing about safe construction, many people were not 
following seismic specifications due to economic reasons: “people have 
given up safety element in later construction with their own money and have 
reverted back to old practices……The biggest reason is poverty. Everybody 
wants to do good construction. If I don’t have roof to cover my head I would 
do construction according to my resources” (Key Informant-16). The 
technical staff of the Municipal Corporation Muzaffarabad said during key 
informant interview that according to The AJK Building Regulations (2006) a 
consultant was required to supervise the construction and give a completion 
certificate to the owner but usually the consultants were de-hired during the 
course of construction, especially in the case of small houses because 
people could not afford to pay the fee (Key Informant-41). 
It is important to know the level of poverty in the study area after the 
earthquake to see if poverty is still as prevalent as it was before the 
earthquake. According to UN reports, poverty was prevalent in the 
earthquake affected areas of AJK (UN 2007a, 2007b).  Most of the families in 
District Bagh have become poorer and at-risk to the difficulties of day-to-day 
survival after the earthquake. Most of the people do not have savings or 
access to banks and other safety nets to fall back upon in the case of an 
emergency and they are financially and economically vulnerable, contrary to 
the perception of many educated and professional planners that remittances 
are helping many families in Bagh (UN 2007a, p. 12). Similarly most of the 
people in Muzaffarabad city have neither savings nor access to financial 
institutions for lending so they are forced to live in the houses damaged by 
the earthquake (UN 2007b). I have tried to collect data on the economic 
condition of the people of the study area but as pointed out by Buttenheim 
(2010), there was no pre-earthquake baseline data available for the study 
area. Baseline data were therefore constructed on the basis of information 
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provided by the surveyed households about their condition before the 
earthquake and after the intervention. Utmost care was taken in data 
collection to minimize errors or biases, for example instead of directly asking 
the income of the household, their sources of income, the condition and size 
of the house, the amount of the household assets, number and type of cattle 
and transport that the household owned, other items such as fridge, TV, 
mobile phone, and the schools (private or government) to which the children 
went were kept in mind while assessing the economic condition of the 
households (see Chapter 4).  
My quantitative data (N=200) demonstrates that the financial condition of 
people in the study area has been mostly adversely affected by the 
earthquake, except for a very small percentage of upper income groups. 
Figure 7.4 shows that the percentage of the Very poor has increased from 
14% before the earthquake to 17.5% after the earthquake and the 
percentage of the Poor has increased from 39% to 40%. The Moderate but 
unstable and Moderate and stable groups have gone down from 30% to 
26.5% and from 16.5% to 14.5% respectively. Data demonstrate that poverty 
is one of the three factors (along with Lack of building control and Ignorance 
of seismic hazard being the other two) has actually increased after the 
earthquake. 
These findings were strongly contested by some key informants. They were 
of the opinion that the financial condition of the people had improved a lot 
after the earthquake due to payment of compensation by the government, 
influx of huge sums of money as charity and donations, and increased 
economic opportunities as a result of billions of rupees investments in 
reconstruction projects. As already discussed in Section 8.2.1 (iv) of this 
thesis, most of the people of the earthquake affected areas could not benefit 
from the economic opportunities which became available soon after the 
earthquake. Apart from quantitative data, I collected the qualitative data (in 
the shape of semi-structured interviews and life stories) from house owners 
to assess their financial status and the impact of the earthquake on their 
livelihoods. Many respondents of the Very poor and Poor categories told 
heart-moving stories of the loss of their livelihoods. Many of them lost their 
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source of livelihood due to physical disability caused by the earthquake. The 
financial condition of these people was opposite of the official version 
mentioned above. Loss of house, assets, and savings coupled with loss of 
livelihoods hit people of the study area hard. Figure 7.5 also highlights the 
livelihoods concern of the people of the study area. House owners were 
asked to identify and prioritize their future concerns. 77% respondents said 
that income was their biggest future concern.  
 
63 Figure 7.4 Financial status of respondents in the study area.       (Source: Author fieldwork) 
7.3.3.4. Culture of Safety/Disaster Risk Reduction 
Apart from effective building control mechanism, a culture of safety in a 
society is also important to ensure safe construction. In the absence of 
effective building control, awareness of safe building techniques plays a 
major role in sustainable solutions to building vulnerability (Bosher et al. 
2007; Macabuag 2010; Pandey et al. 2008). As Abidi (2011, p. 8) observed, 
sustainability can be achieved only if safe construction penetrates “into the 
culture of a society. This is achievable only if earthquake risk is accepted by 
the society at large as a daily life threat, similar as the use of umbrella for 
rain risk, of pullovers for winter risk and of vaccination for disease risk”.  
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It is unfortunate that despite going through a horrific earthquake, the culture 
of safety has not fully penetrated in the study area. I found that many people 
have already started to question the possibility of another earthquake in the 
foreseeable future, hence the need to be careful about construction quality. 
During my fieldwork 200 households were asked through survey 
questionnaire to identify their future concerns. The result of this survey 
shows that earthquake hazard was not their main future worry; 74% of 
respondents said that income was their biggest concern followed by health 
(15%) and education (6%), only 1% mentioned landslide (which was a 
localised hazard) as their biggest future concern (Figure 7.5). These results 
show that day to day issues and problems are prioritised by the affected 
people rather than a future disaster, which has a strong probability of 
occurring again and which they had recently experienced.   
 
64 Figure 7.5 Future concerns of house owners in the study area. (Source: Author fieldwork) 
       
However, Leersum & Arora (2011) gave a different explanation. They found 
from their study of the reconstruction programme that the majority of the 
people in AJK were satisfied with the quality of post-earthquake 
reconstruction and the earthquake risk was no more the most important 
threat in their lives; they attributed it to the success of the reconstruction 
programme of the ERRA. My study partly agrees with this finding; data from 
200 households also found that 82% respondents thought that their new 
house was seismically safe (67% of them attributed this safety perception to 
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the fact that they had constructed their new house according to the ERRA 
guidelines).  
However, my point is that the safety perception of the house is one thing, 
whilst the risk perception of a hazard is another; people should be aware of 
the hazard irrespective of the safety of the structure. Success of a 
reconstruction programme should not make them oblivious to the potential 
hazard. Such reasoning is corroborated by the fact that many house owners 
and key informants admitted during semi-structured interviews that people 
have either not learnt any lesson from the earthquake or they have already 
started to forget the earthquake. If a society starts to forget such a horrific 
tragedy in less than a decade then how can it inculcate the culture of safety 
and DRR and sustain seismic resistant construction in the absence of a strict 
building control mechanism?   
In the light of the discussion above it can be concluded that although the 
post-2005 earthquake housing reconstruction programme successfully 
introduced and enforced seismic resistant construction techniques in rural 
areas, the sustainability of seismic resistant construction is a big issue in 
both rural and urban settings due to various reasons.  
7.4. Impact on the Vulnerability of the Built Environment  
Success of the post-disaster reconstruction should be judged in terms of its 
impact on vulnerability as well as the number of reconstructed houses. 
According to Clinton (2006) cited in Mannakkara (2014, p. 316) “a key test of 
a successful recovery effort is whether it leaves survivors less vulnerable to 
natural hazards” because disasters and ensuing reconstruction provide a 
window of opportunity to address pre-disaster vulnerabilities (Chapter 2). 
However, ensuring that pre-disaster vulnerabilities do not exacerbate is 
always a challenge (Da Silva 2010).   
In this section I discuss the impact of the housing reconstruction programme 
on the vulnerability of the housing stock in the study area and see to what 
extent the pre-earthquake vulnerability of the housing stock has been 
addressed as a result of this intervention. First I explore the quality of two 
different types of housing stock, one constructed in the reconstruction 
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programme and the other constructed post reconstruction programme, and 
then I determine the level of vulnerability of the total housing stock of the 
study area.  
7.4.1. Quality of the Reconstructed Housing Stock 
Technical evaluation of the structural strength of these houses is not within 
the scope of this study; I therefore rely on literature and non-technical data 
collected during my fieldwork to discuss its quality. The literature on the 
quality of the reconstructed houses in the study area is limited and divided. 
There is a body of literature (both grey and academic) which reports that the 
reconstructed houses were mostly built according to seismic resistant 
standards. For example, ERRA (2011) claims that 96% of the reconstructed 
houses were seismic and other hazard resistance compliant; the World Bank 
(2011) reports that 99% of houses were compliant with seismic resistance 
standards at plinth level and 94% were compliant at lintel level; ADB (2011), 
IDB (2014), and Leersum & Arora (2011) term the reconstructed houses 
mostly compliant with earthquake standards and seismically safe. There is 
another body of literature, for example Ejaz (2013) and Kazmi et al. (2012) 
which contest this version and point out shortcomings in the reconstructed 
housing stock. Kazmi et al. (2012) have identified flaws such as construction 
on steep slopes and cutting toes of hill slopes, poor construction designs, 
poor quality construction, and mixed construction which compromise the 
safety of the structures.  
My personal observation is that a big change has occurred in the 
construction typology in the study area; however the quality of construction is 
debatable in certain cases, especially in the case of urban areas (see section 
7.3). My data of 200 households show that kacha houses, most prevalent 
before the earthquake, have been almost eliminated (Figure 7.6).   
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65 Figure 7.6 Change in the housing typology of the study area.   (Source: author fieldwork data) 
 
The good thing is that the ratio of pukka (brick and concrete block) houses 
has increased and the ratio of pukka (stone) has decreased. These pukka 
(stone) houses were not seismically resistant. Another good thing is that the 
vernacular seismic resistant Dhajji-dewari type of construction has been 
revived and many people have expressed their satisfaction and acceptance 
for these houses during discussions with me. If these houses were 
constructed according to the ERRA guidelines, then pre-earthquake 
vulnerability should not be an issue anymore, however four issues need to 
be kept in mind with regard to the quality of the reconstructed housing stock. 
One is the quality of reconstructed houses in urban areas, two the 
repaired/retrofitted houses, three additions into reconstructed houses, and 
four violation of the Master Plan or illegal construction in hazardous places in 
urban areas. 
As discussed earlier, ensuring seismic resistant buildings in urban areas was 
the responsibility of the civic authorities (unlike AI Teams in rural areas) and 
the quality of reconstructed houses depended on the effective control of 
these authorities. Unlike rural areas, where house owners followed 
engineering designs by the ERRA, the house owners in urban areas needed 
the construction drawing (called Planning Permission in the UK) prepared 
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according to the AJK Building Regulations (2006) by a charted architect and 
get it agreed by the Development Authority and the Municipal Corporation. 
This was to ensure that the construction was carried out according to the 
Master Plan and that the building was seismically resistant.  
Until 2014 more than 5,500 houses were reconstructed in Muzaffarabad city 
out of more than 8,600 destroyed houses (SERRA 2014). When the 
Municipal Corporation Muzaffarabad was asked how many planning 
permissions were issued by them, it reported that only 591 planning 
permissions were issued. It means that either not more than 591 houses 
were reconstructed (which is obviously not correct) or around 5,000 (90%) 
houses were reconstructed without any planning permission (this seems 
more plausible). Similarly in the case of Bagh city 2,856 houses were 
destroyed and more than 2000 were reconstructed till 2014 (SERRA 2014), 
but only 1300 planning permissions have been issued by the Municipal 
Corporation Bagh (personal communication). Construction supervision was 
to be done by a consultant hired by the house owner. The consultant would 
issue a Completion Certificate to the owner on the basis of which the 
Municipal Corporation would issue the Occupancy Certificate, which 
declared that the building was fit for living. Both in the case of Bagh and 
Muzaffarabad cities not a single Completion Certificate and Occupancy 
Certificate were issued (personal communication). It means that there is no 
guarantee of compliance with building codes and safety standards in case of 
those thousands of houses which were constructed without planning 
permission. Incidentally these civic bodies do not even know the exact 
number of reconstructed houses.     
Repair or retrofitting of the damaged houses in the study area is a big issue 
for vulnerability. According to the SERRA data more than 34,000 houses 
were damaged. The government paid 75,000 rupees each for 
repair/retrofitting. Not enough has been done to ensure that repair or 
retrofitting was carried out in a proper manner. In rural areas, unlike the 
reconstruction of destroyed houses where the AI Teams visited at three 
different stages of construction to ensure compliance, the AI Teams did not 
visit the damaged houses. In the case of urban areas the civic bodies issued 
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planning permission for the construction of new houses, not for repair or 
retrofitting of damaged houses. According to a resident of the old part of 
Muzaffarabad city “Nobody checked the quality of retrofitting and repair; 
people were just given money and that’s all……….Superficial and cosmetic 
treatment has been done on these houses. 80% houses in the inner city are 
the same and 20% people have made new houses. These 80% houses have 
superficial treatment and God forbid if an earthquake hits again the situation 
would not be different than 2005. That’s what I think. This is a dangerous 
situation”. So the vulnerability of the repaired/retrofitted structures is a 
serious issue and nobody is sure about their safety.  
I visited many such houses during my fieldwork and witnessed the high risk 
in which the residents of these houses were living (Figure 7.7). The picture 
on the left is of a multi-storey house in Bagh which was severely damaged 
due to earthquake. The owner told me that he was doing the repair work 
according to his own understanding without hiring any engineer. The building 
on the right is a big pre-earthquake commercial building. It is obvious from 
the picture that there is no frame structure in it. The building is in precarious 
condition and danger to public but neither knocked down nor retrofitted.           
  
66 Figure 7.7 A damaged house in Bagh city which has been partially repaired and still 
inhabited by the owner and his family (left). A pre-earthquake multi storey commercial 
building in Bagh city, non-frame structure and cracked walls pose serious threat (right).                  
                                                                                                            (Source: Author fieldwork)     
 
Most of the pre-earthquake housing stock had been developed in an 
incremental manner and was one of the reasons for the vulnerability of the 
housing stock (Chapter 6). The same practice of addition to reconstructed 
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houses has already started in the study area. With the passage of time the 
needs of the people have increased and they need to extend their houses. 
The original housing designs of the ERRA for rural areas had the provision 
for further extension using the same material and design, but (as in the past) 
people are not following these instructions. The added structures do not fit 
with the original structures, are constructed with different material and are 
not necessarily built according to seismic standards (Figure 7.8). The 
reconstructed houses do not provide thermal insulation so people are adding 
kacha rooms with reconstructed houses, especially at high elevations (Figure 
7.9). Thus, whilst houses reconstructed with government money according to 
the ERRA specifications might be seismically safe, the structures added later 
on are not necessarily so.  
 
67 Figure 7.8 A poor quality structure (foreground) added with a reconstructed house 
(background) in Bagh city; notice different types of materials and irregular stones used in the 
added structure.                                                                              (Source: Author fieldwork)  
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68 Figure 7.9 Kutcha structures (yellow arrows) added with reconstructed pukka house in rural 
Muzaffarabad.                                                                                  (Source: Author fieldwork)     
 
Master Plans were formulated in urban areas of Muzaffarabad, Bagh, and 
Rawalakot after the earthquake to ensure reconstruction of strong urban 
structure against recurrent natural disasters (JICA 2007). The basic purpose 
of these master plans was to control unsafe and irregular construction and 
infrastructure development, especially in hazardous areas, to avoid damage 
in case of future disasters. Muzaffarabad city was divided into Urban 
Promotion Zone and Urban Preservation Zone. The 850 hectares Urban 
Promotion Zone is the area designated as suitable for future development. 
The land specified for this zone is safe from natural hazards such as 
landslides and floods. This area was found suitable for intensive urban 
development in the future. The Urban Preservation Zone area is 1150 
hectares (most of the area has been declared Red Zone) and is not suitable 
for future urbanization due to potential hazards and risks. According to the 
Land Use Plan and Master Plan, construction on Red Zone (Highly 
Hazardous Zone) Active Land Slides, Fault Lines (MBT & HFT) has been 
restricted (personal communication with DAM official).  
There were around 1500 houses on the MBT at the time of the 2005 
earthquake. Reconstruction of these houses only in the shape of light 
earthquake resistant structures was allowed along 500 meters of the fault 
line. But this restriction is being seriously violated and hundreds of heavy 
structures have been constructed in the Red Zone without the permission of 
the authorities (personal communication with MCM official). Unfortunately the 
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city authorities seem to be unable to control this illegal and dangerous 
practice. A mason in Muzaffarabad city told me that “construction rules are 
being violated in the Red Zone even. If people cannot do the construction 
during the daytime due to the fear of the authorities, they do it in the 
darkness of the night. I have constructed about 30% houses in the darkness 
of the night to avoid the authorities. Even Stay Orders from the Courts are 
violated during the night” (KI-29). Figure 7.10 is a picture of one such three 
storey heavy residential structure which has been constructed in the Red 
Zone by an important businessman of the city.  
 
69 Figure 7.10 A three storey heavy pukka house in Red Zone, where only a lightweight single 
storey structure should have been constructed.                             (Source: Author (fieldwork)  
 
The restriction of 500 meters is being flaunted as well and people are doing 
construction right on the fault line in the areas of Chelabandi, Nisar Camp, 
Gojra, Mohri, Bala Pir, Upper Chatter, Bandi Saman, and Maakrri etc. 
Hundreds of heavy structures have been built right on the fault lines. A 
former Chairman of Muzaffarabad Development Authority (who had also 
worked as Administrator of the Municipal Corporation Muzaffarabad) told me 
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that implementation of the Building Codes and Master Plan was very difficult 
due to political interference, “despite being a political worker myself I say that 
where there is a lot of politics in a small area, it is not possible at all to 
implement these things. It’s too difficult. According to the Microzonation plan, 
Bandi Samaan is a highly hazardous area and no one should live or build 
house there but due to the political pressure people are still living there. Too 
much politics is involved here which doesn’t accept all these rules and 
regulations” (Key Informant-17). The enforcement staff of the Municipal 
Corporation Muzaffarabad also admitted that political interference was one of 
the main reasons of non-implementation of Building Regulations and Master 
Plan (Key Informant-41, 42, 43).  
7.4.2. Quality of the Housing Stock Built Post-reconstruction 
Programme  
Unfortunately up-to-date figures of the total housing stock in the study area 
are still not available. There is no institution in AJK for the collection and 
updating of housing or census data, so we do not know how many houses 
have been constructed outside the housing reconstruction programme. In the 
absence of building control in rural areas, and weak enforcement in urban 
areas, the seismic safety of the housing stock is in doubt. All sorts of houses 
are being built in rural areas without any control by the authorities. The 
worrying thing is that pre-earthquake vulnerable kacha style construction, 
which was eliminated as a result of reconstruction programme, is coming up 
again in rural areas.  
In the case of urban areas, despite building regulations, the construction 
practices have not improved much and defective practices are being 
repeated. My findings during fieldwork are that the factors that contributed 
towards the vulnerability of the housing stock are still there to certain degree. 
According to Iqbal & Khan (2014) the population of Muzaffarabad city (and 
also of Bagh city) has increased many times due to the influx of settlers. ‘The 
population of Muzaffarabad has increased by more than 50,000 since the 
earthquake due to the influx from rural areas’ (Key Informant-41). This 
migration has contributed to the already high density of the building stock.  
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Apart from the quality of structures themselves, the Master Plans are being 
seriously violated in urban areas and there are slum like conditions due to 
the lack of civic amenities, which is a vulnerability issue in itself. According to 
the AJK Building Regulations 2006, construction is allowed up to 35ᴼ in the 
case of rocky and hard soil, and up 20ᴼ slope in the case of non-rocky soil in 
Urban Promotion Zone in Muzaffarabad city. This restriction is also being 
violated and hundreds of new houses have been constructed on slopes more 
than 65○ in Sangri Mera, Sathera, Tariqabad, Kheshker, and Bala Pir areas 
of Muzaffarabad city (personal communication with a Chief Engineer, 
Buildings). This is a potentially dangerous situation and might cause more 
damage than in the 2005 earthquake in case of a future earthquake (ibid). 
Figure 7.11 shows construction activity on steep slope in Muzaffarabad city.  
 
70 Figure 7.11 Construction on steep slopes in Muzaffarabad city; these houses have been 
built by cutting the hill. Almost half the house is on ground and half of stone pedestal or 
concrete pillars which seriously compromises the safety of the structure.                                
                                                                                                            (Source: Author fieldwork) 
Due to steep slope these structures are constructed partially on pillars and 
dry stone masonry pedestals and partially into excavated hillsides which 
compromises their structural strength as well as destabilising the slopes. 
There were hardly any structures here before the earthquake, but dozens of 
structures have been constructed since, and development continues 
unchecked. A Key Informant from Muzaffarabad city blamed the city 
authorities for this and said that according to rules nobody can purchase land 
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in Muzaffarabad city without the NOC (No Objection Certificate) of the 
Development Authority Muzaffarabad. He questioned why the Development 
Authority was issuing NOCs in case of hazardous land.   
Construction on encroached government land still continues after the 
earthquake. According to a high official of the Municipal Corporation 
Muzaffarabad, 3000-4000 houses have been constructed on encroached 
land in different parts of the city; all these structures were constructed 
without any planning permission and nobody knows about their construction 
quality and safety level (personal communication). A senior official of the 
Muzaffarabad Development Authority said that they did not have exact data 
of illegal houses, however their estimate was that about 7000/8000 
structures involving approximately 40,000 people have been constructed by 
those people who migrated into the city from rural areas after the 
earthquake. He frankly admitted “this new development is a disaster in the 
making. Fast and illegal development lacking basic civic amenities and 
infrastructure plus the possibility of massive damage in case of a future 
earthquake should be a point of concern for the authorities” (personal 
communication).  
This influx of population not only resulted in construction on steep slopes but 
also within watercourses. Hundreds of illegal structures have been built in 
different watercourses of Muzaffarabad city since the earthquake, especially 
in Gojra Nala, Gulshan Nala, Tariqabad Nala, and Saathera Nala. Again the 
city authorities do not have the exact data of these structures but they admit 
that a few hundred houses have been constructed illegally in different nullahs 
(Key Informant-35, 41, 42, 53). Hundreds of structures can be seen by a 
quick tour round these nullahs. The Google Earth images below (Figure 
7.12) clearly depict the level of construction in Gojra Nala since 2005. There 
were very few structures in this watercourse until the 2005 earthquake, but 
since then the number of these structures has increased enormously. These 
structures might be seismic resistant but they are prone to flood risk or 
liquefaction due to loose riverbed strata (Figure 7.13).  
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71 Figure 7.12 Construction in Gojra Nullah since 2005; black lines are roughly the boundary of 
the nullah. Huge amount of construction in the nullah is visible.       (Courtesy: Google Earth)   
 
The situation in Bagh city is also alarming. The population of Bagh city has 
almost doubled since the earthquake (65,000 in 2014 as compared to 35,000 
in 2005) due to migration from rural areas (Personal communication). 
According to the head of Bagh Development Authority, within one or two 
years after the earthquake about 2,000 houses were constructed in a 
haphazard manner without any permission by those people who came from 
rural areas. He said that there were no proper roads and streets or other 
civic amenities. Most of the people have encroached into two nullahs and are 
vulnerable to flooding (Key Informant-15 & 16). 
 
72 Figure 7.13 Construction in the Gojra Nullah; the yellow arrow shows the width of the nullah 
that has been taken over by illegal houses.                                     (Source: Author fieldwork) 
 
2005 
2014 
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Another point of concern is that the old parts of Muzaffarabad and Bagh 
cities are still as narrow and congested as they were before the earthquake; 
in fact they have become even more congested due to population increase. 
Much of the damage in 2005 earthquake in these cities was due to the high 
building density. The fallen buildings became a mountain of rubble making 
search and rescue difficult. Unfortunately a visit to these areas is enough to 
reveal that the situation might not be much different in case of a similar 
earthquake in future. A resident of a very congested part of Bagh city told me 
that the narrow streets were not widened because of the shortage of land 
and funds so “people had to construct their houses according to previous 
layout; thus their vulnerability still continues and in case of a future 
earthquake, the damage will be even greater. The situation is even worse 
than before 2005 because many new houses have been built due to the split 
of families” (BU-34).  
A Key Informant from Muzaffarabad city reported that the congestion in the 
old city area of Muzaffarabad, especially the Madina Market area had 
become worse than in 2005 and was a serious safety issue for future: “if any 
calamity hits it would be difficult to take out dead bodies because of narrow 
streets. There is no authority to check this. People are constructing big 
houses with expensive tiled bathrooms but don’t leave space for a street. 
There has been fire here three or four times but the fire engine couldn’t enter 
into these narrow streets” (Key Informant-18). The number of high rise 
commercial buildings has sky rocketed in the older parts of these cities after 
the earthquake because destruction of old buildings provided the owners the 
opportunity to construct even higher buildings (Figure 7.14). The safety of the 
houses in these areas is not only dependent on the quality of construction 
but of the neighbouring high-rise commercial buildings also. This concern 
was shared by many residents of these cities.   
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73Figure 7.14: Newly constructed multi-storey buildings in the congested old city area of 
Muzaffarabad. Notice narrow street and addition of new storeys on an old dilapidated 
building on the left.      (Source: Author fieldwork) 
 
Serious concerns arise about the vulnerability of the housing stock nine 
years after the earthquake. One doesn’t need much engineering knowledge 
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to notice that not all structures are fully safe. Kazmi et al. (2012) fear that due 
to construction flaws that they noticed during their research in the earthquake 
affected areas, any future seismic activity in these areas could be as 
devastating as the 2005 earthquake. A study conducted by the NDMA on 
Muzaffarabad City’s Earthquake Scenario has also calculated the same level 
of damage in case of a future earthquake scenario. According to this study 
14,240 buildings were surveyed in Muzaffarabad city. The study concluded 
that in the case of a future earthquake, 10% of buildings will collapse, 30% 
will suffer heavy damage, 44% will be moderately damaged and about 15% 
will suffer none to slight damage (Table 7.3) (NDMA 2009a). This study was 
conducted in 2009 and the housing stock has increased even more since 
then. In terms of number of deaths expected in this scenario, the death toll 
would be about 50% lesser than in 2005 earthquake.  
30 Table 7.3 Casualty estimation for Muzaffarabad city in case of future earthquake.     
                     (NDMA 2009a, p. 30)                                                                                                                                              
 
Time 
 
Morning 
 
Day 
 
Evening 
 
Night 
 
Total 
Population 
 
 
95,951 
 
86,002 
 
96,335 
 
104,969 
 
Injury 
 
 
10,961 
 
8,915 
 
11,079 
 
12,295 
 
Death 
 
 
2,361 
 
1,995 
 
2,394 
 
2,750 
 
I have discussed this issue with key informants and house owners during my 
fieldwork and they were asked how much damage they expected in case of 
an earthquake in the future. Most of them agreed that the vulnerability of the 
housing stock was still an issue; they were of the opinion that in case of a 
future earthquake of a similar magnitude there would be 30%-50% less 
damage than occurred in the 2005 earthquake. As observed by a resident of 
Muzaffarabad city (Key Informant-17) “if we have made certain things better 
in certain areas, we have created new vulnerabilities in certain other areas”. 
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7.5. Landslide Activity in the Study Area in 2014 
During my fieldwork in 2014 some landslide events happened in the study 
area which highlighted the vulnerability of the housing stock once again. 
These landslides started in different areas of Muzaffarabad and Bagh 
Districts in February/March 2014 after days of heavy rain and snow. Local 
newspapers repeatedly published news of damage to houses and the threat 
to populations in Naseerabad, Karrli in Chakar area, Lohar Gali in rural 
Muzaffarabad, Tariqabad area of Muzaffarabad city, and in some areas of 
Bagh Districts. I visited Maldrah village in Bagh District but could not identify 
a significant landslide hazard. I visited all four places in Muzaffarabad District 
also. In Naseerabad, two adjacent settlements of Nallan Katha and Mohalla 
Bajjar of Kanoor area were particularly at risk. This area is highly 
mountainous and very narrow. The two villages are located at the height of 
about 1500 meters ASL.  
Nallan Katha is located along two parallel mountains and has about 80 
houses. About 16 houses were under threat of rock fall from mountain top on 
the eastern side of the mountain. According to local residents and officials of 
administration in Naseerabad, this mountain was destabilised during the 
2005 earthquake and minor incidents of rock fall had occurred since then; 
however major rock fall activity started recently after heavy rains and snow. 
Since this area was close to the epicentre, almost all the houses were 
destroyed in the 2005 earthquake. These houses were replaced by seismic 
resistant pukka houses during the reconstruction programme. However 
kacha construction is reviving in this area again; kacha rooms have been 
added with almost every pukka house and there were even some fully kacha 
houses in this area as well. I visited one such kacha house which was 
damaged by debris about 1500-2000 meters above in the mountain (Figure 
7.15). According to the owner his house was destroyed in the 2005 
earthquake and he constructed a pukka house further up in the mountain, 
which he uses during summers. He has also constructed a kacha house 
here, which he uses in winters. He told me that the AI Team did advise them 
to construct their houses at a safer location but they had no choice because 
they had no land elsewhere.  
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74 Figure 7.15 Inspecting kacha house damage by a tree which rammed into the wall in village   
Nalla Katha. 
                                                                                                               (Source: Author fieldwork) 
 
Mohalla Bajjar is situated on the northern side of the same mountain on a 
relatively flatter piece of land. There are about 200 houses in this locality. 
According to residents, about 80 houses were at immediate risk. There were 
huge boulders scattered nearby, which people said had rolled down form the 
mountain top, but luckily they didn’t reach the houses. I met the Assistant 
Commissioner Naseerabad who reported that about 60 families might get 
relocated because of this risk. 
I visited Karli area in Chikar the next day. It is located at about 1600 meters 
ASL. The area is under significant landslide threat and is situated near Zilzal 
Lake (Hattian Bala Lake) which was formed by a massive landslide in the 
2005 earthquake (Dunning et al. 2007) which blocked the stream passing 
through the area. This area was severely damaged during the earthquake. 
Most of the houses were kacha which collapsed immediately. Seismically 
resistant pukka houses were constructed as a result of the housing 
reconstruction programme. Unfortunately about 200 houses were damaged 
again in the flood in 2010 from the Zilzal Lake failure. The water of the lake 
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receded and a further landslide was triggered. According to residents the 
government announced compensation of 400,000 rupees and alternate land 
for each damaged house but these promises never materialised. People 
constructed their houses again at this hazardous location with their own 
resources. It was for the third time in 2014 that about 350 houses were once 
again under threat due to landslide activity. About a dozen houses were 
damaged by debris flows and many more were directly in the line of land 
sliding (Figure 7.16).      
 
75 Figure 7.16 Landslide hazard in Karrli Muzaffarabad (within yellow lines showing the limits). 
Houses directly under the landslide can be seen.                            (Source: Author fieldwork)  
 
A few dozen families were already displaced and were living in nearby 
houses, which were also in danger. Local people were understandably too 
worried. A local said “Allah had given us five years; don’t know how much 
time we have”. The local administration reported that they had set up a relief 
camp and some families had shifted there whilst others had moved in with 
friends and families at safer places nearby (personal communication). 
The Lohar Gali area is about 10 KM west of Muzaffarabad city. A small 
locality of about 100 houses called Mughal Mohalla was facing danger due to 
landslide activity. This locality is situated along the ridge of the mountain. 
Residents of the area told me that the landslide hazard was generated 
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because of earth cutting about 500 m downslope for a major road about forty 
years ago. The road remains blocked frequently since then due to landslide 
and the Highways Department keeps cutting the mountain to keep the road 
clear. This landslide has become more active since the 2005 earthquake. 
Heavy rains in 2014 had worsened the situation even more and a major 
portion of the mountain had started to move, causing about 80 houses to 
develop cracks. I could see large cracks in the ground during my visit. I 
visited about 20 houses and 11 of them were in immediate danger of 
collapse (Figure 7.17). Many of these houses were reconstructed after the 
earthquake but they face further danger now.  
 
76 Figure 7.17 A house facing immediate collapse due to landslide in Lohar Gali area of 
Muzaffarabad District.                                                                    (Source: Author fieldwork) 
Tariqabad area in Muzaffarabad city was also facing landslide hazard. This 
area was one of the worst hit during the 2005 earthquake. Situated on steep 
slope, this locality has seen an unplanned and irregular development for 
mostly low income people who migrated to the city from rural areas during 
last forty years or so. Due to a lack of basic infrastructure and low incomes 
this is one of the most vulnerable areas of the city. Unfortunately unplanned 
construction has increased here after the earthquake. Hundreds of new 
houses have been constructed without any planning permission and this 
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practice continues unchecked. I have seen gradual increase in population in 
this area since 1991, but the development after the earthquake is not only 
unprecedented but alarming. There is a mix of housing stock in this area; 
pukka houses (both reconstructed and new), repaired houses, government 
provided pre-engineered structures, shelters, and damaged structures.  
A big landslide has developed in the middle of the locality. Although the civic 
authorities say that this landslide has developed due to illegal and unplanned 
construction over the years in the water course which block the flow of storm 
water, local residents claim that the main reason is road construction by the 
civic authorities (personal interviews). Dozens of houses are at risk due to 
this landslide. I visited the area and interviewed some residents who were 
under immediate threat of landslides. All of them said that the only cause of 
landslide was earth cutting for road construction. Figure 7.18 shows some of 
the houses. I interviewed a lady here whose house had slid down many 
yards and she was living in a tent pitched on the heap of debris. She told me 
that the road work by the development authority was the cause of this 
damage.   
 
77 Figure 7.18 Houses facing grave danger due to landslide. People are still living in these         
                        houses.                                                                         (Source: Author (fieldwork) 
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The above mentioned incidents highlight the fact that although seismic 
resistant houses have been constructed in the study area under the housing 
reconstruction programme, people of many places are still vulnerable to local 
hazards. Massive damage to housing stock in the case of a major 
earthquake in the future cannot be ruled out.  
7.6. Reworking of the Family and Landownership Patterns  
Improvement in the quality of housing stock in the earthquake affected areas 
was the direct impact of the housing reconstruction programme; however this 
programme had some indirect outcomes as well. Reworking of the traditional 
family system and land ownership pattern are two such impacts.   
7.6.1. Reworking of the Family System 
It was the policy of the Government of Pakistan at the start of the 
reconstruction programme to award one compensation package per 
damaged house irrespective of the number of families living in that house 
(called “aik chhat aik muawaza”, literally meaning one roof one 
compensation). Very soon the issue arose that in many cases more than one 
family lived in a house so it was unfair to give only one set of compensation 
to many families. In response the government changed the policy and 
decided to also give compensation to those people who could prove 
themselves to be a separate family living under one roof; however it was 
required that a separate house should be constructed with that money. 
According to the SERRA, about 70,000 additional houses were constructed 
at the completion of the housing reconstruction programme (personal 
communication). It is interesting to see to what extent the addition of these 
houses has impacted upon the traditional family system in these areas. 200 
house owners were asked what their family system was before and after the 
earthquake.  
Figure 7.19 shows that the family system was almost identical before the 
earthquake in rural and urban areas; nuclear family 74% rural, 73% urban 
and joint family system 26% rural and 27% urban. This composition is 
interesting because it is widely believed that joint family system is more 
prevalent in rural areas and nuclear family system is more prevalent in urban 
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areas. However, this composition has dramatically changed after the 
earthquake; the percentage of nuclear families has increased by 20% (from 
74% to 94%) in rural areas and has decreased by 4% (from 73% to 69%) in 
urban areas. The percentage of joint family system has decreased by 20% 
(from 26% to 6%) in rural areas and has increased by 4% (from 27% to 31%) 
in urban areas. 
 
78 Figure 7.19 Family system in the study area before and after the earthquake.                
Almost all the house owners whom I interviewed during my fieldwork agreed 
that the joint family system was broken to a great extent after the 
reconstruction programme, “Yes people have separated. My son was living 
with me before the earthquake but he got separate compensation and has 
made his own house now” (MR-35). The above graph was shown to different 
Key Informants, house owners, and focus group discussion participants 
during my second period of fieldwork.  
Almost all respondents agreed with the findings shown in Figure 7.19; 
however some respondents were of the opinion that the drop in the 
percentage of joint families in urban areas was not as big as shown. The 
respondents were asked what they thought was the reason for the increase 
in the percentage of joint families in urban areas. All respondents were of the 
opinion that limited land and high construction costs in urban areas were two 
of the main reasons. They told me that land was limited and too expensive in 
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urban areas and it was not possible for the already impacted families to buy 
land and build separate houses. The construction cost was also higher so 
people pooled the compensation money and built multi storey houses and 
continued living as joint families. Even those people who were living as a 
nuclear family before the earthquake and could not reconstruct their 
damaged house moved in with their extended families. I met a house owner 
in Bagh city who told me that he and his brother were living as a joint family 
before the earthquake, their house was destroyed in the earthquake and they 
moved in with their uncle. Now four families were living in a house where 
there used to be only one family before the earthquake:  “We got two 
compensations for partially damaged house whereas our house was fully 
damage……..we cannot construct a new house so we moved in our uncles’ 
home…….we are four families living here. Every brother has one room each” 
(BU-18).  
Another reason for this difference between rural and urban areas could be 
due to the difference between the implementation of housing reconstruction 
policy. AI Teams were responsible for the monitoring the housing 
reconstruction in rural areas and were supposed to visit every house to 
ensure construction (Chapters 2 and 5). So whoever received the 
compensation in rural areas had to construct the house as well. In urban 
areas the house owners were given a lump sum of money after getting an 
affidavit that they will construct their house according to seismic resistant 
codes after getting planning permission from relevant civic body. However, 
there was no system to check whether the house was actually constructed or 
not. I have already discussed that the percentage of reconstructed houses 
was far less in urban areas as compared to rural areas (Chapter 5).  
Results demonstrate that the family system prevalent in the study area at the 
time of the earthquake has been greatly impacted by the housing 
reconstruction programme; although split families have not moved to 
different areas, they live in the same compound but they now have separate 
houses and live as separate families. People have mixed views about this 
change, some think it is a positive change but some do not appreciate it and 
feel nostalgic. There are socio-economic implications of this change as well 
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which are not in the scope of this study. However, one major positive 
outcome of splitting of families is the safety of the residents. One of the major 
causes of high mortality rate was that too many people were living in single 
houses and when that house collapsed many people died. Now the housing 
units are smaller with fewer residents so causalities should be reduced in 
future. This was the intention of the government. Some house owners also 
pointed out this fact during semi-structured interviews. Some top ranking 
officials, who had remained associated with the housing reconstruction 
programme, were surprised to see these results, but were of the opinion that 
it was never the intention of the reconstruction programme to break the 
prevalent family system.              
7.6.2. Reworking of the Landownership Pattern 
Up-to-date land records, especially landownership records, are very 
important for any society. They can be effectively used for policy decisions 
and the implementation of these decisions, timely disposal of court cases, 
effective tax collection, and land reforms (Himachal 2015; Prakash & De' 
2007). Above all it assures a person’s right to their property (New England 
2015) so it saves people from disputes and unnecessary litigation and 
tensions.  
The landownership record in the earthquake affected areas has not been 
updated for decades before the earthquake (Key Informant-5).  Though 
households had divided property verbally amongst themselves, the land 
record had not been updated. Thus there were many cases where owners 
couldn’t sell their land on time because of legal issues (ibid). The issue of 
entitlement also emerged when the housing reconstruction programme was 
started after the earthquake of 2005. Affected people faced difficulties in 
getting Housing Cash Grants because they did not have written proof of 
landownership (ibid). People realized the importance of updating records and 
started getting land ownership transferred in their name in order to get 
compensation. The ERRA and other multilateral development agencies 
involved in the reconstruction work were aware of the importance of the 
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updating of the land records and encouraged it. The government also took 
special measures to facilitate the process.  
I have used data of ten years (2004-2013) of the hereditary land ownership 
transfer (called “Warasti Inteqal” or “Mutation” in technical language) of 
District Muzaffarabad and District Bagh to see if there was any change in the 
rate of land ownership transfer. These data were acquired from 
Commissioners of Muzaffarabad and Poonch Divisions. Figure 7.20 was 
generated with these data which shows an unprecedented increase in the 
number of Warasti Inteqal in Bagh and Muzaffarabad districts in 2006 when 
the housing reconstruction started.  
 
                 79 Figure 7.20 Number of hereditary landownership transfers in study area.  
                                                                           (Source: developed by the author based on official data) 
Deputy Commissioner of District Bagh (the person responsible for updating 
and keeping of the land record) agreed that there has been serge in 
hereditary mutations soon after the earthquake. According to Key Informant-
5 (high official of a multilateral development bank) who headed the 
reconstruction portfolio after the earthquake, it was a very positive 
development that the land record had been updated: “previously many 
people did not have property in their name but now they have. Now they 
realize that this is something that needs to be updated………… It will go a 
long way in future for other projects as well”. It will hopefully greatly reduce 
disputes in a society in which, according to a local axiom, there are three 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
M
u
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
Muzaffarabad
Bagh
244 
 
reasons of enmity; “zan, zar, aur zameen” (woman, wealth, and land) and 
empower families to utilize their property according to their wishes and 
needs.   
I also asked the households about landownership before and after the 
earthquake. Quantitative data of 200 households, collected through survey 
questionnaires from the field, also indicate changes in the landownership 
pattern at household level (Table 7.4).  
31 Table 7.4 Change in the landownership pattern at household level in study area. 
Type of Ownership Pre-earthquake Post-earthquake 
Not Owned 0.5% 0.5% 
Head of Family 47.0% 51.5% 
Wife 1.0% 2.5% 
Husband 16.5% 12.5% 
Father 33.0% 23.5% 
Mother 0.0% 0.5% 
Son 0.5% 4.5% 
Brother 0.0% 0.5% 
Daughter 0.0% 0.5% 
No Reply 0.0% 2.0% 
Missing 1.5% 1.5% 
       (Source: Author fieldwork)        
There is an increase in the percentage of land ownership by the Head of 
family (from 47% pre-earthquake to 51.5% post-earthquake) because the 
number of families has increased due to the increase in the number of 
nuclear families (Section 7.4.1). A positive change, though not too big in 
terms of figures, is that the ownership has increased in the case of women. 
In the case of wives it has increased from 1% to 2.5%, in case of daughters 
from 0% to 0.5% and in the case of mothers it has increased from 0% to 
0.5%. This could perhaps be due to the reason that the male head of the 
family died and the male child was a minor so the ownership went to the 
females. However, this is a positive change because before the 2005 
earthquake, there was no practice of giving women their share in the 
property although Islam makes it mandatory to give share of property to 
women also. 
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7.7. Summary 
This chapter was focused on the impact of the housing reconstruction 
programme in the study area after its completion in 2010. Three impacts 
were evaluated in this chapter. The first was the impact on the sustainability 
of the seismic resistant construction. It was found that the sustainability of 
the seismic resistant construction was an issue due to the lack of building 
control mechanisms in rural areas and weak building control in urban areas. 
People have started to either revert back to pre-earthquake construction 
practices or have modified the seismic resistant designs without any 
technical input from qualified engineers. UN-Habitat tried to convince the 
Government of AJK to institutionalise building control in rural areas. A 
proposal was submitted to the Government through the Local Government & 
Rural Development Department, but it could not get through due to unknown 
reasons.  
The second impact that was evaluated was on the vulnerability of the 
housing stock. Two types of housing stock were discussed in this section. 
One was the housing stock built during the reconstruction programme and 
the other was housing stock being added post-reconstruction programme. It 
was discussed that literature was divided on the quality of the reconstructed 
houses, the ERRA and other organizations reported that more than 96% 
reconstructed houses were seismically safe whereas some writers have 
pointed out flaws in these structures. These contesting claims could not be 
verified because technical evaluation of the structural strength of the 
reconstructed houses was not within the scope of this study; however based 
on the literature on the subject and the qualitative data collected during 
fieldwork it was found that since there was an official inspection and 
monitoring system to ensure the construction quality in rural areas the 
likelihood was that these houses were compliant with seismic standards, 
though local level hazards and addition of poor quality structures with them 
did pose challenge for these structures.  
Safety of the reconstructed houses was found to be a big issue in urban 
areas due to weak control by the city authorities. It was found that most of 
the houses in urban areas were constructed without any planning permission 
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and supervision. The city authorities were not sure about the exact number 
of reconstructed houses, or their quality. Safety of repaired houses and 
violation of the Master Plan in cities were also major concerns. In case of 
housing stock being added post-reconstruction programme, it was found that 
in rural areas the quality of these structures was highly doubtful due to the 
absence of building control mechanism;  in urban areas lack of enforcement 
of building regulations, construction in Red Zone, and construction on steep 
slopes and in watercourses have become major safety issues. It was also 
discussed that the landslide activity in different areas of Muzaffarabad district 
has raised concerns about safety of the housing stock. It was concluded that 
despite being a big wake-up call (in the shape of earthquake), technical 
knowledge (of the seismic hazard and safe construction techniques), good 
reconstruction experience, and capacity building (of the civic bodies) the 
vulnerability of the total housing stock was still a big issue in the study area 
even after the reconstruction programme ended.  
The third impact which was evaluated was the reworking of the family system 
and the landownership pattern. It was found that the pre-earthquake family 
pattern was differently impacted in rural / urban contexts. In case of rural 
areas the percentage of nuclear families had increased after the 
reconstruction; whereas in urban areas the percentage of joint families had 
increased and the number of nuclear families had decreased. As regards 
landownership pattern, some positive changes were noticed. It was found 
from the official data that pre-earthquake practice of not transferring 
hereditary ownership was markedly changed with the start of the housing 
reconstruction programme, in order to claim housing compensation. It was 
also found from the fieldwork data that the pattern of landownership within 
the family had also been impacted and those members of the household who 
previously did not own property rights were given ownership. The most 
positive change was that more women now owned property.   
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CHAPTER 8: SHARING THE FINDINGS WITH RESPONDENTS 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses my research findings and themes presented in the 
previous chapters. Several indicators have been used to examine the 
performance and impact of post-disaster housing reconstruction in the study 
area. Qualitative and quantitative data were collected and results were 
generated to evaluate the performance indicators. These findings were 
shared with most of the respondents (from whom I had collected data earlier) 
to obtain their feedback during my second period of fieldwork in January 
2015. This chapter builds mainly on this feedback, my personal experience 
and observations, and also upon literature related to this topic.  
Section 8.2 summarises the key findings of this study which were presented 
to respondents during fieldwork and then their feedback is discussed. 
Section 8.3 discusses the lessons learnt from the experience of housing 
reconstruction programme and recommendations for future disasters. In 
Section 8.4, I outline my opinion about the performance of the post-2005 
housing reconstruction programme vis-a-vis other disasters before and after 
the 2005 earthquake. 
8.2. Study Findings  
This section discusses how respondents of the second fieldwork viewed the 
study findings and how these findings map onto the housing reconstruction 
policy of the Government of Pakistan and the existing knowledge on the 
subject.  
8.2.1. Vulnerability and its Causes 
By deducing from Collins (2009) ‘disaster and development approach’ and 
Wisner et al. s’ (2004) PAR model, I have identified four types of vulnerability 
which were responsible for massive damage in AJK: geological vulnerability, 
physical vulnerability, environmental vulnerability, and socio-economic 
vulnerability (Chapter 5).  
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i. Geological Vulnerability 
As regards geological vulnerability, the study area is situated in a seismically 
active zone. There are many active faults in the study area and elsewhere in 
the region (See figure 1.1). This type of vulnerability is permanent and is 
expected to cause major fatal seismic events in the future (Bilham 2004 
2009; NDMA 2009). The Mw=8 earthquake on 26
th October 2015 in the Hindu 
Kush region in Afghanistan is a reminder of this stark reality.  
This study has found that despite suffering immense losses in the 2005 
earthquake, the pre-earthquake ignorance of seismic hazard in the study 
area has been replaced by a general attitude of obliviousness and fatalism 
on the part of the authorities and the people alike. Many respondents of my 
field surveys admitted that people have already forgotten the earthquake to a 
great extent and in another ten or twenty years it will completely fade from 
their memory. Many suggestions were put forward to the government after 
the earthquake to include the subject of disaster studies in the school and 
college curricula, but unfortunately nothing has been done even after a 
decade. This study highlights that the only way to deal with natural hazards 
is to know them, remember them, and be prepared for them; not fatalism and 
apathy towards them.  
ii. Physical Vulnerability 
This research found that poor quality construction was the main feature of 
physical vulnerability (Section 5.4.2). Unfortunately it has also been found 
that some of the main causes of physical vulnerability such as kacha 
construction, poor quality construction, lack of building control mechanism, 
and construction on marginal locations have not been addressed yet (see 
sections 7.3 & 7.4). Most of the respondents agreed with this finding and 
expressed their concern about this situation.  
iii. Environmental Vulnerability  
In the case of environmental vulnerability, by drawing from Collins (2009)  
Wisner et al. s’ (2004) PAR model, this study identified deforestation and 
excessive road construction activities as some of the main reasons for 
generating landslides which contributed towards damage to the housing 
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stock at local level (Section 5.4.3). Illegal cutting of trees still continues in the 
study area. Local newspapers regularly publish reports of deforestation at 
the hands of timber industry in collusion with the Forest Department. Road 
construction also continues, with renewed resolve of the government to 
invest more and more in this sector. Hundreds of kilometres of new roads are 
being planned every year. The impact of construction of so many roads on 
already destabilized mountains is not difficult to imagine. These findings 
were mostly agreed by the Key Informants and focus groups participants in 
their feedback.    
iv. Socio-economic Vulnerability 
The negative impact of disasters on livelihoods is well documented in the 
literature (see for example, Cannon 1994; Pomeroy et al. 2006; Twigg 2006). 
According to Cannon (1994, p. 27) the impacts of hazards may create ‘newly 
impoverished people’ who have lost their already meagre resources. My 
study found that poverty is one of the main reasons for poor quality 
construction and settlement on both steep slopes and marginal areas of land 
in the study area. In the ten years since the earthquake the financial 
condition of the people in the study area has not improved and the poverty 
related pre-earthquake construction patterns have intensified. My study also 
found that the livelihoods of the people have been negatively impacted by 
the earthquake and the financial condition of most of the surveyed 
households has deteriorated (See Figure 7.3.3.3.). Majority of the 
homeowners and key informants claimed that their financial condition has 
deteriorated after the earthquake, especially those people who were disabled 
due to earthquake injuries. I interviewed five such people who had lost their 
pre-earthquake livelihoods due to disability and were living in impoverished 
conditions. The official figures also suggest that the unemployment rate has 
risen from 6.5% per annum in AJK in 2005 (P&DD 2006), to 14.4% in 2014 
(P&DD 2014). However, some key informants (especially those working for 
the government) fervently contested the findings and claimed that the 
financial condition of the majority of the people has improved after the 
earthquake; though they don’t have official figures to prove this assertion.  
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Although poverty is not the only cause of disaster vulnerability, the 
importance of sufficient and reliable livelihood sources in reducing 
vulnerability cannot be underestimated. Restoration of livelihoods in post-
disaster recovery becomes even more important because most of the people 
have their livelihoods impacted, lose their savings or spend them on other 
needs and hence find it difficult to restore livelihoods without government 
help. Middleton & O’ Keefe (1997) have also highlighted the importance of 
the restoration of peoples’ livelihoods through disaster relief. Schilderman & 
Lyons (2011) observed that the reduction of people's vulnerabilities requires 
more than just better housing; rebuilding of people's livelihoods, restoration 
of local markets and social networks and involvement in decision making are 
important factors in addressing vulnerability. In the case of the study area, 
the ERRA did provide some livelihood support after the earthquake through 
Livelihood Cash Grants for the poor, provision of seeds and farm animals to 
farmers and cash-for-work activities (ADB 2006; ERRA 2011b; Heltberg 
2007) in certain areas. However, these initiatives were for a limited time and 
had limited beneficiary coverage. Twigg (2006, p. 5) also observed similar 
steps in disaster situations elsewhere and found that livelihoods support in 
disaster response is ‘largely confined to support for agriculture and food 
security – for example, distribution of cash, seeds and tools as part of 
agricultural support packages – or to providing short-term assistance through 
food-for-work and cash-for-work projects’ and meet limited and immediate 
needs of the people rather than ‘replenishing livelihood assets in general’.  
In the case of the study area, the Government of AJK should have taken 
steps to further improve upon the initiatives of the ERRA and should have 
continued them once the reconstruction was over. Though many 
respondents agreed with my findings, many people in the study area argued 
that billions of rupees were pumped into the local economy during the early 
recovery and reconstruction phases and this money must have provided 
immense earning opportunities for local people and hence improved their 
financial conditions. Davis (2010a) has also found that the owner-driven 
reconstruction has benefited people in livelihoods development in the study 
area. Evidence of this is however lacking.  
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My experience is that the affected people couldn’t benefit from these 
opportunities for two reasons. The first reason is that soon after the 
earthquake people were focused on immediate response; they had lost their 
loved ones, they had to look after the injured, their homes and livelihoods 
were destroyed, and they were traumatised. They neither had the financial 
resources nor the time and emotional stability to benefit from earning 
opportunities; they found it easier to get relief goods and aid instead. This 
gap was filled by outsiders; business opportunities were availed by people 
from the Punjab and NWFP provinces and employment opportunities in relief 
activities were mostly taken over by people from the NWFP province, which 
already had experience of working in Afghan refugee camps since the 
1980s.  
The second reason is that during the reconstruction phase most of the 
people remained focused on the reconstruction of their homes, such that 
they could not benefit from employment opportunities provided by widely 
available in wider reconstruction work. Cuny (1983) also observes that 
peoples’ livelihoods are disrupted during disasters because they have to 
leave their jobs and get involved in disaster-related activities. In the case of 
study area the reconstruction jobs were again filled by outside labour, 
contractors, and professionals; though some local businessmen and 
educated people did benefit from some opportunities. However, a 
widespread and sustained benefit of these opportunities to the local 
population is unlikely in my opinion. I agree with Pomeroy et al. (2006, p. 
792) that livelihood rehabilitation should not mean giving people jobs only; it 
should address ‘fundamental social, economic and environmental reforms 
that affect… communities and livelihoods’. 
Analysis of results in this study suggests that the relationship between 
development and vulnerability is evident in the case of the study area. The 
development policies of the Government of AJK also contributed towards 
creating the above mentioned vulnerabilities (see Section 5.5). Qurentelli 
(2003) highlights the importance of commitment on the part of policy makers 
to give disaster planning top priority in their agendas. Collins (2009, p. 22) 
also suggests that all ‘the stages of the disaster management cycle require 
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sustainable development solutions if disaster risk is to be reduced.’ In the 
study area the pre-earthquake lack of disaster mitigation measures has not 
improved significantly and hardly any investment has been made; for 
example, there is no provision for the State Disaster Management Agency in 
the AJK budget. According to El Masri & Tipple (2002, p. 162) two lessons 
are important for effective disaster mitigation: the first is that disasters must 
be seen as ‘unresolved development problems’ or ‘failures in development’ 
so disaster mitigation should ‘address the ongoing socioeconomic processes 
which marginalize people and increase their vulnerability’. The second 
lesson is that apart from technological solutions, disaster mitigation should 
be based on a wide range of measures including ‘engineering devices, land 
management, social regulation and economic improvements’ (ibid). 
Qurentelli (2003) also suggests that disaster mitigation should be made part 
of development planning.  
My study also argues that there is a relationship between development and 
disaster vulnerability and the development policies should aim at addressing 
vulnerability. Development is a holistic term which encompasses sustainable 
and equitable economic development (or in McEntire et al.’s 2002, p. 271 
words "invulnerable development"), sustainable infrastructure development, 
social protection, disaster mitigation and good governance (Avellaneda 
2009). While discussing the relationship between development and disaster 
vulnerability Collins (2009) has also highlighted the importance of 
sustainable development which gives priority to disaster mitigation because 
‘development may be both part of prevention and also part of response’ in a 
society (ibid, p. 27). The importance of sustainable and responsible 
development, which in the terms of Collins (2009, p. 28) is the ‘right type of 
development’ cannot be underestimated because this type of development 
‘in the pre disaster stages can prevent as disaster…………..Appropriate 
development can provide the means to avoid disasters, mitigate their impact 
or aid in sustainable recovery once one has occurred’ (ibid).  
This study found that the pre-earthquake development policies, which led to 
disaster vulnerability (i.e. heavily skewed towards building roads, 
environmentally unsustainable and lacking in livelihoods improvement and 
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diversification) still continue in AJK. For example, the throw-forward in AJK in 
2014-15 budget in the roads sector is 30,726 million rupees (equivalent to 
the 6 year budget of the roads sector) which reflects overwhelming 
concentration on infrastructure development, perhaps at the cost of other 
important issues such as livelihoods and disaster mitigation. This observation 
was shared with some key policy makers during my second fieldwork and 
they endorsed my concerns.   
A lack of transparency discourages accountability of the policy makers and 
also promotes corruption in governance structures (Ahrens & Rudolph 2006) 
resulting in bad governance. Bad governance not only negatively impacts 
institutions, it ‘predisposes to increased impacts of disasters or can directly 
cause a disaster, such as when building regulations are not in place, 
investments are not made in preparedness for emergencies or where aid and 
relief are corrupted’ (Collins 2009, p. 8).  The governance has been weak in 
AJK which resulted in ineffective building control in urban areas and also 
impacted the development practices of successive governments (see 
Section 5.5). Unfortunately inefficiency, corruption, political interference, and 
weak governance have increased after the 2005 earthquake (I do not have 
empirical evidence but I base this assessment as being part of the 
governance system myself; this issue had been a topic of passionate 
discussions during my two periods of fieldwork and most of the people I met 
shared their concerns).  Figure 8.1 shows a “Good Governance March” in 
Muzaffarabad by those government employees who feel frustrated and 
marginalized due to corruption and poor governance. The banner displays 
three main points: Merit, Justice, and the Rule of law.      
The job of the ERRA was to restore the earthquake damages only, but the 
governments in AJK should have made structural changes in the governance 
system to address those socio-economic and structural issues which caused 
disaster vulnerability in the first place. Until this is done, people will remain 
vulnerable to future disasters despite undertaking a huge reconstruction and 
rehabilitation programme. According to Pomeroy et al. (2006, p. 792) 
rehabilitation must ‘seek to address the root causes of vulnerability’. Cannon 
(1994, p. 13) also highlights the importance of considering the ‘social and 
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economic systems that both generate vulnerability and determine the type of 
interventions’ in rehabilitation and disaster mitigation activities. 
 
80 Figure 8.1 Good Governance March in Muzaffarabad by Azad Jammu & Kashmir Gazetted 
Officers Association on 2nd June, 2015.                             (Source: The Daily Mahasib 2015) 
 
v. Disaster as a Window of Opportunity 
It has been discussed in this study that although environmental disasters 
cause death and destruction, they have a positive side as well and provide a 
window of opportunity to undo past mistakes and address disaster 
vulnerability through better reconstruction (see Section 3.6).  
This study found that the Government of Pakistan did take the 2005 Kashmir 
as a window of opportunity and decided to ‘convert the adversity into an 
opportunity’ and rebuild the lives of the affected people (ERRA 2012). The 
whole post-earthquake reconstruction and rehabilitation programme revolves 
around the theme of ‘Build Back Better’ (ADB 2010; ERRA 2012; IDB 2014). 
The owner-driven housing reconstruction component of the reconstruction 
programme attempted to make full use of the opportunity provided by the 
earthquake. More than 86% of the housing stock in the study area was 
damaged (Chapter 5) and efforts have been made in the housing 
reconstruction programme to address some of the causes.  
Almost all poor quality and kacha housing in the rural areas (which make up 
88% of the study area) has been replaced by good quality seismic resistant 
housing (ADB 2012; ERRA 2011a; Leersum & Arora 2011). Affected 
homeowners and artisans were given training in seismic resistant 
construction and they practised these skills in the construction of their homes 
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(Davis 2010a). The pre-earthquake ignorance of seismic hazard has been 
addressed through extensive public awareness campaigns by the ERRA. In 
the case of urban areas, seismic hazard micro zonation was undertaken for 
the first time in the history of the study area to make people and authorities 
aware of the danger at the micro level. Hazard sensitive master planning of 
the urban areas was done and seismic resistant building codes were 
introduced for the first time. However, enforcement and sustainability of 
these initiatives remains an issue. Based upon my experience of working in 
the study area for more than two decades, I can say that the post-2005 
housing reconstruction programme has utilized the opportunity in a far better 
way to improve things as compared to the past or later disasters in the 
country. This viewpoint was agreed by almost all respondents during my 
second fieldwork.  
8.2.2. Progress of the Housing Reconstruction Programme 
My research found that the ERRA reports and most of the other literature 
(mostly grey literature) report the progress of the post-2005 earthquake 
housing reconstruction programme in geographical terms only i.e. the total 
number of reconstructed houses in the earthquake affected areas. These 
figures do not show the whole picture of the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
status. In contrast I have evaluated the performance of this programme in 
three contexts: geography (rural and urban), economics (across different 
income groups), and social (female-headed households) to evaluate 
progress in a more comprehensive manner.  
i. Geographical Context 
This study finds that overall 78.5% houses have been reconstructed, not 
96% as claimed by the ERRA. I note though that if this figure is for rural 
areas only then there is not much difference between the findings of my 
study and the official figures. The fieldwork survey results showed that rural 
areas have seen more successful housing reconstruction progress than 
urban areas; 94% of respondents have reconstructed their houses in rural 
areas while only 63% of respondents have been able to reconstruct their 
houses in urban areas (Figure 6.3).  
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This finding was presented before three focus groups held in the study area 
during the second leg of my fieldwork. All participants of focus group in Bagh 
agreed with the progress depicted in the graph (Figure 6.3). In the case of 
the focus group in rural Muzaffarabad one participant agreed with the graph, 
whereas four participants did not agree and were of the opinion that the 
progress in case of rural areas was not more than 90% (as opposed to 94% 
shown in the graph).  
In the case of the focus group in urban Muzaffarabad, five participants 
agreed with the progress figures, one participant was of the opinion that the 
overall progress and rural areas’ progress should be higher, and another was 
of the opinion that progress in the case of urban areas should be higher than 
shown in the graph. All these respondents also agreed with the finding that 
the conditional cash grant, assistance and inspection regime, and the focus 
of the NGOs are the major contributing factors of better progress in rural 
areas; whereas higher construction cost, lengthy master planning process, 
transitional housing, and limited land are the main reasons behind slow 
progress in urban areas. A former Director General of the SERRA said 
“master plans, limited land, and cost of construction are three major factors 
that impacted the progress in the urban context but, in my opinion, the cost 
was the major factor” (Personal communication). A former Deputy Chairman 
ERRA also agreed with this finding (ibid).  
Literature on this subject also corroborates my findings. For example, 
Mumtaz et al. (2008, p. 82) observed that the owner-driven approach 
adopted in the case of post-2005 earthquake in Pakistan has ‘expedited the 
construction pace’ in rural areas but the ‘same could not be the case in urban 
reconstruction due to different socio-economic regime, legislative system, 
land and planning issues’. Qazi (2008, p. 132) noted a ‘rural bias’ amongst 
the humanitarian community and lack of progress in urban areas resulting in 
frustration among the affected people of urban areas. Stephenson (2008) 
also observed that the urban residents did not have the level of help and 
support which was available to the rural people. A former Deputy Chairman 
ERRA admitted that due to the sheer number of damaged houses in rural 
areas his focus was more in these locations; ‘our rural housing was managed 
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far better than our urban housing, the management was better in rural areas 
that’s why there was better progress in rural areas’ (Personal 
communication). An official of a multilateral funder of the housing 
reconstruction programme also agreed that ‘the design of the [housing 
reconstruction] programme was driven by the rural areas because they were 
the majority and they were massively hit’ (ibid).  
ii. Economic Context 
Since the government had given a uniform housing cash grant package to all 
house owners (which it claims was sufficient to construct a core house of 400 
ft2) it was expected that the progress of the housing reconstruction should be 
uniform across all income groups. However, my study found that the 
progress of the housing reconstruction was impacted by the financial status 
of the household with different income groups showing different levels of 
progress of housing reconstruction; progress of construction has a positive 
correlation with financial status of the household (See Figure 6.5).  
This finding was presented to three focus groups, eight key informants, and 
one house owner for their feedback. All the participants of the focus groups, 
one house owner, and five key informants agreed with the finding. A 
participant of a focus group in rural Muzaffarabad (who had worked for the 
UN-HABITAT in the study area) said that the reason for low progress in the 
case of very poor category was the changes in policies of the ERRA; for 
example initially only frame structures were allowed but later Dhajji-dewari 
was also permitted. He said that at certain places he had seen three different 
types of plinths for one house; this not only confused the house owners but 
increased the cost of construction also. Another participant noted that he did 
get the housing grant but couldn’t complete his house because he has six 
children and has a lot of other needs to spend the money on.  
Key informant-1, who is a former Deputy Chairman of the ERRA, gave 
similar reasoning and said that the poor had other needs as well as housing 
so they “may have spent the money elsewhere”. Key informant-2 (a former 
Programme Manager Housing of the ERRA) tried to explain this issue in 
great detail and said that it was not that the very poor were totally ignored; 
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the ERRA started the Livelihood Cash Grant programme and other income 
generation programmes for the poor. He tried to justify the amount of 
housing cash grant, “this amount of 175,000 rupees was never meant to and 
never supposed to meet the whole cost, it was never meant to. It was a 
support, it was a subsidy”. He said that it was possible that the ‘Very Poor’ 
income group had used the Livelihood Cash Grant and some money from 
other sources to reconstruct their houses but the remaining people were so 
poor that they couldn’t do it. He admitted that these results/findings highlight 
that “some other targeted interventions should have been made within this 
programme, probably after running the programme for two or three years. 
Probably we should have given them something more after 175,000 rupees”.  
Key Informant-30, who had worked in the housing reconstruction 
programme, was of the opinion that there should be a difference in the 
progress between rural and urban settings within the income groups as well; 
the progress should be better in ‘Very Poor’ and ‘Poor’ categories in rural 
areas because it was conditional cash grant and people had no choice but to 
construct the house if they wanted government money. 
This study also found that the amount of additional money spent by the 
homeowners from their own resources on the reconstruction of their house 
was exceptionally high in some cases (See Table 6.10). I had no explanation 
for this finding so discussed it with respondents during my second fieldwork. 
Almost all the participants of the focus groups observed that such a high 
amount was quoted by the house owners with the hope that they might get 
some more money in this way. Most of the key informants gave similar 
explanation; ‘the reason of very high figure of maximum additional money 
spent on the reconstruction of house could be that they hoped that they will 
get something’ (Key informant-7).  
The impact of financial status of the household on post-disaster housing 
reconstruction in case of the ODR approach has not been discussed in 
existing literature.  
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iii. Social Context 
There is a wide consensus that disasters impact genders differently, hence 
their recovery is also affected (See, for example, Begum 1993; Cannon 
2002; Delaney & Shrader 2000; Enarson 1999 & 2001; Enarson & Morrow 
1998a, 1998b; Fothergill 1996; Hanan 2002; Hines 2007; Khondker 1996; 
Neumayer & Plümper 2007; Sapir 1992; Thurairajah 2011; Wiest et al. 
1992). However, not much is known about gender and reconstruction 
(Fothergill 1996) and this is particularly true for my study area. Due to the 
patriarchal family system and the particular socio-cultural makeup of the 
society that does not encourage women in Pakistan to take part in out-of-the-
home activities, I expected lower housing reconstruction rates in female-
headed households. Delaney & Shrader (2000, p. 14) have pointed out a 
similar situation elsewhere stating that ‘cultural vulnerabilities such as 
women's restricted mobility and cultural taboos that prohibit women from 
engaging in certain activities, such as house construction’. Interestingly, the 
results of my field survey showed that female-headed households have 
shown better reconstruction progress in the study area compared to male-
head households (see Figure 6.6).  
This finding was presented to three focus groups and eight key informants. 
Participants of all focus groups agreed with the finding and put forward four 
possible reasons for the better progress. One reason is psychological. The 
house provides protection and privacy to single women so they preferred to 
complete their houses first. Enarson & Fordham (2001, no pagination) are of 
the view that safe shelter is vital for women because ‘much of their daily life 
revolves around the household’. The second reason is the social support 
system; people help women and widows in this society so women were able 
to complete the construction of their houses. The third reason is that NGOs 
particularly helped widows and single women in the construction of their 
houses. The fourth reason is that the women are perhaps generally more 
responsible than men: A female participant of the focus group Bagh said that 
women were more responsible and everybody supported the widows in the 
construction of their houses and that’s why the reconstruction progress was 
better in case of female-headed households. A male participant of the same 
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focus group said that men spent their money mostly on income generation 
activities, especially on buying taxis; whereas women spent their money on 
housing reconstruction due to their psychological and social need because 
they felt insecure without a house.  
Delaney & Shrader (2000) noticed that in the post-disaster rehabilitation 
phase men tend to focus more on productive activity and income generation. 
Some participants commented that some men spent the money on a second 
marriage, whereas women spent it on construction of their house. Seven key 
informants agreed with the findings and the reasons mentioned above. Key 
informant-1 (a former Deputy Chairman of ERRA) agreed with the findings 
and said that the participation of women in VRCs ‘allowed female 
participation at grassroots level in a very inclusive manner. They were more 
worried and pushed that their house should be constructed. And they 
became agent of change as far as housing is concerned in 
Kashmir……………. Sense of responsibility in women is far better than men’. 
He said that another reason of better performance of female-headed 
households was that as a policy the ERRA had asked the NGOs to help the 
vulnerable, especially the women who didn’t have able bodied men in their 
home. He said that there was better handholding of female-headed 
households as compared to male-headed households.  
Key informant-2 (a former Programme Manager Housing in the ERRA) 
agreed with the finding and said that there was a preferential treatment for 
female-headed households in the housing reconstruction programme of the 
ERRA. He said that programme and non-programme factors contributed 
towards better performance of female-headed households. Declaring FHHs a 
vulnerable group, construction of model houses for them, priority in 
inspection, and female-specific housing construction training sessions are 
the programme factors; whereas psychological and social reasons are the 
non-programme factors.  
Key informant-5, who headed the post-2005 earthquake reconstruction 
programme in a bilateral funding agency, said that compared to men he had 
found the women in AJK to be more engaging and proactive in housing 
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reconstruction. His finding was that 80% of the men who were given training 
in post-earthquake housing reconstruction did not construct houses 
themselves because of hard labour; whereas many women were found 
laying bricks and doing hard physical labour. A Key informant, who works in 
social protection, was surprised to see the findings because in his opinion 
men were supposed to be more resourceful and responsible in a male 
dominated society, so the progress of the male-headed households should 
have been higher than the female-headed households.   
Mumtaz et al. (2008, p. 81) found the women of the study area ‘more 
dedicated, responsible and sensitive to achieving quality construction’ and 
‘committed to see what they had learned was implemented in their houses’. 
However, Fothergill (1996) noted that female-headed households suffer 
more in the reconstruction phase; as happened in case of Hurricane Andrew 
in the US where the majority of women were without proper housing even 
two years after the event. Similarly, Delaney & Shrader (2000) also observed 
that female-headed households, among other marginalized groups, face 
greater challenges in implementing the post-disaster housing reconstruction 
projects.  
8.2.3. Impact of the Housing Reconstruction Programme  
Apart from evaluation of the physical progress of the post-2005 earthquake 
housing reconstruction programme this study also evaluated the impact of 
the programme after completion. Three aspects have been evaluated in this 
study; sustainability of the seismic resistant construction in the study area, 
impact on disaster vulnerability, and reworking of the family and 
landownership patterns.  
i. Sustainability of Seismic Resistant Construction 
The issue of the sustainability of seismic resistant construction is very 
important in the study area due to high seismic hazard and prevailing status 
of vulnerability. Adopting seismic resistant construction culture addresses the 
vulnerability of the building stock to a greater extent. It has been reported by 
many that the reconstructed housing stock is safe from future seismic activity 
(see for example, ADB 2010, 2011; 2012; DFID 2011; ERRA 2009, 2010; 
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2012; Leersum & Arora 2011; Malik 2011; Mumtaz et al. 2008; Qasim et al. 
2010; Qazi 2008; Schilderman & Lyons 2011; Stephenson 2008; UN-Habitat 
2009, 2011; World Bank 2010, 2011). This notion is generally believed by the 
people of the study area as well (personal communication).  
The aim of the housing reconstruction programme was to rebuild the 
earthquake damaged houses in accordance with seismic resistant 
techniques through ‘rebuilding with familiar methods & easily accessible 
materials – ensuring sustainability and cultural preferences in design’ (ERRA 
2006, p. 4). Technical expertise of the international community, international 
financing, institutional support of the Pakistan Army and effective monitoring 
by the reconstruction authorities contributed towards achieving this aim. 
However the real challenge is to sustain it without this support.  
This study found that sustainability was an issue in the study area because 
of the absence of a building control mechanism in rural areas and weak 
enforcement in urban areas. It has been found that in most cases people 
have reverted back to pre-2005 earthquake construction practices once the 
government’s reconstruction programme was over.  
Sustainability of new construction techniques is an issue in other developing 
countries also. For example, Jigyasu (2002) also found sustainability issues 
in the case of post-disaster reconstruction in earthquakes of Marathwada in 
1993 and Gujarat in 2001.  
I presented my findings on sustainability of seismic resistant construction to 
different respondents during my second fieldwork. Participants of all focus 
groups and almost all key informants agreed with the findings and showed 
their concern over the sustainability issue. A focus group participant from 
rural Muzaffarabad said that although people still have seismic resistant 
construction drawings (which were provided by the ERRA and the Army 
during reconstruction phase), they usually do not follow these designs and 
try to cut costs by using less steel and poor quality construction materials. He 
was of the opinion that poverty was not the reason for cutting cost because 
people spend so much money on ‘showiness’ in their houses.  
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Key informant-5, who works for one of the main funders of the housing 
reconstruction programme, while agreeing with my findings he didn’t believe 
that seismic resistant construction can be achieved without a control 
mechanism just through awareness. He was of the opinion that a high level 
of awareness after the reconstruction programme should have been 
sustained through efficient and reliable building control mechanisms. He 
believes that one reason of low disaster risk financing (insurance) in Pakistan 
is the poor quality of construction; no insurance firm wants to take on these 
risks. Key informant-21, who has a long political and administrative 
experience in the study area, observed that the local housing bodies were 
very weak in the country and proposed that these institutions should be 
strengthened and made responsible for overseeing the construction of 
houses in the rural areas. He agreed that the ERRA seismic guidelines were 
not properly followed any longer. A former Deputy Chairman of the ERRA 
agreed that seismic resistant construction was not sustainable in the 
earthquake affected areas without a strong building control mechanism.  
The literature on this issue is limited in the study area and mostly does not 
identify sustainability as a problem. For example, an Asian Development 
Bank report (ADB 2011, p. 11) observes that the achievements of ERRA’s 
rural housing programme are ‘very likely to be sustainable’. The study used 
three criteria to determine sustainability: diversity of seismic resistant designs 
to fit to the needs of the people; capacity of the stakeholders to apply these 
designs; and the level of adoption: The ERRA rural housing programme 
fulfils these criteria to a greater extent. Another study (ADB 2012) reports 
that about 77% of houses constructed with peoples’ own money were 
compliant with seismic standards. Mumtaz et al. (2008) also found that the 
seismic resistant construction is sustainable in rural areas. Leersum & Arora 
(2011) observed that the practice of SRTs is likely to sustain in the future as 
well. The DFID Project Completion Review (2011) is silent on the issue of 
sustainability.  
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ii. Impact on the Vulnerability in the Study Area 
There are two aspects to vulnerability; one is the vulnerability of the housing 
stock post-reconstruction programme and the other is the overall vulnerability 
of the people in the study area to future disasters.  
As regards the status of vulnerability of the housing stock, my research found 
that there was no valid reason to question the seismic safety of the houses 
constructed under the supervision of the ERRA in rural areas. However, the 
rest of the housing stock i.e. houses reconstructed and repaired in the urban 
areas without the supervision of the ERRA and the housing stock added in 
the study area (both urban and rural) post-reconstruction period, may have 
serious quality issues. As Bilham & Gaur (2013) observed that deaths from 
future earthquakes can be reduced greatly, without any additional scientific 
input, by enforcing construction codes. The relationship between settlements 
on hazardous locations, negligence and corruption of civic authorities and 
disaster losses has been discussed by many (see for example, Ambraseys & 
Bilham 2011; Bilham 2008, 2012; El Masri & Tipple 2002).  
My research also found that the absence of building control mechanism in 
rural areas and weak enforcement of building codes in urban areas are the 
main reasons for poor quality construction apart from an attitude of apathy 
and carelessness on the part of house owners. The result is an extremely 
dangerous situation where most of the housing stock is almost as vulnerable 
to seismic activity as it was at the time of the 2005 earthquake; but with an 
added false sense of safety (of the buildings) amongst the authorities and 
people. This study found that unauthorised and illegal construction onto 
vulnerable sites is adding to the future disaster vulnerability in Muzaffarabad 
and Bagh cities.  
Most of the respondents of the focus groups and key informants agreed with 
this finding. Key Informant-35, a high-ranking official in the Development 
Authority Muzaffarabad, informed that there was no survey of the illegal 
construction in the city after the earthquake but his guess was that about 
7000-8000 structures involving approximately 40,000 people have been 
constructed by people who migrated into the city from rural areas after the 
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earthquake. These new structures are not only constructed on vulnerable 
locations but their quality of construction is also unknown. He termed this 
situation as ‘a disaster in the making’. The flash floods in 2014 caused much 
damage to these structures. The Chairman of National Disaster Management 
Authority of Pakistan (NDMA) also noted that ‘encroachments, poor town 
planning… and the civic bodies’ negligence’ were responsible for this 
damage (The Express Tribune 2014).  
As far as disaster vulnerability of the people in the study area is concerned, 
my research identified certain reasons for vulnerability (Section 5.4 & 5.5). 
Relying mainly on Collins (2009) ‘disaster and development’ approach and 
Wisner et al. s’ (2004) PAR model, I have tried to explain how disaster 
vulnerability progressed in the study area. My research has also found that, 
unfortunately, not much has been learnt from the previous disaster; most of 
the past practices, which led to disaster vulnerability, still continue. Collins’ 
(2009) cycle of relationship between poverty and disaster vulnerability, which 
explains how the cycle perpetuates itself and vulnerable people continue to 
remain vulnerable at different levels, is greatly relevant here (Figure??????). 
As mentioned above, most of the construction in urban areas is being done 
without planning permission. This illegal construction is developing illegal 
settlements lacking basic civic amenities such as electricity, clean drinking 
water, sewerage system, and road infrastructure. Most of the houses that I 
visited during my fieldwork were situated on steep slopes and had no road 
access; I had to climb down steep slopes with great difficulty making me 
wonder what will happen in the case of a future major earthquake. These 
houses did not have the facility of clean drinking water or sewerage systems.  
Some sensible people working in civic bodies and other government 
departments in the these cities are concerned with this situation and think 
that the social issues arising out of these slums could be a big problem in the 
future. Poor living conditions, lack of civic amenities and the congested 
population could be a potential disaster in the case of a future seismic 
activity, but these conditions are likely to cause social problems even without 
an earthquake. Based on my past experience of living and working in the 
study area and my fieldwork I fear that the number of poorly constructed 
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buildings in vulnerable locations and the poor socio-economic conditions of 
these localities has increased the level of vulnerability much more than 
before the 2005 earthquake. In my opinion the earthquake exposed 
contradictions and weaknesses (Olson 2000) in our society which already 
existed in the undercurrents and it has also given new dimensions to existing 
vulnerabilities apart from creating new vulnerable sections in the society. For 
example, in the case of physical vulnerability, the element of large number of 
people living on steep slopes, Red Zone, and water courses has been added 
which has increased the disaster vulnerability of the study area. This 
vulnerability is not confined to seismic hazard only but to hazards also such 
as flash floods and landslides (Please see Section 7.3 and 7.4 for more 
details). In the case of socio-economic vulnerability, the negative impact of 
the earthquake on the livelihoods of the people and increase in the poverty 
level is an added dimension. Similarly, increase in the unplanned and illegal 
housing in the study area after the earthquake has created slum like situation 
which has increased disaster vulnerability (Please see Section 7.4.2). The 
earthquake rendered many people physically disabled creating a new section 
in the society which is physically, economically, and socially dependent. 
Their life is very hard due to the absence of a proper public social support 
system. These people might become an easy target in case of a future 
disaster situation.    
Had this earthquake not occurred, these contradictions would have come out 
in some other form of crises. According to Cutter (2006, no pagination) the 
role of ‘social vulnerability’ is very important in disasters. The social 
vulnerability is not only a product of social inequalities but also ‘involves 
basic provision of health care, the liveability of places, overall indicators of 
quality of life, and accessibility to lifelines (goods, services, emergency 
response personnel), capital and political representation’.     
In Chapter 3, I discussed that it is not only the physical scale of the event but 
the vulnerability of the people as well which determines the scale of damage 
in case of a natural disaster. The vulnerability is determined by the socio-
economic conditions in which these people live. These socio-economic 
conditions are in turn a product of the development policies of the state.    
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iii. Reworking of the Family System and the Landownership Pattern 
The third impact that my study evaluated is the reworking of the family 
system and landownership patterns.  
a. Reworking of the Family System 
Though the impact of natural disasters on social structures and families is 
well documented in the literature (See, for example, Aldrich 2010; Bode 
1977; Bolin 1976, 1985; Gupta & Sharma 2006; Pomeroy et al. 2006, p. 
791), literature on the impact of post-disaster housing reconstruction on 
family structure is minimal.  
A joint family system mainly prevailed in the study area before the 
earthquake. Every family/household was given a separate housing cash 
grant to reconstruct their house after the earthquake. The reconstruction 
authorities in AJK estimate that some 70,000 new houses have been added 
to the housing stock in the study area after the earthquake. This means that 
the family system could have been reworked as a result of the housing 
reconstruction programme. This study found that the number of joint families 
has decreased in rural areas; whereas the number of joint families has 
increased in urban areas after the earthquake (Figure 7.18).  
This finding stimulated intense discussion during my second fieldwork. All 
participants of the focus groups in Bagh and rural Muzaffarabad agreed with 
the finding of the study; whereas the focus group in Muzaffarabad city did not 
agree that the joint family system has increased in urban areas. The reason 
of increase in joint family system in urban areas, as put forward by many 
respondents, was the lack of land and higher cost of construction.  
Most of the key informants agreed with the findings of the study. Key 
informant-21 (a resident of Muzaffarabad city) agreed that the higher cost of 
construction was the main reason for an increase in the joint family system in 
urban areas and he said that he himself was planning to live as a joint family 
with his two sons because of the higher cost of construction. Key informant-2 
(a former Programme Manager Housing in the ERRA) said that the breakage 
of the joint family system ‘was neither our intension nor the intended 
outcome’ of the housing reconstruction policy.  
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People in the earthquake affected areas had mixed opinions about breaking 
of the joint family system. Some of the respondents of my field survey 
thought that it was a positive outcome because families were independent 
and more responsible now. There is a lesser risk of casualty as the 
population is distributed across more houses. These respondents reported 
that many families wanted to part even before the earthquake but didn’t 
because they couldn’t afford financially to build a separate house. Also social 
and family pressures discouraged them, but the earthquake and the 
government’s housing reconstruction programme proved a ‘blessing in 
disguise’. An Imam of a mosque and another key informant put forward a 
religious explanation and said that there was no concept of the joint family 
system in Islam and it was a good thing that families had separated.    
On the other hand many respondents were not happy with the situation and 
said that the breaking of the joint family system was not only a financial strain 
on families but it had psychological and social implications also. In case of a 
future disaster there might not be as much social capital as there was in the 
case of 2005 earthquake. A former Director General of the SERRA 
discussed this subject in great depth.  He expressed his concern over the 
breaking of the joint family system and said that the consumption and 
expenditure patterns of the families had changed and the interactive decision 
making process of the families and the community had also changed. In 
response to my observation that it was, in a way, a transition from a more 
conservative and traditional society to a more modern one he responded that 
there used to be safety nets internally and locally in the society which had 
been looking after the needs of the people at the local and internal level; 
these internal safety nets have been destroyed with the breaking of the joint 
family system.  
My observation is that the families have not parted to distant locations 
geographically. Excluding a few exceptions, the separated families have built 
their separate homes in the same premises. The difference is that unlike in 
the past, families now live in separate houses, though in close proximity, 
having their own head of the household, their own financial resources, 
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possibly with their own internal decision-making mechanism and hence deal 
with society as a separate and independent family unit.     
b. Reworking of the Landownership Pattern  
The impact of the owner-driven reconstruction on the landownership pattern 
in the study area has not been assessed before. This study found that some 
positive changes have occurred in the landownership pattern. The pre-
earthquake practice of not transferring hereditary ownership to the rightful 
heirs markedly changed with the start of the housing reconstruction 
programme in order to claim housing compensation (Figure 7.19). This 
finding is supported by the household data collected during fieldwork which 
showed that the pattern of landownership within the family has also been 
impacted and those members of the household who previously did not own 
property rights were given ownership. The most positive change is that more 
women own property now (Table 7.4).  
This finding was not a surprise for the respondents of my second fieldwork. 
All the participants of the three focus groups and all key informants agreed 
with the findings. A former Director General of the reconstruction 
organization said that it was not the intended outcome of the programme, 
though he was happy with the increase in the landownership of the women.  
8.3. Lessons Learnt and Recommendations   
This part of my study is mainly based on qualitative data collected during my 
fieldwork. Focus group proceedings and interviews with key informants and 
house owners are synthesised here. I have not deliberately utilized literature 
because I want to highlight the thinking of the earthquake affected people.  
8.3.1. Lessons Learnt 
I asked all interviewees what lessons were learnt from the 2005 earthquake 
and the subsequent housing reconstruction programme. The most worrisome 
thing for me is that many respondents said that people haven’t learnt any 
lesson. A former Deputy Chairman said ‘my biggest grief is that we have not 
learnt our lessons’. Some key lessons are summarised below:  
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i. Address Internal Migration 
It has been learnt from the experience of the earthquake that after a disaster 
people should be encouraged to stay at their places of residence to minimise 
migration to towns and cities. Establishing tent villages in the cities after the 
2005 earthquake encouraged an exodus of people from rural areas. Instead 
of setting up relief camps, relief should be provided at their homesteads and 
they should be encouraged to start building shelters/homes as soon as 
possible.  
ii. Housing Reconstruction Grant 
The government’s housing cash grant was given in four instalments over a 
period of three years. The amount given was not enough to construct a 
seismic resistant house in a period of three or more years because the prices 
of labour and construction material increased during this period. Thus people 
faced great difficulty in completing the reconstruction with the grant money 
provided by the government.   
iii. Vulnerable Groups 
Though the government did try to protect the rights of vulnerable groups, 
some vulnerable groups found it especially hard to reconstruct their houses. 
The housing reconstruction programme should be designed to take special 
care of the socially and economically marginalised households and Persons 
with Disabilities (PWDs).  Vulnerable people usually do not have a voice. Any 
post-disaster reconstruction, whether housing reconstruction or other, should 
always have a dedicated outreach arm which should identify the vulnerable 
and provide access for them.  
iv. Avoid Geographical Disparity 
The housing reconstruction programme showed better progress in rural 
areas compared to urban areas. This situation has created bitterness and 
disappointment in residents of urban areas. The policy makers should design 
a programme to cater for both urban and rural settings to avoid any disparity 
between these areas. The findings of my study identify the underlying 
reasons.  
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v. Repair of Damaged Buildings 
Homeowners were given money for retrofitting/repair of their partially 
damaged houses but there was no technical advice or inspection by the 
AITs. Seismic safety of these buildings is uncertain. Retrofitting/repair of the 
damaged buildings should be ensured to eliminate this element of 
vulnerability.    
vi. Sustainability of Safe Construction 
Sustainability of the seismic resistant construction should be ensured to 
avoid revival of former vulnerability. An effective building control mechanism, 
continuous public awareness campaigns and sustainable and equitable 
development policies play an important role in ensuring sustainability and 
addressing vulnerability. 
vii. Livelihoods Diversification 
Improvement in the livelihoods of the people, especially the poor, plays an 
important role not only in the reconstruction of damaged houses but also in 
reducing future disaster vulnerability, ‘to reduce poverty is to reduce disaster’ 
(Collins 2009, p. 252). The Government should do everything possible to 
improve and diversify peoples’ livelihoods so that they are able to recover 
from the negative impacts of the disaster. The affected people should be 
enabled to benefit from the economic opportunities created by the relief and 
recovery work. 
viii. Set Achievable Targets 
Realistic and achievable reconstruction targets should be set for the affected 
areas so that people are not frustrated if grand projects are not achieved. 
Many governments changed in AJK since 2006 and every new government 
claimed that it would make Muzaffarabad like Tokyo or Paris, but wasted 
precious time in doing so. Ambitious Master Plans could not be fully 
implemented in urban areas. The delay in the urban sector infrastructure also 
impaired the progress of the private housing reconstruction.  
ix. Disaster Awareness 
Awareness of disasters increased after the 2005 earthquake, but most of the 
people have forgotten the earthquake and the lessons learnt. In urban areas 
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people are still constructing unsafe houses in hazardous places. Narrow 
streets in old parts of Bagh and Muzaffarabad proved to be death traps 
during the earthquake; people still violate the Master Plans and don’t leave 
enough space for widening streets. If any calamity hits in the future, these 
narrow streets will cause huge damage.  
x. Debris Recycling 
Debris recycling/reuse was encouraged by the ERRA in rural areas which 
not only reduced the cost of construction but protected the environment from 
millions of tons of rubble. Unfortunately this environment-friendly practice 
was not undertaken in the urban areas where the authorities spent millions of 
rupees on debris removal. Scandals of misuse of the government funds and 
improper dumping of the rubble were frequently reported, as well as increase 
in the cost of construction in urban areas. 
xi. Institutional Issues 
Late decision making, especially in the case of land use planning in urban 
areas, delayed the housing reconstruction progress. It was also noted that 
lack of coordination between departments impacted the preparation and 
implementation of the Master Plans in urban areas. Capacity building of civic 
bodies has not been implemented as per plans so these institutions are not 
able to cope with the post-earthquake reconstruction activity and future 
development needs.   
xii. Better Planning  
The success of the ODR approach also depends on the amount of time 
taken in the response mechanism to address the issues of the home owners. 
The shorter the response time the more successful the recovery programme. 
It took authorities months to process the homeowners’ construction queries 
and concerns and convey the solutions back to them. This made the 
homeowners frustrated, wasted their time and increased the cost of 
construction. Instead of issuing the housing reconstruction policy and 
instructions in piecemeal, a more comprehensive document should have 
been issued in the beginning.  
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xiii. Participation of Homeowners 
Participation of the affected people is important for the success of a housing 
reconstruction programme. The ODR approach is only successful when 
quality control and standards are maintained across the board. The 
awareness level of people, literacy rate, poverty level and the security of the 
land tenure are also necessary for the success of the ODR approach.  
xiv. Addressing the Complaints 
A dedicated, well established, and efficient grievance redress system is 
essential to increase the level of confidence among the affected people who 
are involved in housing reconstruction.  
xv. Importance of Awareness 
Awareness-raising through print and electronic media is very import for 
encouraging people to comply with safety standards in construction. Efforts 
such as a compliance catalogue issued by the ERRA to provide additional 
technical support to those who couldn’t comply with construction guidelines 
were of great benefit.  
xvi. Workable Construction Options 
Flexibility in design and implementation is more effective than a one size fits 
all approach. Use of local construction techniques, materials and solutions 
ensured ready acceptance and adoption.  
8.3.2. Recommendations for Future Disaster Scenarios 
Respondents of the field survey were asked to give their recommendations 
regarding housing reconstruction policy and practice in case of a future 
disaster. These recommendations are summarised in the following points: 
i. The government has learnt from the 2005 housing reconstruction 
programme and should base its policy on this learning in case of future 
disasters. The successes and positive points of this programme may be 
replicated and the shortcomings may be addressed elsewhere in the 
country in case of future disasters.  
ii. The ODR approach is workable in the context of Pakistan. 81% of 
respondents (N=200) of this study recommended the ODR approach for 
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housing reconstruction in case of any future disaster, whereas only 8% 
opposed it. However, this approach cannot be recommended at face 
value, as every disaster has its context and every situation has its own 
dynamics. This approach should be applied by keeping in mind a 
particular situation. The ODR approach is more suitable for rural areas 
than for urban areas. Thus a more workable solution should be 
developed for urban areas based on the lessons learnt from the post-
2005 experience in urban settings.  
iii. The ODR approach in future should include more checks and balances 
in the system. Monitoring of the staff and inspection of the under 
construction houses should be improved.  
iv. Livelihoods of the disaster affected people are as important as shelter. 
The government should plan for livelihoods as well as planning 
reconstruction activities. Village level vocational and technical training 
institutes should be established to address poverty. 
v. Community awareness of DRR should be a continuous process. Disaster 
training should be given in schools to manage hazards and disasters. 
Necessary training and equipment should be provided at the village level 
to undertake rescue activities in case of a disaster.  Local Support 
Organizations (LSOs), Local NGOs, and Community Based 
Organizations (CBOs) should be made more affective. Collins (2009) has 
rightly pointed out that ‘with political will, communities and individuals can 
be persuaded to change their behaviour. Beyond encouraging changes 
in behaviour by choice, political will can drive legislation that effectively 
controls the threat of disasters’ (p. 254). The Hyogo Framework for 
Action also calls for ‘development and strengthening of institutions, 
mechanisms and capacities to build resilience to hazards, (Collins 2013, 
p. S117).  
vi. The Government should develop land use policy to stop construction of 
houses in hazardous areas and this policy should be strictly 
implemented. 
275 
 
vii. Building codes should be developed for rural areas as well and these 
codes should be implemented through Local Government and Rural 
Development Department and Village Reconstruction Committees. Local 
Government & Rural Development staff at Union Council level (e.g. 
Project Manager, Sub-engineer, and Secretary) can be used for the 
housing construction management. These staff can utilize the ERRA 
seismic resistant designs for planning permission and construction 
monitoring.  
viii. The data of the housing reconstruction programme should be handed 
over to some authority and should be updated regularly. Patwaris can be 
used to maintain the record of the housing stock at village level. The 
Patwari is required to undertake crop inspections (called Girdawari) twice 
a year; he can be asked to also carry out the housing inspection and 
update the housing data. In this way the record of the housing stock will 
be updated every six months and there will be no need to produce 
housing surveys every ten years at a massive scale and at a staggering 
cost.   
ix. There should be a permanent institution for reconstruction in case of 
future disasters.  
x. Shelter is the foremost requirement after a disaster; the government 
should give top priority to housing. Compensation money should be paid 
as quickly as possible and without barriers so that people construct their 
houses quickly and don’t waste time and money in pursuing their 
compensation cases and waiting for the instalments to be paid. 
xi. There were some complaints of rent seeking or illegal gratification on the 
part of some AITs. The government should devise some mechanism to 
stop corruption in case of future disasters. Policies are good but the 
lower staff should be closely monitored because they often create 
problems for the people. 
xii. There should be a pre-emptive and proactive instead of reactive 
approach towards disasters. Instead of waiting for disaster to happen 
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and then undertaking relief work, the best thing is to think about our 
vulnerabilities. The Government of Pakistan should learn from the 
experience of the earthquake and should undertake an audit of the 
vulnerable buildings in urban areas such as Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, 
and Rawalpindi. These vulnerable buildings should be dismantled or 
strengthened instead of waiting for an earthquake.  
xiii. The government should set up some safety nets such as soft loans and 
insurance for residential and commercial properties in disaster prone 
areas to help people recover from disasters quickly instead of waiting for 
outside help.  
xiv. Vulnerable people usually do not have a voice. Any post-disaster 
reconstruction, whether housing reconstruction or otherwise, should 
always have a dedicated outreach programme which should identify the 
vulnerable and support access for them to decisions and funding.  
xv. Disaster mitigation should be made an essential part of the development 
process. As highlighted by Collins (2009, p.250) ‘disaster reduction is 
fundamentally a development issue, whether in terms of dealing with 
risks associated with underdevelopment or any other form of 
inappropriate development. Development is also about learning and 
adapting to the risk of disaster’. The Hyogo Framework for Action also 
calls for the ‘integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable 
development policies and planning’ (Collins 2013, p. S117). 
8.4. Final Assessment  
As a final analysis of the post-2005 earthquake housing reconstruction 
programme, based on over two decades of experience of working in the study 
area and dealing with different environmental and human-induced disasters in 
the study area, the discussions that I had with different stakeholders of the 
programme, and anlysis of literature on the subject (see for example, Abidi 
2011; ADB 2010, 2011; 2012; Ahmad et al. 2011; Cosgrave & Herson 2008; 
Davis 2010a; DFID 2011; ERRA 2009, 2010; 2012; Haq et al. 2009; ICIMOD 
2012; IDB 2014; Leersum & Arora 2011; Madiwale 2012; Malik 2011; Mumtaz 
et al. 2008; Qasim et al. 2010; Qazi 2008; Schilderman & Lyons 2011; 
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Stephenson et al. 2008; UN-Habitat 2008, 2011; World Bank 2010, 2011) this 
programme can be regarded a major success. In the context of a developing 
country like Pakistan, this programme excels any other post-disaster housing 
reconstruction initiative in the country (before and after 2005 earthquake) in 
the following terms: 
 Scale of the Programme: reconstruction and repair of more than 600,000 
damaged houses spread over thousands of square kilometres (Davis 
2010); 
 Financial and Technical Assistance: the amount of housing cash grant 
was far more than for past or later disasters (Annex-1) and technical 
assistance in the shape of seismic resistant construction designs, hazard 
risk mapping, micro zonation, urban areas land use planning and master 
planning were undertaken for the first time; 
 Seismic Resistant Construction: was introduced in the country at the 
household level for the first time in the country (Davis 2010); 
 Beneficiary Participation and Empowerment: homeowners were free to 
decide the type of construction, the size of the house, and the pace of 
work as long as it complied with the seismic standards; 
 Hazard Awareness and Training: more than 700,000 people got 
technical and social mobilization training; 
 Town Planning and Seismic Hazard Microzonation: Master Plans were 
developed for the reconstruction and future development of urban areas of 
Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Rawlakot for the first time in history of these towns 
(Annex-7). The Master Plans were developed on the basis of Land Use 
Plans and Seismic Hazard Maps. 
 Revival of the Traditional Local Seismic Construction Techniques: 
Bahttar and Dhajji-dewari construction techniques were revived and 
thousands of these houses have been built;  
 Ownership and Commitment of the Government: was of very high level 
compared to other disaster situations in the country; 
 Progress of Construction: 94% of houses have been reconstructed in 
the rural areas in 5 years; 
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 Data Management and Complaint Handling: the enormous data of the 
housing reconstruction programme was managed in excellent manner; all 
the details at household level could be acquired through one-window 
facility and different regional offices, or telephone or online. A detailed and 
efficient complaint redressal system was also introduced in the country for 
the first time whereupon more than 15,000 complaints were handled 
between October 2008 and March 2009 alone (ERRA 2016).   
 The Landless Policy: thousands of families lost their already very small 
landholdings in the earthquake (due to landslides, liquefaction, proximity 
to fault lines, and master planning requirements). The government gave 
money to approximately 14,000 landless families to purchase land for the 
construction of their homes (Annex-10). This initiative is unprecedented in 
the history of the country and was acclaimed by many in the world (Davis 
2010); and 
 Impact on the Lives of the People: the pre-earthquake kacha houses 
have been replaced with good quality pukka houses, people have bank 
accounts now as a result of payment of housing cash grant through banks 
(Davis 2010), family system and land ownership patterns have changed 
and people of AJK were exposed to the outside world due to the work of 
dozens of international organizations.      
Internationally, this programme stands out from other housing reconstruction 
programmes such as after 2003 Bam earthquake, 2001 Gujrat earthquake, 
and 2004 Tsunami (see for example, Abidi 2011; Audefroy 2011; Barenstein 
et al. 2008; Davis 2010; Ge et al. 2010; Ghafory-Ashtiany & Hosseini 2008; 
Gharaati 2006; GSDMA 2002; Kenny 2005; Omidvar et al. 2010; Rand et al. 
2011; Ratnayake & Rameezdeen 2007; Samaddar & Okada 2006; 
Sanderson & Sharma 2008; Shaw et al. 2003; Steinberg 2007; Twigg 2006) 
in terms of universal application of the owner-driven reconstruction approach, 
conditional cash grant, progress of housing reconstruction, occupancy of the 
reconstructed houses, disaster risk reduction, and beneficiary satisfaction 
with the reconstructed houses (Section 3.8.1). As an acknowledgment of this 
contribution the ERRA was awarded the United Nations Sasakawa 2011 
Award for Disaster Reduction.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
9.1. Introduction 
This study was set out to evaluate the government of Pakistan’s ‘Owner-
driven’ housing reconstruction programme in AJK after 2005 earthquake in 
Kashmir. It has sought to identify the relationship between disaster 
vulnerability and development, reasons of disaster vulnerability in AJK, and 
the role that the development policies of the Government of AJK played in 
creating vulnerability to the 2005 earthquake. The study has evaluated the 
progress of the housing reconstruction programme in geographic, 
economics, and social contexts and the impact it made. This study has also 
ventured to draw lessons learnt and recommendations for 
transferability/replication of the ODR in case of future disasters.         
 
The study has sought to answer the following set of questions:  
 
1. What factors made people vulnerable to seismic hazard in AJK? 
2. How successfully has the Government of Pakistan implemented the 
housing reconstruction policy in the aftermath of 2005 earthquake and 
is the characterization of this policy as successful in the geography, 
economics and social contexts? 
3. After the completion of the housing reconstruction programme: 
a. To what extent are the seismic-resistant construction techniques 
sustainable in the study area, especially in rural areas? 
b. How far has ODR been able to reduce/address the vulnerability 
issues in   the study area? 
c. To what extent has the implementation of the ODR re-worked the 
family and household structures and patterns of land ownership? 
4. What lessons can be learnt from the Pakistan experience and what are 
the recommendations for transferability/replication of this approach in 
the case of future disaster events? 
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9.2. Geographical Setting 
The research was conducted in the earthquake affected areas of AJK in the 
north of Pakistan. The study area is highly mountainous and is located in one 
of the most seismically active areas in the world where the Indian and the 
Eurasian tectonic plates meet. Four major faults are found in the study area. 
The 2005 earthquake is associated with the rupture of one of these faults. 
This earthquake was the biggest in the documented history of the country 
and caused massive damage over a large area. Due to enormity of damage 
in the housing sector, the Government of Pakistan launched a major housing 
reconstruction programme using the Owner-driven reconstruction approach 
for the first time. A brief history and geography of the study area were 
described in Chapter 1 and the details of the 2005 earthquake were 
described in Chapter 2.          
9.3. Theoretical Basis  
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this thesis set out the theoretical basis of the study. 
Disasters, vulnerability, and development came out as central themes on 
which the foundation of this study was laid in Chapter 3 (Theoretical 
Framework). Disaster losses are unevenly distributed between the 
developed and the developing countries. In the developed world there is 
lesser loss of life and more economic losses; whereas in the developing 
countries, the life losses are exceptionally high and economic losses are low. 
Vulnerability plays important role in determining the degree of loss from a 
disaster; the nature and level of vulnerability is, in turn, mainly the outcome 
of the development processes.  
My research has relied on the ‘Pressure and Release’ or PAR model 
developed by Blaikie et al. (1994 and further developed by Wisner et al. 
2004) and Collins (2009) “disaster and development approach” to explore the 
reasons of vulnerability in the study area. Disasters can work as a window of 
opportunity to reduce vulnerability by addressing the past mistakes. Post-
disaster housing reconstruction is one of the important ways to reduce 
disaster vulnerability. Four mainstream housing reconstruction approaches 
(i.e. Unconditional cash grant approach, Community-driven reconstruction, 
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Agency-driven reconstruction, and Owner-driven reconstruction) were 
discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 (Research Methodology) explained the research methodology of 
this study. It is an ethnographic study undertaken by an insider for which 
mixed methods approach has been adopted. This approach served the 
purposes of triangulation, complementarity, initiation, development, and 
expansion through Concurrent Nested Design. Methodological tools for data 
collection consisted of collection of secondary data, key informant interviews, 
survey questionnaires, house owner interviews, focus group discussions, 
and life stories. The data were collected from four rural union councils and 
two cities of Muzaffarabad and Bagh districts in AJK.  
Chapter 5 (Vulnerability of the Housing Stock in the Study Area) has 
explained how the relationship between disaster, vulnerability, and 
development (discussed in Chapter 3) worked in AJK and how disaster 
vulnerability resulted in widespread damage to housing stock. This chapter 
sought to answer the following research question: 
1. What factors made people vulnerable to seismic hazard in AJK? 
Four types of vulnerability have been identified which were responsible for 
the massive damage to the housing stock in the study area: geological 
vulnerability, physical vulnerability, environmental vulnerability, and socio-
economic vulnerability. While explaining the role of the development policies 
of the Government of AJK towards creating these vulnerabilities, the study 
has argued that although the geological vulnerability was not a direct 
outcome of the government’s development policies, this vulnerability could 
have been reduced to a great extent had the governments been responsible 
enough to invest in disaster mitigation. As regards physical vulnerability and 
socio-economic vulnerability, successive governments have not been able to 
uplift the economic conditions of the people so that the peoples’ vulnerability 
could have been addressed. The main argument here was that development 
was a holistic term which encompassed sustainable and equitable economic 
development, sustainable infrastructure development, social protection, 
disaster mitigation and good governance as well. The governance had been 
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weak in AJK so there was lack of building control mechanisms which 
resulted in poor quality construction. The over-emphasis of the government 
on road infrastructure development and deforestation had contributed 
towards environmental vulnerability.      
9.4. Empirical Findings 
The main empirical findings of the study were summarized in two empirical 
chapters of this thesis: (Chapter 6, Post-2005 Earthquake Housing 
Reconstruction in AJK; and Chapter 7, Impact of the Housing Reconstruction 
Programme). This section synthesizes the empirical findings to answer two 
research questions of the study: 
1. How successfully has the Government of Pakistan implemented the 
housing reconstruction policy in the aftermath of 2005 earthquake 
and is the characterization of this policy as successful in the 
geography, economics and social contexts? 
a. Progress in geographical context: the study has found 
considerable variation in the progress of housing reconstruction 
between rural and urban contexts. 94% of the surveyed houses had 
been found constructed in rural areas and 63% of the surveyed 
houses in urban areas were constructed. Thus the overall progress 
of the reconstruction was 78.5%.  
b. Progress in economic context: this study has found that despite 
uniform housing cash grant package, the household economic status 
has impacted the progress of the housing reconstruction. Only 35% 
households of the “Very Poor” income group had been able to 
reconstruct their houses. The progress increased with increase in the 
income level; 81% “Poor”, 88.5% “Moderate but unstable”, 100% 
“Moderate and stable”, 100% “Strong”, and 100% “Well-off” surveyed 
households had been found to have reconstructed their houses.  
c. Progress in social context: despite the patriarchal and male-
dominated nature of the society, the female-headed households 
showed better housing reconstruction progress than the male-
headed households. 85.7% female-headed households had 
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reconstructed their houses as compared to 76.6% of male-head 
households. 
 
2. After the completion of the housing reconstruction programme: 
a. To what extent are the seismic-resistant construction 
techniques sustainable in the study area, especially in rural 
areas? The study has found that the sustainability of the 
seismic-resistant construction is an issue in the study area. In 
rural areas, the absence of building control mechanism is 
responsible for it; whereas in urban areas, weak enforcement of 
building codes is the main reason.    
b. How far has ODR been able to reduce/address the 
vulnerability of the building stock in the study area? 
Vulnerability of the housing stock has been addressed to the 
extent of houses constructed under the reconstruction 
programme in rural areas; whereas the safety of the houses 
reconstructed (or repaired) in urban areas remains a big 
question mark.  Similarly the Post-reconstruction period 
construction practices had been found adding to the 
vulnerability of the housing stock in the study area.   
c. To what extent has the implementation of the ODR re-
worked the family and household structures and patterns 
of land ownership? The study has found that both family 
structures and patterns of landownership have been impacted 
by the housing reconstruction programme. The percentage of 
joint families has decreased in rural areas and increased in 
case of urban areas. It has also been found that the 
landownership pattern has also been reworked as a result of 
ODR policy and the ratio of females owning the land titles has 
increased slightly in the study area.   
9.5. Limitations of the Study / Challenges during Fieldwork 
This study has put forward an evaluative perspective on an important post-
disaster recovery programme. It was conducted by an ‘insider’ using a 
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variety of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods in a society 
recovering from physical, social, psychological, and economic impacts of one 
of the worst disasters of its history. The direct result of this research setting is 
the limitations of this study, which are discussed in this section. 
9.5.1.  Positionality  
My positionality and power relationship was a big challenge. England (1994); 
Finlay (2002); Ganga & Scott (2006); Gilbert (1994); LaBaree (2000); and 
Mullings (1999) have discussed in detail the ethical, methodological and 
power relationship issues associated with being a researcher. At the start of 
the fieldwork I was aware of the fact that my positionality might affect the 
power relationship with respondents; especially the house owners and some 
key informants. I expected that due to the fact that I worked as Director 
General/Secretary of the reconstruction agency, some house owners might 
not express their true feelings due to fear on one hand or due to expected 
gain in future on the other hand.  
Unlike Robinson (2014) who revealed his positionality to respondents 
(homeowners) before interviews, I thought it proper not to reveal my 
positionality to respondents prior to interviews because it had great potential 
to bias their opinion (Ganga & Scott 2006). In some cases where the 
respondents insisted on revealing my identity or somehow came to know 
about it, their opinions were clouded by their personal biases to certain 
extent. For example, many house owners exaggerated the amount of 
additional money that they spent on the reconstruction of their damaged 
house. A very poor house owner even said that he had spent one million 
rupees extra on the reconstruction of his house; it was obvious from his 
financial condition and the condition of the house that this amount was 
exaggerated, perhaps with the hope to get some of this money back. Some 
house owners complained during interviews that they were unduly denied full 
compensation but when I checked from the SERRA it was found that in 
almost all the cases their complaints were unfounded.  
As regards my positionality and power relationship in case of key informants 
I expected that those key informants who had worked with me as junior 
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colleagues might not express their true feelings or might feel intimidated. 
This was also confirmed during my fieldwork when I interviewed those key 
informants who had worked under me in different organizations, they were 
confused and embarrassed to see me in their room and would offer me their 
chair to sit in instead of visitors chairs. One of my former subordinates 
(though I do not like to use this terminology but this is the only prevalent 
terminology there so I keep it as such to keep the flavour of the situation) 
avoided the interview many times and kept running around on one pretext or 
the other, which angered me also to be honest. Later on I realised that he 
was too embarrassed to talk to me. I, therefore, arranged a combined 
interview with two of his other colleagues in a different room. After a few 
minutes he gained confidence and became the most vocal and contributing 
participant. Every effort was made to clarify to them that this research will not 
in any way adversely affect anybody or would not be source of any undue 
gain in future (Whiting 2008). They were encouraged to be themselves and 
express their feelings freely.   
9.5.2. Challenges of being ‘insider’ 
Although my background of being from the same country, my work 
experience and local contacts were a clear advantage (Dyck 2000, cited in 
Robinson 2014, p. 70), it led to a limitation as well i.e. the issues related with 
the phenomenon of being an ‘insider’, and notably someone who is a high 
raking government official (Ganga & Scott, 2006). As highlighted by Delyser 
(2001); LaBaree (2000); Mullings (1999); and Rose (1997) it’s not easy and 
simple being an insider and in every research the insider has to face the 
dilemma of insider-outsider. As LaBaree (2000) explained, by being insider it 
is expected that the researcher already knows the answer because ‘[b]y 
"insider" research, we mean social interviews conducted between 
researchers and participants who share a similar cultural, linguistic, ethnic, 
national and religious heritage’ (Ganga & Scott 2006, no pagination).  
I had to face the same problem during my fieldwork, especially while doing 
semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. Most of the 
respondents expected me to already know the answer of my questions due 
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to the reason that I belong to AJK and my experience of the earthquake 
myself and working in the reconstruction programme, for example when I 
asked a key informant about problems in housing reconstruction in urban 
areas he said “who knows the issues of Muzaffarabad better than you, so it’s 
better not to ask me (Key Informant-2). Some even mentioned my job at the 
time of the earthquake “your Revenue Department was involved in the 
disbursement of compensation” (Key Informant-5). While answering my 
questions some respondents were aware of the fact that I had worked in the 
reconstruction programme and must be having my own opinion as an insider 
“you had also been involved in it and must be having your own opinion as 
well” (Key Informant-7). Some respondents tried to carefully craft their 
answers being conscious of my position; “you have worked at very high 
administrative positions” (MR-3). 
According to Delyser (2001) the change of role, from being an insider to an 
outsider, sometimes confuses people. This is exactly what happened to me 
as well. My change of role, from being a high-level government official to a 
researcher, confused those people who already knew me. They frequently 
mentioned that they were confused that whether they should consider me a 
government officer or a researcher. It was too difficult for them to replace 
more than two decades old role with a new and completely opposite one. A 
former boss of mine was very amused to see me when I went to interview 
him wearing khakis instead of a business suit, carrying a rucksack instead of 
a briefcase and armed with camera, voice recorder, and noting pad. I tried to 
keep myself as “normal” and “down to earth” as possible by my demeanour, 
for example, sitting on the ground or standing instead of using a chair, 
speaking in local dialects, sharing jokes with them, having cup of tea with 
them, etc. (Figure 9.1).  
Barnes (1979); Herbert (2000); LaBaree (2000) and Lee & Renzetti (1993) 
observe that the insider-outsider phenomenon is a very sensitive issue and 
may raise suspicions about the research motives also. In my case many 
people were not sure about true purpose of my research and couldn’t 
convince themselves that despite being a senior level government officer I 
was carrying out a purely academic exercise. I had to face difficulties in 
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getting data from some organizations unofficially. My “parent department” 
was a particularly hard nut to crack. I had to ask them repeatedly for 
something and they would not budge. The Deputy Commissioner and the 
Commissioner office had a readymade excuse that the whole record was 
destroyed by the earthquake, whereas I personally knew that the 
Commissioner office was not even slightly damaged by the earthquake and 
most of the record of the Deputy Commissioner office was either salvaged or 
reconstructed afterwards. I must admit that it frustrated and angered me a lot 
and I mentioned it to them also. As warned by Bourdieu (1988, cited in 
Robison 2014) about analysing one’s own group, later on I came to know 
that basically the staff were afraid that I was doing some kind of enquiry 
against them so they tried to avoid giving me any kind of data. I took great 
pains to assure them that it was not an enquiry but purely an academic 
exercise and would not affect them in any manner. Some people even 
mentioned that it was a way of the Western governments to give 
scholarships to local people and get vital information about their country 
through research otherwise why would they spend so much money on them.            
  
81 Figure 9.1 Conducting house owner interviews.                             (Source: Author fieldwork) 
 
9.5.3. Socio-cultural Issues  
The study area has a peculiar socio-cultural set up and religious mind set. 
Women usually do not interact with “Na-mehram” (all those men with whom a 
Muslim woman is permitted by Islam to marry). I thought that it would be 
difficult to collect data from women through interviews and survey 
questionnaires or do focus groups and life stories. To tackle this limitation it 
was planned to hire an experienced female research assistant to interact 
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with female respondents. I had anticipated this issue on the basis of my 
knowledge and past experience of that society. I must admit that my thinking 
proved to be not entirely correct in this regard. To my surprise things had 
changed a lot since the earthquake. I had hired both male and female 
research assistants for data collection, as I had planned in my research 
methodology. The male research assistant told me after the completion of 
the exercise that they did not face any particular hesitation on the part of 
female respondents or their families in conducting the survey and in fact it 
was more difficult for them to take care of a female colleague in difficult 
terrain and extremely harsh weather. He was of the opinion that it was 
possible to conduct interviews with female respondents even without a 
female research assistant. Moreover the female research assistant for Bagh 
District was not available for domestic issues and the lady for Muzaffarabad 
District had got a job by the time I started interviews, hence both were 
unavailable for qualitative data collection phase. So I decided not to hire new 
female research assistants and make an attempt to do interviews without 
them.  
I was pleasantly surprised to see that interviewing female respondents was 
not too difficult, of course in the presence of male member of the family. I 
personally found it welcoming because women could now voice their feelings 
in front of an outsider. This change might have happened due to the working 
of a large number of international organizations and national and 
international NGOs that came into the study area soon after the earthquake 
and remained there for quite some time; more than 15 international 
organizations and 75 national and international NGOs were involved in 
reconstruction work and more than 150 national and international NGOs 
worked during rescue and relief phase (SERRA 2015). Such a heavy 
presence of outside actors was unprecedented in the history of the study 
area because due to the disputed nature of AJK, international organizations 
and INGOs had no access there before the earthquake. I found during my 
fieldwork that people were not shy of interacting with outsiders and were 
usually ready to talk, though they expected that the survey would eventually 
289 
 
bring some material benefits for them and sometimes one had to be 
discerning and careful in judging their statements.  
It was a general impression in the area that people had become very sharp 
after the earthquake and knew what to tell and what information needed to 
be held back. Another thing that I experienced was that may be due to their 
interaction with international organizations, the participants of the focus 
group discussion sessions expected same level of standard and facilities 
from me as from international organizations; for example a good venue, 
sumptuous meal, refreshments before and after meal, travel expenses, and 
some money at the end of the session.              
9.5.4. Ethical Issues 
Ethical issues were also very important in this research. The most sensitive 
issue was going through the trauma of remembering the tragic earthquake 
event again. At the start of the fieldwork I was aware of the fact that 
remembering the traumatic personal and societal impacts of the earthquake 
would be a very painful experience for the respondents, especially those 
house owners who had lost their loved ones and their whole lives’ earnings. I 
was also aware that since I belong to the same country and have been 
working in the study area for many years and I experienced the earthquake 
myself as victim, I could understand the pain of these people and could make 
them realize that I share their pain. Every effort was made to handle this 
issue as sensitively as possible. People did feel pain while telling the tales of 
death and misery but I think my being “insider” proved to be the biggest 
asset to solace them a bit; I could never help crying with them (Robinson 
2014) and sharing my own experiences of going through the traumatic event.  
The second ethical issue was the anonymity of the informants because in 
countries like Pakistan it is quite possible that the authorities might in anyway 
harm those people who criticise the government. Every effort was made to 
maintain the anonymity of the informants. Every interviewee was explained 
before the start of the interview that they had the choice to remain 
anonymous and could withdraw from the interview during or after the 
interview. The whole process of anonymity and usage of data in the thesis 
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and destruction of data after the completion of the research was explained to 
them. Consent forms were also used to get written consent but some key 
informants did not want to sign the consent form so they were not forced to 
do so. However, the house owners were wary of signing a paper so they 
were not asked to sign the consent form; their verbal consent was sought 
instead. These measures were taken for all stages of the field work i.e. 
gathering of official data, survey questionnaires, key informant interviews, 
semi-structured interviews, focus group meetings and life stories. Most of the 
key informants and some house owners said that they had no objection in 
mentioning their name in the report, in fact a few insisted on mentioning their 
names, however I deem it proper not to mention any name in the thesis and 
try to conceal their identity as much as possible. I will mention some names 
only in those cases where they made positive comments.     
9.5.5. Geographical Challenges 
AJ&K is a geographically remote area of Pakistan. Earthquake affected 
areas are mountainous and were very difficult to access even prior to the 
earthquake (Leersum & Arora 2011). Most of the road network was severely 
damaged, which until today has not been reconstructed fully. Access to rural 
areas was thus one of the major challenges for fieldwork. These rural 
settlements are widely distributed and most of the time houses are situated 
far away from each other within settlements. It is usually very time 
consuming to travel between these houses in this difficult mountainous 
terrain; for example the mean distance from nearest road to the household 
visited during quantitative data collection was a 23 minute walk and the 
farthest household was a 180 minute walk. I was told that our female 
research assistant found it very difficult to walk such long distances on steep 
and snow covered mountains. Thus it was decided not to send her on such 
difficult expeditions. Frequent landslides were the main problem due to which 
many field visits were rescheduled (Figure 9.3).  
Many of these landslides were very dangerous and had taken many lives. 
While travelling I had not only to be careful about my safety but also the 
safety of my research assistants and their driver. They were given clear 
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instructions to check the weather forecast and coordinate with the local 
Highway Department people to know about the situation of the roads well 
before travelling. 
  
82 Figure 9.2 Landslide hazard on the roads.                                      (Source: Author fieldwork)   
9.5.6. Situated Knowledge  
My positionality and the phenomenon of being ‘insider’ are the strength as 
well as weakness of this study. On the one hand these factors give me 
strength, as compared to an outsider, to know so many things personally 
about my research topic (Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis 2002) and get the things 
done during research (See, for example, Section 8.4.1 & 8.4.2). On the other 
hand these factors make the knowledge produced highly ‘situated’ (Rose 
1997, p. 305). McDowell (1992, cited in Rose 1997, p. 305) writes that ‘we 
must recognize and take account of our own position, as well as that of our 
research participants, and write this into our research practice'.  
Perhaps as a logical outcome of reflexivity, it is not possible to avoid the 
situatedness of knowledge in my kind of study. Being a member of the same 
society, being a high-level civil servant, and personally going through the 
very phenomenon which is being researched; neutrality comes seldom. I 
have remained continuously conscious of these three factors throughout my 
research. As a member of this society how far can I neutralise myself from 
my psyche, my biases, my preconceived notions, and my prejudices and 
preferences that my 50 year socialization process has shaped? As a civil 
servant, how successfully can I detach myself from the norm to confine 
neutrality to being impersonal only while writing something official (not to use 
first person pronouns, for example, using ‘undersigned’ instead of ‘I’ in official 
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writing) because impartiality and neutrality have their limits here? And how 
much dispassionate and objective can a great tragedy like the 2005 
earthquake let someone to remain?  
Is my study ethnography or auto-ethnography or an objective study or a 
subjective one? I am not sure. Should I write it as a personal story or as a 
cold, factual, and objective research paper? I am not sure. And I do not claim 
the neutrality and objectivity of my research. How can a study be objective 
when it is written with tearful eyes and trembling hands? Yes my study might 
be ‘subjective’ and ‘situated’ but does it become invalid and unreliable 
because of it? Perhaps NO because as observed by Sole & Edmondson 
(2001, p. 3) ‘situated knowledge is critical to learning’. Harding (2004, p. 127) 
also finds situated knowledge ‘possible’ and ‘desirable’. My study is not 
meant to be a guide on disaster management; it is an effort to understand 
one of the most important events in the history of a nation; an event which 
might soon fall prey to the oblivion of those very people whom it hurt the 
most.  
Is this study universally applicable (Rose 1997)? No, I do not make any such 
claim because every society and every locale has its own peculiarities; but it 
may provide some insight to academics and policy makers in their efforts to 
make this world safer from disasters.  
9.5.7. Logistic Issues  
The holy month of Ramadan was expected to fall in the second month of my 
field work and impact my activities to some extent. This month is a time of 
relatively reduced daily activity and reduced working hours due to fasting and 
other religious activities. Convincing people to be available for research work 
during their schedule of enhanced religious activities is a limitation. So I 
designed my fieldwork timetable accordingly from the beginning; I therefore 
undertook secondary data collection and analysis of these data and other 
relevant activities during this time.  
Being an insider I knew that finding some of the key informants could be a 
limitation because some of the key informants had left their job or had moved 
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to other organizations. I was lucky to have found them after some searching. 
Though most of the people were readily available for interviews and gave me 
as much time as necessary, some agreed to be interviewed but were never 
available. Despite the fact that I had worked with the ERRA for many years 
and I knew many people there I couldn’t get access to the concerned people 
though they promised to meet whenever I contacted. I had to travel to 
Islamabad (about 135 Km away) twice to interview a former Programme 
Manager of the ERRA, who was working in another government organization 
now, but the gentleman somehow missed his appointment. Once I went to 
his office and we started to chat but then he got a call from his boss and he 
went away saying he will contact me when he was free and will also email 
me some important reports; I stayed in the hotel for two nights waiting for his 
call but he never got in contact. Another former employee of the SERRA also 
slipped away frequently, though I managed to get hold of him due to my 
patience and persistence.      
It was in the middle of my fieldwork in the month of December that my wife, 
my youngest daughter and I fell ill, on the same day. It started with severe 
fever. The doctors first treated for Malaria but when there was no respite in 
the fever we were admitted into a local hospital. After a few days of tests on 
us by different doctors they finally concluded that I was suffering from 
Dengue fever (a deadly type of fever which was very common at that time 
and had caused many deaths) and my wife and daughter were suffering from 
some unknown type of fever. We were referred to a bigger hospital in 
Islamabad (about 130 Km away from our home). Doctors there concluded 
that all of us were suffering from Typhoid fever but due to experimentation 
with different types of antibiotics it had become too resistant. Thus they had 
to resort to extra high doses of antibiotics. It took us three weeks to come out 
of the hospital and another four weeks of bed rest to recover. Doctors were 
of the opinion that we got the infection through contaminated food or drink.      
Tricky situations also developed during my fieldwork. My research assistant 
was constantly chased and questioned by certain policemen in Bagh city. 
They even took away a survey form saying they would investigate what this 
research was about. I had to personally contact the Deputy Commissioner to 
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resolve the matter who told me that many con men were active in the area 
cheating people in the name of financial assistance and the police might 
have become alert due to this reason. However, no such thing happened 
afterwards. I am impressed by the efficiency and vigilance of the police, if 
this was the only reason for doing so.  
9.6. Contribution of the Study to Existing Body of Knowledge   
I cannot say like Mohapatra (2009) that no serious attempt has been made in 
my field of study before. However, as far as post-2005 earthquake housing 
reconstruction in AJK is concerned, this perhaps is the only and the first 
study of its kind (i.e. a PhD research by a local stakeholder of the 
reconstruction programme). As compared to existing studies, my study 
throws a new light on the subject by looking beyond reconstruction and trying 
to find out the real reasons of disaster vulnerability in the study area and how 
this vulnerability is linked with the development policies of the state.  
Another contribution of this study is that unlike existing studies it evaluates 
the progress of the housing reconstruction programme in the study area in 
geographic, economics, and social contexts. It tries to explain what factors 
influenced housing reconstruction in these contexts. There is hardly any 
literature on the study area that evaluates the impact of the housing 
reconstruction programme with the angle of sustainability of the seismic 
resistant construction, disaster vulnerability, family system, and 
landownership patterns.  
The above analyses (evaluation of the progress in different contexts and 
impact of the programme) can prove useful not only to policy makers for 
future planning but to academicians also for further research elsewhere in 
the world.  
This study is unique in the sense that it blends literature, policy, practice, and 
lessons learnt aspects to evaluate the housing reconstruction programme in 
the study area. It builds on the existing literature and examines the Owner-
driven housing reconstruction policy in the light of this body of knowledge. It 
then evaluates how successfully this policy was translated into practice. And 
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Lessons learnt are drawn from this practice, which will hopefully become part 
of the existing body of knowledge (Figure 9.3).   
This study adds to the existing body of knowledge in respect of the research 
approach that it adopts. Unlike other studies in the study area, my study uses 
a mixed-methods approach in which a range of quantitative and qualitative 
data collection tools have been used. Only Leersum & Arora (2011) have 
used this technique in their study to evaluate the housing reconstruction 
programme in AJK. However, their study is limited to the rural context only 
and was conducted too early (during the implementation phase in 2008) to 
fully evaluate the performance and impact of the programme. My study is 
conducted three years after the completion of the programme and is not 
limited to rural context only; it not only spans over rural/urban, economics, 
and social contexts but evaluates its impacts in different contexts as well.   
 
 
83 Figure 9.3 Contribution of the present study to the existing body of knowledge.  
                                                                                                                           (Source: Author) 
9.7. Suggestions for Future Research  
Due to its limitations and the enormity of the subject, this study is by no 
means final and conclusive. In fact when I was preparing the Research 
My study 
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Proposal for this study, I did not know that this subject has so many layers 
which have sufficient material and importance for separate studies. The 
following could be the future research projects:     
9.7.1. Replication of ODR in Later Disasters 
Since 2005 earthquake, Pakistan has experienced four major floods, two 
major earthquakes, and three military operations against terrorists which 
rendered millions of people homeless and destroyed many houses. Despite 
successfully practising the Owner-driven reconstruction approach after 2005 
earthquake, this approach has not been replicated in Pakistan in case of 
later disasters (Abidi 2010). It would be worthwhile to conduct research to 
know the reasons of not replicating the ODR approach in the country and its 
consequences. Another study can be done to know whether ODR approach 
has been practised elsewhere in the world after 2005 Kashmir earthquake 
and how successfully this was achieved?  
9.7.2. ODR and Vulnerable Groups 
As discussed in this thesis, disasters not only hit the vulnerable groups hard; 
they create more vulnerable people as well. The importance of their recovery 
and the difficulties that they face in this process cannot be overemphasised. 
Vulnerable groups such as marginalised people, ethnic minorities, and 
persons with disabilities (PWDs) add up to sizeable population who can 
become a focus of future research.    
9.7.3. Impact of the Earthquake on the Livelihoods of the People  
I have very briefly discussed in my thesis that 2005 earthquake has 
negatively impacted the livelihoods of the people in the study area, hence the 
reconstruction of their houses, sustainability of the seismic resistant 
construction, and their future disaster vulnerability. I do not think that I could 
do justice with this aspect in my thesis because it is such a big area and 
needs a separate study. This type of study becomes especially important 
due to the gap between the perception of the government and the people. 
The government authorities think that livelihoods of the people have 
recovered in a much better way and people are economically much better 
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after the earthquake; whereas most of the affected people are of the view 
that their financial conditions have worsened after the earthquake.       
9.7.4. Environmental Impacts of Housing Reconstruction  
Many people discussed with me during my research that though the newly 
constructed houses were seismically safe and better than before in many 
respects, they lacked the thermal qualities of the pre-earthquake houses. 
These people said that they now needed more energy to combat the harsh 
climate. Cutting of trees for heating during winters and increased use of air-
conditioners during summers will definitely have negative impact on already 
fragile natural environment of AJK. A study in this respect will prove useful to 
government to take necessary measures.   
9.8. Conclusion   
Natural disasters act as wakeup calls to warn us about our weaknesses. 
They also provide us the window of opportunity to reduce future disaster 
vulnerability by addressing past mistakes. The 2005 earthquake in Kashmir 
was one such call. It exposed the contradictions and weaknesses within our 
society. The housing reconstruction programme was able to “convert the 
adversity into opportunity” by replacing more than 85% poor quality housing 
stock with safe and better quality housing. Unfortunately, that window of 
opportunity could not be utilized by the government for the reorientation of 
the development paradigm and sustainability of safe construction practices.   
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EPILOGUE  
 
Everybody has their own future planning…. Before the earthquake I too had 
so many plans for my future; I wanted to get higher education and be 
something. The biggest ‘bad affect’ of the earthquake was that all my plans 
were shattered by the earthquake and I could not shape my life towards my 
plans. The earthquake took away five years of my life; I had to spend these 
years in pursuit of mundane things of life instead of realizing my dreams. I 
had to sail according to time and couldn’t utilize the time according to my 
aspirations.  
(Sajjad, a young victim of the earthquake in Urban Bagh) 
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ANNEXURES  
 
Annex-1: Comparison of Compensation Packages. 
 
Property/Nature of damage 
Amount of Compensation (PKR) 
Before 
Earthquake 
Earthquake 2005 
After 
Earthquake 
Pakka 
House 
(i) Completely 
damaged 
(ii) Partially 
damaged 
20,000 
 
10,000 
  
175,000 
 
75,000 
25,000 
 
15,000 
Kacha 
House 
(i) Completely 
damaged 
(ii) Partially 
damaged 
10,000 
 
   5,000 
175,000 
 
  75,000 
15,000 
 
10,000 
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Annex-2: Earthquake 2005 damages in AJ&K 
Sector Damages 
Est. Cost 
(PKR in 
billions) 
Education 
Education institutions: 2792 including 1702 primary 
schools,174 mosque schools, 570 middle, 296 high/ 
higher secondary schools, 23  inter, 14 degree 
colleges,6 post graduate colleges & 2 university 
campuses 
28.239 
Transport & 
Communication 
Roads: 810 km 
Bridges: 2,725 meter 
6.140 
Health 
Health institutions: 176 including 96 BHUs, 47 civil 
dispensaries, 15 RHCs, 4 THQs, 2 CMHs, 2 DHQs, 
Jinnah Dental Hospital, 01 Chest Disease Hospital & 
AIMS MZD 
5.926 
Physical Planning 
& Housing 
Official accommodation: 806 Nos (2050385 sft.) 
 
5.153 
LG&RDD 
Rural access roads: 1809 km, bridges: 18, foot 
bridges: 56, and rural water supply & solid waste: 
1630 
4.988 
Environment  
Forests, landslides and office buildings: 128 
 
1.394 
Livelihood Means of livelihoods 1.577 
Electricity 
Damage to electrical infrastructure and hydroelectric 
generation facilities  
0.944 
 
Others (Industries, Tourism, Agriculture) 9.969 
Total 64.328 
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Annex-3: List of key informants  
 
 
                                       List of Key informants 
a. ERRA 
1. Ex Deputy Chairman, ERRA, Islamabad 
2. Ex Director Housing, ERRA, Islamabad 
b. Multilaterals 
3. Asian Development Bank (Pakistan Country Office, Islamabad Mission) 
4. World Bank (Islamabad Office) 
c. GoAJK 
5. Deputy Commissioner, Bagh 
6. Deputy Commissioner, Muzaffarabad 
7. Deputy Director, Social Welfare & Women Development Department, 
Muzaffarabad 
8. Geology Department University of AJK. 
9. Director,  State Disaster Management  Agency, Muzaffarabad 
d. SERRA 
10. Ex Director General, SERRA Muzaffarabad  
11. Ex Director (Housing) SERRA, Muzaffarabad 
12. Director (M&E) SERRA, Muzaffarabad 
13. Director Social Protection/Donors & Sponsors, SERRA 
14. Housing data resource centre,  SERRA Muzaffarabad 
15. Ex-Chairman, Assistance & Inspection Team 
16. Ex-Chairman, of Village Reconstruction Committee 
17. Ex-Chairman, Assistance & Inspection Team 
e. Local government 
18. Administrator, Municipal Corporation Muzaffarabad 
19. Chairman, Development Authority Muzaffarabad 
20. Chairman, Bagh Development Authority 
21. Administrator, Municipal Corporation Bagh 
22. Director Estate, Development Authority Muzaffarabad 
23. Deputy Director Building Control, Municipal Corporation Muzaffarabad 
24. Secretary, Municipal Corporation Muzaffarabad 
25. Municipal Magistrate, Municipal Corporation Muzaffarabad 
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f. Civil society 
1. Member of AJK Legislative Assembly, Muzaffarabad 
2. Chairman, Muzaffarabad City Development Foundation  
3. Correspondent, The Daily Dawn 
4. Chief Editor, The Daily Khabernama, Muzaffarabad 
5. Freelance journalist, Muzaffarabad 
6. Imam of mosque in rural Muzaffarabad 
g. International Organizations  
7. Ex-Employee of UN-Habitat, Muzaffarabad 
8. Ex-Employee UN-Habitat, Muzaffarabad 
h. Business 
9. Mason in Muzaffarabad city 
10. Architect in Muzaffarabad city 
11. Vice President, Nespak Islamabad 
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Annex-4: Consent form for interviews  
 
CONSENT FORM FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
PhD Project: Pakistan Earthquake-2005: Private Housing Reconstruction in Azad   Jammu 
& Kashmir, Pakistan – A Study of “Owner-driven approach” 
I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate): 
1. I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in 
the Information Sheet dated ________________. 
 
2. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and my 
participation. 
 
3. I voluntarily agree to participate in the project.  
4. I understand I can withdraw at any time without giving reasons and that I will 
not be penalised for withdrawing nor will I be questioned on why I have 
withdrawn. 
 
5. The procedures regarding confidentiality have been clearly explained (e.g. use 
of names, pseudonyms, anonymisation of data, etc.) to me. 
 
6. If applicable, separate terms of consent for interviews, audio, video or other 
forms of data collection have been explained and provided to me. 
 
7. The use of the data in research, publications, sharing and archiving has been 
explained to me. 
 
8. I understand that other researchers will have access to this data only if they 
agree to preserve the confidentiality of the data and if they agree to the terms I 
have specified in this form. 
 
9. Select only one of the following: 
 I would like my name used and understand what I have said or written 
as part of this study will be used in reports, publications and other 
research outputs so that anything I have contributed to this project can 
be recognised.  
 I do not want my name used in this project.                              
 
 
10. I, along with the Researcher, agree to sign and date this informed consent 
form.  
 
 
Participant:   
__________________ ____________________ ________________ 
Name of Participant  Signature    Date 
Researcher: 
____________________     ____________________      _______________ 
Name of Researcher  Signature    Date 
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Annex-5: House damage assessment form 
 
 
 
 
338 
 
Annex-6: Land use plan for Muzaffarabad city  
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Annex-7: Master Plan of Rawalakot city  
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Annex-8a: ERRA’s guidelines for Dhajji-dewari construction. 
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Annex-8b: ERRA’s guidelines for Dhajji-dewari construction. 
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Annex-9a: ERRA’s guidelines for seismic resistant construction.  
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Annex-9b: ERRA’s guidelines for seismic resistant construction.  
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Annex-9c: ERRA’s guidelines for seismic resistant construction.  
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Annex-10: Landless Policy poster.  
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Annex-11: Social mobilization pamphlet.
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Annex-12: Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). 
 
 
 
  
349 
 
Annex-13: Survey questionnaire form. 
Pakistan Earthquake-2005: Private Housing Reconstruction in Azad Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistan - A Study of 
"Owner-driven reconstruction" 
 
 
 
 
      
 
  
           
           
           
 
Household Code    
 
       
 
Name of person 
interviewed   
     
 
           
 
Address 
  
   
 
Relation to household 
head 
  
MU-001 MU-026 MR-01 MR-026 BU-01 BU-26 BR-01 BR-26 
 
Interview date   MU-002 MU-027 MR-02 MR-027 BU-02 BU-27 BR-02 BR-27 
 
Interviewer: 
MU-003 MU-028 MR-03 MR-028 BU-03 BU-28 BR-03 BR-28 
 
MU-004 MU-029 MR-04 MR-029 BU-04 BU-29 BR-04 BR-29 
 
Do you agree for semi-
structured interview in 
future? 
Yes / No 
MU-005 MU-030 MR-05 MR-030 BU-05 BU-30 BR-05 BR-30 
 
MU-006 MU-031 MR-06 MR-031 BU-06 BU-31 BR-06 BR-31 
 
Phone No: 
MU-007 MU-032 MR-07 MR-032 BU-07 BU-32 BR-07 BR-32 
 
MU-008 MU-033 MR-08 MR-033 BU-08 BU-33 BR-08 BR-33 
 
    MU-009 MU-034 MR-09 MR-034 BU-09 BU-34 BR-09 BR-34 
 
 
 
MU-010 MU-035 MR-10 MR-035 BU-10 BU-35 BR-10 BR-35 
  
 
MU-011 MU-036 MR-11 MR-036 BU-11 BU-36 BR-11 BR-36 
   
MU-012 MU-037 MR-12 MR-037 BU-12 BU-37 BR-12 BR-37 
   
MU-013 MU-038 MR-13 MR-038 BU-13 BU-38 BR-13 BR-38 
Household code (below) 
Circle the code of the household you 
are interviewing here then transfer 
the code to the Questionnaire code 
above (follow the arrows). 
MU: Muzaffarabad Urban 
MR: Muzaffarabad Rural 
BU: Bagh Urban 
BR: Bagh Rural 
PLEASE READ THIS CAREFULLY 
The person to be interviewed is preferably the HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD. If he/she is not 
available, choose a 'principal respondent' to answer the questions in place of the HOUSEHOLD 
HEAD. The person selected must be above 18 years age and a member of the household who is 
able to give information on the other household members. 
WHO IS THE HEAD OF THE 
HOUSEHOLD? 
The head of the household 
is the person who received 
the Housing Cash Grant 
from the government and 
signed the MoU with the 
AI Team. 
RELATIONSHIP TO HOUSEHOLD HEAD 
Head.................................................1 
Wife/husband…................................2 
Daughter/Son...................................3 
Son/daughter-in-law........................4 
Grandchild........................................5 
Father or mother..............................6 
Sister or brother...............................7 
Grandfather/grandmother...............8 
Niece/nephew..................................9 
Other relative.................................10 
Adopted/step child.........................11 
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MU-014 MU-039 MR-14 MR-039 BU-14 BU-39 BR-14 BR-39 
   
MU-015 MU-040 MR-15 MR-040 BU-15 BU-40 BR-15 BR-40 
   
MU-016 MU-041 MR-16 MR-041 BU-16 BU-41 BR-16 BR-41 
   
MU-017 MU-042 MR-17 MR-042 BU-17 BU-42 BR-17 BR-42 
   
MU-018 MU-043 MR-18 MR-043 BU-18 BU-43 BR-18 BR-43 
   
MU-019 MU-044 MR-19 MR-044 BU-19 BU-44 BR-19 BR-44 
   
MU-020 MU-045 MR-20 MR-045 BU-20 BU-45 BR-20 BR-45 
   
MU-021 MU-046 MR-21 MR-046 BU-21 BU-46 BR-21 BR-46 
   
MU-022 MU-047 MR-22 MR-047 BU-22 BU-47 BR-22 BR-47 
   
MU-023 MU-048 MR-23 MR-048 BU-23 BU-48 BR-23 BR-48 
   
MU-024 MU-049 MR-24 MR-049 BU-24 BU-49 BR-24 BR-49 
   
MU-025 MU-050 MR-25 MR-050 BU-25 BU-50 BR-25 BR-50 
SECTION 1: STATUS OF THE HOUSEHOLD BEFORE 2005 EARTHQUAKE        (Note: Please clearly 
explain the stage) 
1.1 
Who was the head of the household  before the 
earthquake? (Please write number)   
 
 
1.2 Age of the head at the time of earthquake.   
 
1.3 Was the land owned by the household? Yes  No 
 
1.4 If yes who owned the land? (Please write number)      
 
1.5 
What was the size of 
the house? 
  Rooms:                Kitchen:             
Toilet/Bath: 
 
1.6 
Did the household live as a joint family before the 
earthquake? 
Yes / 
No       
      
1.7 
If Yes, how many families lived in the 
household? 
  
      
      
1.8  How many people lived in the house? 
  
 
      
      
Head. . . . . . . . . 1 
Wife. . . . . . . . . .2 
Husband. . . . . . 3 
Father. . . . . . . . 4 
Mother. . . . . . . .5 
Grandfather. . . .6 
Grandmother. . .7 
351 
 
1.9 
What type of 
construction the 
house was? 
Kacha:                                        
with mud roof 
with CGI roof. 
 
 
    Pukka (stone):                            
with RCC roof 
with CGI roof. 
      Pukka (block):                            
with RCC roof 
with CGI roof. 
      Pukka (brick):                             
with RCC roof 
with CGI roof. 
      Dhajji.                                                              
│Other. 
      
1.20 
What facilities did the household have 
before the earthquake? 
Electric
ity 
Yes / 
No 
 
 
    
Toilet 
Yes / 
No 
 
     
PWS 
Yes / 
No 
      
Phone 
Yes / 
No 
      
RWH 
Yes / 
No 
      
1.21 
What were the 
livelihood sources of 
the household before 
2005 earthquake. 
(Please mention in 
order of volume) 
1 2 
3 4 
1.22 
What was the 
financial condition of 
the household before 
the 2005 earthquake? 
(Please mark the 
relevant) 
1. Very poor 2. Poor 3. Moderate but unstable 
4. Moderate and 
stable 
5. Strong 6. Well off 
1.23 
Was the household ever damaged by any  disaster 
before the 2005 earthquake? 
Yes / 
No 
            
      
PWS: Piped Water 
Supply 
RWH: Rain Water 
Harvesting. 
CGI: Corrugated Iron Sheet 
RCC: Re-enforced Concrete 
Cement. 
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1.24 If Yes, when and how?  
  
      
            1.25 Was any kind of government assistance provided 
for the reconstruction of the damaged house? 
Yes / 
No       
      1.26 If yes, what kind of assistance was provided?    
            
(a) Financial (Please write amount in Rupees) 
  
      
(b) 
Technical, e.g. building 
design, inspection team 
(Please briefly describe) 
  
(c ) 
Social Protection, e.g. 
rights of the women, 
elderly, orphans, 
minorities, poor etc. 
(Please briefly describe)   
SECTION 1 (Contd): STATUS OF THE HOUSEHOLD BEFORE 2005 EARTHQUAKE 
(d) 
Training (Please briefly 
describe) 
  
(e ) 
Community involvement, 
e.g. Village 
Reconstruction 
Committees (Please 
briefly describe)   
1.27 
 Did any kind of government committee visit the 
household to assess the damage?   
          
Yes / No 
    
  
1.28 
Did you have any idea that the area was in 
the earthquake zone? 
            Yes / No 
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1.29 
Does the household know anything about any major earthquake in 
area in the past?  
      
Yes / No 
  
  
1.30 If yes which was it?    
1.31 
Did you have any knowledge of earthquake resistant building techniques 
before 2005? 
    Yes / No 
1.32 
Were any earthquake resistant techniques used in the 
construction of the damaged house?    
  Yes / No 
1.33 If yes, please specify.    
1.34 
What factors in your 
opinion were 
responsible for 
damage to the 
household?              
(Please specify in 
order of merit) 
1 2 
3 4 
5 6 
Section 2: Earthquake 2005     (Please clearly explain that this is a new section and deals with the 
earthquake) 
2.0 Was there any warning of the earthquake? 
     
Yes / No 
2.1 Did anybody die in your household due to the earthquake? If yes how many?   
2.2 
How many people were injured in your 
household due to the earthquake? 
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2.3 How quickly were services restored? (In 
number of days)             
 
  
(a)    Electricity                                                                             1. in the community: 2. in the household:  
(b)   Water Supply 1. in the community: 2. in the household:  
(c)     Road 1. in the community: 2. in the household:  
(d)   Phone 1. in the community: 2. in the household:  
  
(e )  Education 1. in the community: 2. in the household:  
2.4 
Where did the household live immediately 
after the earthquake? 
      
  
  (a)   Government camp (Please specify name) 
  
(b)   Friends or relatives (Please specify place) 
  
(c )  Rented accommodation (Please specify 
place)   
  
(d)   In the same house (Please specify the 
arrangement e.g. tent, shelter etc)   
2.5 
For how many days did they stay in the 
new place? 
  
2.6 
If the household shifted to other place, how many members 
stayed back in the damaged house?    
2.7 
How soon did the patwari visit the household after 
the earthquake?    
2.8 
How many days after the earthquake the 
damage survey was done?    
2.9 
What help was provided to the household 
by anyone after the earthquake? 
Food 
Items 
Blankets Warm Clothes 
Household 
items 
Medicines 
2.10 
When did the household receive the Rs. 
25,000 grant?    
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2.11 
Did the household receive compensation 
for the dead and injured? 
      
Yes / No 
2.12 
Did you have a bank account before the 
earthquake? 
            
Yes / No 
2.13 
How much are you satisfied with the relief 
work? 
Not satisfied Less satisfied 
Fairly 
satisfied 
Highly 
satisfied 
2.14 
Did the household receive any shelter 
material? 
Yes No 
     
  
2.15 If yes, what material was received? Tents Shelter CGI Sheets 
Other material (Please specify) 
2.16 Which organisation provided the material? 
Government International NGO National NGO 
Private 
Individual 
Other (Please Specify):  
2.17 
What were the main worries/Challenges of 
the household after the earthquake? 
1 2 
3 4 
2.18 
Did the household spent any money form 
the housing subsidy on renting a house? If 
yes, how much?    
     
Section 3: After the Earthquake 2005                         (Please explain that this sections is about after 
the earthquake) 
3.0 
Did the government survey team visit the 
household to assess the damage to house? 
Yes No 
    
  
3.1 What was the nature of damage? Completely Damaged Partially 
Damaged 
Minor 
Damage 
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3.2 
How much compensation was given by the 
government? 
Rs. 
   
  
3.3 Are you satisfied with your damage category? Yes No 
    
  
3.4 When did you start the construction work?   
3.5 
Did the government survey team visit the 
household to at every stage of construction? 
Yes No 
    
  
3.6 Did the household find these visits helpful?  Yes No 
    
  
3.7 
Please explain 
reason. 
  
3.8 
What type of construction is the new 
house after reconstruction?  
Pukka (stone) with RCC 
roof 
Pukka (block) with CGI 
Sheet roof 
Dhajji 
Pukka (brick) with RCC 
roof 
Pukka (brick) with CGI Sheet roof 
3.8 What is the size of the house? Rooms  Kitchen Toilet/Bath 
3.9 What facilities the new house has? Electricity Road Toilet Piped Water 
Supply 
Rain Water 
Harvesting 
3.10 How long did it take to complete the construction?  
  
3.11 
Was the government compensation enough for construction? If not 
how much money did the household add?    
3.12 How much of this is the foreign remittance? 
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3.13 
How does the household feel about the 
new house? 
Very 
Unhappy 
Unhappy Satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
Happy Very happy 
3.14 
Who is the head of the household after the 
construction of new house? (Please refer 
to Page 2 for reference)   
Age: 
3.15 
Who owns the land after the earthquake?  
(Please refer to Page 2 for reference)   
Age: 
3.15 Explain reasons.  
  
3.16 
How much safe you feel the house is in 
case of any future earthquake? 
Not Safe Safe Very Safe Not Sure 
3.17 Explain reasons.  
  
3.18 
What is economic condition of the 
household now after the earthquake?  
Very 
Poor  
Poor Moderate but unstable Moderate but stable 
Strong Well Off           
Section 3 (Contd): After the Earthquake 2005 
3.18 
What are your main 
worries for future? 
(Please specify in 
1 2 
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order of priority) 
3 4 
3.19 
From where the household expects to get 
help in case of future disaster situation? 
(Please mark the relevant, may mark more 
than one) 
Government NGOs UN Relatives 
Private 
Individuals 
Army Self-help Not Sure 
3.20 
Did the household experience any other disaster situation after the 8th October 2005 
earthquake? 
Yes No  
3.21 
If yes, how? What 
kind of help did the 
household get and 
from which agency?  
  
3.22 
How much the household was satisfied 
with this help? 
Worse than 2005 earthquake. Equal to 2005 earthquake. 
Better than 2005 earthquake. Not Sure. 
3.23 
Did the household use the Complaint 
Redressal System? 
Yes No 
      
3.24 If yes, how do you rate your experience?  Worst Bad Satisfactory Good 
Very 
Good 
Not Sure 
3.25 
Do you have any experience of complaint 
redressal mechanism in the past? 
Yes No 
      
3.26 
If yes, how do you rate 2005 experience 
with your past experience?  
Worse than 2005 earthquake. Equal to 2005 earthquake. 
Better than 2005 earthquake. Not Sure. 
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3.27 
Do you recommend the housing reconstruction approach of 2005 housing approach 
in case of a future disaster? 
Yes No 
  
3.28 
How do you feel the status of your 
household 8 years after the earthquake? 
Worse than before 2005 
earthquake. 
Equal to 2005 earthquake. 
Better than before 2005 earthquake. Not Sure. 
Section 4: Enumerator's Notes 
4.0 
How far is the 
household from the 
road? 
  
Interview started at:                                                                     
  
  
 Interview ended at: 
  
4.1 Briefly describe the surroundings of the area. 
    
        
  
    
        
  
4.2 Briefly describe the household and its assets. 
                      
                      
4.3 
Give your observations about the interview (e.g. how many people were present, how many talked, their 
behaviour, did the women also participate, what were their feelings while talking about the earthquake and 
afterwards etc.). 
 
